

Métaphysique et philosophie de la connaissance - Claudine Tiercelin
Collège de France
Dans ses cours et séminaires au Collège de France, Claudine Tiercelin a examiné plusieurs problèmes métaphysiques fondamentaux : le statut des « espèces naturelles » et de l'essentialisme contemporain, la nature et la réalité des dispositions, ou ce en quoi peut consister une authentique connaissance métaphysique de la nature. En philosophie de la connaissance, elle a proposé une nouvelle définition de la connaissance elle-même, précisé le sens du concept de connaissance pratique, souligné l'importance des vertus épistémiques, et rappelé les liens étroits qui existent entre la connaissance et la démocratie entendue comme un espace de vérité et de raisons. Ses cours plus récents interrogent les relations complexes qui se sont tissées au cours de l'histoire entre l'ontologie et la sémiotique, et montrent la pertinence d'un projet visant à développer aujourd'hui une ontologie qui s'inscrirait dans une perspective simultanément sémiotique et réaliste. Ses prochains cours reviendront sur la question classique des articulations du réel et sur la place que doit prendre l'esprit si l'on veut pouvoir accéder à une connaissance métaphysique qui soit à même de réconcilier « philosophie de la nature » et « philosophie de l'intellect ».
Episodes
Mentioned books

Jun 6, 2023 • 36min
Colloque - Virtual and Augmented Realities: Epistemological and Metaphysical Issues : Self-Involving Imagination
Claudine TiercelinMétaphysique et philosophie de la connaissanceAnnée 2022-2023Colloque - Virtual and Augmented Realities: Epistemological and Metaphysical Issues : Self-Involving ImaginationIntervenant(s)Alexander Fisher, University of CambridgeRésuméThis paper considers the ethical significance of self-involving imagination, where we imagine ourselves as others. This form of imagination occurs in taking on personal ideals, in simulation of others' mental states, and when we imagine ourselves as characters in acting or in videogames and virtual reality. The ethical concern is that the imaginer might be morally corrupted as troubling attitudes taken on in imagination leak into their actual psychology. This worry is heightened for interactive media as imagined attitudes play a significant role in motivating action, hence more plausibly might start to influence us outside of the imaginative context.I note two mechanisms which serve to prevent leakage of immoral attitudes, dampening this ethical concern. First, we often face heightened imaginative resistance to taking on immoral mental states. This prevents us even imagining holding certain immoral attitudes. Second, whilst we generally passively quarantine our attitudes to the imaginative context, in morally charged cases we also more actively quarantine – we take on immoral attitudes in imagination but are consciously careful not to acquire them in reality. This pair of guarding mechanisms help prevent our becoming morally corrupted through self-involving imagination.PrésentationVirtual Reality technology affords its users a strongly immersive and interactive experience of computer-generated environments, through a dedicated headset. With Augmented Reality devices, 3D computer-generated imagery is projected onto physical space, thereby "augmenting" the user's surroundings with an overlay of virtual entities. These "Extended Reality" (XR) technologies are likely to become a part of our everyday life in the near future. They also raise a host of fascinating issues, which have increasingly been discussed in the recent philosophical literature. This international conference will investigate the metaphysical and epistemological questions raised by XR technologies.Le colloque est intégralement en anglais et a eu lieu les 5 et 6 juin au Collège de France

