This week we talk about student protests, curfews, and East Pakistan.
We also discuss Sheikh Hasina, Myanmar, and authoritarians.
Recommended Book: The Identity Trap by Yascha Mounk
Transcript
Bangladesh is a country of about 170 million people, those people living in an area a little smaller than the US state of Illinois, a hair over 57,000 square miles.
It shares a smallish southeastern border with Myanmar, and its entire southern border runs up against the Bay of Bengal, which is part of the Indian Ocean, but it's surrounded to the west, north, and most of its eastern border by India, which nearly entirely encompasses Bangladesh due to the nature of its historical formation.
Back in 1905, a previously somewhat sprawling administrative region called Bengal, which has a lot history of human occupation and development, and which for the past several hundred years leading up to that point had been colonized by various Europeans, was carved-out by the British as a separate province, newly designated Eastern Bengal and Assam, at the urging of local Muslim aristocrats who were playing ball with then-governing British leaders, the lot of them having worked together to make the region one of the most profitable in British India, boasting the highest gross domestic product, and the highest per-capita income on the subcontinent, at the time.
This division separated Bengal from its Hindu-dominated neighboring provinces, including nearby, and booming Calcutta, which was pissed at this development because it allowed the British to invest more directly and lavishly in an area that was already doing pretty well for itself, without risking some of that money overflowing into nearby, Hindu areas, like, for instance, Calcutta.
This division also allowed local Muslim leaders to attain more political power, in part because of all that investment, but also because it freed them up to form an array of political interest groups that, because of the nature of this provincial division, allowed them to focus on the needs of Muslim citizens, and to counter the influence of remaining local Hindu landowners, and other such folks who have previously wielded an outsized portion of that power; these leaders were redistributing power in the region to Muslims over Hindus, basically, in contrast to how things worked, previously.
In 1935, the British government promised to grant the Bengalese government limited provincial autonomy as part of a larger effort to set the subcontinent out on its own path, leading up to the grand decolonization effort that European nations would undergo following WWII, and though there was a significant effort to make Bengal its own country in 1946, post-war and just before the partition of British India, that effort proved futile, and those in charge of doing the carving-up instead divided the country into areas that are basically aligned with modern day India and modern day Pakistan, but two-thirds of Bengal were given to Pakistan, while one-third was given to India.
This meant that a portion of Pakistan, the most populous portion, though with a smaller land area, was separated from the remainder of the country by Indian territory, and the logic of dividing things in this way was that the British wanted to basically delineate Hindu areas from Muslim areas, and while large, spread-out groups of Muslims lived roughly within the borders of modern day Pakistan, a large, more densely crowded group of Muslims lived in Bengal, hence the otherwise nonsensical-seeming decision to break a country up into two pieces in this way.
Frictions developed between mainland Pakistan and the portion of Pakistan, formally Bengal, that was initially called East Bengal, and then renamed East Pakistan in 1955, almost immediately.
There was a movement to get the Bengali language officially recognized as a state language, alongside Urdu, which was promoted as the exclusive federal language of Pakistan, early on, and a list of six demands were presented to the Pakistani government by East Pakistan-based politicians, all of which aimed to get the region equal representation in what they felt was a West Pakistan-biased system, despite the fact that, again, East Pakistan, formally Bengal, was the most populous part of the country, and they had the most thriving economy, as well, bringing in most of the country's income.
These demands led to what's become known as the Six Points Movement, which in turn, just a few years later, kicked off the Bangladesh War of Independence, which was exactly what it sounds like: an effort by folks in East Pakistan to achieve independence from the larger government of Pakistan, which had in recent years been taken over by a military junta which, like the previous government, didn't give as much political power to Easy Pakistanis.
That junta, in late March of 1971, launched a military operation called Operation Searchlight that was meant to take out separatists in East Pakistan—but in practice this meant they swooped in and started targeting academics, members of the local intelligentsia, and people of Hindu faith, alongside members of the rabble-rousing groups that were petitioning for more power in this smaller-by-landmass, but larger by population and income, segment of the country.
