Axis of Disorder

This week we talk about China, Russia, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

We also discuss BRICS, North Korea, and the post-WWII global world order.

Recommended Book: Supercommunicators by Charles Duhigg

Transcript

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, or SCO, is a defense and economic alliance that was started by China and Russia back in 2001, and which has since expanded to become the largest regional organization in the world in terms of both land area and population, encompassing something like 80% of Eurasia, and 40% of the global population, as of 2020.

The SCO also boasts about 20% of global GDP between its member nations, which originally included the governments of its precursor regional alliance, the Shanghai Five, which formed back in 1996: China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.

With the evolution of that group into the SCO, though, Uzbekistan joined the club, and in 2017 it allowed India and Pakistan in, as well. Iran joined in 2023, and the list of observer and dialogue partner nations is pretty big, including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Cambodia, Egypt, Kuwait, the Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and the UAE.

The original purpose of the Shanghai Five, which was inherited by the SCO, was to increase trust and diplomatic relationships between these nations, which otherwise have a lot of potential enemies surrounding them on all sides—this is why the advice to never fight a land war in Asia is so well-taken: there's just a lot of land and a lot of borders and pretty much everyone who's tried, with few exceptions, has found themselves depleted by the effort.

Thus, while there are other components to the SCO, member countries' agreement to respect each others' borders, including opposition to intervention in other countries—invading them, messing with their politics, criticizing their approach to human rights, etc—the sovereignty issue is the big one here, with making sure that everyone involved is diplomatically tied-up with everyone else in a close second, so member states can focus on the borders that present the most risk, and invest less attention and resources on the borders they share with their fellow members.

That said, the SCO also includes mechanisms that allow member nations to work together on big projects, like transportation infrastructure that passes through or benefits more than one country, and fighting local terrorist organizations. It also allows them to integrate some aspects of their monetary and banking infrastructure, among other ties, so there's an economic component to these relationships.

Another intergovernmental organization that likewise encompasses a significant chunk of the global population, landmass, and economic activity is BRICS, which is an acronym that was originally coined to gesture at the economic potential of the then-burgeoning economies of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, but which in recent years has expanded to also include Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the UAE.

BRICS nations hold about 30% of the world's territory, 45% of its population, and pull in about 33% of global GDP, based on purchasing power parity.

And BRICS has long served as a sort of counterweight to global institutions that often seem to favor the world's wealthiest and most powerful nations, many of which are Western nations, like those of North America and Europe.

So while the G7's expanded iteration, the G20, brings nations like Brazil, India, and Indonesia into the conversation, the majority of the power in such institutions—and this includes institutions like the UN, because of who holds vetoes and soft power influence within those organizations—the majority of the power is still typically held by the world's currently most influential and wealthy governments.

And BRICS, from the beginning, included those nations that were assumed to become the most powerful, or at least equally powerful nations, by many metrics, in ten or twenty or thirty years, based on demographics, economic growth, and so on.

Both of these groupings, then, are attempts to lash together the governments of nations that are on favorable growth trajectories, or otherwise in interesting, upward-moving positions by various metrics, or which are located in areas that would benefit from some kind of unity, but which aren't always given the respect they believe they deserve within other globe-straddling organizations; in some cases because they're simply not there yet, in others because their governments are a bit more authoritarian, while entities like the UN, while including everyone, tend to favor democracies.

What I'd like to talk about today is another loose grouping of nations that seems to be forming, and which, while it doesn't have an official designation or even membership roster yet, is becoming increasingly well-defined, collaborative, and active.

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The geopolitical, military, and news analysis community has been struggling, over the past handful of years in particular, to come up with a monicker for a loosely defined, but increasingly impactful cluster of nations that are oriented, in part, around disrupting the current global status quo, including but not limited to the rule of law and establishment through which international things are typically handled that arose in the wake of WWII.

