This week we talk about Egypt, Eritrea, and Sudan.
We also discuss the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, ports, and journalism.
Recommended Book: The Infinity Machine by Sebastian Mallaby
Transcript
In 2018, Ethiopia reopened its embassy in Eritrea. The two countries had fought a border war in the late 1990s and had spent nearly two decades in a tense state that was not quite war, not quite peace. The reopening was part of a striking reconciliation between Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki. Abiy received the Nobel Peace Prize the following year, in large part for his efforts to end that conflict.
At the beginning of October, though, Ethiopia announced that it was re-closing that embassy. It ordered ten Eritrean diplomats to leave Addis Ababa, saying they had engaged in activities that threatened Ethiopian security. Eritrea called the decision astonishing and said it was severing diplomatic ties with Ethiopia in response.
Ethiopia also expelled an Egyptian diplomat, and Egypt responded by expelling an Ethiopian one. The African Union urged all three countries to exercise restraint and preserve channels of communication, but all of this was happening as fighting was picking back up in northern Ethiopia, and as explosions were heard in the capital, Addis Ababa. A source connected to an armed opposition alliance told Reuters that the group had launched drone strikes there. But as of early October, there had been no independent confirmation of what caused those explosions. Witnesses and officials confirmed hearing blasts; whether they were an attack, and who might have carried it out, are still open questions.
What I’d like to talk about today is how a peace that once seemed to transform this part of Africa fell apart, how Ethiopia’s internal war became entangled with its disputes with its neighbors, and why it’s important to distinguish what’s actually happening from what each side in this simmering conflict says is happening.
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Let’s kick things off with a quick refresher of this region’s geography and history, to help explain why this crisis has so many layers.
Eritrea sits along the Red Sea, just north of Ethiopia. It became independent from Ethiopia in 1993, which left Ethiopia without a coastline. The two countries initially maintained decent relations, but then they went to war over their border in 1998. The fighting ended in 2000, without any real resolution, and without formally establishing a new, mutually acceptable relationship. That was the long stalemate Abiy and Isaias seemed to resolve back in 2018.
Inside Ethiopia, there was another important change during this period. For decades, a political movement originating in the northern region of Tigray, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, or TPLF, had been the dominant force in the coalition that governed the country. Abiy came to power in 2018 and reshaped that governing coalition, and this put even more distance between the central government and the TPLF.
In 2020, those political disputes erupted into a war between the Ethiopian federal government and Tigrayan forces. Eritrea fought alongside Ethiopia’s government against the TPLF. This is one of the most striking reversals in the present crisis: the government and its former Eritrean ally are now accusing one another of dangerous interference, while Ethiopian officials allege that Eritrea is helping that same Tigrayan movement they once fought against.
This war, which lasted from 2020 to 2022, killed hundreds of thousands of people, according to estimates that vary substantially because conditions made reliable counting so difficult. It also displaced millions, damaged farms and hospitals, and involved absolutely horrific abuses against civilians. International investigators and human-rights groups documented atrocities by multiple parties, including Ethiopian and Eritrean forces and Tigrayan fighters.
In November of 2022, Ethiopia’s government and the TPLF signed a peace agreement in Pretoria, South Africa. They agreed to stop fighting, disarm Tigrayan forces, restore services throughout the region, allow humanitarian aid to reach civilians, and to work toward a more stable political settlement. But Eritrea was not a party to that agreement, and that’s because there were two different peace processes.
The 2018 reconciliation was between Ethiopia and Eritrea: two states ending a border standoff. The Pretoria agreement was between Ethiopia’s federal government and the TPLF: two parties trying to end a civil war. Neither agreement automatically settled the questions at the heart of the other one, and Eritrea’s role in the civil war made it more difficult for a ceasefire between Ethiopian and Tigrayan leaders to guarantee peace along the Eritrean border.
Parts of western Tigray were, and remain to this day, contested by Tigrayan and Amhara authorities. Hundreds of thousands of people displaced from that area have not been able to return home safely. Disarmament did not proceed as the agreement envisioned, and rights groups continued to report abuses, including by Eritrean troops in parts of Tigray.
Within Tigray, the TPLF split into rival factions. The status of the regional administration became another source of conflict. In May of this year, TPLF leaders pushed out an administration backed by the federal government. The two sides disputed who had authority there, how the peace agreement should be carried out, and whether federal funds were being withheld. Human Rights Watch also reported allegations of a coercive recruitment drive by Tigrayan authorities, including the forced recruitment of child soldiers.