Operation Searchlight sparked the aforementioned Bangladesh War of Independence, and nine months later, the military government's efforts during this conflict were deemed to be genocidal because of how they targeted ethnic Bengalis, killing somewhere between 300,000 and 3 million of them, while also intentionally and systematically raping hundreds of thousands of Bengali women, the soldiers who committed these acts doing so with the formal go-ahead from their government—they were told to do so, basically.
These atrocities eventually pulled India into the conflict, in part because millions of Bengalis were fleeing across their border to escape the genocide, and in part because the genocide was occurring, to begin with, and that sparked the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, which eventually led to an end to that genocide when Pakistan's government surrendered at the tail-end of 1971.
That victory led to, formerly Bengal, then East Pakistan, now Bangladesh's independence from Pakistan. It also concretized India's military dominance in the region, and Pakistan, what remained of it, lost more than half its population, much of its economic base, and suffered a long period of embarrassment that left it questioning the basis of its militant, braggadocios approach to both nationalism and foreign policy; it was previously a well-respected and feared military force, but it became a somewhat eyes-downcast entity in the region for a while, lots of reforms eventually helping it shore-up its economy, but remnants of this period still percolate in its internal politics and government operation, to this day, including its antagonism toward India, and its support of local jihadist groups, which the government uses as a counterbalance against India and other local power structures, which it can no longer face head-on.
What I'd like to talk about today is a swirl of new tumult in modern day Bangladesh, and what this moderate uproar might mean for the country's future.
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Modern Bangladesh is surrounded by conflict.
Myanmar's military government is in the midst of a civil war, following the recent overthrow of its democratically elected civilian government, and the subsequent rise and loose collaboration between rebel groups in various parts of the country.
India is booming, and is broadly considered to be the next big power player on the world stage, though it's already a regional titan. It also continues to scuffle with Pakistan to its northwest, and with China along its shared borders, which are located just a short distance north of Bangladesh.
Bangladesh's coast, along the Bay of Bengal, has long underperformed economically, despite being surrounded by some of the most impactful producers of goods in the world, and this coastline, including the one occupied by Bangladesh, has become incredibly unpredictable in recent years: regularly flooding, entire villages being swept out to sea, and freshwater sources increasingly tainted by those incursions of salt water.
This area already has a lot going on, in other words, and many of those goings on seem primed for amplification in the coming years, as global power structures and economic tangles continue to flex and break and rearrange, and as the climate continues to behave in increasingly distressing ways; there's a political and military realignment happening in this part of the world, but geopolitics and global economics are also swirling and rearranging in all sorts of unpredictable ways.
All of which serves as context for a recent series of protests that arose around Bangladesh beginning in July of 2024.
These protests were held by mostly students who were not fans of a quota scheme that was originally implemented by the government in the wake of that 1971 war with Pakistan, this system abolished in 2018, but which was reimplemented by the country's High Court shortly before the protests began.
And this system basically promised that 30% of all government jobs would go to the descendants of people who fought in that war against Pakistan, for independence, alongside some jobs for minority groups, folks from traditionally underrepresented districts, and people who are disabled—though mostly it was meant to honor the descendants of those veterans.
The protesting students were pissed about this reimplementation because the country's economy isn't great at the moment, and unemployment is rife; the jobs that are available are not paying much, and are not terribly secure. About 18 million young people are currently unemployed in Bangladesh.
Government jobs, in contrast, tend to provide some level of consistency and predictability, pay relatively well, and tend to stick around—folks in such jobs aren't worried about being fired or their jobs disappearing, because of their very nature. So the best jobs, by that standard, are government jobs, and nearly a third of those jobs have been promised to people who, in many cases, just happened to be born to the right parents or grandparents; and notably, the majority of folks with families who fought in that conflict, are also supporters of the current, authoritarian Bangladeshi government—so part of the criticism here is that these quotas offer a means of giving cushy, reliable jobs to supporters of the current regime, without seeming like that's what they're doing.
