Consumer Finance Monitor

Today’s podcast, which repurposes a recent webinar, is the conclusion of a two-part examination of the CFPB’s use of a proposed interpretive rule, rather than a legislative rule, to expand regulatory requirements for earned wage access (EWA) products. Part One, which was released last week, focused on the CFPB’s use of an interpretive rule to expand regulatory requirements for buy-now, pay-later (BNPL) products. We open with a discussion of EWA products, briefly describing and distinguishing direct-to-consumer EWAs and employer-based EWAS. We review some of the consumer-friendly features that are common to EWAs, including that there is no interest charged and they are typically non-recourse, and discuss expedited funding fees and tips, neither of which is required to access EWAs. We also provide an overview of how some states have attempted to regulate (or specifically not regulate) EWAs. We then transition into a discussion of the CFPB’s history with EWA products, including the Bureau’s advisory opinion in 2020 that took a markedly different approach to EWAs, essentially taking the position that a certain subset of EWAs fell outside of the definition of “credit” under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) and Regulation Z. The CFPB’s proposed interpretive rule, on the other hand, states that EWAs are “credit” and that expedited funding fees and optional tips, in most circumstances, are part of the finance charge that must be disclosed under TILA and Regulation Z. We explore the Bureau’s reasoning in support of these conclusions and some of the compliance difficulties that the proposed interpretive rule would create were it to go into effect as written. Since this recording took place, the CFPB has posted over 148,000 comment letters that it has received on the proposed interpretive rule, many of which are from consumers who use EWAs to access a portion of their earned wages prior to their scheduled payday and are concerned that the proposed interpretive rule could limit or jeopardize their access to EWAs. The high number of responses demonstrates the level of interest that the CFPB’s proposed interpretive rule has generated. We conclude with thoughts about vulnerabilities with both the proposed interpretive rule for EWAs and the interpretive rule for BNPLs that we described in Part One of this podcast, as well as how these rules could potentially be challenged. One notable development that has occurred since our recording is that the Financial Technology Association has filed a complaint asking a D.C. federal court to strike down the interpretive rule for BNPLs because of the alleged violations of the Administrative Procedure Act that we discuss in this episode. Alan Kaplinsky, former Practice Leader and Senior Counsel in Ballard Spahr’s Consumer Financial Services Group, moderates today’s episode, and is joined by John Culhane and Michael Guerrero, Partners in the Group, and John Kimble, Of Counsel in the Group.

Today’s podcast, which repurposes a recent webinar, is the first in a two-part examination of the CFPB’s use of an interpretive rule, rather than a legislative rule, to expand regulatory requirements for buy-now, pay-later (BNPL) products. Part Two, which will be available next week, will focus on the CFPB’s use of a proposed interpretive rule to expand regulatory requirements for earned wage access (EWA) products. We open with an overview of what interpretive rules are and how they differ procedurally and substantively from legislative rules. The intended use of interpretive rules is to explain the meaning of an existing provision of law, while legislative rules, which require a more complicated and time-consuming procedure, including a notice and comment period under the Administrative Procedures Act, are intended to be used to expand or implement a provision of law. We also discuss why the CFPB chose to use an interpretive rule and why they decided to include a request for comments when that is not required for interpretive rules. We then discuss BNPL products, including how they work and some of the features that have made them popular with consumers and merchants. We point out that the interpretive rule seems to represent a change in the views of the CFPB with regard to BNPL. After providing an overview of the CFPB’s history with the product, including a report issued by the Bureau back in 2022, we delve into the details of the CFPB’s interpretive rule. We discuss how the CFPB seems to be expanding the definition of a “credit card” to include what the Bureau calls a “digital user account,” which is how consumers access their BNPL information. We conclude with thoughts about the implications of the CFPB’s interpretive rule and some of the difficulties that BNPL providers will have complying with the interpretive rule. This includes a discussion of the timing of billing statements and written notice requirements for billing error disputes and merchant disputes. Alan Kaplinsky, former Practice Leader and Senior Counsel in Ballard Spahr’s Consumer Financial Services Group, moderates today’s episode, and is joined by John Culhane, Michael Guerrero, and Joseph Schuster, Partners in the Group. The webinar was recorded before the CFPB issued an FAQ, which purports to answer a number of open questions raised by the BNPL interpretive rule. We recommend that you review the FAQ after listening to this podcast.  

