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Feb 27, 2024 • 46min

3.81 Fall and Rise of China: Russo-Japanese War #8: Stalemate at Shaho and Sandepu

Last time we spoke about the bloody siege of Port Arthur. General Maresuke Nogi lost a lot during the Russo-Japanese War, at Port Arthur it would cost him thousands of young men, his last son and in many ways his soul. The 3rd IJA fought tooth and nail to take each feature one by one, inching closer to the port city. Nogi’s initial strategy to target the east was a terrible failure, costing countless men and nearly his command. When prodded by Baron Kodama to target 203 meter Hill, Nogi’s men had finally found the crux to Port Arthur’s defenses. It was a terrible and bloody ordeal, but once 203 meter hill fell, the 3rd IJA were finally able to deploy their artillery in a position to smash the trapped Russian fleet. Now Port Arthur was back in Japanese hands and all that remained was Mukden. #81 The Russo-Japanese War part 8: A stalemate at Shaho and Sandepu Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Port Arthur had finally fallen and the forces of Kuropatkin were once again on the retreat. Kuropatkin sought to establish defenses at Tiehling as the area was more suitable to make a stand rather than the plains surrounding Mukden. Yet as had become customary, Alexeiev intervened stressing ‘the continued retreat to Tiehling will not prove favorable to the morale of the army’. The Russian forces were completely demoralized and the Hong Huzi became emboldened. The Chinese bandits struck at the fleeing Russian forces, particularly the Cossacks. Japanese officers were directing their efforts, trying to hit train carts full of supplies. Russian soldiers and officers were suffering from dysentery and venereal diseases, many also fell to the bottle. Kuropatkins numerical advantage would see be lost, as General Nogi’s 3rd IJA would soon come join the rest. Tsar Nicholas II decided to form a second Manchurian Army, under the command of General Oscar Casmirovitch Grippenberg. The man was more politician than soldier, he had not seen active service since the Crimean War, and even then only commanded a battalion. At the ripe age of 66, deaf and quite the hypochondriac, he came to Manchuria, and brought with him news of the motherland. St Petersburg was seeing more dissonance, the people were in rapid disorder, the overall feeling was that of revolution. For the Japanese side, they were also licking their wounds. They had lost many men, and to remedy the loss of manpower they created a new ordinance on September 29th raising an additional 46,548 men to replace over 1/6th of their army that had fallen. Marshal Oyama looked to his logistics, preparing for the next engagement and probably did not expect what Kuropatkin did. Kuropatkin suddenly went on the offensive. Kuropatkin sent out these orders ‘I order the Manchurian Army entrusted to my command to attack the enemy in whatever position he may be occupying having as the main object to gain possession of the right bank of the Taitzu river.’ He scheduled an attack to be made on October 5th, shaking the Russian army out of their depression, to see if they could exact vengeance. Grippenberg and his command and not yet arrived to the theater of war when Kuropatkin began his offensive plans. Grippenberg’s army consisted of the 6th and 8th Siberian corps, the 61st infantry division and a division of Don Cossacks. In the meantime, Alexeiev gave Kuropatkin the 6th Siberians. Despite the losses inquired upon his forces, at this time Kuropatkin still held superiority in numbers, with 261 battalions vs Oyama’s 170. At Mukden Kuropatkin had formed a bridgehead. To his south was the Taitzu river, to the east ran the Sha Ho. The railway line ran parallel to the old Mandarin Road. Around the Sha Ho area were hills and west of it many villages. The terrain east of the Mandarin road was mountainous, forcing infantry to be confined to pathways. Kuropatkin divided his forces in two forming western and eastern armies. Behind this were the general reserves, two flanks guards and a rearguard. The western force consisted of the 10th and 17th corps, with 4 regiments of Cossacks led by General Bildering. The Eastern Force consisted of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Siberian corps with a division of Cossacks under the command of Stakelberg. He ordered his army to advance along a 20 mile front through Pienniulupu to Penshihu. Within his reserves were the 4th Siberians and 1st European corps, the 6th Siberians made up the rearguard. The bulk of Kuropatkins front line force was east of the railway, but the west held more favorable ground for artillery and cavalry. The terrain to the east was less favorable for movement, yet Kuropatkin chose here to make his main thrust. Perhaps Kuropatkin planned to surprise the Japanese with such a bold move, yet it would not work. Oyama’s forces had just been reinforced by a cavalry brigade who were occupying a narrow position going from the Coal Mines at Yentai to Santaitzu. Oyama sought to concentrate his forces as much as possible in the hopes an opportunity for an offensive would soon present itself. Oyama placed General Oku’s 2nd IJA on the left, General Nozu’s 4th IJA in the middle and Kuroki’s 1st IJA on the right. Within his reserve was the 12th division, near the right flanks rear. Oyama’s intelligence could not find two Russian corp locations, so he held back 3 Kobi brigades and a field artillery brigade in reserve at Liaoyang. 15 miles northeast in the mountains at Pienniulupu was Umezawa’s Kobi brigade scouting forward. Umezawa’s force were having a difficult time because of faulty maps. Kuropatkin was going to use his Western force to launch a holding attack, seeing two corps face off against the 2nd and 4th IJA. The disparity in strength was roughly 45,000 vs 72,000. Meanwhile the eastern force would perform the main assault with over 73, albeit under-strengthed battalions, numbering 50,000 or so. The 1st IJA would be roughly 40,000 strong. The first contact would be made in front of Umezawa’s position. Kuroki was convinced the main Russian assault was about to hit the northern area where Umezawa was, but Oyama was not convinced of this. Kuroki would turn out to be right, one of his patrols came across some documents on a dead Russian officer showcasing Stakelbergs offensive. When Oyama was presented with the evidence he immediately ordered a preemptive attack against the perceived main Russian thrust. Umezawa pulled his brigade out of their position on the 7th of October, moving to Penhsihu. The Russians quickly seized Penhsihu by the 10th securing their right flank as Umezawa was forced to pull back further. Meanwhile the 5th IJA division’s advance was being hampered by a Russian regiment and the 2nd IJA were pushing the 17th corps further back. The Russians formed a new central group consisting of the 4th Siberian corps and a Cossack division led by Mischenko. This was done to plug up the gap created between the western and eastern forces. The Eastern forces were being bogged down heavily due to the mountainous terrain. Their communication line and maps were quite poor. Stakelberg was also being overly cautious in his movements, while Oyama would be quite simplistic in his orders. ‘I desire to drive the enemy at present east of the Mukden highway towards the north east.’ The result was the entire force, excluding the 12th division and Umezawa’s men, advancing 16 miles to a new line from Fengchipu to Kuanlinpu. The goal was to smash the Russian center with the 2nd, Guards, 10th and 5th divisions. The 4th IJA would wheel around the right while the 2nd IJA would attract the attention of the Russian right, drawing their reserves. On the morning of the 11th, the battle swayed back and forth in the mountains and around the villages over the plains. The Russians were having the soldiers go shoulder to shoulder upon features meeting the onslaught of attacks. Wherever it looked like the Japanese might break through, the Russian commanders screamed for reserves to come up. This caused a bit of confusion amongst so many reserve units being called forward. The Japanese used the night to gain momentum, sneaking around while the Russian artillery was less effective. On the night of the 11th, the 4th IJA were to perform their wheeling maneuver seeing the 10th division advance. At 1am the division surged forward with bayonets fixed, each man was wearing a black greatcoat over his khaki uniform. The men were also wearing white armbands, as a previous attack had gone disastrously when neither side could tell friend from foe. Apparently a Japanese commander had given his men orders “Japanese are short, foreigners are tall” it did not go well. The Russians had fortified a village and from its walls fired upon the incoming Japanese. The Japanese grabbed volunteers to breach the wall, 200 men set off for a “Kesshitai” known in english as forlorn hope attack. Most of the groups leaders were shot or bayoneted, but their sheer weight won the night. In one of the village houses the Japanese found a regimental commander. He was severely wounded and could hardly stand, but he refused to surrender. The Japanese night attack was a attempt to form a wedge between the Western force and central group, it achieved its objective at the cost of 60 officers and 1250 casualties. Most of these were of the 5th IJA division whose job was to wheel around the heart of the enemy’s position. That night Stakelberg ordered his men to attempt a breach of the Japanese lines. Their first effort was directed at the Taling Pass, but they were easily swept aside as the Japanese had anticipated the attack. A second attempt was made and succeeded somewhat, but the Japanese were quick to counter attack. The Japanese seized the position back and the Russians were calling up more reserves in response. The next day, Kuropatkin lost the initiative to Oyama. Oyama had succeeded in bringing superior numbers to critical points. It was evident the 10th IJA division had suffered tremendous casualties, so the 5th IJA division was brought up. Now the Russian right wing, consisting of the 17th Corps, some 25,000 men would be hit by 3 Japanese divisions totaling 32,000. Until this point, Kuropatkin had not committed 50,000 men and 250 guns of his reserve. The bulk of his 6th siberian and 1st European corps were untasked and the 2nd Siberians were basically stuck in limbo while Kuropatkin and Stakelberg kept a series of long distance messages unable to coordinate properly. Kuropatkin was patiently awaiting reports from Stakelbergs offensive in the east, hoping he would have a breakthrough. However the terrible maps and rough mountainous terrain were hampering all efforts. It was not just the terrain, Stakelberg was not the same officer who began the war in the east. Stakelberg was weary and demoralized. The 2nd cavalry brigade of Prince Kanin, reinforced with 1200 men began a southern advance against Stakelberg. The attack had the element of surprise and forced the cavalry divisions of Samsonov and Liubavin to pull out, exposing Rennenkampf’s infantry along the northern bank of the river. This action would force Stakelberg to order a retreat. In the west, the 17th corps reinforced with a brigade of the 6th corps was exposed to attacks from the 2nd IJA. The 6th corps commander refused to assist. This left the 17th corps to fight it alone and they were severely defeated and forced to withdraw along their front. The 219th regiment, part of the 6th corps had just arrived at the scene and encountered the retreating men of the 139th and 140th regiments. Yet the 219th regiment kept advancing, unsupported by artillery, towards a position then occupied by 6 Japanese battalions and 11 batteries. Such was the communications failure at Sha Ho. The Japanese held their fire as the 219th advancing within 600 yards. The first experience of battle for the 219th would be the combined fire of 66 guns and thousands of rifles. They were blasted to pieces, they quickly routed leaving behind 22 officers and 832 men on the ground. A quarter of the regiment had been lost. The morning of the 13th saw the eastern group retreating. That same day saw the arrived of the 5th Kobi brigade, allowing Oyama to reinforce his depleted 12th division. Meanwhile the Guards division was in serious trouble as Stakelberg had tossed a counter attack their way. Luckily for the Guards, when they pulled back, so did the Russians, they did not pursue them at all. Oyama tossed all his remaining reserves to restore the equilibrium and hoped the added help would allow Kuroki’s 1st IJA to cut off the retreating eastern force. The Russians were gradually forming a full retreat. Bilderings western force found some breathing space as the 2nd IJA were nearing exhaustion. Oyama had no further reserves, the next reinforcements would be the 8th division arriving by train to Liaoyang. The Russian right flank was still holding firm, with their uncommitted guard led by Lt General Dembovski. Had his force of 16 squadrons and 32 guns been tossed into the mixed they perhaps could have severely hurt the 4th IJA division. Oyama then gave out new orders ‘to pursue the enemy as far as the left bank of the Sha river’. On the 14th the demoralized Russians were falling back through a rainy night. Again rain was saving the Russian’s withdrawal. At 7:20am Shahopu was lost by the 10th corps. The 10th corps were trying to hold a southern portion of the Sha river, but were gradually withdrawing. To try and stop them Kuropatkin sent 10 battalions with orders to attack southwards. That night the 10th corps withdrew leaving only 3 points to the south of the river within Russian hands. These were the village of Lamutun, One Tree Hill and Putilov Hill. Meanwhile the 6th corps launched an attack against the 4th IJA division. The attack went unsupported, as other nearby units were in disarray. The Russians advanced into a maelstrom of fire from the Japanese, nearly 2000 men were lost. On the 15th Oyama issued another batch of orders ‘I intend to reform the Japanese armies on the left bank of the Sha Ho, in order to prepare to advance to the line of the Hun Ho.’ At the time, Oyama could not ford the Sha river while the Russians still held positions south of it. That day the Japanese seized Putilov Hill and Lamutun village, while Kuropatkin assembled a reserve nearing 30,000 men in strength. The next day, One Tree Hill was captured as General Gerngross took command of the enormous reserve group. Gerngross was ordered to recapture Putilov and One Tree Hill. These features were not large, nor very steep, sitting just south of the Sha river. At 5pm the Russian unleashed their artillery upon the Japanese occupiers, who quickly withdrew. General Putilov grabbed men to attack the hill that would soon bear his name as General Novikov with 3 regiment of the 1st European corps attacked One Tree Hill and the 36th east siberian rifle regiment would attack the Japanese right rear. Novikov’s men advanced so quickly they caught some of the Japanese still withdrawing at One Tree Hill. This resulted in 4 Japanese companies making a nightly stand upon the hill to give their comrades time to get out. Meanwhile Putilov heard the sounds of battle from One Tree Hill and ordered his men to advance with haste. His force was met by a tremendous volley of gunfire from Japanese rearguards. Yet both features fell back into Russian hands and with it a boost to morale. The price was heavy, the Russians took 3000 casualties, while the Japanese had roughly 1000. Both sides then began to dig in, neither commander had secured his objective and thus the battle fell to stalemate. Winter was coming along as the men built vast trench networks. What has become known as the battle of Sha Ho was quite indecisive. The Russians suffered 41,550 casualties, the Japanese 39,769. In the face of what was somewhat a reversal in the campaign, Tsar Nicholas II recalled Alexeiev to St Petersburg and left Kuropatkin a free hand to plan his next move. Finally rid of the troublesome Alexeiev was on one hand a great thing for Kuropatkin, it was however unfortunately far too late into the war. Kuropatkin was not in a good position and now he could not complain of the divided command issue to the Tsar, the responsibility was his and his alone. Winter was settling in, news of Port Arthur's fall and news of revolutionary fever back home was rampant amongst the troops. The Russians held a 100 mile long defense the Japanese could not outflank, but Kuropatkin knew Nogi’s 3rd IJA were enroute. Trains were carrying men and supplies from Port Arthur. Kuropatkin looked to his cavalry to better the situation “In order to induce the enemy to detach as many men as possible for their line of communications, and so weaken their front, to handicap their supply arrangements, and to stop the rail transport of Nogi’s units to the front, a raid by a mounted force was organised against their line of communications.“ Mischenko was put in charge of a 6000 strong cavalry unit alongside 6 batteries of light guns to perform a raid. His target was to seize Newchwang station where he hoped to achieve two objectives. 1) to destroy a large stockpile of foodstuff there and 2) to destroy a portion of the track between Tashihchiao and Kaiping. On January 12th Mischenkos force approached the main stores depot, normally guarded by just 500 Japanese. His cavalry advanced along the railway as his dragoons began cutting the line behind them. At 4pm a train approached from their rear with 16 trucks each carrying 30 Japanese. The train was coming extremely fast and steamed past them while also firing upon them. The depot was now garrisoned by 1000 Japanese who had well entrenched positions and knew the Russian cavalry were enroute. The mounted Cossacks made 3 charges against the Japanese lines, but could do little without infantry support. The Russian artillery failed to have enough effect and upon mounting casualties, Mischenko was forced to withdraw leaving behind 62 dead and 6 wounded. Meanwhile the dragoons cutting the railway line had no idea their force was defeated and were quickly brushed aside. Thus what could have been a brilliant raid saving the Russians valuable time, was a disaster. By January 18th, Grippenburg had arrived to take command of the 2nd Manchurian Army situated on the right of the Russian defensive line. In the center was the 3rd Manchurian army led by General Kaulbars. To the left was the 1st Manchurian army led by Linievich. Kuropatkin would issue orders 3 days before Russia’s 1905 bloody sunday at the winter palace. ‘Our primary object is to drive the enemy behind the Taitzu River and to inflict on him as much damage as possible.’ Kuropatkin was unleashing a full blown offensive, seeking to hammer the Japanese before Nogi could arrive to tip the scale. Though Mischenko’s raid failed horribly, it did bring Kuropatkin valuable intelligence, indicating Nogi was not yet within the theatre. The intelligence also indicated the Japanese left flank was quite vulnerable. Grippenberg seized the initiative and began massively redeploying units on January 14-16th, this unfortunately fully showcased his intent to the Japanese. Kuropatkin would late write ‘These movements, of course, at once disclosed our intentions, and information soon came in that the enemy had, in their turn, commenced moving their troops westward and fortifying opposite our new dispositions.’ The most southern held position of the Russians was Changtau. Further south were the villages of Haikoutai and Sandepu, roughly 2 miles apart held and fortified by the Japanese. These villages held walls around 3 feet thick surrounded by open plains. The walls had been fitted with gun holes for machine guns that the Japanese made sure had good interlocking arcs of fire. The Russian advance began on the 25th, and the winter weather was dreadful. Grippenbergs army of 75,000 men marched across the frozen Hun river. The 1st Siberian corps of Stakelberg quickly seized Heikoutai, but at a tremendous cost of casualties. Meanwhile over at the left flank’s position at Sandepu, the Japanese had 4 divisions and were attacked by 7 divisions of Grippenberg. There was a state of confusion between the forces of Grippenberg and Kaulbars armies from the offset. Hampered by a lack of maps, literally working with sketches and facing blizzard conditions, Grippenergs 14th division shelled and occupied the neighboring hamlet of Paotaitzu by accident. A false report was soon dispatched to Kuropatkin indicating Sandepu had fallen. When Grippenberg realized his mistake, he ordered his heavy artillery to shell the actual target. His troops were exhausted from the offensive and weather, so Grippenberg gave them the a day's rest on the 27th, but the rest area was literally beside Sandepu, still held by the 5th IJA division. Stakelbergs men in the area were absolutely smashed by the Japanese who quickly attacked them. Stakelberg would lose roughly 6000 men before withdrawing during the night. On the night of the 28th, the bulk of Grippenbergs army was now separated from Kaulbars on either side of Sandepu village. The Russians launched attacks against Sandepu, but failed to make any progress. The Japanese held position was thwarted the two Russian armies ability to cooperate. Soon Kuropatkin learnt what was going on as Grippenberg requested reinforcements to continue his advance. Kuropatkin refused to reinforce Grippenberg and ordered him to pull back greatly irritated by the Grippenbergs insubordination. At the exact same time, Oyama ordered his armies to push the Russians past the Hun River. Thus when Grippenberg began to withdraw he was met with a massive Japanese offensive. Oyama described the action as such “‘We attempted several attack movements but suffered heavily from the enemy’s artillery, and especially from his machine guns, but all the columns continued the attack with all their might. Our forces charging into Heikoutai occupied the place firmly and entirely by half past nine.’” Kuropatkin had thus failed to achieve any of his objectives, the Sandepu debacle had cost him 20,000 casualties, the Japanese suffered 9000 casualties. Over a third of the Russian loses were incurred by Stakelbergs 1st Siberian corps, largely due to the commander refusing to comply with direct orders. As a result Stakelberg was removed from command and by January 30th, Grippenberg was asking to be relieved of command, stating he was gravely ill! Kuropatkin wrote “This action of his set a fatal example both to those under him and to the rest of the army, and was most harmful to all discipline. The opinions, also, that he had expressed to the effect that the campaign was virtually over, and that we should retire to Mukden and Harbin, had a dangerously disturbing effect on our weaker members. It was in the long run more harmful than any single defeat of a portion of our force would have been” As Grippenberg took his leave for St Petersburg, he stopped by Harbin and gave a report to the Novoe Vremya, it was quite a embellished account of what had occurred “Victory was in our hands, and I cannot tell you how anxiously I awaited men and authorisation to advance … On the night of the 29th we retired, carrying away all our wounded men, and even picking up broken bayonets. The men retired unwillingly with tears in their eyes. I decided that it was impossible for me to remain any longer at the front, and the next day I reported myself to General Kuropatkin, asking him to relieve me of my command immediately.” Thus Kuropatkin had finally been rid of the meddlesome Alexeiev, only to be severed with a megalomaniac commander who refused to listen to orders, such as Grippenberg. To make matters worse, Grippenberg, a senior general came back home and leaked such information to the official newspaper during a time in which revolution could break out at any moment. The mention of tens of thousands of Russian soldiers being killed in what was seen as a pointless war, drove the public's outrage further. The Times had this to report “They had been told that they would beat the Japanese as soon as they had them on the plain. After Liaoyang they were told that they would beat the Makaki (leatherskinned dwarfs) as soon as the kaoliang was cut and the little tricksters had to fight in the open. After the Sha Ho they were told that the Japanese could not bear the cold, and that they would never stand their ground in a winter engagement.” By February of 1905 the war had become 1 year old and the Russians had little to show for it. Meanwhile back home nearly 1000 people were dead or wounded from the events of Bloody Sunday. Disorder and looting broke out across St Petersburg. Strikes began to erupt outside the city in places like Batum, Tiflis, Baku, Kovno, Reval, Vilna, Riga, Warsaw and of course Moscow. Over 400,000 Russian workers refused to work in January of 1905 as Tsar Nicholas II attempted appeasing the peoples fever with a Duma. Soon that began to fail, the Tsar resorted to brute force to quell the strike movement. In the next few months an estimated 15,000 people were shot or hanged, 20,000 were beaten up and 45,000 would be sent into exile. The attractive war was adding fuel to the fires of revolution within the Russian Empire. A weak aristocracy was barely holding on to its fledgling empire. The Tsar had initially saw the outbreak of war in the east to be a positive factor that would contribute to a raise of morale amongst the populace of Russia, but it was backfiring tremendously. Of course the revolutionary fever had more to do with other variables than an unpopular war, but what would happen if Russia lost the war? I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. General Grippenberg did not turn out to be a great replacement for Alexeiev. Kuropatkin struggled to toss any offensive he could to break Oyama’s armies before General Nogi’s 3rd IJA arrived at the theatre of war. Now all that remained was Mukden and with it Russia’s hope of holding onto Manchuria.