Following that conflict, the US and the Soviet Union scrambled to figure out how to deal with each other in ways that didn't lead to, at first, conventional war, and then in a relatively short period of time, nuclear war, and that led to a flurry of geopolitical activity that culminated in the creation of, among other things, of the United Nations, which itself birthed a huge stack of other organizations and protocols, most of which favored those who were willing to play ball within these institutions, and made life a little more difficult for those who defied them; North Korea, for instance, following its formation after the Korean War, is famously excluded from a lot of the benefits of belonging to the modern international order, in large part because it's made it pretty clear it intends to do away with its neighbor to the south, and maybe the US and other perceptual enemies, as well, the first chance it gets.

The group that analysts have been trying to label centers around China and Russia, but usually includes Iran, as well, and in some cases North Korea, as well. Iran's many proxy groups, like Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and Hamas in Gaza, are also sometimes thus categorized.

Some of the proposed labels have been clear and illustrative, others have been a little in the weeds—like the acronym CRANKs, which kinda sorta stands for China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, the Axis of Upheaval, the Axis of Autocracy, and in some more western and patriotic publications, the New Axis of Evil, and even the Legion of Doom, which arguably makes this group seem pretty hardcore, but I guess it still gets the intended point across.

I personally like one that was posited by a writer for the American Enterprise Institute, the Axis of Disorder, as while there's still a fairly biased reference to the WWII Axis powers in there, which depending on whose side you're on and which governments you support, could be construed as an unfair comparison, but it also points at the seeming purpose of a lot of this group's actions, which seem to orient around disrupting the current world order—that one that was implemented post-WWII.

And the seeming rationale for this is that this post-WWII order was established to favor nations with capitalistic economies and democratic values, including things like human rights, freedom of the press, freedom of worship, and the like; and while there's absolutely room for argument as to how well various nations uphold those values on a country-to-country basis, and across time, few would argue that China has a better reputation for human rights than Sweden, or that Iran has a better record for equality between the sexes than the UK.

So we live in a world, today, that's shaped by a bunch of values that these loosely grouped oppositional nations don't really agree with, at least not to the degree that other nations think they should, and a lot of the levers of power are currently in other hands. And they believe, well, why shouldn't we hold those levers? Why shouldn't China have the economic power the US has? Why shouldn't Iran be as geopolitically influential as Germany? Why shouldn't North Korea be in charge of something like the UN?

And on top of that, why should the US and its allies hold the reins of so many sanctions-related powers? Why should the USD and its vast underpinnings grant one nation, and its allies, so many benefits, while the rest of the world is forced to play ball and toe the line—play ball according to rules set by the US and those who believe similar things, and toe lines they draw according to their preferences—lest they find themselves, like Iran and North Korea, and increasingly, now, Russia, sanctioned into oblivion?

It's a fair question, if you are ambivalent about those aforementioned human rights and press freedoms and such.

And these governments, not really liking those limitations on their behaviors and how they run things, are doing what they can, in a loosely affiliated way, to disrupt these enforcement institutions and the powers and nations they support.

So part of the strategy of this group is fairly direct and unambiguous: they playact toeing the line a lot of the time, but when they think they can get away with it.

Some of these raw acts of violation, though, would seem to be performed with the intention of making people question those institutions and powers, and the larger order they add up to, which could, over time, bring some of the nations that are sitting on the sidelines over to their, oppositional side; courting those of the so-called nonaligned movement, basically, of which there are officially around 120, though about 25 of them are highly desirable allies that have become transactional in their dealings with members of both sides of this simmering conflict, with the roughly delineated west on one side, and that of China and Russia and their allies on the other.

The economist actually called this group the Transactional 25, to T25, which is a nicely illustrative monicker, and that group includes nations as big as India and as small, but increasingly diplomatically important, as Qatar.

So when the Houthis shut down the Red Sea passage to the Suez Canal, disrupting global trade, and when North Korea provides ammunition to Russia for use during its invasion of Ukraine, these are actions that are beneficial to these groups unto themselves—the Houthis gain more attention and recruits, and get to hurt, ostensibly at least, Israel and its allies, and North Korea gets more trade with Russia, while also helping set a precedent for invading and claiming a neighboring country, which is something they're very interested in doing at some point—but they're also actions that show the weakness of the current global system and the folks running it, which could, over time, nudge more nations over to their side.

