Philosophical Disquisitions

In this episode of the Ethics of Academia, I chat to Justin Weinberg, Associate Professor of Philosophy at University of South Carolina. Justin researches ethical and social philosophy, as well as metaphilosophy. He is also the editor of the popular Daily Nous blog and has, as a result, developed an interest in many of the moral dimensions of philosophical academia. As a result, our conversation traverses a wide territory, from the purpose of philosophical research to the ethics of grading. You can download the episode here or listen below. You can also subscribe on Apple, Spotify, Google or any other preferred podcasting service. Subscribe to the newsletter

In this episode I talk to Regina Rini, Canada Research Chair at York University in Toronto. Regina has a background in neuroscience and cognitive science but now works primarily in moral philosophy. She has the distinction of writing a lot of philosophy for the public through her columns for the Time Literary Supplement and the value of this becomes a major theme of our conversation. You can download the episode here or listen below. You can also subscribe on Apple, Spotify and other podcasting services. Subscribe to the newsletter

This is the second episode in my short series on The Ethics of Academia. In this episode I chat to Michael Cholbi, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh. We reflect on the value of applied ethical research and the right approach to teaching. Michael has thought quite a lot about the ethics of work, in general, and the ethics of teaching and grading in particular. So those become central themes in our conversation. You can download the podcast here or listen below. You can also subscribe on Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, Spotify and other podcasting services (the RSS feed is here). Subscribe to the newsletter

I have been reflecting on the ethics of academic life for some time. I've written several articles about it over the years. These have focused on the ethics of grading, student-teacher relationships, academic career choice, and the value of teaching (among other things). I've only scratched the surface. It seems to me that academic life is replete with ethical dilemmas and challenges. Some systematic reflection on and discussion of those ethical challenges would seem desirable. Obviously, there is a fair bit of writing available on the topic but, as best I can tell, there is no podcast dedicated to it. So I decided to start one. I'm launching this podcast as both an addendum to my normal podcast (which deals primarily with the ethics of technology) and as an independent podcast in its own right. If you just want to subscribe to the Ethics of Academia, you can do so here (Apple and Spotify). (And if you do so, you'll get the added bonus of access to the first three episodes). I intend this to be a limited series but, if it proves popular, I might come back to it. In the first episode, I chat to Sven Nyholm (Utrecht University) about the ethics of research, teaching and administration. Sven is a longtime friend and collaborator. He has been one of my most frequent guests on my main podcast so he seemed like the ideal person to kickstart this series. Although we talk about a lot of different things, Sven draws particular attention to the ethical importance of the division of labour in academic life.You can download the episode here or listen below. Subscribe to the newsletter

How easily do we anthropomorphise robots? Do we see them as moral agents or, even, moral patients? Can we dehumanise them? These are some of the questions addressed in this episode with my guests, Dennis Küster and Aleksandra Świderska. Dennis is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Bremen. Aleksandra is a senior researcher at the University of Warsaw. They have worked together on a number of studies about how humans perceive and respond to robots. We discuss several of their joint studies in this episode. You can download the episode here or listen below. You can also subscribe on Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, Spotify and other podcasting services (the RSS feed is here). Relevant LinksDennis's webpageAleksandra's webpage'I saw it on YouTube! How online videos shape perceptions of mind, morality, and fears about robots' by Dennis, Aleksandra and David Gunkel'Robots as malevolent moral agents: Harmful behavior results in dehumanization, not anthropomorphism' by Aleksandra and Dennis'Seeing the mind of robots: Harm augments mind perception but benevolent intentions reduce dehumanisation of artificial entities in visual vignettes' by Dennis and Aleksandra Subscribe to the newsletter

One particularly important social institution is the police force, who are increasingly using technological tools to help efficiently and effectively deploy policing resources. I’ve covered criticisms of these tools in the past, but in this episode, my guest Daniel Susser has some novel perspectives to share on this topic, as well as some broader reflections on how humans can relate to machines in social decision-making. This one was a lot of fun and covered a lot of ground. You can download the episode here or listen below. You can also subscribe on Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, Spotify and other podcasting services (the RSS feed is here). Relevant LinksDaniel's HomepageDaniel on Twitter'Predictive Policing and the Ethics of Preemption' by Daniel'Strange Loops: Apparent versus Actual Human Involvement in Automated Decision-Making' by Daniel (and Kiel Brennan-Marquez and Karen Levy) Subscribe to the newsletter

