The Principles of War - Lessons from Military History on Strategy, Tactics, Doctrine and Leadership.

Our guest on the podast today is BRIG Ulf Henricsson from the Swedish Army.  He was the commander of Nordbat 2, which was recognised as one of the most successful units that where committed to UNPROFOR for the peacekeeing effort in Bosnia.  I first read about Nordbat 2 in an Article on Strategy Bridge. We start with the discussion about how Mission Command has been used in the Swedish Army, and how it is taught within the Swedish Army, including the way that Mission Command is used in barracks.  We discuss the composition of Nordbat 2.  The composition is the start of the success of Nordbat 2 and the composition was driven by the Mision Analysis that was conducted. Of the 1,300 members of Nordbat 2, around 1,000 were reservists who had volunteered for service in Bosnia.  The Mission is a critical part of Mission Command, including the intent, so we look at explicit and implied tasks in the mission that was given.  He found that within Bosnia, the discussion about the mission was a lot easier than the discussions between countries. This leads to a discussion about the Rules of Engagement and how they were used.  BRIG Henricsson has a relatively free interpretation of the rules of engagement with that interpretation devolved down the chain of command. We discuss some of the examples of Mission Command that lead to the success of Nordbat 2, including the incident at Stupni Do.   The use of Mission Command and robust peacekeeping lead to a reputation that assisted Nordbat 2 in the accomplishment of their mission. We look at Mission Analysis and how it lead to a composition for Nordbat 2 that set some of the conditions for success.  Another component was the rules of engagement that were provided by nations providing troops to UNPROFOR.  The RoE and the interpretation of the RoE was often manipulated by warring forces and lead to some units being ineffective in their role. BRIG Henriccson discusses support he received from his Commander in Bosnia, and he also discusses the risks that he ran with the use of Mission Command.  We finish with a look at some of the reasons that Mission Command is difficult to practice and what some of the conditions are required for the successful use of Mission Command. He finishes off with his advice for commanders today on how to use Mission Command to enhance your chances of mission success. Some questions that are raised are: Are some societies better placed to enact Mission Command? How often is there a clear intent in orders that you receive? Is their a difference between the employment of Mission Command in barracks vs on Operation or Exercise?    

We continue our examination of the Battle of Long Tan with Dave Sabben.  12 Pl has returned to the D Coy position, with some of the survivors of 11 Pl and the Coy prepares to receive the next assault. BRIG Jackson is faced with the dilemma of trying to divine the true intentions of the enemy.  Is it a diversion in preparation for a move against the Task Force base, or is it an attempt to destroy a Coy outside the base. B Coy is ordered to return to the D Coy location and 10 APCs are loaded with troops from A Coy at Nui Dat and dispatched to reinforce the D Coy position. 6 RAR CO, LT COL Townsend recalls the APCs because he wants to go out with the APCs.  How does LT Roberts respond to a call to return for the CO, when he knows that D Coy is in a critical situation with low ammunition. At 18:30 what is enabling the Coy to survive in the face of ongoing assaults?  What air support was available, how was it used and how effective was it? The enemy starts to mass and commences further assaults against the position.  The pace of the assaults increases and the troops don’t have enough time to fully reload their magazines.  The sun has set and it is becoming increasingly dark. At 18:55 increase numbers of waves assault the position, around the perimeter. Troops, controlled by whistle blasts walking in firing from the hips.  It is now dark and the only illumination available to the defenders is the flashes from the artillery.  Check out the show notes for the podcast for images and more details for this and other podcast episodes. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook. If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

For an information operation that is fought of Facebook, how do you identify the Avenues of Approach? We use OCOKA to conduct the terrain analysis for Information Analysis.  We look to orientate everyone to the human terrain in an information operation that is conducted using social media. Observation and Fields of Fire:  Observation is no longer blocked by terrain nor limited by range.  The Internet Research Agency is located in Russia, but they are able to conduct operations as if they were based in Washington DC.  Tools like Twitterfall.  We look at spearfishing email attacks.  Facebook has tools inbuilt to enable adjusting the fall of shot for each of the posts that you are using.  Cover and Concealment:  In a Social Media war, cover comes from the privacy settings.  Cover is asymmetric in a Social Media war.  We compare Op Tidal Wave 2, a conventional propaganda campaign with leaflet drops, compared to how it could be conducted with Social Media. Obstacles:  We look at culture and language – grammar in particular.  These are the real barriers for operations conducted on Social Media.    Key and Decisive Terrain:  The concept of key terrain is fundamentally changed when operations move onto social media.  We compare the 228 massacre in Taiwan and the Key Terrain there with disintermediation that social media creates. Avenues of Approach:  Traditionally the enemy is canalised into an engagement area, before they can reach their objective.  Social Media war can strike directly at civilians in a target country.  There is no physical terrain to defend.  The avenues of approach now depend on the target demographic – Linkedin, vKontact, Facebook or Snapchat.  We briefly discuss the evolution of avenues of approach for information operations.  This concludes the ground brief for social media operations.  Are there any questions? Check out the show notes for the podcast for images and more details for this and other podcast episodes. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook. If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