Jun 6, 2023 • 39min
Colloque - Virtual and Augmented Realities: Epistemological and Metaphysical Issues : Seeing-in and Virtual Reality
Claudine TiercelinMétaphysique et philosophie de la connaissanceAnnée 2022-2023Colloque - Virtual and Augmented Realities: Epistemological and Metaphysical Issues : Seeing-in and Virtual RealityIntervenant(s)Manuel Rebuschi, AHP-PReST, Université de LorraineRésuméIs Virtual Reality a special metaphysical category of reality, as David Chalmers claims? In this talk, I argue that this is not the most obvious way, and I oppose it with a (pseudo-)dualistic conception of VR, combining reality and fiction. To do this, I will draw on Walton's analysis of fictions and on Wollheim's conception of what it is to see-in a pictorial work. It seems that we can understand our interactions in virtual worlds not as a radical rupture, but as an extension of our usual ways of seeing object representations. The proposed conception taking its start in a logical analysis of the statements produced during our interactions in virtual worlds, it also relies on a formal background, based on an extension of first-order modal logic, which will be briefly evoked.PrésentationVirtual Reality technology affords its users a strongly immersive and interactive experience of computer-generated environments, through a dedicated headset. With Augmented Reality devices, 3D computer-generated imagery is projected onto physical space, thereby "augmenting" the user's surroundings with an overlay of virtual entities. These "Extended Reality" (XR) technologies are likely to become a part of our everyday life in the near future. They also raise a host of fascinating issues, which have increasingly been discussed in the recent philosophical literature. This international conference will investigate the metaphysical and epistemological questions raised by XR technologies.Le colloque est intégralement en anglais et a eu lieu les 5 et 6 juin au Collège de France

Jun 6, 2023 • 39min
Colloque - Virtual and Augmented Realities: Epistemological and Metaphysical Issues : Really just making it up: fictionalism about the virtual (and a whole lot more?)
Claudine TiercelinMétaphysique et philosophie de la connaissanceAnnée 2022-2023Colloque - Virtual and Augmented Realities: Epistemological and Metaphysical Issues : Really just making it up: fictionalism about the virtual (and a whole lot more?)Intervenant(s)Neil McDonnell, University of GlasgowRésuméAre the entities that we encounter in virtual environments real? As a virtual realist, Chalmers argues that they are. In contrast, virtual fictionalists say they aren't. Instead, such entities are merely posits within games of make-believe, games that are guided by the existing digital props we engage with. The aim of this talk is to explore and extend this fictionalist approach to virtual ontology.Specifically, the first half of the talk sketches the available options when it comes to the debate about virtual ontology. This then leads to an articulation of a Waltonian fictionalist account, which I (extending joint Wildman/McDonnell work) argue is superior to Chalmers' virtual realism. However, this leads to an issue facing fictionalism: once one adopts it for virtual objects, it is hard to see where the fictiionalism stops. In other words, what should fictionalists say about non-virtual entities like universities, paper money, and Cryptocurrency? It seems wild to think that these are fictions too, since they are so important/value to us in our everyday lives. To address this challenge, I introduce the notions of consensus and mandated fictions. After defining these in Waltonian terms, I use them to articulate a (nearly) global fictionalist story which alleviates the worry. The result is an ambitious, distinctively unifying extension of fictionalism about the virtual to include the social, institutional, and constructed.PrésentationVirtual Reality technology affords its users a strongly immersive and interactive experience of computer-generated environments, through a dedicated headset. With Augmented Reality devices, 3D computer-generated imagery is projected onto physical space, thereby "augmenting" the user's surroundings with an overlay of virtual entities. These "Extended Reality" (XR) technologies are likely to become a part of our everyday life in the near future. They also raise a host of fascinating issues, which have increasingly been discussed in the recent philosophical literature. This international conference will investigate the metaphysical and epistemological questions raised by XR technologies.Le colloque est intégralement en anglais et a eu lieu les 5 et 6 juin au Collège de France

Jun 6, 2023 • 23min
Colloque - Virtual and Augmented Realities: Epistemological and Metaphysical Issues : Eye Movements and the Feeling of Presence
Claudine TiercelinMétaphysique et philosophie de la connaissanceAnnée 2022-2023Colloque - Virtual and Augmented Realities: Epistemological and Metaphysical Issues : Eye Movements and the Feeling of PresenceIntervenant(s)Bence Nanay, University of AntwerpRésuméEmpirical studies show great variation in the smoothness of tracking eye movements in various perceptual situations. In this talk, I examine the relation between the smoothness of tracking eye movements and the feeling of presence in the case of perception, dreaming, visualising, stereograms and virtual reality and argue for a very minimalist and mechanistic explanation of the feeling of presence. PrésentationVirtual Reality technology affords its users a strongly immersive and interactive experience of computer-generated environments, through a dedicated headset. With Augmented Reality devices, 3D computer-generated imagery is projected onto physical space, thereby "augmenting" the user's surroundings with an overlay of virtual entities. These "Extended Reality" (XR) technologies are likely to become a part of our everyday life in the near future. They also raise a host of fascinating issues, which have increasingly been discussed in the recent philosophical literature. This international conference will investigate the metaphysical and epistemological questions raised by XR technologies.Le colloque est intégralement en anglais et a eu lieu les 5 et 6 juin au Collège de France

