Profiles in Strategy

Episode three of the Endless Wars case study: ISIS - Operation Inherent Resolve. In this episode Jon O'Gorman hosts Patrick McCarthy, Michael Shaw, and Burak Kadercan. They discuss the rise of ISIS from the early insurgency days in Iraq to its formation of a caliphate. The veterans of the campaign discuss their roles then answer the question about what our military learned. We also look at the policies of the early Iraq days post 2003 as the potential cause of the rise of ISIS. We end on the question of what is to be done for the future prevention of the rise of armed extremist groups.

Episode two of the Endless Wars case study. In this episode Jon O'Gorman hosts Heidi Lane, Patrick McCarthy, Matthew Nischwitz, and Michael Shaw. We continue with our military professors who are veterans of the conflict, joined by regional subject matter expert Heidi Lane. They start the conversation talking about why opening a secondary theater in Iraq made sense. They move to the discussion about the De-Baathification of Iraq and what effect it had on the country. They move through the process of insurgency, civil war, and how ISIS eventually had a different positive effect on the Iraqi people. They also discuss how poor civil-military relations caused certain estimates to be overlooked in the beginnings of the campaign. They end with thoughts about the future of Iraq and whether a desire for the independent Kurdistan could ignite a larger regional war.

For this next case we are going to have three segments (or parts) on each of the major theaters discussed in the case - Afghanistan, Iraq and ISIS. We are also going to leverage our military professors of the Strategy and Policy Department and their on-the-ground practitioner experience in these conflicts. In this part, Jon O'Gorman hosts Marc Genest, Michael Shaw, and Patrick McCarthy on the Afghanistan theater. They discuss their thoughts about the end in Afghanistan, and whether or not the U.S. understood the nature of the war. They also look at the parallels to Vietnam and if those parallels are oversold. They look at the conflict through the institutional dimension of strategy lens and if our own bureaucracy hinders our success in these types of conflicts. Additionally, they discuss if the conflict has harmed civilian-military relations in the U.S. Finally, that talk about key takeaways.

In this episode Jon O’Gorman hosts David Stone and Timothy Hoyt as they discuss the conflicts between India and Pakistan from their partition in 1947 to the Kargil conflict in 1999. They talk about the other options that the British had to prevent the bloodletting of 1947 and the six-week partition. Then they talk about the Cold War as the backdrop for the conflicts and how both sides used the great powers and signed pacts with them to gain economic trade and military supplies. Lastly, they talk about how both nuclear weapons and irregular warfare have added new dimensions to the conflict.

In this Episode Jon O'Gorman hosts Michael Dennis and Daniel Post from the Strategy and Police Department and they discuss nuclear weapons in the context of the Cold War. They start by talking about nuclear diplomacy and its meaning in the Cold War. Next, they discuss how nuclear weapons change the calculus in the military to include wargaming the problems. They also talk about the economic impact of maintaining a nuclear stockpile and how that might have meant the death knell of the Soviet economy. Lastly, they discuss how technology does not replace sound strategic thinking in the contemporary world.

In this episode, Jon O'Gorman hosts David Stone and Kristin Mulready-Stone in talking about the Vietnamese Wars against the French, Americans and Chinese respectively. We look at the conflicts from a Red Team perspective and start by talking about French problems of colonial aims in Indochina. We look at Ho Chi Mihn and his perspective, nationalist vs. communist learnings, and internal communist disagreements in North Vietnam. We move to looking at the second Indochina War and American involvement. We talk about how the Sino-Soviet split complicates relations and support to Vietnam and how regional and domestic concerns loom over the myth of the world communist brotherhood. Lastly, we talk about why China decides to invade Vietnam, how it goes and what it may means the future and Taiwan.

In this episode Jon O'Gorman hosts Andrew (Dex) Wilson, Nicholas Sarantakes, and Kristin Mulready-Stone to discuss China and Korea. They begin by discussing the warlord period of China as the stage setter for the Chinese civil war. They next move to the problems Chiang has in unifying the country vs. Mao and his easier path. They kick around the concept of how the context of the civil war matters to Mao's victory and how his three-phase model might not be the best insurgent theory in any other place but China. Additionally, it might not even have been how Mao won China exactly. They talk about Chinese and U.S. involvement in Korea and what it meant for Taiwan. Lastly, they end with contemporary relevance and why China is once again making Taiwan an issue in the international arena and how it has more to do with domestic control than unification.

In this episode, Jon O’Gorman hosts Andrew Wilson, Michael Dennis, and Nicholas Sarantakes in a discussion about the grand strategy of the Second World War. They begin by talking about the Europe First strategy and what it meant for the United States on the home front: socially, economically, and politically. Next, they discuss how the Sino-Japanese Conflict that started in the 1930s was the real underlying cause that drew the U.S. into the war. The theory of Douhet’s air power as a strategy to defeat Germany and Japan is discussed as well as the how the war was terminated differently in each theater. Finally, the contemporary parallel is drawn as they look at two theories of containment of Communism in the early cold war as an allegory to the actions of the U.S. support of Ukraine and Taiwan today.

In this session Jon O'Gorman hosts John Maurer, Jesse Tumblin, and David Stone as they discuss why the allies of the first Great War could not win the peace, thus sowing the seeds of the second. They talk about the strategic choices and problems Britain had in maintaining its empire as well as the problems of other European powers during the period. The enigma of the Soviet Union and Communism as a spoiler for maintaining the peace is also discussed. We then speak of the Great Depression as the factor that forever changes the calculus and how Britain's choices going into the late 1930s were bleak. Appeasement as a strategy and its ramifications are looked at—we end with how this perhaps has parallels to the Russia-Ukrainian war of today.

In this episode Jon O’Gorman hosts Jesse Tumblin, David Stone, and James Holmes. They wrestle with the decision for war and what it means in this conflict. They also look at the naval theorists Corbett and Mahan whose theories are seen on full display in this case study. The concept of peripheral campaigns is discussed, specifically if Gallipoli could have achieved its intent. We tie this to the broader discussion of how navies can have effects on land and how Clausewitz says what peripheral campaigns need. Lastly, we look at war termination and how the treaty of Brest-Litovsk affects the thinking of Vladimir Putin to this day.