We look at some of the actions that were used in an attempt to influence the US democratic system through the use of social media.  Using the military to conduct regime change is extremely expensive in terms of blood and treasure - we look at some of the measures that can be used with non-kinetic means to create regime change.  We look at the use of Social media from the point of view of how marketers use social media, because Social Media Warfare is often about using marketing tools to sell an idea, rather than more conventional uses for Social Media. To win the 100 victories in 100 battles is not the acme of skill, but to subdue the enemy without fight is the acme of skill.  If this is the case, then the use of Social Media to achieve regime change would definitely qualify as the acme of skill. We compare kinetic strikes above the detection threshold with non-kinetic strike below the detection threshold.  We also look at an example of a pre-emptive strike to achieve regime change before a state has become an enemy of the state.  The pre-emptive strike starts the war before the enemy has a chance to prepare for war, which is important if you believe that if you find yourself in a fair fight, then you have done something wrong. Kinetic strikes are by their very nature above the detection threshold.  Non-kinetic means have a much lower signature, and therefore could be below the detection threshold.  We look at FDR’s speech following the strike on Pearl Harbour.  What if there are now tools to allow regime change that does not require the use of military force? Check out the show notes for the podcast for images and more details for this and other podcast episodes. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook. If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

This episode of the podcast sees the transition from the encounter battle through to D Coy moving to being completely on the defensive.  11 Pl becomes decisively engaged, with enemy flanking to the north whilst being engaged by 3 MGs from the front.  As 11 Pl starts the call for fire, MAJ Smith calls for reinforcements in order to regain the initiative.  As the tempo of the artillery support increases, the audience at the Little Patty concert moves away to support the Coy in contact. 10 Pl moves towards the foot hills to the north, observing a force attempting to flank 11 Pl.  The Task Force initially refuses to reinforce the NZ 161 Bty, requiring time consuming switching between targets and adjustment.  On later is 161 reinforced with 2 further batteries. 2LT Dave Sabbens 12 Pl detaches a section to provide security to CHQ and moves off 2 up to attempt to marry up with 11 Pl.  By now 2 hours into the battle, each Pl has a bty in support.  10 Pl is down to 50% ammunition and requests and ammo resupply.  This is initially refused.  The pilots who had bought up Little Patty to Nui Dat. The US resupply would be 30 minutes which could be too late.  Moral and physical courage is shown by the RAAF pilots as they ignore restrictions from Canberra about flying into contact in order to provide supply to the troops in contact. The situation is so desperate that SGT Bob Buick, the PL SGT in 11 Pl calls in artillery on his on position.  The FO refuses to bring the artillery onto their position, but brings the rounds in as close as possible. 11 Pl moves back marry up with 12 Pl and they commence to move back to CHQ. Check out the show notes for the podcast for images and more details for this and other podcast episodes. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook. If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

We continue our discussion with Dave Sabben, picking in the in the second half of July. The base was being heavily reconnoitered.  We discuss the preparation for the defences at Nui Dat.  Dave suggests that Canberra believed that the base was considered to be safe and unlikely to be attacked. The South Vietnamese intelligence was treated as suspect, as was the US intelligence because a lot of it was sourced from the South Vietnamese. A radio intercept unit was located at Nui Dat.  They were tracking the morse code communications.  With direction finding, the sigint was providing some good intelligence showing a large force moving towards the east of Nui Dat 2.  The shelling on the 17th of August by mortars, RCLs and at least one artillery piece.  B Coy was sent to locate the location of the mortar base plates and attempt to track down the force responsible.  Tracking the enemy was laborious, in dangerous terrain.  B Coy remained out on the 17th and D Coy was sent to relieve them. D Coy finds bullock tracks and blood stains leading into the rubber plantation.  The tracks split and 10 Pl follows one and 11 Pl follows the second with 12 Pl bringing up the rear. An minor obstacle crossing drill is conducted by the Coy as they come across a cattle fence.  Sgt Bob Buick, the Pl SGT for 11 Pl sees 6 - 7 enemy soldiers with slung AK-47s, completely non tac.  He opens fire with his Armalite, hitting at least one.  Six 6 vs a platoon with 30 troops is a good troop ratio orders Maj Smith gives LT Sharp to follow up the enemy.  Shortly, they are engaged by a force that looks like another Pl, so the Coy needs to to reinforce 11 Pl. Check out the show notes for the podcast for images and more details for this and other podcast episodes. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook. If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