Our podcast today focuses on negative option consumer contracts, i.e., agreements that allow a seller to assume a customer’s silence is an acceptance of an offer. Such contracts are ubiquitous in today’s marketplace. Today’s guests are Kaitlin Caruso, a professor at the University of Maine Law School, and Prentiss Cox, a professor at the University of Minnesota Law School. They have written an article entitled, “Silence as Consumer Consent: Global Regulation of Negative Option Contracts.” The article is available on SSRN and will soon be published in the American University Law Review. The Professors first describe what they perceive to be some of the consumer harms resulting from the use of negative option contracts – consumers signing up for “free trial” offers that convert to term contracts requiring consumers to pay periodic fees after the free trial period has expired; credit card “add-on” products which are sold through telemarketing, like credit life and disability insurance; subscription contracts which make it difficult for consumers to cancel; subscription contracts for services, which are not used for lengthy periods of time while the consumer continues to pay periodic fees. The Professors then describe the existing federal and state statutes and FTC regulations and why they are inadequate to protect consumers. They point out that the current FTC negative option rule was promulgated decades before the development of the Internet and obviously does not begin to deal with online sales of goods and services. Instead, the FTC rule is intended to deal with mail order sales like the “Book-of-the-Month” club. While the FTC has proposed a new negative option rule which is a vast improvement over the existing FTC rule, it is unclear when or if a final rule will be promulgated. The Professors also describe the federal Restore Online Shoppers Confidence Act, and the FTC‘s Telemarketing Sales Rule which tangentially pertain to negative option contracts. Finally, the professors discuss a patchwork quilt of state laws (mostly part of state UDAP statutes) which deal with negative option contracts. After surveying the existing federal and state laws, as well as negative option laws enacted in many foreign countries, the Professors describe the core elements of what a negative option law (be it state or federal) should contain in order to protect consumers. The core elements are: 1.  A prohibition against converting a “free trial” offer into a term contract; 2. A prohibition against automatically converting a negative option contract into another term contract with the contract instead becoming a month-to- month contract.  Alternatively, the negative option contract could convert to a term contract, which could then be canceled during the first 90 days after the consumer sees a charge on a credit card statement. 3. If a subscription to services is not used by the consumer for at least one year, then the seller must notify the consumer of the dormancy, and if the service remains dormant for another three months thereafter, then the seller must cease charging the consumer for the service.  Alan Kaplinsky, Senior Counsel in Ballard Spahr’s Consumer Financial Services Group, hosts today’s episode.

Judge Daniel Domenico, a Federal District Court judge for the District of Colorado, lends his expertise to a crucial discussion on interstate usury parity. He delves into the landmark opinion on Colorado's opt-out legislation for interstate loans. The conversation examines the historical context of interest rate exportation between state-chartered and national banks. Domenico also discusses recent court challenges, the implications of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act, and how these developments shape the banking landscape.

Regulatory bodies are tightening their grip on bank partnerships with fintechs. Insightful discussions highlight the potential risks and benefits of these collaborations, emphasizing the need for strategic compliance. Experts delve into the various structures of bank-fintech partnerships, exploring implications for consumer safety and accountability. Navigating the regulatory landscape requires banks to adopt robust legal strategies and proactive monitoring. Continuous due diligence is essential for managing risks in this rapidly evolving financial environment.

On June 28, in Loper Bright v. Raimondo, et al., the Supreme Court overturned the Chevron deference doctrine, a long-standing tenet of administrative law established in 1984 in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. This doctrine directed courts to defer to a government agency’s interpretation of ambiguous statutory language as long as the interpretation was reasonable. However, legal scholars now express widely divergent views as to the scope and likely effects of Loper Bright’s overruling of the Chevron doctrine on the future course of regulatory agency interpretive and enforcement authority. In this two-part episode, which repurposes a recent webinar, a panel of experts delves into the Loper Bright decision, and its underpinnings, rationale, and likely fallout. Our podcast features moderator Alan Kaplinsky, Senior Counsel and former practice leader of Ballard Spahr’s Consumer Financial Services Group; Ballard Spahr Partners Richard Andreano, Jr. and John Culhane, Jr.; and special guests Craig Green, Charles Klein Professor of Law and Government at Temple University Beasley School of Law, and Kent Barnett, recently appointed Dean of the Moritz College of Law at The Ohio State University. Part II opens with an in-depth discussion of the major questions doctrine (which bars agencies from resolving questions of great economic and political significance without clear statutory authority), how it has evolved, and its interaction with Chevron deference. Our experts offer predictions as to the likely role of the major questions doctrine in post-Chevron jurisprudence, and touch on the non-delegation doctrine (which prevents Congress from delegating legislative power). We also refer to the effects of another recent Supreme Court decision, Corner Post, Inc. v Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, which expands the time during which entities new to an industry may challenge longstanding agency rules. We then consider the practical effects of the Loper Bright and Corner Post decisions on pending and future litigation. Partners Richard Andreano and John Culhane discuss concrete examples of cases currently progressing through the courts that already are evidencing the effects of Loper Bright, and ways in which arguments now are being articulated or might be articulated in litigation challenging a number of regulatory rules and interpretations in the absence of Chevron deference. We proceed to explore other significant topics including the validity of prior decisions of the Supreme Court and lower courts that were based exclusively on the Chevron doctrine. Our panel then opines on whether Loper Bright, both in its entirety and as to certain of its specific constituent elements, is “good” or “bad” for the consumer financial services industry and for regulated entities in general. In conclusion, Mr. Andreano cites concerns about how courts may apply alternative deference guidance that remains in place (including Skidmore deference, discussed in Part I of this podcast), and Mr. Culhane expresses hope that the outcome in Loper Bright might move agencies to engage in more thorough, thoughtful, and precise analysis in the rulemaking process.