So the Pretoria agreement stopped a major war, but it left armed groups, competing governments, disputed territory, and displaced families in place, their problems unresolved.
Then, in late September of this year, fighting between federal forces and Tigrayan fighters intensified in Tigray and neighboring Afar. The United Nations reported that armed forces had seized the airports in Mekelle, Axum, and Shire, and warned that hostilities were spreading into neighboring areas. An alliance of seven Ethiopian opposition groups also announced a common challenge to Abiy’s government, though importantly, an announcement of cooperation doesn’t tell us how closely those groups are actually coordinating on the ground.
Ethiopia’s army chief then accused Eritrea of helping the TPLF and suggested that Egypt and Sudan were supporting the opposition as well. Eritrea, Egypt, and Sudan have denied the allegations. And those differing stories point at a difficulty in any conflict, but especially one happening in this part of the world, at this moment in time.
Governments have access to information they may not make public. They also have reasons to portray an internal opponent as an instrument of a foreign power. Armed groups have their own reasons to claim allies or capabilities they may not actually possess. And governments accused of involvement in a conflict or violent act have strong reasons to deny it, whether the accusation is true or false.
This fog of war applies to the aforementioned blasts in Addis Ababa, too. If opposition forces had successfully attacked targets in the capital, that would represent a significant shift in the conflict. Reuters reported a claim from a source linked to the opposition alliance, but also said it could not confirm who caused the explosions. The Associated Press reported that it remained unclear whether the blasts were an attack or just military exercises. So there’s a consequential claim here, but not yet confirmation of a rebel strike on the capital.
Part of the problem is that independent observation is difficult in this region right now. Internet service in northern Ethiopia was disrupted as the fighting escalated. Roads and flights have been interrupted. Earlier this year, Ethiopian authorities expelled a French journalist after her reporting trip to Tigray, and temporarily revoked accreditation for three Reuters journalists following a separate investigation, before restoring it months later. Press-freedom organizations have documented pressure on Ethiopian reporters, as well.
This doesn’t mean all official statements related to this conflict are false. It means there are fewer independent witnesses able to confirm them, and fewer ways for people living near the fighting to tell the outside world what they are seeing. During the last Tigray war, communications blackouts helped create conditions in which rumors traveled faster than verifiable accounts, and those same risks are present now.
Journalists and researchers can sometimes use satellite images, hospital records, interviews with people who have fled, and statements from the parties to build a picture of what happened. But a hospital can confirm that people were wounded without knowing who fired the weapon. A satellite image might show damage without revealing who caused it. And an eyewitness can describe a blast without being aware of a drone flying overhead.
That said, we can note a few things with reasonable certainty. The diplomatic expulsions and embassy closure were public government decisions. Fighting has resumed. Medical teams are treating many more people with war wounds, and civilians who survived the previous war are once again facing displacement and interrupted services. Uncertainty about who fired a weapon in Addis Ababa doesn’t make those events uncertain, it just keeps us from having a complete picture of the context surrounding those confirmed elements.
Let’s talk for a moment about why there’s concern about this conflict, which is inside Ethiopia, possibly spreading beyond its borders.
With Eritrea, the central issue is the Red Sea. Ethiopia is a large, landlocked country that depends on ports in neighboring states for access to global trade. Abiy has argued that reliable access to the sea is vital to its economy and security, and his government has shown a lot of interest in the Eritrean port of Assab.
Eritrea’s government has interpreted this interest as a possible threat to its territory. Ethiopian officials have spoken about seeking access through negotiation, but some of Abiy’s statements about Ethiopia’s historic loss of the coast have perhaps rightly heightened fears in Asmara. When both parties worry the other might be preparing for a fight, reactionary troop movements or support for rival political groups can become evidence for something neither side originally intended, but which eventually becomes real, nonetheless.
Egypt’s dispute with Ethiopia is different. It centers on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, built on the Blue Nile. Ethiopia sees the dam as crucial for generating electricity and supporting development within its borders, but Egypt depends heavily on Nile waters and wants a binding agreement about how the dam will operate, especially in dry years. The dam was inaugurated in 2025, but the underlying dispute was not resolved, leaving Egypt worrying that it might not receive enough water due to that new, massive upstream infrastructure.
Egypt and Eritrea, interestingly, have grown closer as both have become more worried about Ethiopia. That’s why the Egyptian diplomatic expulsion is part of the regional story to begin with; that existing conflict with Ethiopia over its new dam makes it thinkable that Egypt might come down against Ethiopia in the event of a regional war breaking out, even if there’s no reason to think Egypt is seeking such a war, currently.