This isn't just theory: this is something we've already seen play out in parts of Africa, where Russia's Wagner mercenaries have been subbed-in for US and UN troops, for defending against extremist militants purposes, and we've seen other T25 nations in particular wobble on various, global-scale issues, to the point that it's a big question who India, who Indonesia, who Vietnam, who Israel would support if push came to shove and a global conflict broke out, or if some kind of geopolitical movement arose, intending to fundamentally alter institutions like the UN—who would these sideline-sitters throw in their lot with?

These disruptions, in some ways, are arguments in favor of siding with the group that's trying to upend the way things are currently done, by showing the fragility of that existing system.

This new Axis of Disorder, or whatever we want to call it, is not a fully unified front, however. Neither is what they're positioning themselves against, members of the UN, EU, NATO, and every other group regularly squabbling with each other; but the rifts between China and Russia are huge, with China becoming increasingly dominant over Russia, Russia's economy becoming more and more reliant on their neighbor, and that's created tensions within both countries, alongside existing concerns about the vast border they share.

Likewise, North Korea worries pretty much everyone, and Russia's recent announcement of a defense pact with them has raised a lot of eyebrows, including in China. And while Iran has gained a lot of prestige in Russia recently, for the cheap and functional drones and rockets they offer, their ongoing tensions with regional neighbors that China and Russia would like to get closer to, like Saudi Arabia, makes them a bit of a liability, as much as an asset, and the actions they help their proxies take (like the Houthis in the Red Sea) are not ideal for shipping giant China.

So there's a lot of scuffling and below-the-surface tension between the members of this so-called axis, and while they're doing an arguably solid job, so far, of testing the limits of the current system, and publicly airing its weak points, that doesn't mean they're set up for anything more substantial than that kind of testing the fence, seeing what they can get away with, asymmetric warfare sort of approach to this ambition.

They're not as tight as the loosely defined west, then, but it also behooves them to keep things in the grey area, in some ways, lest they trigger alarm bells throughout those systems they're trying to throw off, so that looseness might serve them more than hinder them, at this point. It also allows them to work with grey-area members of this group, like Venezuela and Cuba, which periodically make nice with their western opposition, while still fighting against them at the macro-scale.

Probably the biggest impact this group is having right now, though, with all that testing and vulnerability identifying, is increasing the number of threat surfaces the world faces, in terms of hacking and snooping and stealing, but also in terms of provoking military actions and threatening more of the same.

Russia invading Ukraine was a big deal, and China threatening to invade Taiwan could be even bigger; and both of those acts, alongside all of the hacking they do, the stealing of intellectual property, the leaking of state secrets, and the messing with foreign elections, are all violations of what's supposed to be good and proper and allowed within that global system.

And because they're pushing all those buttons all at once, they're spreading the response capability of the other side pretty thin, which could be a precursor to a more direct attack, but it could also just be a means of weakening that system, wearing it out to the point that it no longer functions even at the imperfect level it was at before, which could, over time, make way for some new model, run by a new set of hands.

Show Notes

https://archive.ph/bOr06

https://nationalinterest.org/feature/meet-cranks-how-china-russia-iran-and-north-korea%C2%A0align-against-america-211186

https://thehill.com/opinion/4094000-iran-just-joined-a-pact-with-moscow-and-beijing-heres-what-it-means-for-the-us/

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/06/22/world/asia/putin-korea-china-disruption.html

https://warontherocks.com/2024/04/the-axis-off-kilter-why-an-iran-russia-china-axis-is-shakier-than-meets-the-eye/

https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2024/03/18/how-china-russia-and-iran-are-forging-closer-ties

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/axis-upheaval-russia-iran-north-korea-taylor-fontaine

https://www.aei.org/articles/the-axis-of-disorder-how-russian-iran-and-china-want-to-remake-the-world/

https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/never_fight_a_land_war_in_Asia

https://www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/guides/zynt2nb/revision/3

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commonwealth_of_Independent_States

https://archive.ph/xVbrh

https://www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/guides/zynt2nb/revision/3

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shanghai_Cooperation_Organisation

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BRICS