A Better Peace: The War Room Podcast

…the claim that AI is changing the nature of warfare…it doesn't have to be backed up by any empirical evidence at all…simply saying that maybe gets you what you want In the first episode our scholars began the discussion of the nature versus the character of war. In episode 2 the conversation turns to AI and the marketing value of claiming nature IS changing and it eventually flows to war termination. A BETTER PEACE welcomes Emily Knowles of the Oxford Research Group to join our own faculty members Tino Perez, Jacqueline Whitt, and Andrew Hiil to closely examine this article of faith of strategic thought. They each offer personal and professional opinions on the concept and delve into a great deal more in part one of this watercooler style discussion.     Emily Knowles is the Program Director of Oxford Research Group’s Remote Warfare Program. Celestino Perez is a colonel in the U.S. Army and a faculty instructor in the Department of National Security and Strategy at the U.S. Army War College. Jacqueline E. Whitt is an Associate Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Army War College and the Editor-in-Chief of WAR ROOM. Andrew A. Hill is the former Chair of Strategic Leadership and the first Editor-In-Chief of WAR ROOM at the U.S. Army War College. The views expressed in this presentation are those of the speakers and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, U.S. Army, or Department of Defense. Photo Description: The M3 howitzer was designed to be deployed with airborne troops and used during World War II, with a variant used during the Korean War. Photo Credit: U.S. Army Episode 1

I think it makes...strategic thinkers think that they're saying something profound when in fact they are not.   Scholars have long held that the nature of war is enduring and unchanging, while the character of war is in flux and subject to the whims of technology and modern thought. It is a concept often credited to von Clausewitz but odds are it's not that old an idea. A BETTER PEACE welcomes Emily Knowles of the Oxford Research Group to join our own faculty members Tino Perez, Jacqueline Whitt, and Andrew Hiil to closely examine this deeply held truth of strategic thought. They each offer personal and professional opinions on the concept and delve into a great deal more in part one of this watercooler style discussion.     Emily Knowles is the Program Director of Oxford Research Group’s Remote Warfare Program. Celestino Perez is a colonel in the U.S. Army and a faculty instructor in the Department of National Security and Strategy at the U.S. Army War College. Jacqueline E. Whitt is Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Army War College and the Editor-in-Chief of WAR ROOM. Andrew A. Hill is the former Chair of Strategic Leadership and the first Editor-In-Chief of WAR ROOM at the U.S. Army War College. The views expressed in this presentation are those of the speakers and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, U.S. Army, or Department of Defense. Image: New Inventions of Modern Times -Nova Reperta-, The Invention of Gunpowder, plate 3 Image Creator: Jan van der Straet, called Stradanus, Harris Brisbane Dick Fund, 1934 Episode 2

When you're more focused on lethality you're less likely to look at ways the military can act to support things that will maybe avoid war in the first place During his tenure as the Secretary of Defense, James N. Mattis frequently used the term lethality in describing all aspects of the U.S. Department of Defense. It was described as a desired endstate for all acquisitions, it was the subject of criticism in the world of joint Professional Military Education, and service secretaries and chief were given carte blanche to eliminate or restructure anything that hindered or didn't contribute to lethality. Andrew Diederich joins Editor-In-Chief Jacqueline Whitt to discuss the shortcomings of that thinking in the strategic realm. If all the DoD concerns itself with is lethality, what roles, what options, what contributions is it at worst ignoring, at best, allowing to deteriorate?     LTC Andrew Diederich is a graduate of the U.S. Army War College AY19 Resident Class and currently assigned to Northern Command. Jacqueline E. Whitt is Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Army War College and the Editor-in-Chief of WAR ROOM. The views expressed in this presentation are those of the speakers and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, U.S. Army, or Department of Defense. Photo Description: Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, Calif. – Cpl. Matthew Teutsch (left) and Cpl. Brett Norman, both combat videographers with the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit, participate in hand-to-hand and close quarters combat during martial arts training at Camp Pendleton, Calif., Oct. 2, 2018. The Marines worked on offensive and defensive techniques utilizing different weapons systems focusing on the motto of the Martial Arts Program: “One Mind, Any Weapon.” Photo Credit:  U.S. Marine Corps photo by Staff Sgt. Donald Holbert

