Reasonable Faith Podcast Question of the Week #958: A New Argument from Contingency
Sep 25, 2025
Doral engages with Dr. William Lane Craig about a novel contingency argument from a French book. They dissect a five-step argument suggesting that matter is contingent. Craig challenges the notion that the contingent properties of matter imply the contingency of matter itself. He also explores how necessary beings can possess contingent properties and questions the significance of size and weight. Ultimately, Craig expresses skepticism about the authors' claims, highlighting the need for more evidence on the essential nature of matter.
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Contingent Properties Don’t Imply Contingent Being
- William Lane Craig argues that contingent properties (like size or weight) do not entail the contingency of the thing itself.
- He notes a necessary entity could have varying properties across possible worlds without thereby becoming non-necessary.
Necessary Entities Can Vary In Properties
- Craig gives God as an example of a necessary being that can possess different states across worlds, showing necessity can coexist with varying properties.
- He suggests matter might likewise exist in all worlds while varying in size or weight without being different matter.
Challenge: Are Size and Weight Essential?
- Craig identifies the crucial premise missing from Bolloré and Bonassi: they must show differing size or weight makes it a different piece of matter.
- He questions whether size and weight are essential properties of matter in the way charge might be.
