ROCKING OUR PRIORS

How can governments tackle tax evasion? To explore this question, Professor Dina Pomeranz examined two Randomized Control Trials in Chile, and a natural experiment in Ecuador. Her research indicates that firms are more likely to pay their taxes when they anticipate government sanctions and enforcement. Information alone is not enough to boost compliance; firms also need to believe that government will penalise evasion. To learn more, read: https://voxdev.org/topic/public-economics/dodging-taxman-evidence-ecuador; https://www.povertyactionlab.org/sites/default/files/publications/role-vat-tax-enforcement.pdf; https://www.econ.uzh.ch/en/people/faculty/pomeranz.html We hope you enjoy our podcast!

What is motivating the Government of Bangladesh to recognise, register, & respect trade unions? And change the labour law, so all workers can organise collectively to push for better conditions, rights, and pay? 1) Commercial pressure from global buyers 2) Threats of trade sanctions from the EU 3) Voters (domestic political pressures) 4) None of the above. Dr. Jennifer Bair (Associate Professor, University of Virginia) explains why labour repression remains pervasive in Bangladesh. Notwithstanding the horrors of Rana Plaza, there is little incentive for the Government to tolerate trade unions. Instead they ban trade unions in export processing zones. This is part of their economic strategy, to keep costs low, and remain globally competitive. So what might encourage change? Stronger commercial pressure for reform, suggests Dr. Bair. Interested? You can learn more about Dr. Bair's work here: https://sociology.virginia.edu/content/jennifer-bair Research discussed in the podcast: Jennifer Bair, "Labor Administration and Inspection in Post-Rana Plaza Bangladesh" in International Labor Rights Case Law https://brill.com/view/journals/ilrc/3/3/article-p457_457.xml Jennifer Bair and others, "Forcing change from the outside? The role of trade-labour linkages in transforming Vietnam's labour regime" in Competition & Change https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1024529417729326 Mark Anner, "Squeezing workers’ rights in global supply chains: purchasing practices in the Bangladesh garment export sector in comparative perspective" in Review of International Political Economy: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09692290.2019.1625426?journalCode=rrip20#.XRUS7W6rCKs.twitter Ungated working paper: https://ler.la.psu.edu/gwr/documents/CGWR2017ResearchReportBindingPower.pdf John S. Ahlquist and Layna Mosley, "Firm Participation in Voluntary Regulatory Initiatives: the Accord, Alliance, and US garment importers from Bangladesh" http://laynamosley.web.unc.edu/files/2018/04/Ahlquist-Mosley-2018.pdf Alice Evans (me!), "Export Incentives & Domestic Activists" https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331864175_Export_Incentives_Domestic_Activists

Which improves aid effectiveness: setting targets and monitoring delivery, or enhancing autonomy for frontline workers? Dr. Dan Honig explores this question using a database of 14,000 development projects and eight qualitative studies. We discuss his methods, findings, and implications. I do hope you enjoy it. Check out the book: https://global.oup.com/academic/product/navigation-by-judgment-9780190672454?cc=gb&lang=en

Over a thousand people died at the Rana Plaza factory collapse in Bangladesh. That was five years ago, this April. To learn what caused it, what's happened since, and how we can prevent another such tragedy I'm joined by Professor Juliane Reinecke, of King's Business School. Keen to learn more? You can read Juliane Reinecke's paper here: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/bjir.12242

Authoritarian leaders who hold elections actually stay in power longer than those who don't. Democracy thus facilitates dictatorships, in a sense. Why is this? How do they get away with it? And what could prevent these counterfeit democracies? In this podcast, Professor Nic Cheeseman discusses his brilliant new book (co-authored with Dr. Brian Klaas). Curious? Check out the book: https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300204438/how-rig-election

Does violence increase risk aversion? Drs. Pamela Jakiela and Owen Ozier did a natural experiment by mistake. Their survey was interrupted by the Kenyan post-electoral violence: a thousand dead; thousands internally displaced. Participants had an equal chance of being interviewed before or after survey. So this enabled Pam and Owen to explore the impact of conflict on people's preferences. What did they find? Did conflict increase or decrease risk aversion? Do their survey results reflect real-world behavioural change? Does risk-aversion matter for development? Why do we need to know about people's preferences for risk aversion? Curious? Click here to read the paper and learn more: http://www.pamjakiela.com/JakielaOzier-riskpreferences-2017-08-29.pdf You can read more of Pam's work here: http://www.pamjakiela.com/ And Owen's here: http://economics.ozier.com/owen/ Thank you for listening!

How can we ensure everyone gets a decent education? Dr. David Evans (World Bank Lead Economist) discusses the World Development Report 2018. Key points: - Focus on learning (not school enrolement); - Build inclusive coalitions; - Galvanise support for reform by highlighting faster improvements in neighbouring places; - Iteratively adapt to identify what works in context. Intrigued? Read the full report: http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/wdr2018

How can we improve health care management? Provide more training, or more supportive supervision? To ascertain what works, Dr. David Evans (Lead Economist at the World Bank), colleagues, and the Nigerian Ministry of Health ran a Randomised Control Trial. What did they find? Why are RCTs useful? What are their limits? And what other methodologies might we use to improve health care? Spoiler: training alone is insufficient. Supportive supervision is key to improving health care management. Curious? Check out the paper – co-authored with Felipe A. Dunsch, Felipe, Ezinne Eze-Ajoku, and Mario Macis: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/170951/1/dp10967.pdf

How can we assess the impact and scalability of complex interventions? Why use mixed methods? How can we tackle hubris among economists at the World Bank? The wonderful Professor Michael Woolcock (Lead Social Scientist at the World Bank) makes the case for mixed methods. This discussion draws on his chapter, forthcoming in Michiru Nagatsu and Attilia Ruzzene (eds.) (forthcoming) "Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Social Science: A Dialogue". (London: Bloomsbury Academic) You can read more about his work here: http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/people/m/michael-woolcock

Although widely overlooked, formal rules have significantly impacted democratisation in African politics. So, to understand democratisation, we need to focus less on personal relationships (like neopatrimonialism) and more on term limits, constitutions, electoral commissions, economic regulations and systems of land tenure. When leaders uphold formal rules, this sets expectations, generating a positive feedback loop. For example, when a president stands down at the end of their term, subsequent presidents are more likely to do so. In this podcast, Professor Nic Cheeseman discusses his fascinating new book, on how the rules of the game shape political developments. Check out the book: https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/institutions-and-democracy-in-africa/73ED89DF634FAFAA2D070F0ED4EE780F