Jun 5, 2023 • 46min
Colloque - Virtual and Augmented Realities: Epistemological and Metaphysical Issues : The Constitution of Virtual Objects
Claudine TiercelinMétaphysique et philosophie de la connaissanceAnnée 2022-2023Colloque - Virtual and Augmented Realities: Epistemological and Metaphysical Issues : The Constitution of Virtual ObjectsIntervenant(s)Alexandre Declos, Maître de conférences, Collège de FranceGuillaume Bucchioni, Aix-Marseille UniversitéRésuméDavid Chalmers has recently argued that virtual reality is a genuine kind of reality, populated by real digital entities. At the ontological level, this realist view is ambiguous between two readings. One states that virtual entities are strictly identical to digital entities. The other considers that virtual entities and digital entities are distinct, but that the former ontologically depend on the latter. In this presentation, we shall explore the latter form of virtual realism, and attempt to offer a novel account of the dependence of the virtual on the digital. Virtual objects, we contend, should be seen as constituted by digital objects and mental states. In order to develop this claim, we shall draw on Lynne Rudder Baker's theory of constitution We'll explore the rationale and consequences of this view, which we take to be the most promising form of realism about the virtual. PrésentationVirtual Reality technology affords its users a strongly immersive and interactive experience of computer-generated environments, through a dedicated headset. With Augmented Reality devices, 3D computer-generated imagery is projected onto physical space, thereby "augmenting" the user's surroundings with an overlay of virtual entities. These "Extended Reality" (XR) technologies are likely to become a part of our everyday life in the near future. They also raise a host of fascinating issues, which have increasingly been discussed in the recent philosophical literature. This international conference will investigate the metaphysical and epistemological questions raised by XR technologies.Le colloque est intégralement en anglais et a eu lieu les 5 et 6 juin au Collège de France

Jun 5, 2023 • 40min
Colloque - Virtual and Augmented Realities: Epistemological and Metaphysical Issues : On the Limits of Successful Virtualization
Claudine TiercelinMétaphysique et philosophie de la connaissanceAnnée 2022-2023Colloque - Virtual and Augmented Realities: Epistemological and Metaphysical Issues : On the Limits of Successful VirtualizationIntervenant(s)Pawel Grabarczyk, IT University of CopenhagenRésuméIn my talk, I wish to explore the thesis of virtual realism and establish the limits of successful virtualization. The thesis of virtual realism states that virtual environments and objects are real (as opposed to fictional) and that some virtual objects can be treated as instantiations of the same category as their non-virtual counterparts. I agree with the first part of the thesis and suggest a variant I call "virtual physicalism". According to virtual physicalism, virtual objects are physical because they are a series of computer states. The second part of the thesis of virtual realism is more contentious as, apart from some well-known non-controversial examples, it is hard to say how far we can go with the virtualization of reality. I investigate this question and suggest some criteria for successful virtualization. According to my view virtual objects function as digital toys and do not require us to engage in pretend play or make-believe. As with non-virtual toys, they share many properties with objects they mimic. If they end up sharing enough properties and causal powers to be used instead of their non-virtual counterparts, they may be elevated to being instantiations of the same type of objects. The biggest obstacle for virtual objects to go through this "upgrade" process is the limitation of the causal powers of the computer states they are made of. For many virtual objects, this leads to isolation – they may be considered functionally equivalent to their non-virtual counterparts but only inside virtual environments. One way to diminish this inherent limitation is to make virtual environments important parts of reality. If they become persistent, widespread, and causally connected with non-virtual reality, the objects within them may become treated as genuine specialized versions of non-virtual objects, not just digital toys modeled on them. PrésentationVirtual Reality technology affords its users a strongly immersive and interactive experience of computer-generated environments, through a dedicated headset. With Augmented Reality devices, 3D computer-generated imagery is projected onto physical space, thereby "augmenting" the user's surroundings with an overlay of virtual entities. These "Extended Reality" (XR) technologies are likely to become a part of our everyday life in the near future. They also raise a host of fascinating issues, which have increasingly been discussed in the recent philosophical literature. This international conference will investigate the metaphysical and epistemological questions raised by XR technologies.Le colloque est intégralement en anglais et a eu lieu les 5 et 6 juin au Collège de France