Jan 1, 2024 • 56min

3.80 Fall and Rise of China: Russo-Japanese War #7: Siege of Port Arthur

Last time we spoke about the battle of Liaoyang. Kuropatkin yet again was forced to fight a battle he did not want to fight. The Russians had just suffered a string of defeats, gradually being pushed further and further north in Manchuria. While Kuropatkin would have liked to pull back and await more reinforcements, Alexeiev sought action. Despite the circumstances, the 3 layered defenses of Liaoyang were formidable, and better yet, the Russians outnumbered the Japanese. Yet Kuropatkin’s intelligence was flawed and under the belief he was outnumbered he acted in such a way that would cause his defeat at the hands of Oyama. Three Japanese divisions worked together to seize key features allowing for the collapse of each Russian defensive layer. Once the Japanese artillery began battering Liaoyang and her railway station it was all but over. Now Kuropatkin’s forces are withdrawing to Mukden and the prize of Port Arthur was for the taking. #80 The Russo-Japanese War part 7: Nogi’s Siege of Port Arthur Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. We just left off with Oyama and his 3 divisions defeating Kuropatkin at Liaoyang, sending the Russians fleeing towards Mukden. Yet while that story was occurring, an entire other battle, a crucial one at that, was occurring at Port Arthur. The last time we spoke about the Liaodong Peninsula, General Maresuke Nogi received the appointment of commander for the 3rd IJA. Nogi’s appointment was a bit of a shock for the other commanders, he had been brought out of three years of retirement for the job. He had played a part in the capture of Port Arthur back in the war of 1894, a battle that cost only 16 of his soldiers. The fight for Port Arthur in 1904 would cost much more than that. Port Arthur had three lines of defense. The old part of the town was surrounded on the landward side by a great ditch. 4000 yards from the town was the old Chinese Wall, strengthened by new forts on multiple parts of it. Northwest and northeast of Port Arthur were a series of fortified hills, such as 203 Meter Hill which overlooked the town and harbor. If this hill was captured, the Japanese could place artillery upon it and destroy the Russian fleet at anchor. This fact was not lost on the Russians, especially not Viceroy admiral Alexeiv who sent a message to Admiral Witgeft on August 7th of 1904 ‘I again reiterate my inflexible determination that you are to take the Squadron out of Port Arthur.’ And so again Witgeft would again try to flee Port Arthur to hook up with the Vladivostok squadron. The fleet departed on August 10th, with the Peresvyet and Retvizan still damaged from shellfire, Retvizan was carrying 400 tons of water through a hole below her waterline. A subordinate pointing out to Witgeft the damaged ships would slow the fleet down, but he replied ‘My orders, are to go to Vladivostok with the whole Squadron, and that I shall do.’ Patrolling Round Island was Admiral Togo’s main battle fleet, with 3 Japanese divisions of 11 cruisers, 17 destroyers and 29 torpedoboats to the east and west of Port Arthur. The Russian fleet were crawling at a snail's pace and Togo was quick to pounce on such a wounded animal. Just before 12:30pm the Japanese began opening fire at 8000 yards. Togo attempted crossing the Russians T and by 1pm both fleets were opposite courses at a range of 10,000 yards. The Russians kept charging in the direction of Vladivostok as the Japanese sped after them cautiously trying not to receive terrible hits. At 4pm the Poltava began to slow down causing the rest of the fleet to also. Mikasa sped on, but was nearly stopped dead by a salvo of 12 inch shells from Poltava. The Japanese began to concentrate fire on Poltava as the Peresvyet landed hits upon Mikasa, Shikishima and Asahi. It looked as if the Russians might have brought doom to Togo. Then at 5:45pm luck hit the Japanese. 2 12 inch shells hit Tsarevitch breaking down her foremast and one smash her conning tower right where admiral Witgeft was standing. All that remained of the admiral was part of his leg, the rest of his staff were blown to pieces. War correspondent Richmond Smith wrote ‘The steel roof of the tower was driven against the man at the wheel, and he was killed and jammed flat against the post with the helm hard over. The roof of the conning tower had to be cut away before the corpse could be cut away and the steering gear liberated.’ The Sevastopol and Peresvyet narrowly avoided running into Tsarevitch. Then the transfer of command signal was hoisted above the flagship, Prince Ukhtomski aboard Peresvyet hoisted his signal ordered the fleet to follow him. The Russians turned around to flee back to Port Arthur. The Japanese continued their chase, but Togo feared losing his precious battleships and elected to send the destroyers to chase the tails of the Russians. Despite their best efforts, not a single Russian ship was sunk, in what became known as the battle of the yellow sea. The morning of August 11th saw 5 battleships, 1 cruiser and 3 destroyers back at harbor. Their sailors, guns and ammunition were taken off the ships and allocated to the land defenses. Not all the ships returned to Port Arthur however. Tsarevitch had been hit by 15 12 inch shells, her funnels were drained of fuel, she had burnt 480 tons of coal in just 24 hours. She was escorted by 3 destroyers to the German port of Kiaochou where she would be interned for the rest of the war. Diana coaled up at Kiaochou and would sail for Saigon where she was interned. Askold departed for Shanghai, hoping to repair herself quickly and make a break for it, but the Japanese sent piquet ships to watch her. The crews of Askold were thus forced to be interned. Ryeshitelni tried to make a break for it, but the Japanese hunted her down and managed to board her. She was renamed Akatsuki and would join the IJN combined fleet. Only the Novik would have a chance to fight again. Captain Mikhail von Schultz intended to take Novik to Kiachou to coal up before making a dash east of Japan to Vladivostok. Diana and Grozovoi declined following such a dangerous action, so Novik went it alone, departing Kiaochou on August 12th. Early on August 14th a Japanese merchant ship sighted Novik passing Yakushima and reported it to the IJN command. Captains Sento Takenaka and Takagi Sukeichi aboard Tsushima and Chitose received orders to hunt her down, both proceeding north through the Sea of Japan. Both ships met up on August 18th at Hakodate whereupon they received orders to patrol the western side of the Tsugaru strait. The IJN believed the Novik intended to pass through La Perouse Strait to coal at Korsakov before heading for Vladivostok. Chitose and Tsushima independently searched the strait finding no sign of the Novik. Tsushima headed for Korsakov and at 4pm on the 20th observed smoke rising from the harbor. Schultz was alerted of the Tsushima and made a break for it heading south and by 4:30 Tsushima was opening fire upon her. Novik returned fire, but the Tsushima was more heavily armed and scored multiple hits. Novik took 5 hits below her waterline and one knocked out her boilers. Novik turned back for Korsakov and at 5:40 scored a hit on Tsushima below the waterline flooding two compartments. Tsushima began to list so heavily she was forced to abandon the hunt and make emergency repairs. As Tsushima repaired herself, Chitose rushed to the scene and during the night of the 20th both IJN cruisers watched the Novik anchored at Korsakov harbor, waiting for her to depart. Novik’s steering gear was damaged beyond repair, so Schultz ordered her to be scuttled in the shallow harbor water. At dawn on the 21st, Chitose entered the harbor to find the abandoned Novik sunk on a sandbank. Chitose closed in at 4400 yards and opened fire scoring 20 hits as the Russian crew on land withdrew. On August 13th the Vladivostok squadron was given orders to try and support Port Arthur’s trapped fleet so they set out to do so. The Rossiya, Gromoboi and Rurik were sailing when on August 14th they were intercepted by 4 IJN cruisers led by Admiral Kamimura. In the battle, Rurik sunk and Rossiya and Gromoboi barely made it back to Vladivostok. Port Arthur was now on her own. Lt General Stoessel’s entire Siberian corps were withdrawn from the Kwantung Peninsula into the grand fortress of Port Arthur, under the command of Lt General Smirnov. Realizing there might arise problems with two competing commanders, Kuropatkin had sent orders back on July 3rd making Stoessel the superior officer, while Smirnov would focus on the command of the fortress itself. Stoessel had two divisional commanders who would be important during the siege. Our old cowardly friend Lt Fok and the much more competent and popular might I add, Kondratenko. Thus the chain of command was overall commander Stoessel, commander of the fort Smirnov and commander of the land forces Kondratenko. Major General Byeli commanded the artillery and to make matters more confusing, the units of the Russian navy would be under Stoessel. Nogi had acquired the giant 4.7 inch land based artillery pieces that would begin bombarding Port Arthur on August 7th. The IJN also added their guns to the bombardment as Nogi’s army would begin to clear the hills northeast of the city, such as the 600 foot tall Takushan and smaller Hsiaokushan, known also as Big Orphan and Little Orphan Hills. Both hills were not heavily defended, only having a garrison of 3 battalions and some supporting fire from the eastern forts, but they were quite steep and held mutually supporting promontories with only the southern slopes providing decent access to their peaks. In front of them ran the Ta River and from the Japanese point of view there lay half a mile of absolutely open ground between them and the hills. If the Japanese could seize them, this would provide a strategic anchor, as explained by one of Nogi’s divisional commanders “The Great and Little Orphans may be likened to the meat between the ribs of a chicken, which is hard to get and yet we are reluctant to throw it away. As long as these hills are left in the enemy’s hands, we are sure to be overlooked and shot from them, even though after we have taken them ourselves, we cannot help becoming a target for the enemy.” If you look at a map, basically the hills were a major hindrance to any Japanese movement to other locations, they simply had to be seized. At 7:30pm on August 7th, the Japanese infantry began their attack from the northeast and northwest. The artillery had been smashing the hills since 4:30pm. It was a rainy and dark night as the men advanced under artillery support, and the Ta River would drown many. The Japanese were forced to dig in at the foot of the hills and await daylight. At dawn the artillery commenced again as the infantry surged forward without much success. By midday a Russian flotilla led by the Novik hired upon the southern slopes. The Russian fleets guns were firing from Takhe Bay and they outranged the Japanese field artillery. To make matters worse the minefields were keeping the IJN ships at a distance. 3 inch howitzers were detached to the east coast hills and began to counter fire, forcing the Russian flotilla away and allowing the Japanese to resume their advance. Now the Japanese artillery enjoyed supremacy as shrapnel poured upon the Russian gun crews. Gradually the Russians were forced from their trenches making a withdrawal during the night heading down the reverse slopes. The two orphan hills cost the Japanese 1280 casualties, a mere appetizer of what was to be the main course. The IJA forces were greatly upset by how easily the Russian navy was able to come over and shoot upon them. Thus the IJN brought up 4 12 pounder guns to make sure the Russian ships would not harass the land forces anymore. On the 13th the Japanese lifted a balloon above the Wolf Hills to provide photo reconnaissance. The Russians meanwhile had no balloons, nor pigeons or wireless telegraphy. It seems the reconnaissance did nothing to dissuade Nogi from performing a frontal assault aimed at hitting the heart of the Russian eastern position, these were the Wantai heights. Nogi deployed the 1st division on the right, the 9th division in the center and the 11th division on the left. Between Wantai and the city was a large ravine and Nogi believed if they breached Wantai, the flanking forts would fall easily leaving a path to seize the town. Nogi devised a feint to create the illusion they were performing the exact same attack upon Port Arthur that was done in 1894. This also was done to protect his right flank for the frontal assault in the west. The 1st division was given the task of capturing 180 meter hill as a preliminary for the capture of 203 meter hill. It was hoped the preliminary operation in the west would draw away Russian forces from Wantai. At 9pm on the 13th the western advance began. The area of 180 and 203 meter hill was under the command of Tretyakov, who was under the command of General Kondratenko. Here were the 5th and 13th east siberians, reinforced with 2 companies of sailors. The Russians made an egregious error, they placed their artillery upon the crests of the hills, something their comrades further east in Manchuria had learnt the hard way. With the Russian field artillery basically neutralized, the Japanese crept towards the features losing a few hundred in the process. Yet it would not be the creeping Japanese infantry that tore the Russians from their trenches, but rather the Japanese concealed artillery. The Japanese guns first began to smash 174 meter hill. Streams of wounded Russians would go down the hill as fresh reserves were sent up. By midday on the 20th a messenger arrived to Tretyakov and Kondratenko’s HQ, he was joined by a visitor, General Fok. The messenger carried a note from the commander upon hill 174. He was requesting a company from the reserves to be dispatched over. General Fok overheard the report, and intervened claiming Tretyakov and Kondratenko lacked experience and should wait before releasing any reserves. Kondratenko, probably insulted agreed to wait a little, but Tretyakov looked up towards the hill with his binoculars and would recalled ‘I noticed three riflemen running away from the hill, and three men without rifles behind them. I drew General Kondratenko’s attention to them, and he evidently realised his mistake, for he said to me, “Ah! Now it is too late!”’ The trickle of men running turned into a disorderly retreat, as Tretyakov continues ‘A disorderly retreat is always started by one man, and in most cases this man is physically weak … What an enormous influence one man, whether officer or private, can have on the issue of a battle.’ Tretyakov and Kondratenko both rode out to try and stop the men from running. A counter attack was launched quickly, but it failed, to make things worse the Japanese had just seized a knoll north east of 180 meter hill. The Japanese paid for this with 1700 casualties, for the Russians it was 1100. On August the 11th the Japanese had sent terms of surrender, on the 16th the Russian military council met and rejected the terms. Stoessel and Smirnov sent a signed response to Nogi on the 17th reading ‘The honour and dignity of Russia do not allow of overtures of any sort being made for a surrender.’ On the 19th the Japanese artillery began to systematically hit the eastern defensive forts such as Fort Shungshu and the Chikuan Batter. Countless Russian guns were being destroyed or neutralized. The Waterworks redoubt located north of the railway was attacked by a Japanese company. Out of 108 men, 30 would survive. The Russians launched a counter attack on the 20th and the withdrawing Japanese were caught in the open field by artillery, providing carnage. Simultaneous to the attack on the Waterworks Redoubt, the 9th and 11th divisions began their frontal assaults. The Russian engineers had created nasty surprises for the Japanese. Planks were cut down with nails driven through them, you know that scene from home alone? The Japanese typically wore straw tabi, so this was particularly rough. They also hung telegraph wire all around to make up for a lack of barbed wire, anywhere that could trip an ankle or break the momentum of a charge. Some wire obstacles were attached to power supplies to give the Japanese quite a shock. During the night, magnesium flares, starshells and searchlights illuminated any attempt of the Japanese to sneak an advance. In terms of machine guns, the Russians typically enjoyed a 10 to 1 odds of superiority. Despite the grueling hardship, the Japanese kept the advance moving forward, under the threat of artillery, machine guns, terrible weather and booby traps. August 21st began with a grotesque scene of Japanese bodies flung over wire all around. The 11th division attempted to leap frog towards the East Panlung fort over a watercourse and were cut to pieces by machine guns. The 9th division reinforced by a brigade was making slow progress. Then a small section of machine guns were knocked out in the East Panlung allowing some of the Japanese to seize forward trenches around the battery. The Russians fired into the trenches from the battery and from the West Panlung battery. The Japanese held on for the lives as reinforcements tried to creep over in 2’s and 3’s. When Russian riflemen tried to move closer to dislodge the Japanese, the Japanese artillery smashed them causing a bit of a standoff. At midday Japanese officers stood up grabbing the rising sun flag and charged a Russian parapet. All the men that followed them were shot down or bayoneted before the flag could be planted. The Russians were beginning to severely suffer from the artillery fire. By 4pm a party of sailors came to reinforce the East Panlung, but a Japanese counter attack from a toehold near the parapet stopped them from reaching their destination. Then a Japanese company commander led his men into a watercourse between the East and West Panlung forts. The commander could see the Russian attention was focused on the Eastern Fort, so he led his men against the Western fort. The infantry swarmed up the northeast slopes towards West Panlung suffering few casualties. The fort was set ablaze by 6pm with its occupants ejected, but the Japanese were unable to occupy it because of the inferno. The old chinese wall forts began to fire upon the West Panlung to dissuade the Japanese from claiming it. Meanwhile two battalions of the 7th regiment charged the East Panlung and would seize it at a terrible cost. During the 7th regiments roll call the next day, out of 1800 men, only 200 were present. With the Panlungs taken, now it was time to seize Wantai. A brigade of the 11th division and 9th division would use the Panlung forts as springboards to hit Wantai on the 24th. Moving up to the Panlung forts was something out of a horror film as described to us by Tadayoshi Sakurai ‘The dead and wounded were piled one upon another in nooks and corners, some groaning with pain, some crying for help, and some perfectly quiet, breathing no longer,’. The infantry moving up had to crawl over their dead and wounded to do so. As both brigades made their way, casualties mounted. Two companies seized the initiative and launched their attack and were cut to pieces by machine guns 500 yards from Wantai. The next day saw the exact same carnage, war correspondent Richmon Smith had this to say of the event “‘It looked as if there was not a single foot of ground which had not its own particular shell, and the whole ridge was enveloped in a thick cloud of smoke and dust from the explosions“ The following night the men began to pull back to the Panlung forts, leaving countless dead strewn in the hundreds over the hillsides. Nogi was at his desk when he received a report indicating he had lost 18,000 men. To just give you an idea, a division is 15,000 men. Such a sacrifice had got him what? Just taking the Orphan Hills had seen 9000 men lost to sickness and wounds. His total casualty list was that of 30,000 all counted. The Panlung forts were hardly a prize as the Japanese were figuring out, Wantai was holding them back without them. Holding the forts caused more casualties as the Russians fired upon them. On the night of August 27th the Russians launched a counter attack against West Panlung that failed, but it did showcase the reality of the situation for the Japanese there. Wantai held a moat nearly 30 feet wide and 25 feet deep, its fortifications were extremely sturdy, it was not going to fall, the idea to seize it and then the city was fallacy. A new strategy was needed. As Marshal Oyama was about to attack Kuropaktin at Liaoyang, Nogi required more men. 15,000 men led by Major General Teshima were enroute with siege artillery. On September 14th, the first battery of 11 inch howitzers would arrive. These colossal beasts fired 500 lb shells effectively 7700 yards. Nogi also unleashed sappers, who first targeted the Waterworks Redoubt. The Japanese were not experts at sapping as noted by Danish war correspondent Benjamin Wegner Norregaard ‘It was too slow for them, and it was taxing their tenacity and fortitude to a much higher degree than the most desperate attacks in the open. They did not like it, and they did not understand it, and the majority of their officers shared their feelings.’ The sappers began from the advance Russian trench lines and made a southerly course towards the redoubt. 650 yards of trench work, requiring tons of earth to be removed from the tunnels. In front of the Panlungs, 2000 yards of trench work was dug up to connect the 9th divisional HQ. What would later be normalized along the western front in WW1 was being seen in its infancy here. After 19 days the general attack resumed on September 19th. Nogi now planned a feint attack against the eastern defenses while attacking the Waterworks Redoubt, the Sueshi Lunette and a more substantial effort would be mounted against Hills 180 and 203. At 5:40 a storming party lept from their forward trenches at the Waterworks Redoubt. They were stopped in their tracks and ran back to their trenches. At 2am the Japanese performed the same attack and this saw the Russian withdrawing. The Japanese suffered 500 casualties, but gained a new platform to sap from and captured the enemies water supply. The Sueshi lunette would fall the next day in a similar manner. The 9th division occupied the Waterworks Redoubt and Sushi Lunettes while the 1st Division began attacking the Temple Redoubt, 180 and 203 meter hills. They both received new artillery support; 5 naval 12 pounders, 2 4.7 inch guns, 12 4.7 howitzers, 12 3.5 inch mortars, 60 field guns and 8 4 pounder Hotchkiss guns. 180 meter hill was narrow with steep sides, occupied by 6 Russian companies in shallow trenches encircling its crest. Upon its northern peak were 2 6 inch guns managed by sailors. The first Japanese breakthrough occurred on September 17th when some forward trenches were grabbed without firing a single shot. It would turn out the Russian 7th company, 28th regiment were eating their dinner when they were suddenly attacked. They tried to take back their trenches but were unable. At 2pm on the 19th the Japanese artillery assisted by some IJN gunboats from Louisa Bay began to hit Tretyakov’s men hard. At 4pm on the 20th, a simultaneous two battalion attack smashed the Russians leaving Tretyakov to write “Our gunners failed to locate the enemy’s batteries, and thus remained impotent witnesses of the slaughter of our companies. Just then I saw the top of the right flank of Namako Yama covered with grey smoke and the men there rushing headlong down the hill. After the men on the right flank [they were Seven Company of the Twenty-eighth Regiment] had run, the others from the battery and the enemy appeared simultaneously on the crest.” Russian troops began to rout as the Japanese seized an observation post close to 180 meter hill. 130 Russians died in the trenches, for the Japanese it was close to 450 casualties. On that same day the Japanese seized the Temple Redoubt. Back on September 18th, General Baron Kodama visited a depressed General Nogi. He advised Nogi to press further on with the sapping effort and looking closely at the battle map, raised attention to the 203 meter hill. He noted such a feature offered the perfect artillery placement to smash the harbor fleet and win the battle. It seems Nogi heeded the advice as on the 20th he launched a 3-pronged attack against 203 meter hill, bypassing 180 meter hill. The Japanese were repelled on two sides, but grabbed a foothold in the southwest corner. The Japanese swept up the hill with their artillery support as the Russian machine gun crews acted like deaths scythes raking them down. The Russians also tossed down boulders to gruesome effect. On the 22nd Smirnov ordered some quickfires to be brought up to the lip of a ravine under the cover of Kaoliang. The guns caught the Japanese by complete surprise and fired upon them at point blank range causing panic and carnage. At night the Russian hill top defenders tossed hand made mines blowing Japanese in entrenched positions to pieces. Countless Japanese were forced to flee from their foothold on 203 meter hill. 2500 Japanese casualties had mounted against the formidable hill as Nogi ordered the men to back off and allow artillery to soften it up more. The Russian hand grenade proved to be a very effective weapon against Japanese hill charges. Three factories within Port Arthur went into full production because of it. Yet only so much ammunition was stored in the city, and the Russian commanders knew the shells would run out. The Russians were so meticulous, they began a program of finding Japanese shell duds and re-processed them to be fired back upon the enemy. Food was not an enormous issue yet for the Russians, though dysentery and scurvy was increasing. Meanwhile the Japanese were seeing an exponential increase in Beriberi disease. In July they had 5000 cases, August 10,000, another 5000 in September. For those not familiar, beriberi is kind of like a scurvy one gets when their diet is restricted to just rice, particularly rice that is fermented in dampness and heat. The Russians began to hear rumors of the arrival of Japanese 11 inch howitzers. The Japanese had laid down a small railway from Dalny to move the giant 500 lb shells. By October 1st the artillery crews had prepared everything for the giant show of force, their target was to be Fort Chikuan. It took 100 shells, before it was turned to ruin. Nogi and his staff were very pleased with the performance of the new 11 inch howitzers, by October 15th two more batteries of 6 guns arrived. Four of the guns were placed ominously within a mile of 203 meter hill. Tretyakov wrote ‘This was serious news for us. One could feel that 203 Metre Hill was practically safe against six inch projectiles, but eleven inchs were a very different matter.’ Tretyakov solution was ‘to delve deeper into the rock’. Elsewhere upon the hill, feared they were doomed. ‘The wearing, trying uncertainty, the want of confidence, and the constant, unavoidable danger began to tell.The younger men lost their nerve, and suicides commenced.’ The sapping efforts had created a new north and northeast front. The 1st division now would attack Fort Sungshu, the 9th division Fort Erhlung and the 11th divisions fort Chikuan. Nogi issued urgency to their tasks as he wished to present Emperor Meiji the gift of Port Arthur on his Birthday, November 3rd. October saw countless Japanese attacks and sapping drawing closer and closer to Russian fortifications. On the 26th the area around the 3 forts were surrounded by Japanese infantry and sappers. At Fort Chikuan a tunnel reached within 50 yards of its moat. At Fort Erhlung the sappers were within 300 yards from the Russian forward trenches. The Japanese invented many gadgets and techniques during this process. They made wooden mortars within their sapper trenches that could fire 250-400 yards or so. To combat enemy grenades they made springy wire trampolines that bounced them off. They even began dabbling in some ancient fashion. Some Japanese created steel body armor, weighing 40 lbs or so that protected them from small arms fire, yet larger arms knocked them down. To combat this, they made two poles fastened to the pioneers waist to keep them up right. On October 26th a Japanese artillery barrage began to build up, directed against Erhlung and Sungshu. Then Japanese infantry stormed forward trenches and for the next two days relentlessly pushed forward. By the night of the 29th two Russian counter attacks in front of Erhlung and Sungshu failed to dislodge them. On the 29th a large barrage was unleashed followed by Japanese storming across a front of just 50-100 yards. The Russians knew exactly where they would come from and all weapons were directed upon them. The attacks were simultaneous. Against Chikuan the Japanese crossed 40 yards and were gunned down by machine guns and torn up by shrapnel. Though little progress was made, some Japanese seized a parapet 200 yards west of the fort. The attack against Fort Erhlung was a complete disaster. The Japanese charged through the chaos and reached its moat only to find out their scaling ladders were 20 feet too short. At Sungshu the same problem was found, but the men were able to cling to the side of the fort. 6 days of desperate hand to hand fighting saw the Japanese lose 124 officers and 3611 men. The only gift the Japanese could provide to Emperor Meiji was a 101 gun salute with the rounds hitting Erhlung. News hit Japan of the failures, the public was angered by Nogi. He was nearly sacked if not for Emperor Meiji’s personal intervention. Oyama was livid and sent Kodama to Nogi who strongly advised Nogi to focus on 203 meter hill. If Nogi did not comply Kodama was under orders