The idea that the sciences can’t be unified–that there will never be a single ‘theory of everything’–is the current orthodoxy in philosophy of science and in many sciences as well. But different versions of pluralism present very different views of what exactly they are pluralistic about, why sciences cannot be unified, and what the failure of unification entails about the world and about our knowledge of it. In Scientific Pluralism Reconsidered: A New Approach to the Dis(unity) of Science (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2017), Stephanie Ruphy untangles and examines a number of different issues within the pluralist camp. Ruphy, who is professor of philosophy at Universite Grenoble-Alpes, argues for a “foliated pluralism” in ontology and for the relativity of knowledge claims and our representations of the world to historical features and epistemic interests. She also critically examines anti-reductionist arguments in terms of the generality of their conclusions and whether they support the inference from disunity to disorder. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoicesSupport our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/philosophy

The idea that a political order derives its authority, legitimacy, and justification from some kind of initial agreement or contract, whether hypothetical or tacit, has been a mainstay of political philosophy, at least since Hobbes. Today, the leading approach to theorizing justice–John Rawls’ conception of “justice as fairness”– employs a contract doctrine, albeit of a somewhat modified kind. There, too, the idea is that an initial agreement, struck under special conditions of fairness, settles the principles of justice that will govern a society. The fundamental thought driving social contract theories is undeniably intuitive: What else could justify social rules and principles but the agreement of those who are to live under them? But, of course, there are fairly obvious problems with the very idea of a hypothetical prosocial fair agreement that results in principles and rules to govern actual societies. In Social Contract Theory for a Diverse World: Beyond Tolerance (Routledge, 2017), Ryan Muldoon (SUNY Buffalo) launches an original kind of criticism of social contract theory, both in its classical and current formulations. According to Muldoon, extant social contract theories do not take sufficient account of diversity. Muldoon then proposes a revised version of social contract theory, and also a reorientation in political philosophy itself. In Muldoon’s hands, social contract theory is not aimed primarily at the production and justification of principles of justice; rather, the social contract is a tool of discovery in an ongoing social experiment. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoicesSupport our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/philosophy

Are complex phenomena “nothing but the sum of their parts”, or are they “more than the sum of their parts”? Physicists, chemists, and biologists as well as philosophers have long argued on both sides of this debate between the idea of reduction and that of emergence. At this point, argues Carl Gillett, the sides have reached a stalemate, where it is difficult to know in what ways the sides fundamentally disagree about the nature of the relation between a composite whole and its parts. In Reduction and Emergence in Science and Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 2016), Gillett aims to break the stalemate by providing needed clarification about what divides contemporary reductionists from contemporary emergentists, and lays out the strongest positions on each side. Gillett, who is professor of philosophy at Northern Illinois University, uses his framework to provide a platform for future philosophical and scientific inquiry, helping reorient the debate towards fruitful empirical tests that might provide evidence for one view over the other, and point the way towards new issues regarding the nature of collectives. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoicesSupport our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/philosophy

The philosopher (and 1972 presidential candidate) John Hospers once wrote, “justice is getting what one deserves. What could be simpler?” As it turns out, this seemingly simple idea is in the opinion of many contemporary political philosophers complicated enough to be implausible. According to many these theorists, the question of what one deserves is no less vexed than the question of what justice requires. Some even hold that the question of what one deserves can be answered only by reference to a conception of justice. Accordingly, it seems as if a defense of Hospers’ simple idea requires a lot of effort. In Distributive Justice: Getting What We Deserve from Our Country (Oxford University Press, 2016), Fred Feldman provides an original version of desertism, the view according to which justice prevails in a society when all of its members get what they deserve from whatever entity has the job of enacting justice. He forcefully argues that, once it is articulated with the requisite nuance and precision, desertism is an attractive conception of distributive justice. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoicesSupport our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/philosophy

Psychological and philosophical theories of the emotions tend to take the adult emotional repertoire as the paradigm case for understanding the emotions. From this standpoint, the emotions are usually distinguished into two categories: the basic emotions, like fear or happiness, and the higher cognitive emotions, like shame or pride. In her new book, Becoming Human: The Ontogenesis, Metaphysics, and Expression of Human Emotionality (MIT Press, 2016), Jennifer Greenwood challenges this standard division and related distinctions, such as which emotions are innate or learned. Greenwood, who is academic tutor in philosophy, education, and nursing at the University of Queensland, argues that there is just one natural kind, emotions, that develop from common precursor states by means of deeply interactive relations between the assistance-soliciting infant or child and the assistance-providing caregiver. This deep functional interaction justifies her claim that the emotions are a case of extended cognition, as well as the view that language mediates emotional ontogenesis. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoicesSupport our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/philosophy