Sudan has also been named in recent Ethiopian accusations about foreign enemies conspiring, and like Egypt, it has denied them.
The danger is that leaders may begin treating every local setback as proof of a foreign plot, and every move by a neighbor as preparation for an attack. The more countries they bring into that story, all of them watching their backs and fearing a first strike against their interests, the more chances there are for one misread event to provoke a response somewhere else, triggering a cascade of tit-for-tat violence.
Diplomatic expulsions don’t mean these countries are at war. Governments sometimes recall or expel diplomats during a crisis and eventually restore relations. But an embassy is also a place where officials can send warnings, clarify intentions, and subtly taste-test possible compromises. Closing an embassy while armies are fighting nearby removes one safe, ordinary way to do those sorts of things. That’s why the African Union’s call to keep communicating is more than just a ceremonial expression of concern; embassies and ambassadors help keep wars from happening.
Now all that said, as tends to be the case, the people with the least control over these high-level, state decisions are already bearing the majority of their cost.
Doctors Without Borders said that in two hospitals in northern Ethiopia, the number of war-wounded patients received rose from around 180 to more than 420 over a 48-hour period in late September. Another hospital in Shire received more than 300 wounded patients that week. Some medical outreach has been suspended for the moment because staff cannot safely reach people outside hospitals due to the fighting.
In Tigray, people who were displaced during the earlier war still live in camps. Residents of these camps have described hearing artillery again. Others report disruptions to banking and communications, making it harder to buy food or run a business even when the fighting is still a long ways away.
These accounts are part of how we can tell whether a claimed de-escalation is real. An embassy can reopen while roads remain blocked. Leaders can announce talks while families remain unable to return home. A ceasefire can stop large battles while smaller groups continue to threaten civilians. On the ground reporting helps us understand the true nature of what might be officially called a ceasefire, or the true nature of what might be officially called a war.
There are reasons to think a wider war is not inevitable, here, though, despite everything.
The Ethiopian, Eritrean, and Egyptian governments all stand to lose from a larger conflict. The African Union helped broker the 2022 agreement, and both it and the United Nations are urging renewed dialogue. Those institutions have relationships and channels and sticks and carrots they can use to nudge things back on course, even if it might take a while to do so.
The main things to be watching now are whether Ethiopian and Tigrayan leaders resume talks under the Pretoria framework; whether aid workers can move safely and services are restored; whether Eritrean or other foreign forces can be independently documented crossing into the fighting; and whether Ethiopia and Eritrea find a way to discuss port access without treating it as a question that can only be settled through the application of force.
Show Notes
https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/african-union-urges-ethiopia-eritrea-egypt-refrain-actions-that-could-undermine-2026-10-02/
https://www.internazionale.it/ultime-notizie-reuters/2026/10/02/explosions-heard-overnight-in-ethiopia-s-capital-diplomatic-sources-say
https://www.au.int/en/pressreleases/20261001/statement-auc-escalating-tensions-between-ethiopia-eritrea-and-egypt
https://apnews.com/article/ethiopia-blasts-tigray-war-a864e8cd442bade4531b8e7609f3216c
https://apnews.com/article/ethiopia-tigray-war-eritrea-sudan-egypt-6b3208122a4221f3c2e8dcbe21630016
https://ethiopia.un.org/en/323246-un-secretary-general-statement-ethiopia
https://www.msf.org/msf-teams-scale-medical-response-fighting-resumes-ethiopia
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2137710/b210-ehtioipia-eritrea-tigray.pdf
https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/09/09/rising-tigray-tensions-test-african-union
https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/06/23/ethiopia-tigray-authorities-should-withdraw-abusive-law
https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/04/22/ethiopia-persecution-of-tigrayans-unrelenting
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2026/country-chapters/eritrea
https://cpj.org/2026/06/ethiopia-expels-french-journalist-augustine-passilly-after-reporting-trip-to-tigray/
https://cpj.org/2026/02/ethiopia-revokes-reuters-journalists-accreditation-following-investigative-report/
https://rsf.org/en/ethiopia-rsf-condemns-escalating-pressure-and-intimidation-against-independent-news-site-addis
https://amp.dw.com/en/ethiopia-internet-disrupted-in-tigray-amid-conflict-escalation/a-79424191
https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2019/summary/
https://apnews.com/article/12ae4fcb39169cd077c538c7c112c6fd
https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2026/10/02/egypt-ethiopia-nile-dam-latest/
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