Power Structuralism in Ancient Ontologies

Jessica Wilson from the University of Toronto discusses a determinable-based account of metaphysical indeterminacy, challenging traditional views on determinables and offering fresh insights. Topics include perspective-relative determinations, undetermined determinables, and applications to quantum superpositions.

Berman (St Louis Univ.) lays out and defends a platonic explanation of non-modal and modal truths using Forms as their truthmakers. He argues that this platonic theory is parsimonious, naturalistic, and ontologically serious.

Kistler (Sorbonne) introduces a distinction between powers and dispositions: A 'multi-track disposition' manifests itself in different ways Mi in different triggering circumstances Ti.

Bird (Bristol) warns against overextending the case for a powers ontology, arguing that it cannot answer typical questions outside fundamental metaphysics, for example concerning the analysis of causal statements.

Mumford (Nottingham) argues that although superior to a stimulus-response model, Martin's mutual manifestation model must be amended to resemble less mereological composition and more causation.

Ladyman (Bristol) explains the recent debates about the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles and results about weak discernibility. He considers their implications for structuralism and the light they shed on ontological dependence.

Van Inwagen (Notre Dame) argues that relational ontologies (denying properties can be constituents of particulars) are preferable to constituent ontologies (holding properties are constituents of the particulars that have them).

Jacobs (St. Louis Univ.) explores the view that between a substance and its power, on one hand, and the result of the substance manifesting its power, there is no relation at all. Thus, causal, relational truths have non-relational ontological grounds.