We discuss the terrain in Phuoc Tuy, including Long Tan and the defensive base at Nui Dat. We discuss the demarcation in responsibility between the ARVN and the Australian troops and the impact of ARVN having responsibility for dealing with the roads and villages.  We also discuss the strategic hamlet program and the impact of resettling the population out of Long Tan village and the creation of a free Fire zone in the area.  How did the resettlement of villagers impact their lives? The intent for the establishment of 1 ATF was to, "Help stop the fighting the South."  1 ATF turned this into "we will dominate Phuoc Tuy province in order to help stop the fighting in the South." The plan was to secure the base and then expand the influence out from around the base and disrupt VC operating in the bush.  We discuss the impact of Lina Alpha, the 5km line out from Nui Dat that was to act as an exclusion zone,but but the time of Long Tan, there was 1 significant issue with it - we talk about the road that runs through the defensive perimeter and how the VC could conduct recon on the suspected minefields.  The road was used to access Binh Ba in the north.  This sets the scene our next Episode - The Encounter Battle. Check out the show notes for the podcast for images and more details for this and other podcast episodes. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook. If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

Dave Sabben describes his experience when he joins D Coy, 6 RAR.  Dave makes an important point, many of the officers and SNCOs were newly promoted into their roles, a function of the rapid expansion of the Army. Fifty percent of the diggers in Delta were National Servicemen. In March 1966, 6 RAR is notified that they will be going to Vietnam.  Delta left in early July, The first birthday of 6 RAR was the 6th of June in 1966 and celebrated it's first birthday on the beach of Vung Tau.  Dave and the rest of Delta Coy joined the battalion on the next day.  Training was conducted in air mobile operations and weapons training intensified.  Second hand Armalites were issued to replace the Owen guns.  The Owen gun was designed in 1939, The building of the base at Nui Dat was commenced by 5 RAR in May.  6 RAR was deployed quickly to the base after intelligence suggested that an attack was being planned for the poorly defended base at Nui Dat. We look at the creation of 1 Australian Task Force and look at the reasons behind it's placement in Phuoc Tuy Province. The name Nui Dat, comes from the name of one of the terrain features, meaning small hill. We discuss the importance of the Vung Tau. Check out the show notes for the podcast for images and more details for this and other podcast episodes. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook. If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

This lecture is presented by Dr Rhys Crawley, the author of Climax at Gallipoli. Dr Crawley compares artillery at Gallipoli with the employment of artillery in 1915 on the Western Front.  Artillery was still seen as an accessory for the artillery, rather than as a separate arms distinct from the infantry. What lessons where learnt at the Battle of Neuve Chappelle and how were those lessons applied at Gallipoli? We look at the concentration of artillery at Gallipoli and compare it to the Western Front. We look at troop / gun ratios and the actual guns that were deployed to Gallipoli.  What was the quality like of the guns that were used? How many men were required to move the guns?  The average incline was 9% and in some places it was twice that.  This significantly decreased the mobility of the guns and limited the flexibility in the employments of the guns. Check out the show notes for the podcast for images and more details for this and other podcast episodes. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook. If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

We look at the Scheyville Experience.  This is important because it highlights the process required to train junior officers to be able to lead soldiers into combat and to win. Scheyville had 1883  graduates, 1690 were National Serviceman,  355 served in Vietnam, and 8 gave there lives in Vietnam.  We look at the syllabus at OTU Scheyville, and we talk to Dave Sabben about his experience at Scheyville, from his Officer Selection Board, through to the training that he received at Scheyville. What was the success rate of those volunteering to be officers?  What was the training like?  How did they distill the concept of Leadership into the officer cadets?  Given Dave's experience in Vietnam, how would he have improved it? In just 22 weeks, Dave Sabben graduated from OTU Scheyville.  We look at his recollections of the training and how he felt prepared to graduate as a Platoon Commander in 6 RAR. Check out the show notes for the podcast for images and more details for this and other podcast episodes. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook. If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.