It is common to think that technology is morally neutral. “Guns don’t kill people; people kill people’ - as the typical gun lobby argument goes. But is this really the right way to think about technology? Could it be that technology is not so neutral as we might suppose? These are questions I explore today with my guest Olya Kudina. Olya is an ethicist of technology focusing on the dynamic interaction between values and technologies. Currently, she is an Assistant Professor at Delft University of Technology. You can download the episode here or listen below. You can also subscribe on Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, Spotify and other podcasting services (the RSS feed is here). Relevant LinksOlya's HomepageOlya on TwitterThe technological mediation of morality: value dynamism, and the complex interaction between ethics and technology - Olya's PhD Thesis'Ethics from Within: Google Glass, the Collingridge Dilemma, and the Mediated Value of Privacy' by Olya and Peter Paul Verbeek"Alexa, who am I?”: Voice Assistants and Hermeneutic Lemniscate as the Technologically Mediated Sense-Making - by Olya'Moral Uncertainty in Technomoral Change: Bridging the Explanatory Gap' by Philip Nickel, Olya Kudina and Ibo van den Poel Subscribe to the newsletter

I was raised in the tradition of believing that everyone is of equal moral worth. But when I scrutinise my daily practices, I don’t think I can honestly say that I act as if everyone is of equal moral worth. The idea that some people belong within the circle of moral concern and some do not is central to many moral systems. But what affects the dynamics of the moral circle? How does it contract and expand? Can it expand indefinitely? In this episode I discuss these questions with Joshua Rottman. Josh is an associate Professor in the Department of Psychology and the Program in Scientific and Philosophical Studies of Mind at Franklin and Marshall College. His research is situated at the intersection of cognitive development and moral psychology, and he primarily focuses on studying the factors that lead certain entities and objects to be attributed with (or stripped of) moral concern. You can download the episode here or listen below. You can also subscribe on Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, Spotify and other podcasting services (the RSS feed is here). Show NotesTopics discussed include:The normative significance of moral psychologyThe concept of the moral circleHow the moral circle develops in childrenHow the moral circle changes over timeCan the moral circle expand indefinitely?Do we have a limited budget of moral concern?Do most people underuse their budget of moral concern?Why do some people prioritise the non-human world over marginal humans?Relevant LinksJosh's webpage at F and M CollegeJosh's personal webpageJosh at Psychology Today'Tree huggers vs Human Lovers' by Josh et alSummary of the above article at Psychology Today'Towards a Psychology of Moral Expansiveness' by Crimston et al Subscribe to the newsletter

Can we move beyond the Aristotelian account of friendship when thinking about our relationships with robots? Can we hate robots? In this episode, I talk to Helen Ryland about these topics. Helen is a UK-based philosopher. She completed her PhD in Philosophy in 2020 at the University of Birmingham. She now works as an Associate Lecturer for The Open University. Her work examines human-robot relationships, video game ethics, and the personhood and moral status of marginal cases of human rights (e.g., subjects with dementia, nonhuman animals, and robots). You can download the episode here or listen below. You can also subscribe on Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, Spotify and other podcasting services (the RSS feed is here). Show NotesTopics covered include:What is friendship and why does it matter?The Aristotelian account of friendshipLimitations of the Aristotelian accountMoving beyond AristotleThe degrees of friendship modelWhy we can be friends with robotsCriticisms of robot-human friendshipThe possibility of hating robotsDo we already hate robots?Why would it matter if we did hate robots?Relevant LinksHelen's homepage'It's Friendship Jim, But Not as We Know It:  A Degrees-of-Friendship View of Human–Robot Friendships' by HelenCould you hate a robot? Does it matter if you could? by Helen Subscribe to the newsletter

Thomas Sinclair (left), Ben Kenward (right)Lots of people are worried about the ethics of AI. One particular area of concern is whether we should program machines to follow existing normative/moral principles when making decisions. But social moral values change over time. Should machines not be designed to allow for such changes? If machines are programmed to follow our current values will they impede moral progress? In this episode, I talk to Ben Kenward and Thomas Sinclair about this issue. Ben is a Senior Lecturer in Psychology at Oxford Brookes University in the UK. His research focuses on ecological psychology, mainly examining environmental activism such as the Extinction Rebellion movement of which he is a part. Thomas is a Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy at Wadham College, Oxford, and an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Oxford's Faculty of Philosophy. His research and teaching focus on questions in moral and political philosophy. You can download the episode here or listen below. You can also subscribe on Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, Spotify and other podcasting services (the RSS feed is here).  Show NotesTopics discussed incude:What is a moral value?What is a moral machine?What is moral progress?Has society progress, morally speaking, in the past?How can we design moral machines?What's the problem with getting machines to follow our current moral consensus?Will people over-defer to machines? Will they outsource their moral reasoning to machines?Why is a lack of moral progress such a problem right now?Relevant LinksThomas's webpageBen's webpage'Machine morality, moral progress and the looming environmental disaster' by Ben and Tom