On June 28, in Loper Bright v. Raimondo, et al., the Supreme Court overturned the Chevron deference doctrine, a long-standing tenet of administrative law established in 1984 in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. This doctrine directed courts to defer to a government agency’s interpretation of a statute if the statute was ambiguous regarding, or simply did not address, the issue before the court, as long as the interpretation was reasonable. However, legal scholars now express widely divergent views as to the scope and likely effects of Loper Bright’s overruling of the Chevron doctrine on the future course of regulatory agency interpretive and enforcement authority. In this two-part episode, which repurposes a recent webinar, a panel of experts delves into the Loper Bright decision, and its underpinnings, rationale, and likely fallout. Our podcast features moderator Alan Kaplinsky, Senior Counsel and former practice leader of Ballard Spahr’s Consumer Financial Services Group; Ballard Spahr Partners Richard Andreano, Jr. and John Culhane, Jr.; and special guests Craig Green, Charles Klein Professor of Law and Government at Temple University Beasley School of Law, and Kent Barnett, recently appointed Dean of the Moritz College of Law at The Ohio State University. In Part I, we first review the history of judicial deference to agency interpretations in American courts throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, culminating in the advent of Chevron deference.  We then discuss post-Chevron developments, including shifts in judicial and political views of the role courts should play in interpretation of agency action. Then, we turn to an in-depth discussion of the majority opinion in Loper Bright, authored by Chief Justice Roberts, including its reliance on the Administrative Procedure Act to invalidate Chevron deference and the opinion’s numerous ambiguities that result in a “very, very fuzzy” outcome, leaving regulated industries facing uncertainty as to whether or not courts will uphold agency rules. We then explore other topics including the majority opinion’s endorsement of an approach courts should take to review agency actions as described in a 1940’s case, Skidmore v. Swift & Co.; what deference may or may not be given to agency policy-making and fact-finding in light of Loper Bright; and the divergent views of some legal scholars who suggest that many courts will continue to give broad deference to agency views notwithstanding Loper Bright.

The Supreme Court's decision in Cantero v. Bank of America leaves national bank preemption in a state of uncertainty. The discussion delves into the Dodd-Frank Act's standards and how they interact with state laws on mortgage escrow accounts. Recent rulings from the Ninth Circuit are scrutinized, revealing tensions between federal and state regulations. Additionally, arbitration provisions in consumer contracts are explored, emphasizing their role in shielding banks from class action lawsuits. Such complexities shape the evolving landscape of financial services and banking operations.

The CFPB recently issued yet another final rule the agency says will help deter violations of consumer protection laws. This rule requires certain nonbank entities to register with the CFPB upon becoming subject to any order from local, state, or federal agencies or courts involving consumer protection law violations. The registry rule applies to any supervised or non-supervised nonbank that engages in offering or providing a consumer financial product or service and any of its service provider affiliates unless excluded. The CFPB will require the nonbank entities that are subject to the rule to register the specific terms and conditions on an annual basis. There will be public access to this database. We also address the CFPB’s recent circular in which the agency stated that certain terms in consumer financial product or service contracts may constitute violations of consumer protection law. Notably, the circular states that the use of prefatory language that often appears in consumer contracts—such as “subject to applicable law” or “to the extent permitted by law”—will not immunize contract language from being deceptive. We explain why practically every consumer contract in use today technically violates the CFPB circular. We also explain how we are helping several clients review and revise their consumer contracts to comply with the circular. Alan Kaplinsky, Senior Counsel in Ballard Spahr’s Consumer Financial Services Group, leads the discussion, and is joined by John Culhane, Richard Andreano, Joseph Schuster, and Reid Herlihy, partners in the Group.

A great number of fintechs are contemplating owning a bank or obtaining a banking charter—either a national bank charter, a state bank charter or a special purpose charter. In this episode, we are joined by our special guest Michele Alt, co-founder and partner of Klaros Group, an investment and advisory firm, and Scott Coleman, a partner in our Consumer Financial Services Group who leads our banking practice. Both Michele and Scott help banks and fintechs navigate the complicated regulatory issues that are critical to their growth and sustainability. We discuss the reasons why fintechs might want to become banks, and why regulators are reluctant to grant them charters. Alt says that a bank charter provides a fintech with low-cost funding in the form of FDIC-insured deposits and it eliminates the applicability of myriad state licensing requirements. On the other hand, she says, there are onerous capital requirements and regulators often are reluctant to embrace innovation. We discuss how some regulators fear that fintechs are fueled by growth over profits and how it could lead to lax management practices. Regulators have reason to be concerned about those risks, and if you charter a bank, you are responsible for it. Alan Kaplinsky, Senior Counsel in Ballard Spahr’s Consumer Financial Services Group, leads the conversation.