to take over. Nogi attempted another general assault against the eastern defenses, but most of November would be dedicated to sapping and mining in front of Forts Erhlung and Sungshu. By late November Nogi received the 7th division, but the November assaults would only add to the butchers bill. After the second assault attempt on November 27th the Japanese lost 208 officers, 5933 wounded. A third November assault was made and this time General Kondratenko issued some brutal orders. Russian snipers were brought to the rear, and they shot those who tried to withdraw. The message was passed along the Russian line loud and clear. At 203 meter hill the Japanese were about to see 8000 casualties, for the Russians 3000. The world had rarely seen such slaughter. Kondratenko guessed they had seen the last general assault against the forts for awhile, so he gambled by thinning out the line, trying to build up a reserve for counter attacks. Nogi was determined to seize hills 180 and 203. The 1st division reinforced with a Kobi regiment began an attack on November 28th at 8:30am. Under artillery support they performed a 3-pronged attack. The 11 inch howitzers fired 1000 500lb shells upon 203 and 180 meter hills that day. Two battalions attacked the southern peak, 1 battalion the north peak of 203 meter hill and 3 companies against 180 meter hill. The southern peak force reached the southwest corner of the hill where they became exposed to Russian artillery firing from Pigeon Bay. Being raked by shrapnel they could advance no further. The northern peak force fared no better. The attack against 180 meter hill saw no progress at all. Overall the only significant victory was securing the south west flank of 203 meter hill. On November 29th the morning sun showed corpses strung everywhere across the hills going up to the Russian trenches, a grizzly sight. Japanese artillery continued to smash the hills and during the night the Japanese launched a further 3 pronged attack. After 36 hours the Japanese were exhausted. Nogi ordered the 7th division to relieve the spent 1st division and upon doing so a messenger suddenly rushed into his HQ with a terrible message. Nogi’s son Yasukori had died. His eldest son had died at the battle of Nanshan with the 2nd IJA and now his other son under him. He asked the messenger if his son fulfilled his duties as tears welled up in his eyes. He would write later ‘ If the death of my son was a compensator for the thousands of deaths incured in the 3rd army. I often wonder how I could apologise to His Majesty and to the people for having killed so many of my men.’ Nogi ordered his sons body to be turned to ashes and a small memorial stone was made at the foot of 203 meter hill marking the spot he died. Meanwhile the mix of soldiers and sailors atop 203 meter hill were being slowly bled dry by artillery and attacks. Countless times men, mostly the sailors would turn to flight during combat, but Tretyakov with his saber in hand and open arms kept shepherding them back to their trenches. Tretyakov would hit men with the flat of his sword to restore order. He also handed out a supply of St. George’s Crosses to award those for brave acts. 203 meter hill was sponging up reserves and soon 9000 unemployed men within Port Arthur city were pressed into service. On November 30th another fierce artillery barrage rocked the hill and it was followed up at 2:30 by an attack from the 7th division. The men of the 7th vowed to take the hill or not return. When they came into view of the Russians on the northern slopes the fire was so intense they had to pause to allow their artillery to suppress the Russians. As best as they could, trying to crawl over their own dead, they could not reach the Russians. But one small party of Japanese managed to gain a foothold on the left flank, and there the rising son flag was planted. Tretyakov recalled ‘The sight of this flag always filled our men with fury. I knew this, and, pointing to it, shouted to the reserve: “Go and take it down, my lads!” and like one man, our sailors rushed into the work.’ The small party of Japanese would could not be removed. General Fok issued a memorandum ‘In the same way that he must sooner or later succumb, so too must a fortress fall. No commandant should waste his men in an attempt to recapture a position yielded to the enemy.’ Stoessel concurred with the view and held an emergency council about the dire situation upon 203 meter hill. Fok at the meeting said ‘It’s absurd to try to hold out there longer. We must think of the men. It’s all the same: sooner or later we shall have to abandon it. We must not waste men; we shall want them later.’ Only Smirnov objected. That same night, Kodama was informed that a 203 meter hill was falling into their hands. So relieved he went to bed, but the next morning he found out it was not true. He furiously went over to Nogi, but fearing the man would kill himself he did not seize command, but instead demanded he be allowed to give orders on the 203 meter hill front alone. On December 1st, Tretyakov tossed a counter attack, seeing hand to hand fighting, bayonets and grenades being tossed. Tretyakov wrote of it “A non-combatant detachment, under a quartermaster, came up to make good our losses of the preceding day. The men were placed in the trenches allotted to the reserves, and the officer stood looking at the road, and the piles of dead lying on it. I suggested to him that he should sit in the trench or stand close up under the almost perpendicular bank of the road. But the young fellow said he was not afraid of such missiles, pointing with his hand to an eleven inch shell which was hurtling away after having ricocheted off the ground; but just at that moment there was a terrific roar, and he was hidden in the black smoke from a large shell that had burst just where he stood. When the smoke had cleared away, he was no longer there.“ On December 2nd the Japanese attacks petered out. Twice wounded, Tretyakov had to be evacuated from the hill for surgery. This left few officers upon the hill, and those there were wounded. On December 5th, the Japanese sappers drew closer to 203 and 180 meter hills. At 1:30pm bayonets were fixed and after the artillery barrage lifted 15 minutes later the Japanese charged. Major General Saito led his 14th brigade up the western slopes of 203 meter hill. Shrapnel was flying everywhere they looked, but the Japanese managed to get atop the western peak and now charged the Russian positions. To their amazement they had seized not just 203 meter hill, but also 180 meter hill. They found Russian dead and wounded everywhere, it turned out 4 days of artillery bombardment had devastated them. The Russians launched two counter attacks, but were unable to wrestle the positions back. War correspondents were allowed to visit the hills and the sight horrified them. Ashmead Barlett atop 203 meter hill recalled ‘There have probably never been so many dead crowded into so small a space since the French stormed the great redoubt at Borodino.’ David James wrote “The sight of those trenches heaped up with arms and legs and dismembered bodies all mixed together and then frozen into compact masses, the expressions on the faces of the scattered heads of decapitated bodies, the stupendous magnitude of the concentrated horror, impressed itself indelibly into the utmost recesses of my unaccustomed brain.” The Russians had no more than 1500 men at any given time upon 203 meter hill and would lose over 3000. The Japanese took 8000 casualties taking the hill and the 7th division would see hundreds of dead from the 1st division as they stormed it. The 1st and 7th divisions after the battle for Port Arthur would virtually cease to exist as fighting formations. No sooner than it had been captured, did the 11 inch howitzers receive their 500 lb armor piercing rounds and began to smash the trapped Russian navy. On the 5th, Poltava took a hit below her magazine which exploded. Retvizan and Pobieda were severed damaged and on fire. On the 6th 280 11 inch rounds were fired and all ships in the western basin suffered numerous hits. On the 7th, Retvizan was sunk, two days later Pobieda and Palada rested at the bottom. Peresvyet and Bayan were on fire and wrecked. Sevastopol was hit 5 times, but remained afloat. The IJN watched this go on, a bit embarrassingly. Sevastopol managed to hide herself behind the Tiger’s tail, so IJN destroyers came to fire over 124 torpedoes at her. Despite her anti torpedo boom protection, she took 6 hits and was taking on water. On the night of January 2nd Sevastopol was tugged out to open sea to sink. While that was the story of the death of the Russian navy at Port Arthur, the city itself was hit with artillery without mercy. The Russian commanders knew Kuropatkin was not coming to their rescue. The destruction of the fleet now meant the port was useless and the incoming baltic fleet would simply go to Vladivostok. Smirnov and Kondratenko argued they had a months reserves of food and ammunition and their duty was to continue to fight. Smirnov argued ‘I cannot allow any discussion with regard to a capitulation before the middle of January at the earliest. At home they are just preparing to celebrate the jubilee of Sevastopol. Our fathers held out for eleven months! We shall not have completed eleven months till January 8, and only then will the son be worthy of the father.’ Stoessel and Fok did not share the view. Stoessel declared ‘As to the surrender of the fortress, I shall know when that should take place, and I will not permit a street massacre,’ Kondratenko went over to Fort Chikuan on december 15th and was visibly depressed. At 9pm a 11 inch shell hit a weakened part of the fort's walls and killed Kondretenko alongside 6 senior officers. News of his death stunned and brought forth a sense of despair for the Russians. At 10pm Smirnov received the report of his death and became bitterly upset at the loss of a friend and the only man capable of holding back Stoessel. Smirnov said to his chief of staff ‘We must go to Stoessel at once. Fok is next in seniority to Kondratenko, and Stoessel will certainly try to give him the vacant appointment. This must at all costs be prevented.’ The next morning Smirnov was surprised to see a Fok in a good mood, Fok had been given command in the western front while Smirnov took over the eastern front. Foks first order was to halve the strength in his forts and their supporting flanks. On December 18th, a 2000 kg mine was exploded under Fort Chikuan before the Japanese captured it with ease. On the 28th multiple mines were exploded under Fort Erhlung and it too was captured. On the 29th the Russians held a war council on the issue of the next fortress. The gunners, logisticians and even naval men agreed they could continue the struggle. Stoessl signaled Tsar Nicholas II ‘We cannot hold out more than a few days; I am taking measures to prevent a street massacre.I am extremely grateful to all of you for coming to such a resolution.’ New Years eve in Japan was one of joyous celebration. After 10am, Fort Sungshu had mines explode under it, by midday the last fort was captured. On New Years Day, Wantai fell with relative ease. Stoessel sent a message to Nogi on that day “Being acquainted with the general state of affairs in the theatre of war, I am of the opinion that no object is to be gained by further opposition in Port Arthur, and so, to avoid useless loss of life, I am anxious to enter into negotiations for a capitulation. If your Excellency agrees, I would ask you to be so good as to appoint accredited persons to negotiate concerning the terms and arrangements for surrender, and to appoint a spot where they may meet my representatives.” Upon hearing the news, Tretyakov angrily reported ‘General indignation against General Fok was apparent and every kind of accusation was heaped upon his head’. Delegates met at Sueshi village on January 2nd of 1905 as Stoessel sent word to the Tsar “I was forced today to sign the capitulation surrendering Port Arthur. Officers and civil officers paroled with honours of war; garrison prisoners of war. I apply to you for this obligation.” For the Japanese the humiliation of 1895 was finally lifted. Tretyakov said to his men ‘Yes my lads. We have been ordered to surrender; but no blame attaches to the Fifth Regiment, and you can with a clear conscience tell each and every one that the Fifth Regiment has always looked death bravely in the face and has been ready to die without question for its Tsar and country.’ Tretyakov would write in his memoirs ‘Many of them burst into tears, and I could hardly speak for the sobs that choked me’. The Russian commanders were given the choice of parole back to Russia, promising not to take part in the war any longer or to be POW’s with their men. As the Japanese entered the city they found ample supplies of food, particularly champagne and vodka. A roll call revealed 16,000 sick and wounded in the hospital and 868 officers and 23491 men fit to march into captivity. The Japanese had anticipated 9000 POW’s and were somewhat ashamed of their opponents premature surrender. The Russians had suffered in total 31306 casualties, less than a third were fatal. The Japanese suffered twice that. The Japanese acquired 24369 POWs and for this they suffered 57,780 casualties, 33769 sick. The Russians had 6000 deaths, the Japanese suffered 14,000 deaths. General Nogi was a broken man, he had lost two sons to the war and sent thousands of Japan’s youth to their graves. On January 14th he assembled 120,000 of the men to a shrine erected in honor of the fallen. Richmond Smith was there and recalled ‘In the form of a half circle, extending from the base of the hill far out onto the plain, was the victorious army, drawn up in divisions, brigades, regiments and companies, their fixed bayonets glittering in the sunlight.’ Companies came forward one by one to bow at the shrine. Nogi read an invocation ‘My heart is oppressed with sadness when I think of all you who have paid the price of victory, and whose spirits are in the great hereafter’. After the Russo-Japanese War, Nogi made a report directly to Emperor Meiji during a Gozen Kaigi. WAfter explaining all that befell during the Siege of Port Arthur, he broke down and wept, apologizing for the 56,000 lives lost in that campaign and asking to be allowed to commit seppuku in atonement. Emperor Meiji told him that suicide was unacceptable, as all responsibility for the war was due to his imperial orders, and that Nogi must remain alive, at least as long as he himself lived. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The siege of Port Arthur in many ways was a teaser of the horrors that would befall the world in 1914. For General Nogi it cost him another son and the experience broke him. For the Japanese and Russians in the east, they were some of the first to taste what warfare in the 20th century was going to be like.

