The Theory of Anything

Can philosophical theories be refuted? What is a bad explanation? Can all theories be made more empirical? In search of an answer to these questions, Bruce takes a deep dive into what he believes is the correct way to apply “Popper’s ratchet” to metaphysical or philosophical theories. Along the way, Bruce puts forward a generalization of testability he calls “checkability” and explains why “vague-maning” our theories is “worse than dogmatism.”

Continuing from episode 91, we continue our deep dive into Popper's Conjectures and Refutations Chapter 8 where Popper explains how to use his epistemology on philosophical theories that (by definition) can't be 'refuted'. Despite agreeing with most of Popper's specific arguments, we offer some considerable criticisms to Popper's approach to criticizing philosophical theories -- particularly to Popper's criticisms of the theory of Determinism which is a 'best theory' by any fair standard but Popper (incorrectly) thought was false. Bruce argues that Popper's approach in C&R Ch. 8 is problematic because it opens the 'Crit Rat Loophole', which is a common way CritRats interpret Popper that allows any preferred theory to be declare a 'best theory' based on the scantest of criticisms. Bruce argues that Chapter 8 of C&R fails in this important regard because it doesn't give a good answer to the question "How does one tell the difference between a good philosophical explanation and a bad explanation?"

The discussion centers around Popper's critical analysis of induction, framing it as nonexistent. It delves into the philosophical debates contrasting good and bad explanations, featuring the intersection of Popper's ideas and modern machine learning. The speakers highlight the importance of empirical testability and explore the relevance of induction in scientific reasoning. Themes of creativity in AI and the complexities of hypothesis formation also emerge, showcasing the interplay between critical rationalism and contemporary practices.

Ivan Phillips, a Bayesian epistemologist passionate about Karl Popper's ideas, delves into the nuances of Bayesianism and its critiques from critical rationalists. He discusses how Bayesian reasoning updates beliefs, shedding light on its applicability in ethical frameworks and scientific theories. The conversation touches on the historical roots of Bayes' theorem and challenges traditional views of the scientific method. Phillips also critiques Popper's understanding of probability, making a strong case for the relevance of Bayesian thought in today's reasoning.

This week we discuss the book Orthodoxy by G.K. Chesterton (1908), perhaps the most famous defense of the Christian tradition. We contrast this with Karl Popper’s talk, “Towards a Rational Theory of Tradition” (1948), from his collection of essays, Conjectures and Refutations. We consider: What is the role of tradition in science and knowledge? Is there a relationship between liberalism and Christianity? Is Chesterton actually a rationalist? What are the paradoxes of Christianity? Is there a link between madness and rationality? Follow us on Twitter: ⁠https://x.com/bnielson01⁠

Kenneth Stanley, an AI researcher and author of "Why Greatness Cannot Be Planned," discusses the pitfalls of setting specific goals in innovation. He argues that objective measures can mislead discovery and creativity, advocating for open-ended exploration instead. Stanley explores how these ideas connect to education, Darwinian evolution, and scientific inquiry. He highlights the concept of 'novelty search' in AI research, suggesting that meaningful discoveries often come from unexpected paths rather than rigid objectives.

Is the universal explainer hypothesis falsifiable? How does the concept of universality relate to human minds? Is anything truly beyond human comprehension? And how would you frame universality as an interesting topic at a party? This week we also feature a guest, Dan Gish, a fellow traveler Bruce has connected with on Twitter. Dan (on Twitter) had questions about if the incomprehensibility of LLMs refuted the universal explainer hypothesis. This was Bruce's attempt to give him an honest answer to Dan's questions. Follow us on Twitter.

Dive into the world of fuzzy categories and essentialism with a discussion on how humans form categories, the role of analogy-making in intelligence, and the connections between Hofstadter's ideas and theories by Pinker, Popper, and Deutsch. Explore the complexities of free will, cognitive categorization, and the interplay between definitions and knowledge in science.

Delving into critical rationalism and Hofstadter's analogy theory, the podcast explores the core mechanism of human cognition. Discussions challenge the idea of analogy as inductivism and its role in human consciousness and creating AGI. The intersection of critical rationalism with Hofstadter's work sparks an engaging debate on the implications for AI and human intelligence.

Here we discuss a 1992 interview with David Deutsch where he makes the case that video games are inherently educational, not addictive, and that children should not be stopped from playing as much as they want. We contrast the view of humans, science, and knowledge promoted there by David Deutsch with the more pessimistic view of thinkers such as Jonathan Haidt today. Bruce and Peter reflect on their own mixed feelings on this issue both as critical rationalists and parents. David Deutsch on video games: https://takingchildrenseriously.com/video-games-a-unique-educational-environment/ Peter briefly quotes from this recent article by Jonathan Haidt: https://www.thefp.com/p/jonathan-haidt-worried-about-the-boys-too Follow us on Twitter: https://twitter.com/bnielson01