Jun 5, 2023 • 33min
Colloque - Virtual and Augmented Realities: Epistemological and Metaphysical Issues : Mona Lisa in the Matrix
Claudine TiercelinMétaphysique et philosophie de la connaissanceAnnée 2022-2023Colloque - Virtual and Augmented Realities: Epistemological and Metaphysical Issues : Mona Lisa in the MatrixIntervenant(s)Katalin Farkas, Central European University, ViennaRésuméIt is customary to think that certain entities have irreplaceable value. The group of these entities include for example art works like the Mona Lisa, family heirlooms of great emotional significance, and, of course, people. In this talk, I investigate in what sense we can have irreplaceable virtual objects.PrésentationVirtual Reality technology affords its users a strongly immersive and interactive experience of computer-generated environments, through a dedicated headset. With Augmented Reality devices, 3D computer-generated imagery is projected onto physical space, thereby "augmenting" the user's surroundings with an overlay of virtual entities. These "Extended Reality" (XR) technologies are likely to become a part of our everyday life in the near future. They also raise a host of fascinating issues, which have increasingly been discussed in the recent philosophical literature. This international conference will investigate the metaphysical and epistemological questions raised by XR technologies.Le colloque est intégralement en anglais et a eu lieu les 5 et 6 juin au Collège de France

Jun 5, 2023 • 41min
Colloque - Virtual and Augmented Realities: Epistemological and Metaphysical Issues : The Psychopathology of Everyday Metaphysics: Depersonalization, Structuralism, and the Problem of Reality
Claudine TiercelinMétaphysique et philosophie de la connaissanceAnnée 2022-2023Colloque - Virtual and Augmented Realities: Epistemological and Metaphysical Issues : The Psychopathology of Everyday Metaphysics: Depersonalization, Structuralism, and the Problem of RealityIntervenant(s)Alexandre Billon, Université de LilleRésuméAt the turn of the 19th century, French psychiatrists discovered a couple of intriguingly philosophical disorders. Patients suffering from these disorders were characterized as "metaphysician doubters" or "pathological metaphysicians". They relentlessly questioned their existence, the nature of the self, the reality of things around them, or the very identity of their relatives. "When one has seen many of these pathological doubters, Janet lamented, one comes to sadly wonder whether philosophical speculation is a disease of the human mind (Janet, 1909, 302)". Janet was half-joking. Yet, I would like to suggest that he was half-right. More precisely, I argue that the study of such pathological metaphysicians (who are known, today, as patients suffering from depersonalization) can shed some light on a fundamental problem in the phenomenology and epistemology of metaphysics that I dub "the problem of reality", and suggests that the way the philosophical tradition has dealt with this problem is deeply misguided. This problem, which has recently resurfaced in discussions about structuralism, digitalism and virtual realism, stems from the incompatibility of two strong intuitions. According to the first intuition, the deep nature of things is hidden from us, and the world as we know it (through perception and science) is somehow shallow and lacking in reality. For all we know, philosophers have claimed for centuries, we might just be facing shadows in a cave, we might just be dreaming, we might just be brains in a vat, or even sims in a gigantic computer simulation. There is, or there might be, say these philosophers a deeper and so to speak more real layer of reality — ultimate or metaphysical reality — but it is hidden from the delivering of our senses and of our scientific endeavors. This philosophical intuition clashes with an equally strong, but probably more naïve, intuition, to the effect that the world as we know seems perfectly real. A set of shadows, a dream, or an informational structure seems too ethereal, unsubstantial, or virtual (in one word, too unreal) to be identical to the world as we know it. To solve this problem we need to discount one intuition in favor of the other, and metaphysicians have typically discounted the more naïve "intuition of reality". Drawing, on the study of pathological metaphysicians, I will argue that they are wrong.PrésentationVirtual Reality technology affords its users a strongly immersive and interactive experience of computer-generated environments, through a dedicated headset. With Augmented Reality devices, 3D computer-generated imagery is projected onto physical space, thereby "augmenting" the user's surroundings with an overlay of virtual entities. These "Extended Reality" (XR) technologies are likely to become a part of our everyday life in the near future. They also raise a host of fascinating issues, which have increasingly been discussed in the recent philosophical literature. This international conference will investigate the metaphysical and epistemological questions raised by XR technologies.Le colloque est intégralement en anglais et a eu lieu les 5 et 6 juin au Collège de France