Dec 26, 2023 • 52min

3.79 Fall and Rise of China: Russo-Japanese War #6: Liaoyang

Last time we spoke about theJapanese advance to Liaoyang. After the loss at Telissu, the Russians began to scramble to defend multiple locations in Manchuria. With multiple Japanese armies advancing simultaneously, Kuropatkin could not be sure where they would hit next and found himself making matters worse when he ordered troops to hold too many places. The Russian losses at Tashihciao, the passes a Fenshuiling and Motien, Chiaotou, Hsimucheng, Tawan, and Yangtzuling. The Russians were in disarray, trying to delay so more troops could gather at Liaoyang and Mukden, but their efforts were being trampled upon. Even out at sea, Admiral Witgeft made and attempt to break out and join up with the Vladivostok Squadron, but was likewise forced to pull back. Now multiple Japanese armies would converge to smash Liaoyang, Manchuria was being slowly conquered city by city. #79 The Russo-Japanese War part 6: The Battle of Liaoyang Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. The Russians had just been severed multiple defeats. Not a single one of Kuropatkins formations had been spared the humiliation. A times correspondent had this to say ‘There is such a thing as the tradition of defeat, and unenviable is the army that creates it.” The commander of the European 17th corps, General Baron Bildering was appointed commander of the Eastern Front. In addition to his 17th corps, he received the 3rd Siberian army corps and the 10th corps. The two opposing armies spent three weeks skirmishing with another over the course of 6 mountainous miles. On the 3rd of August, Haicheng that had so much attention and effort dedicated to it, was entered with little opposition. The Russians had spent so much time at Haicheng, building up its fortifications and expected a battle that never took place. To make matters worse, so much supplies had been brought over to Haicheng, the Russians did not have enough time to destroy or move it all, so the Japanese took it all as a prize. The 1st, 2nd and 4th IJA met at Haicheng as Kuropatkins front was reduced from 140 to 45 miles. The Russian main body was now deployed along the railway at Anshanchan, 22 miles northeast of Haicheng and around 20 miles west of Liaoyang. The war took its toll on Kuropatkin by this point. If you ever heard the memes about what US presidents look like before and after presidency, its kind of a similar situation. Kuropatkin was said to be unrecognizable by August of 1904, he had that 1000 mile stare. Kuropatkin sat huddled in a carriage riding through Liaoyang, not even acknowledging or looking at men who saluted him. Kuropatkin was a experienced military man, he had worked in numerous political positions, a very distinguished figure, and he was quite broken. The Japanese were consolidating and advancing upon Liaoyang. His overcaution, lack of determination, a gradual erosion of his confidence in the face of a growing admiration for the enemy were losing him the war. Kuropatkin cabled the Tsar that he had withdrawn from Haicheng to Liaoyang because “The Japanese superiority in numbers. They were accustomed to hills and hot weather; they were younger, carried lighter loads, and had numerous mountain artillery and pack transport. Their energetic and intelligent leadership. The extraordinary patriotism and military spirit of their troops; and the lack of such a spirit on our side (caused by general ignorance of what we were fighting for)” This telegram sounds a lot to me like someone simply stating “they are better than us sir”. Its pure defeatism, and completely unwarranted mind you, the war was not lost by a large margin. Now Liaoyang was a city holding a population of roughly 60,000. The railway had a north-south-west-east junction at Liaoyang and the Taitzu river ran north of the city. It was a walled city, and by this point held around three lines of defense running some 40 miles long, something Kuropatkin called his zone of maneuver. The railway line running south from Harbin remained the Russians only line of communication while the Japanese had the benefit of two lines. Liaoyang was a vital junction not just for rail, but also for roads. The old mandarin road ran up the west coast of the Liaodong peninsula and Port Arthur, both passed through places like Liaoyang before going to Korea. The Taitzu river is a tributary of the Liao river flowing east and west into the sea. There are 3 important tributaries; the Lan and Tang rivers east of Liaoyang and the Sha river to her south. The battlefield of Liaoyang would have the mandarin roads on the flat open plains of the Liao valley to the west. Here there was abundant kaoliang, over 9 feet tall offering coverage. To the east of the Mandarin roads, spurs rose up to taller mountains. Within the city the railway station was sitting near the northwest wall. The station was constantly receiving materials of war and troops. Nearby to the railway station was the Russian HQ. Despite the incoming battle the Russians allowed normal civilian life to go by, yet again allowing the numerous Japanese spies to do their work. Kuropatkins troops busied themselves with vodka and women, even his chief of staff was allowed time off to be with his girlfriend as Kuropatkin shouldered the additional work. The battle of Liaoyang was to be a decisive battle, something Kuropatkin wrote himself in his memoirs. If the Russians lost, their communication lines in China would be cut, the resources of the Liao plan would be lost, something their interior economy depended upon and of course Port Arthur would be even more in trouble. Kuropatkin did all he could to delay the enemy so he could build up forces at Liaoyang, if it fell all was left was Mukden. On August 3rd, Kuropatkin and Alexeiev met at Liaoyang. Both men understood the threat the Japanese advance meant. Alexeiev wanted a an offensive to be made against the 1st IJA, whereupon Kuropatkin was forced to speak to him like a toddler about the reality of the situation. The string of defeats had destroyed the Russian morale, they lacked sufficient officers, their strength was both qualitatively and quantitatively less than the enemy. Alexeiev would depart believing he had achieved some sort of compromise with Kuropatkin to get him to agree to fight at Liaoyang, but of course this was what Kuropatkin sought regardless. Liaoyang was to be defended by three lines of defense. The innermost line ran close to the city, anchored across the river on the northern bank. The line held 8 forts with 130 old pattern guns all dug in. Flank protection, obstacles, ditches and tons of cover provided an impressive line of defense. This defense line was watched and mapped by Chinese spies working for Lt Colonel Isauma. Its number one weakness was some high ground 6 miles south east of it. If the high ground was seized, artillery could be placed upon it to ran down fire upon the city and railway station. The next line of defense ran a radius of 7 miles from the city. The line went from Manju Yama in the northeast to a feature 693 feet high overlooking the railway. The outermost line this was about 15 miles out going from Anshanchan to Anping. The line was not as strong as the inner line, but offered substantial obstacles against the enemy. The Russians believed the Japanese would perform two basic courses of action. The first would be to turn a flank, the second to throw a frontal attack against the successive lines of defense. To turn a flank, the Japanese would need to cross a river, leaving them very vulnerable to Russian counter attacks provided by their reserves. The Japanese frontal attack would progressively exhaust itself, setting up counter strokes. The battle would be the first time the leaders of each side would be directly commanding. The Japanese troops were confident, well practiced and yet to be served a real defeat. Despite the losses, Kuropatkins withdrawals were performed perfectly, this battle was quite open to either side winning. The Russians divided themselves into three groups; the southern group, eastern group and reserves. General Zarubaiev led the southern group consisting of the 1st, 2nd and 4th Siberian corps entrenched at Anshanchan. 10 miles south of his position were the advanced guards with the army reserve taken from all 3 corps. Amongst them were 11 cavalry squadrons and 6 guns under General Mishchenko. Baron Bildering led the eastern group consisting of the 3rd Siberian and 10th european corps. They were deployed in a semicircle between the Tang and Taitzu. To the left of the Taitzu was brigade of the 17th corps. A bridge connected this detachment to the main body. The reserves were at Liaoyang under Kuropatkins command, they consisted of 30 battalions taken from the 2nd siberians and 17th corps. Over at Mukden were the recently arrived 5th Siberian corps of which 8 battalions were ordered to advance to the Taitzu river to guard the left flank. Also at Mukden were elements of the 1st european corps. The Russians took specific care to guard their flanks and railway, but most of the detachments were in the east, while approaches from the west were somewhat neglected. At this point in the war, there was a large possibility China might enter the war on Japan’s side. This indeed was something Kuropatkin wrote about often, but it had major consequences. If China entered the war it would most likely draw in France, which would draw in Britain both of whom would seek to end hostilities. Such a situation would be against Japan’s interests, Japan was actively doing everything she could to stop the Chinese from such actions, but publicly Japan fanned rumors using her spy network. Such rumors spoke of how General Ma had gathered a 30,000 strong force along the western borders of Manchuria. Other rumors spoke of a Japanese army landing at Yingkou to join forces with a large Honghuzi force. On top of the rumor filled paranoia, Kuropatkin had some bad intelligence. He believed the Japanese outnumbered them heavily, but in reality he had some 158,000 men and Commander in Chief of the IJA, Iwao Oyama held 125,000. The Russians had the numbers, Oyama enjoyed perfect intelligence on this and he knew every day they grew. Thus Oyama ordered his commanders to keep grabbing the initiative, because if they did not the Russians would soon overwhelm them. Meanwhile something else deeply concerned Oyama, Nogi was besieging Port Arthur and things were going terribly. Oyama had hoped Port Arthur would fall before he tossed the kitchen sink at Liaoyang, but he could wait no longer. Kuropatkin’s cavalry which he referred to as “old men on little horses” were not living up to what he thought they should be. He relied upon them for intelligence and they over exaggerated everything. His cavalry was three times larger than the Japanese, they should have been crushing them in every battle. Now every day that passed by was a victory for the Russians, already the 5th Siberians at Vladivostok were being diverted to Liaoyang, time was everything. Kuropatkin planned to hold the line between Anshanchan and Anping with a strong covering force, 3 corps strong. He planned to hold back some reserves and hit to Japanese when they began a frontal attack and this strategy did not sit well with Generals like Bildering or Sluchevski. Both generals did not like the idea of fighting in front of an unfordable river and advised pulling the entire force back to Liaoyangs inner defense. Sluchevski took this a step further recommending they take up a new defensive position between Mukden and Liaoyang. Kuropatkin wrote this in his memoirs “These officers reiterated the same opinions still more forcibly early in August, when the difficulty of moving their troops towards Liaoyang became greatly increased by the heavy rains. The Viceroy, who was much perturbed about the fate of Port Arthur, by the news of the unfortunate result of the naval operations on August 10, and whose fears were increased by Stoessel’s highly alarmist reports, was at the same time urging me (August 15) to assist the fortress and make an advance of some sort – though it were only a demonstration – towards Haicheng. “ Kuropatkin messaged the Tsar about the conflicting ideas, and the Tsar replied that he acting as the commanding general knew best and would decide what was to be done, not his subordinates. On the 7th of August Kuropatkin told Bildering that they would fight a decisive battle and it would be along the Anshanchan-Anping line. However two days later Kuropatkin instructed the commander of the 3rd Siberians, General Ivanov that his job was to only act as rearguards and not enter into the foray of battle. Ivanov was bewildered by this and sought further clarification to which Kuropatkin said “‘They were to avoid a desperate struggle and simultaneously to hold their positions and gain time, but to retreat to the main defences at Liaoyang if seriously attacked, without permitting themselves to be demoralised or disorganised.” Thus Ivanov basically planned for a retreat from the line before any fighting was to be had. Then on August the 23rd Kuropatkin changed his mind completely and reaffirmed the decisive battle would be fought on the Anshanchan-Anping line, he wrote this to Sluchevski who was commanding the 10th corps “Under these circumstances, I do not think we need confine ourselves to fighting rearguard actions in the positions occupied by the Tenth and Third Siberian Army Corps and by the troops on the southern front. I am resolved to fight in those positions with all the forces apportioned to their defence, to beat the enemy back and to assume the offensive should a favourable opportunity present itself. “ It seems the Russian intelligence throughout August bolstered Kuropatkin. There were reports the 2nd IJA relinquished 3-4 divisions to help at Port Arthur, this of course was not true and most likely fed to the Russian by Japanese spies. There was another report 30-40 thousand Japanese in Oku’s army were facing a cholera outbreak, again not true. It seemed to the Russians the Japanese were at the moment at least performing defense in front of Liaoyang. Kuropatkin instructed Sluchevski to prepare a possible offensive should an opportunity present itself, but reaffirmed Bildering and Zarubaiev they would maintain their positions. Thus the outer defensive line changed a bit, something that would aid Oyama. On the Japanese side they wargamed a few options before them. Everything did not look good on the board and ultimately they decided to pursue a simple course of action. They would exert pressure across the whole Russian line until the combined force could initiate a converging attack. At this