Words have meaning and all too often there is no common understanding of that intended meaning. When former Secretary of Defense Mattis placed an emphasis on intellectual leadership in “cultivating creative workforce talent” he surely had a specific idea in mind as to what that represented. Today’s panel takes a crack at just what intellect versus intelligence means and more importantly how to get after individual development. COLs Terri Peterkin and Maurice Sipos along with Dr. John Bonin join Buck Haberichter in the studio to try and understand just what the SECDEF had in mind and just as importantly how to get to his desired end state. What should institutions of higher learning, leaders and mentors do to develop creative leaders?

The charter was...to look at preparation of the Navy for the defense of maritime security and the coasts In the early 1900's the U.S. Navy found itself creating strategy in an ad hoc manner in the midst of modernization and calls for officer corps structure and education reform. In response the Secretary of the Navy initiated efforts which led to the creation of the Naval War College and equally as important the General Board of the Navy. The General Board was essentially the first Navy General Staff in all but name for fear of creeping Prussian militarism. John Kuehn, a professor of history at the Army Command and General Staff College, recounts the early days of the Navy's attempt to formalize strategy formulation. He and JP Clark review the formative stages of the modern U.S. Navy and the worldwide reach and structure that so many are familiar with today.   Dr. John Kuehn is a Professor of Military History at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. COL JP Clark is the Deputy Director for Academic Engagement for the Strategic Studies Institute and a WAR ROOM Senior Editor. The views expressed in this presentation are those of the speakers and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, U.S. Army, or Department of Defense. Photo: USS Baron DeKalb, an Eads class ironclad Photo Credit: U.S. Naval archives

Dickinson College...students marched on the War College but instead of violence we had discussion. In a time when the nation sees increasing political divides and claims that the civil-military gap is ever widening, one program reaches out to try and reverse the trend. Colonels Ed Kaplan and Mike Baim join WAR ROOM Editor-in-Chief Jacqueline E. Whitt, to highlight the contributions of the U.S. Army War College's Eisenhower Series College Program. Ed and Mike explain how each academic year a joint cohort of military officers reach out to colleges and town halls across the nation to introduce War College students to audiences that are often unfamiliar with members of the U.S. Military. Their goal is to have reasoned and thoughtful discussions with the society they serve and protect. And for the last 50 years the Eisenhower Program has succeeded in closing that gap in communities that have little or no tie to the military. COL Mike Baim is a graduate of the U.S. Army War College AY19 Resident Class. Colonel Ed Kaplan is the Director of Aerospace Studies at the U.S. Army War College. Jacqueline E. Whitt is Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Army War College and the Editor-in-Chief of WAR ROOM. The views expressed in this presentation are those of the speakers and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, U.S. Army, or Department of Defense. Check out this video of a typical engagement for the Eisenhower Series College Program. Photo: On the eve of the operation, Dwight D. Eisenhower visited Greenham Common, an English airfield in Newbury, where he addressed the blackened face of 1st Lieutenant Wallace C. Strobel, Company E, 502nd Parachute Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division, and other airborne troopers. Photo Credit: U.S. Army Signal Corps

Bill Johnsen, a historian at the U.S. Army War College, and Con Crane, Chief of the Historical Services Division, dive into the life of Baron Antoine-Henri Jomini, a pivotal figure in military theory. They explore Jomini's battle against Clausewitz's chaotic approach and how his structured principles originated from Napoleon’s victories. Discussion highlights Jomini's lasting impact on military education, the balance of art and science in warfare, and the need for critical thinking about military strategy today.