We are all familiar with the idea that some persons are disabled. But what is disability? What makes it such that a condition–physical, cognitive, psychological–is a disability, rather than, say, a disease or illness? Is disability always and intrinsically bad? Are disabilities things to be cured? Might disabilities be merely ways of being different? And what role should the testimony and experiences of disabled persons play in addressing these questions? In The Minority Body: A Theory of Disability (Oxford University Press, 2016) Elizabeth Barnes argues that, at least for a range of physical conditions characterized as disabilities, disabilities are merely ways in which bodies can be different, not ways of their being intrinsically badly off. She argues that this view of disability as mere difference has important implications for broader moral and social issues concerning disabled persons; she also argues that her view is better able to respect the experiences and testimony of disabled persons. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoicesSupport our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/philosophy

Andy Clark, author of 'Surfing Uncertainty: Prediction, Action, and Embodied Mind', discusses the predictive processing hypothesis and its relation to embodied cognition, attention modulation, and perceptual experience. They explore the role of top-down models, traditional debates in philosophy, and the relevance of the Cartesian evil demon in embodied cognition. They also delve into the cognitive penetrability of perception, implicit biases, and the importance of good information in minimizing prediction error.

On any mature view, war is horrific. Naturally, there is a broad range of fundamental ethical questions regarding war. According to most moral theories, war is nonetheless sometimes permitted, and perhaps even obligatory. But even an obligatory war may be fought in a morally impermissible way. So it makes sense to distinguish the moral questions concerning the decision to wage war from the questions concerning the conduct of soldiers, armies, and states in the course of fighting a war. There is a large and growing contemporary literature devoted to these questions. Surprisingly absent from these discussions are utilitarian views of the morality of war. In Utilitarianism and the Ethics of War (Routledge, 2016) William H. Shaw of San Jose State University provides a much needed utilitarian analysis of the ethics of war. Shaw proposes a fundamental utilitarian principle regarding the moral rightness of waging war, and then argues on utilitarian grounds for a compelling conception of the morality, duties, and responsibilities that apply to those fighting a war. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoicesSupport our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/philosophy

Why is it controversial to cast light-skinned actress Zoe Saldana as the lead character in a film about the performer Nina Simone? How should we understand the coexisting desire and revulsion of the black body that traces its roots to Thomas Jefferson’s longstanding relationship with his slave Sally Hemings and extends to contemporary attitudes towards black hair? In Black is Beautiful: A Philosophy of Black Aesthetics (Wiley-Blackwell, 2016), Paul C. Taylor examines primary themes in racialism from the perspective of aesthetic culture. Taylor, Associate Professor of Philosophy and African American Studies and an Associate Dean for Undergraduate Studies and at Penn State University, considers such issues as black invisibility, expressive culture and politics, and the problem of authenticity and cultural appropriation. He also lays the foundation for analytic philosophical tools to be brought more widely to bear on scholarly discussion of issues related to race and racialism. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoicesSupport our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/philosophy

Political states claim the moral right to rule the persons living within their jurisdiction; they claim the authority to make and enforce laws, establish policies, and allocate benefits and burdens of various kinds. But states also claim rights over their territories. These include rights to establish and protect borders, to control airspace, extract and use natural resources on and beneath their geographical region. Philosophers have long wondered about the basis for states claims to authority over persons. But there are additional questions regarding the territorial authority claimed by states. How do states come to possess rights to the natural resources that lie beneath the ground? How might the moral character of the initial acquisition of land impact a states present claims to authority? In Boundaries of Authority (Oxford University Press, 2016) A. John Simmons (University of Virginia) argues that leading accounts of state authority are insufficient to address successfully the distinctive questions regarding state boundaries. Building on his own Lockean individualist account of authority, Simmons develops a philosophical conception of how the moral rights claimed by states could be justified.   Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoicesSupport our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/philosophy