point Oyama would decide whether they hit left, center or right. From his HQ at Haicheng, Oyama ordered his forces to drive the Russians from their forward position to their main position hopefully by August 28th. The 1st IJA was to advance west of the Tang river; the 4th IJA would advance against the main Russian line by the 29th; the 2nd IJA would advance along the Sha river and coordinate with the 4th IJA. The 1st IJA began their advance on the 26th followed by the Guards division 3 days prior. The major attack would by performed by the 2nd and half of the 12th division against the 10th corps at Anping. The other half of the 12th with the Kobi brigade would hit the Russian left. Their assault was scheduled for the night of the 25th. The advance of the Japanese force was terrible, it was a muddy nightmare making the movement of their heavy artillery difficult. General Mishchenko cavalry were patrolling in a gap between the two Russian groups, but had pulled back into the reserve, Kuropatkin planned to use them as a hammer later. The gap was then filled by weaker detachments. The Japanese Guards division were advancing upon the 3rd Siberians while the 10th division of the 4th IJA were hitting the gap. Kuropatkin watched this with despair believing the Guards division were actually 3 divisions strong. The Russians went into a state of frantic reinforcement. Kuropatkin ordered the 17th corps to maintain their position while also detaching the 35th division from the 17th corps to give to Ivanov’s 3rd Siberians without telling Bildering. To further assist the 3rd siberians, the 10th corps were ordered to attack eastward on the 26th thus protecting the 3rd right flank. Reserves were tossed to the southwards just before the Russians were attacked. General Liubavin on the 25th reported he believed the Japanese would cross the Taitzu and this caught the attention of both Kuropatkin and Bildering to make sure the gaps there would be filled up. Thus the 10th corps were now exposed to the combined attacks of the 2nd and 12th IJA divisions. On the 25th, the Guards Division surged into the 3rd Siberians outposts. During the night, it seemed inevitable the Japanese were exerting pressure so the 10th corps offensive actions were canceled. At 6:10am Japanese artillery was beginning to support the Guards division, hitting the 3rd Siberians position which sat on a ridge rising some 1000 feet above the river valley. The Russian artillery dueled from better firing positions until 4pm removing the Japanese artillery threat from the sector. Until 8pm the Russian artillery battered the Japanese unchallenged. The Guards division were thus severely hamstrung by the Russian artillery, but they continued without artillery support and threatened to break through into a gap between the two army groups. Meanwhile Colonel Martinov of the Zaraisk regiment, 35th division alongside a cavalry squadron and battery began to hear gunfire 5 miles in front of their position. Martinov was ordered forward more and ran into the Russian right line held by General Grekov along with multiple cavalry squadrons. Grekov reported the situation to Martinov and that he planned to toss a counter attack. The cavalry squadrons were not forthcoming for such an action, so Martinov aided him by moving unseen up a valley to hit the left flank of the advancing Japanese line. Three batteries began firing into the Japanese flank with such a devastating effect, General Asada had to order his brigade to withdraw. The attacker had become the attacked! The commander of the Guards division upon seeing the 3rd Siberian corps entrenchments, requested reserves be brought up. At 8am word was sent to Kuroki who promised him the entire army reserve, unfortunately said reserves were marching from Fenghuangcheng and were exhausted by the time they reached the guards at 6pm. In order to save Asada’s brigade, his divisional commander ordered a 3 battalion strong attack against the center of the 3rd siberian corps. The attack was intended to be a diversion, nothing serious. By 4pm the Japanese artillery were snuffed out, their infantry failed to make any progress and thus they pulled back conveniently under the cover of a storm. Now 4 miles north east of Anping is a saddle known as Hungshaling, it elevates around 1900 feet and dominates the Tang valley. The Tambov regiment of the 9th division were atop it. Their divisional commander placed 9 battalions along the front line each one responsible for about a mile of the line, within his reserve were 7 battalions. They had two field batteries and four mountain guns in the position. The 9th division were about to be hit by Kurokis 2nd IJA main central thrust, supported by the 12th division’s 12th brigade. The 23rd brigade of General Kigoshi were given the task of seizing Hangshaling. Now Hungshaling is a formidle steep and rocky ridge, its northern edge covers the Taitzu river while its southern overlooks the Tang river flowing through the Hungsha pass. The lower slopes are covered in trees, but then it becomes 40 yards of open steep ground. The Tambov regiment positioned their 6 field guns on a narrow 20 yard wide ridge for the best visibility possible, but this also made them vulnerable. Kurkoki’s men had little chance of taking such a position, anyone who approached would be met with blankets of shrapnel and bullets. The ridge did have one weak spot, in front of it was a carpet of dead ground which could not be properly covered by the defenders, and attackers could get their artillery there to hit them. The 2nd and 12th IJA divisions attacked the 10th corps position on the night of the 25th. The 2nd division advanced in two columns attacking the right hand side of the 10th corps. By 8am the attack was petering out without progress. The 12th division advanced in five columns and managed to penetrate the Russian line and this led Russian units to pull back, exposing the left flank and Hungshaling. At 8:30pm on the 25th, the 23rd IJA brigade began their approach upon Hungshaling. Just after 1am, two battalions joined up taking a nearby spur called Suribachi Yama, while another regiment to their northwest position two mountain guns on the North Papanling. The Japanese were quite exposed and in isolated pockets, they prodded around, but were repelled everytime from the defenders upon their heights. At dawn the fighting really began. The Japanese artillery located at a place called One Tree Pass moved forward under fire from the Tambov regiment. The Tambov commander sent three companies to counter attack as the Japanese were motioned for a toehold upon the hill. For two hours the battle raged back and forth. The Russians then received word the 9th division on their right had withdrawn. At this point their reserve was down to half, while the Japanese had depleted theres. The Russians began the age old tactic of tossing boulders down the hill upon the advancing Japanese to great effect. By midday both sides were exhausted and bloody. General Sluchevski of the 10th corp watched Hungshalings struggle nervously. He continuously requested reinforcements from Bildering, but Bildering believed he was overreacting and refused to release the 3rd division. Bouldering was withholding the 3rd division because he sought to use them in the emergency that the Japanese managed to cross the Taitzu, he was also being fed information from Ivanov that he was facing far more units than he actually was. At 3:30pm the Japanese artillery began to fire again, fiercely targeting Hungshaling. The Japanese attacked from the south, but to no avail. A concurrent attack from the north in regimental strength was more successful. The Japanese swept past some abandoned batteries causing nearly 50% casualties upon their occupants before they pulled out. The Tambov regiment clung to the southern portion of the ridge, but their CO was wounded and 500 out of their 2500 men were dead or too wounded to fight. By 6pm the regiment was withdrawing through Peikou under the cover of a storm. It was a terrible loss, because the 3rd Siberians were crushing the 12th IJA division and the loss of Hungshaling would completely negate it. While Tambov’s regiment were pulling out, Sluchevski sent the last regiment of his corps reserve to Peikou while pleading with Bildering for aid. At 8pm Bildering agreed to send two regiment to the 10th corps, but it was all too late. Kuropatkin received word of the fall of the Peikou sector and ordered it recaptured immediately, for it threatened the entire outer defensive line. All the while the storm raged and with so much rain, reports came that the Tang river was rising and that her bridges might be lost, leaving the only viable crossing point for the 10th corps at a bridge 3 miles north of Anping which was now dominated by the Japanese position at Peikou. The 10th corps were withdrawing and this in turn threatened the position of the 3rd Siberians. That night Kuropatkin ordered the whole army to withdraw to the advanced position. The situation of the Southern group was nowhere near as desperate as the Eastern Group. Zarubaiev was ordered to resist but also to withdraw once the enemy began its main attack. The 26th had been a rather quiet day, then on the 27th at 6am the Southern group began their withdrawal. The Eastern group conducted a difficult and rather dangerous withdrawal through the rained out roads, but made it to their advanced positions without conflict. The energy was sapped out of the men, General Stakelberg commanding the 1st Siberians asked Zarubaeiv if his troops could rest on the 28th and Zarubaeiv agreed. For some reason General Zasulich’s 2nd siberians did not comply like the rest and continued to retreat and this move exposed the left flank of the stationary 4th Siberians holding a central position. The 4th Siberians could not retreat because the road heading north was blocked. The 3rd and 5th IJA divisions advanced too quickly, Zarubaeiv ordered Zasulich to stop his withdrawal, but he did not comply. Zarubaeiv sent the order again, and yet Zasulich did not comply. Kuropatkin then ordered Zasulich to turn back and help cover the withdrawal of the corps that he had effectively abandoned stating “if it were necessary to do so to cover the retreat of those Corps, to fight to the last man and perish’. Gradually the Russians got into their advanced lines, but it was a terribly messy ordeal. Countless supplies were abandoned, an entire battery was left on a road. Teams of men trying to grab materials were being fired upon by the Japanese who did not let up. Thus the first round of defenses was defeated. It was a confused mess. The 3rd Siberians and 10th corps received a blow to morale. With the contraction of forces to the secondary advanced line, Kuropatkin now placed his 17th corp on the north bank of the river. The second line of defenses was around 7 miles south of Liaoyang and included numerous hills that were heavily fortified. The Russians line contracted afford more defense, but this also allowed Oyama to encircle them easier. As darkness fell on August 29th, Oyama issued his orders to attack and took the 2nd IJA’s 4th division under his personal command. The 2nd IJA would advance upon the Soushanpu position to Hsinlitun overlooking the Tassu brook. To their right was the 4th IJA who would attack the area from Hsinlitun to Tsaofantun. The Guards division with other elements would attack the line of hills running north east. The 12th division with support from the 15th brigade and the 2nd divisions artillery would cross the Taitzu river to try and turn the Russian left flank. Thus three Japanese divisions would be attacking the 1st Siberian corp west of the Tassu brook; to the east of the Tassu brook the 10th division, 10th brigade, guards division and 3rd brigade would attack the 3rd Siberian corps and 10th corps. Assuming the units got over the Taitzu the 2nd and 12th divisions would hit the 17th corps. Kuropatkin outnumbered the Japanese significantly in the east, not so much in the west. Oyama kept his 4th division in his own hands to meet any possible Russian counter moves. Dawn on the 30th, the attack began. There was little progress to be made as the Russian artillery battered the attackers back. The casualties were immense for some units, the 2nd regiment only got within 1000 yard of the Russian lines and suffered 71 deaths and 325 wounded for the day. The second guards brigade supported by a kobi battalion attacked a 1030 feet hill held by the 11th east siberian regiment and 36th regiment. The Japanese managed to seize forward trenches, but soon Russian batteries came in and dislodged them. At 5am the 10th IJA division with 2 kobi regiment attacked some heights south and west of Tsaofantun held by the 3rd corps. The fighting was vicious and the Russians charged out of their trenches to meet the Japanese bayonet to bayonet. British Captain James Jardine attached with the 2nd IJA wrote this of the action “Whenever one side charged, the other side always charged to meet them. To a listener the effect was extraordinary. A hot musketry fight might be in progress, when suddenly the Russians would sound the charge. Instantly all firing would cease on either side, the Japanese cheering wildly in answer to the drums and bugles of the enemy. The Russians cheer ‘Hoorah!’, the Japanese, on such desperate occasions, cheer ‘Wa-a-a!’ The impression given by these cheers, mingling with the rattle of the drums and the clangour of the bugles, was more melancholy than martial, sounding like a prolonged wail of grief ascending from the troubled earth up into the dark heavens. “ The 3rd battalion of the 23rd east Siberian regiment bore the brunt of the attack and within 20 minutes lost all of their officers and 304 out of 502 soldiers. A russian battery rushed over and at a range of 600 yards battered the Japanese tossing them back. Oyama’s strategy at this point was to unhinge the Tassu brook position so the 4th IJA could turn the flank of the 1st and 3rd corps. The Japanese were gradually pushing forward getting their artillery in range to do more effective damage. Ultimately the Japanese were halted, but Kuropatkin was nervous the Japanese would succeed in turning the flank. Kuropatkin began to shuffle some units around and this allowed the Japanese to seize the village of Wuluntai and begin shelling Hill 693 and Mahyetun. The 2nd IJA advanced along the railway with the 5th division of the 4th IJA supporting them to the right. Their combined force began forcing open a gap. Stakelberg began requesting reinforcements from Kuropatkin, but Kuropatkin rejected this believing the Japanese could not be strong everywhere along the line and thus things must be already be stabilized. Stakelberg was instructed to assist the 3rd corps, but if their position and his was untenable they should withdraw to the inner defense line. The attacks opening the gap to the Tassu brook were increasing in strength, prompting Stakelberg to plead again for reinforcements. Despite the pressure the Japanese were applying since 6am, it was not until 11am when their line was complete and ready to really assault. At 12:45pm Stakelberg yet again requests more reinforcements and this time he was granted them, but unfortunately they were coming from the hill 693 sector and were heavily delayed. Stakelberg frantically plugged gaps in his line, until 2pm when finally some reinforcements arrived. Meanwhile Mishchenko grabbed a mixed force of 15 battalions drawn from numerous corps and charged into the Japanese north of hill 693. The action was uncoordinated and basically saw the men just filling a defensive line instead of actually dislodging the Japanese attackers upon the hill. Stakelberg reported at 4:40pm he had fully stabilized his lines. The night saw numerous attacks launched against hill 693 and Mahyetun, but without success. To make a demonstration, the Japanese demoted 3 generals for their lack of success. One of those generals was the father of Hideki Tojo. One commander who had a chance at success was General Kuroki. Bold action was required so Kuroki took action at 1pm on his own initiative to order a crossing of the river stated for 11pm that night. At midnight his forces began cross the Taitzu river unopposed some 15 miles to the east of Liaoyang. The water was around 3 feet deep where they crossed. Russian dragoons watched the Japanese cross the river and establish a bridgehead, they frantically sent word to Kuropatkin which only reached him by 11am because their telephones were having problems. The Russians had lost the vital opportunity to smash the Japanese as they crossed, cavalry forces under Liubavin who were supposed to be screening, but instead withdrew leaving the infantry. The morning of the 31st saw further Japanese attacks upon all the strategic features. Hsinlitun was being enveloped slowly, hill 693’s forward trenches were overwhelmed and seized, though the Japanese artillery would tragically hit their own men in the process. The Russians and Japanese atop hill 693 ended up fighting with bayonets leading to The 34th IJA regiment suffered 487 killed with 632 wounded, the 3rd east siberian regiment facing them took 35% officer and 38% casualties in the process. Shoushan hill saw a similar clash and a surprise attack was performed at the villages of Mahyetun and Kuchiatzu, but Russian machine guns saved them. Oyama still held back his 4th division wary of counter attacks, by nightfall the Russian line not only held, it caused 3000 casualties upon the Japanese. The saving grace was only to be Kuroki’s river crossing which gravely worried Kuropatkin who issued orders to his corps commanders “disposition No 3”. This plan was for a general retreat to the inner defensive line while reserves would be launched to hit Kuroki’s bridge head, then estimated to be 70,000 men. At 7:30pm the corps commanders initiated the command. Kuropatkin was still under the belief the enemy was much larger than they were, he had thus handed them a victory at the second line and it was completely unwarranted. By 1am the Japanese were discovering the Russians were withdrawing and by 3am, the Japanese seized all the features they had been bleeding for. With the first light of day they could now see Liaoyang more clearly as they brought their artillery closer and closer. At this point Oyama believed he was dealing with a routed army. The 17th Siberian army corps were now divdied. On the right was the 3rd division holding hil l1057, to the left was Lt General Dobrjinski 35th division on hill 920, the corps reserve was to the rear at the village of Shahotun led by Major General Glasko. Facing them was Kuroki. Kuroki observed the new Russian lines and saw a 75 foot knoll, it was the Russians “vital ground”. Vital ground was a terrain that if possesed by an enemy would seriously interfere with ones defense. Kuroki called the knoll Manju Yama meaning “rice cake hill”. Major General Okasaki’s 15th brigade of the 2nd division was given the mission to seize hill 920 and Manju Yama while the 12th division would advance to cut off the railway. At 8:30am the artillery began a duel and the Japanese took care to batter Manju Yama. At 9:30am the 15th brigade with the 12th divisions artillery for support began to attack Manju Yama, they would soon be joined by the 23rd brigade. As daylight was dimming the fire fight over Manju Yama remained fierce. The knoll was heavily fortified, the Russians knew it was of utmost importance to hold it. By 10:30pm the Japanese managed to gain a toehold on the northside of the knoll. Meanwhile the battle for hill 920 resulted in the Russians gradually evacuating the position. Their evacuation led to further units of the 17th corps pulling back weakening the line. The Russians launched two counter attacks at hill 920, but both failed seeing them pull out of the area by 4am. With the loss of hill 920 also came the loss of Manju Yama. Now three Russian corps wee severely restricted in their ability to maneuver. Within the Japanese hands Manju Yama provided the element of a shield to protect further river crossings, this was a catastrophe for the Russians. Now Kuroki sought to advance the forces to sweep away Liubavins cavalry, to approach the Yentai mines and seize the junction of the Yentai mines- Mukden railway. Meanwhile Kuropatkin was not informed of the loss of Manju Yama, Bildering only reported a hill to the northeast was captured, but that he would recapture the position when he had reorganized his reserves. When the loss of Manju Yama became known, the 1st Siberian corp was ordered to come up alongside the 17th corp and attack the Japanese right flank and rear. General Orlov commanding the 54th division of the 5th Siberian corp was ordered to cooperate with the 17th corp and recapture Manju Yama. Orlov was to take orders from Bildering and received orders at 7pm on September 1st to attack the Japanese position alongside the 17th corps at dawn. But two hours later Orlov received other orders stating ‘Your principal task is to keep in touch with Bildering, and if he is not attacked to act in the manner which has been indicated. If however he is attacked at Hsikuantun you will move to his support by the shortest route.’ Orlov was confused by this and sent word to Bildering asking for clarification, but his messenger got lost in a field of Kaoliang. Rather than do nothing Orlov took up a position south of the Yentai mines with Samsonov waiting for orders to strike. From his position Orlov could see the fighting on Manju Yama, it seemed the 17th corps were in deep battle, so Orlov acted. He left Samsonovs cavalry, two battalions and 8 guns to defend the Yentai mines as he rushed forward. Orlovs force became disorganized in some kaoliang, his artillery were unable to keep up properly. Most of Orlov’s men were reservists and when they met the enemy everything fell to ruin. By 1pm it was clear to Orlov his force was in a hopeless position, his main body was losing a battle of atrition and his left flank was about to be turned. Amidst the slaughter a messenger showed up at 1:10pm telling Orlov the 17th corps were falling apart and to act with extreme caution. Orlov replied ‘As I am unable to effect a junction with either the First Siberian or Seventeenth Corps, I am falling back on Yentai Station.’ The Japanese chased their terrified fleeing oponents in a tremendous rout. Stakelbergs battered 1st siberian corps were advancing in two columns when they came across Orlov’s rabble fleeing westward. Stakelberg in a very sick state ordered Orlov to grab his one remaining battalion and head back into the kaoliang forest to hit the Japanese artillery. Orlov personally led the battalion into the fray of battle and was hit 5 times in the head and stomach, his battalion was destroyed, what would remain of them would limp back to the Yentai mines. The Japanese set up artillery on the Shoushan Hill and began firing upon the western defenses of Liaoyang, as told to us by a correspondant of the times “The civilised world had never seen anything to compare with the final preparations for the advance of the Japanese infantry. The massed and scattered batteries took the line of Russian resistance in sections. The 250 guns opened first on the Russian settlement. Great columns of dust and smoke rose up from amidst the grey stone buildings. Then suddenly out of this whirlwind of bursting shell shot up great tongues of lurid flame. The very rocks of Shoushan quivered with the blasts of ever recurrent discharges. The air shrieked with the rush of high velocity projectiles.” The railway station was evacuating the wounded and civilians, it became a primary target for the Japanese artillery. Shells burst over the post office, the Red Cross tents, over a hospital, over numerous homes and business, it was chaos. Despite the breakthrough where Orlov was wounded, many Russian positions were holding. Kuropatkin left Liaoyang at 6am for the eastern side of the battlefield. He recieved signals from multiple commanders that Manju Yama was captured, but Bildering contuined to send word he was about to regain the feature. Kuropatkin ordered Zarubaeiv to perform a offensive to buy time, the offensive would costs 1200 Russian casualties. In the meantime General Dobrjinski’s 35th division were ordered to recapture Manju Yama. Dobrjinski’s men advanced through the Kaoliang forest, but Bildering contuined to issue reports he was “just about to attack the feature” prompting Kuropatkin to continously postpone Dobrjinski’s attack until it was nighttime and when they attacked they received no supprt and were defeated with heavy losses. On September 2nd during the afternoon Kuropatkin received news of Orlov’s deafeat, the 12th IJA had lost 180 men, Orlov had lost 1450, absolutely crushing. Numerous Russian units coverged against Manju Yama; 7 battalions from the 1st European and 5th Siberian corps attacked it from the right; General Vasiliev held 13 battalions of the 10th corps in the center and on the left were 6 battalions of the 17th corps under Colonel Istomin. Atop Manju Yama was the 15th brigade with one other regiment already battered. At 2:15pm 152 guns began firing upon the feature until 7pm. The Russian infantry began at 7pm when darkness fell. The Russians quickly became disoriented in the Kaoliang field, friendly fire occurred everywhere. Many of the Russians would not even make it within 20 yards to hurl grenades at the Japanese trenches. By 8:30 the Russians had to pull back. Later that night magnesium flares were launched and a fierce assault was made. By 9pm the attack became chaotic, to many troops of both armies were intermingled. The Russian national anthem literally had to be played to get their troops to assembly positions again. At 11pm the Russians were being pushed away, while Bildering continued to report to Kuropatkin “at any moment the pivot will be back in our hands”. In reality the Russian attack was definitely beaten back. 3 Russian regimental commanders and 300 troops were dead. On September the 5th when Japanese burial teams completed their work they would find 1039 casualties stood atop Manju Yama. At 3am on september 3rd, Zarubaeiv reported to Kuropatkin he was running low on ammunition and being beaten back. Then Stakelberg reported “I report that my situation is serious, and that, in consequence of the severe losses suffered by my regiments during the last five days, I not only cannot without serious reinforcements assume the offensive, but cannot even accept battle. I have therefore resolved to retreat this night on Liulinkou, where I will await fresh orders. ‘ After this were reported of Orlov’s defeat and that Liubavins cavalry screen was 20 miles from Mukden. Then Bildering reported that the Russians were forced off Manju Yama and that he would most likely have to withdraw and would not be able to continue offensive actions. At 4am another message came from Bildering ‘Very unfortunate. But since Stakelberg also has retreated, I must decide to retreat on Mukden and beyond. Concentrate there, reorganise and advance.’ Kuropatkin replied ‘My communications with Mukden being threatened by considerable Japanese forces, I am retiring my army to that place, as its first duty is to protect those communications.’ And thus a 43 miles retreat to Mukden would begin on September 3rd and end by the 10th. The Japanese lost 5337 men dead and 18063 wounded. For the Russians it was 3611 dead and 14,301 wounded. It was in essence an indecisive battle, a army of 200,000 Russians would slip away to fight another day. The Official British History summed up the battle of Liaoyang as such “The importance of this battle can hardly be exaggerated. By their victory the Japanese triumphantly vindicated their strategy and extricated themselves from a position which at one time threatened to prove extremely dangerous. Moreover, the knowledge that they had emerged victorious from a bitter trial of strength gave them that supreme confidence in their own invincibility which is the greatest asset of a soldier. Lastly, a reverse following, as it would have upon the failure of the first general assault upon Port Arthur, must have been disastrous for Japan. It is not, therefore, without reason that the twelve days from 23 August to 3 September have been called the most crucial period in the history of the War. “ Tsar Nicholas II sent Kuropatkin a conciliatory message following the news of the retreat from Liaoyang: ‘From your reports of the fighting at Liaoyang I appreciate that it was impossible for you to have held that position longer without risk of being completely cut off from your communications.’ By september 6th, the Tsar ordered a second Manchurian army to be formed and both armies would henceforth be led by Alexeiev. The battle of Liaoyang held up 50,000 Russians at Port Arthur from helping and nearly 100,000 Japanese likewise. Now the road was wide open for the Japanese to conquer the rest of Manchuria. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Kuropatkin was fed terrible intelligence and believed he was facing a much larger enemy than he was. In the end Kuropatkin fought a valiant battle for Liaoyang and inflicted tremendous casualties upon the Japanese, but Oyama’s strategy won the day.

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Age of Conquest: A Kings and Generals Podcast

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