We continue our Great Strategists series with an episode on the man whose works serve as a foundation of strategic thought about war. Thucydides (c. 460-400 BC) was a Athenian general in the Peloponnesian War who, early on, recognized the War's potential for transforming the political and social structures of the period. Thus, he set out to write a detailed account of the War from its onset. His aim was to understand how wars began, its impacts on combatant forces and societies, and to raise questions about the meaning of 'just' war. His first-person perspective adds color and power to his description of these events. Much of the contemporary discourse about the nature and character of war is owed to Thucydides. However, the full History of the Peloponnesian War is not the easiest read and covers an extensive amount of ground. It is both too easy and dangerous to reduce the work to particular passages such as the powerful Melian Dialogue or reduce the work to bumper stickers like the "Thucydidean Trap." A wider reading shows how strategic decisions made early in the war had significant effects in the short and long terms. Helping tell Thucydides' story and the impacts of his History are three faculty members from the U.S. Army War College -- Drs. Tami Davis Biddle, Michael Neiberg, and Richard Lacquement. Each have a role in incorporating Thucydides' works into the War College curriculum and offer their individual perspectives. UProfessor of Strategy and WAR ROOM Editor-in-Chief Jacqueline E. Whitt moderates. [Thucydides] is one of the very few primary resources we have. If he hadn't done this, we probably wouldn't know very much about this period at all Tami Davis Biddle is Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Army War College. Michael Neiberg is Chair of War Studies at the U.S. Army War College. Richard Lacquement was Dean of the School of Strategic Landpower at the U.S. Army War College. Jacqueline Whitt is Associate Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Army War College and the Editor-in-Chief of WAR ROOM. The views expressed in this presentation are those of the speakers and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, U.S. Army, or Department of Defense. Image: Depiction of Pericles' Funeral Oration by Phillip Foltz, c. 1877, via Wikimedia Commons, public domain

Ah, writing ... that elusive skill. For all the advice and helpful books on the market, there is little substitute for developing the skill through practice and experience. But not everyone has the time, and even experienced writers can struggle to find the right words. In this episode of A BETTER PEACE, Jennifer Keene and Michael Neiberg discuss various tips on writing, especially history and other scholarship. How does one craft a good thesis? Or deliver a great hook in the introduction? Or develop those 'wow' moments that leave a lasting impression on the reader?

At the outbreak of the war, all of those armies were quite small but they rapidly grew many times their size in 1914 Historical memory of the First World War often focuses on the western front, perhaps because of egocentrism or the wealth of documents and literature that emerged from the front. But while the western front is iconic, this focus obscures the fact that the Great War was indeed a world war fought on several continents by soldiers from around the globe. An often overlooked theater was Africa, where soldiers from colonial armies fought each other on the continent, or joined their colonial powers on the western front. These small colonial armies originally supported and preserved imperial rule, but as the Great War broke out they mobilized quickly. What motivated Africans to fight in the armies of their colonial power? How did the war change the relationships between the empires and their colonies? These are other topics are presented by special guest Michelle Moyd, author of Violent Intermediaries: African Soldiers, Conquest, and Everyday Colonialism in German East Africa. WAR ROOM Editor-in-Chief Jacqueline E. Whitt moderates.     Michelle Moyd is the Ruth N. Halls Associate Professor, Department of History and Associate Director, Center for Research on Race and Ethnicity in Society at Indiana University. Jacqueline E. Whitt is the Editor-in-Chief of WAR ROOM. The views expressed in this presentation are those of the speakers and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. Army War College, U.S. Army, or Department of Defense. Photo: Four Askaris, German East Africa Soldiers, taken between 1906 and 1918. Photo Credit: By Bundesarchiv, Bild 105-DOA3124 / Walther Dobbertin / under creative commons license 3.0, Germany [CC-BY-SA 3.0, CC BY-SA 3.0 de]. Refer to this link for more information.