Jun 5, 2023 • 46min
Colloque - Virtual and Augmented Realities: Epistemological and Metaphysical Issues : Why BIVs Would Not Be (Much) Deceived (and Would Learn a Lot)
Claudine TiercelinMétaphysique et philosophie de la connaissanceAnnée 2022-2023Colloque - Virtual and Augmented Realities: Epistemological and Metaphysical Issues : Why BIVs Would Not Be (Much) Deceived (and Would Learn a Lot)Intervenant(s)Benoit Gaultier, University of ZurichRésuméMy aim in this talk is to examine Chalmers' veridicalism, and more precisely i) to indicate a reason to doubt the cogency of one of his' arguments for veridicalism, ii) to argue that if BIVs' ordinary beliefs are true for the reasons indicated by Chalmers, then BIVs' (metaphysical) beliefs about the fundamental nature of reality also are true, and iii) to advance that it could be that BIVs' are right about the fundamental nature of reality while being ignorant of it.PrésentationVirtual Reality technology affords its users a strongly immersive and interactive experience of computer-generated environments, through a dedicated headset. With Augmented Reality devices, 3D computer-generated imagery is projected onto physical space, thereby "augmenting" the user's surroundings with an overlay of virtual entities. These "Extended Reality" (XR) technologies are likely to become a part of our everyday life in the near future. They also raise a host of fascinating issues, which have increasingly been discussed in the recent philosophical literature. This international conference will investigate the metaphysical and epistemological questions raised by XR technologies.Le colloque est intégralement en anglais et a eu lieu les 5 et 6 juin au Collège de France

Jun 5, 2023 • 40min
Colloque - Virtual and Augmented Realities: Epistemological and Metaphysical Issues : Virtual Reality and the Metaverse: Ontology and Ethics
Claudine TiercelinMétaphysique et philosophie de la connaissanceAnnée 2022-2023Colloque - Virtual and Augmented Realities: Epistemological and Metaphysical Issues : Virtual Reality and the Metaverse: Ontology and EthicsIntervenant(s)Philip Brey, University of TwenteRésuméIn this presentation, I will do an ontological analysis of virtual reality, which will form the basis for an ethical analysis. I will present an analysis of what I call virtual ontology: the ontology of virtual environments and the actions and events that take place in them. I will make the case that a key virtual ontology is to distinguish with entities in virtual environments are ontologically real and which are mere simulations. I will argue for the ontological reality of several classes of entities in virtual environments, while denying the reality of others. This ontological analysis will then form the basis for a metaethical analysis of virtual environments, which aims to determine which ethical issues that we know from the physical world also exist in virtual environments, and what their mode of existence is. This analysis will also include an assessment of ethical issues that can exist in virtual environments that have no direct analogue in the physical world.PrésentationVirtual Reality technology affords its users a strongly immersive and interactive experience of computer-generated environments, through a dedicated headset. With Augmented Reality devices, 3D computer-generated imagery is projected onto physical space, thereby "augmenting" the user's surroundings with an overlay of virtual entities. These "Extended Reality" (XR) technologies are likely to become a part of our everyday life in the near future. They also raise a host of fascinating issues, which have increasingly been discussed in the recent philosophical literature. This international conference will investigate the metaphysical and epistemological questions raised by XR technologies.Le colloque est intégralement en anglais et a eu lieu les 5 et 6 juin au Collège de France