These peaceful student protests were met with heavy resistance and violence by the government, which deployed police and soldiers who shot at protestors and shut down universities and the internet in the country, and that led to more protests, including by non-students, who were also met with at times deadly force.
About 150 people have been confirmed killed, so far, though that's the government's figure, and other, independent counts have tallied more than 200 dead. Hundreds of protestors were also arrested and curfews were implemented.
The Supreme Court responded to the initial protests by reducing the quota in late July, to the point that about 5% of government jobs would go to descendants of those veterans, which in practice meant about 93% of all government jobs would be divvied-out in a normal way, hiring people based on who's the best candidate.
Protests largely ceased after that announcement, and the government restored internet services 11 days after shutting it down across the country. Social media platforms like WhatsApp and TikTok remain restricted, however, as these services were used to promote and organize protests.
Curfews have also been relaxed somewhat, though police are reportedly sweeping through schools and cities, grabbing people who were recorded at protests, arresting thousands of them, including at least half a dozen students who led the initial protests that kicked everything off.
Protest leaders are now demanding that the remaining curfews be lifted, that those who were arrested are released, charges against them dropped, and that the leaders responsible for the heavy-handed response should resign.
Some protestors have also called for the country's Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina, to step down, as she initially called the students traitors, though she later backtracked and said she didn't want them to be harmed.
Hasina is the longest-serving Prime Minister in Bangladeshi history, having initially stepped into the position in 1996, then stepping back into the role in 2009—she's held the office ever since.
She's generally considered to be an authoritarian, and has been accused of fixing elections, extrajudicial killings, and the imprisonment, or worse, of politicians and journalists who challenge her in any way.
She is, given all that, then, perhaps not surprisingly blaming these protests not on the students—not any longer, at least—but instead on opposition political parties who she says are attempting to challenge her rule, and thus, the wellbeing of the country as a whole.
Given that this is a relatively well-established authoritarian regime, there's a nonzero chance those who are in charge of these protests will take the win with the quota system, even though it wasn't fully removed, and step back from these other, more substantial demands that are unlikely to be met, short of perhaps a token resignation here and there by lower-run government officials who take the bullet for those higher up.
Outside demands for impartial investigations into who caused what are likewise unlikely to move forward, and the government has made it pretty clear it intends to double-down on the "it's the political opposition doing this to us, and you" narrative, which could help them justify further clamping-down on these groups, even to the point of more imprisonments and killings, but bare-minimum, in such a way that it makes dislodging the current ruling party even more difficult in the future.
It's possible that tumult elsewhere around the world, including in Bangladesh's own backyard, might encourage overreaction, not under reaction, from those in charge, as Myanmar's military government is having a lot of trouble with rebels, these days, and while it's not impossible that the prime minister will give in to more moderate demands, publicly apologizing for the violent response and firing some of her higher-level ministers, her government's history hints that things are more likely to tilt in the other direction, at least for the foreseeable future, and at least if the protestors fail to scale-up their operations to incorporate more of the country's population than they have, thus far.
At the moment, then, things have calmed a bit in terms of protests and government responses to those protests in Bangladesh. But there are elements to this story that have made things even more volatile than they already were, and because of how uncertain so many variables in the region are right now, there's a chance we'll see this, or connected movements and storylines, bubble back up at some point in the near-future.
Show Notes
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2024/bay-of-bengal-climate-change/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sheikh_Hasina
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/bangladesh-protests-quelled-anger-discontent-remain-2024-07-26/
https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jul/26/bangladesh-student-protests-mass-movement-against-dictator
https://apnews.com/article/bangladesh-campus-violence-hasina-bc513b6d68cf5b94cfd898f3c7f153d2
https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/bangladesh-student-group-vows-to-resume-protests-if-demands-not-met/article68456310.ece
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/7/25/bangladesh-minister-defends-govt-response-to-protests-amid-calls-for-probe
https://www.aljazeera.com/program/newsfeed/2024/7/24/bangladeshs-deadly-protests-explained
https://www.britannica.com/topic/largest-U-S-state-by-area
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bangladesh
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indo-Pakistani_war_of_1971
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