Matthew Green, a renowned cryptographer known for his passionate takes on security, joins Justin Schuh to dissect the controversial Dual_EC_DRBG. They debate whether this random number generator was a deliberate backdoor by the NSA or merely a colossal blunder. The conversation uncovers the ethical dilemmas of cryptographic standards, the NSA's questionable practices, and the erosion of public trust in secure communications. Their insights blend humor and serious analysis, illuminating the complexities of cryptography in today's world.
The podcast debates whether Dual_EC_DRBG's vulnerabilities were intentionally designed as a backdoor by the NSA or simply mismanagement mistakes.
NIST's collaboration with the NSA raises concerns about transparency and conflicts of interest in certifying cryptographic standards like Dual EC.
The integration of Dual EC in commercial products, such as Juniper's firewalls, highlights the severe security implications of trusting flawed standards.
Deep dives
Overview of Dual EC DRBG
Dual EC DRBG (Deterministic Random Bit Generator) is a cryptographic standard that features a debate around its legitimacy and security, particularly regarding its association with the NSA. The discussion highlights that many view Dual EC as a backdoor but emphasizes that its design comes from a government standard intended for secure communication. The speakers explore evidence suggesting that the algorithm itself contains vulnerabilities, allowing for potential exploitation if certain parameters are known. This creates a complex scenario where it’s debated whether the NSA intentionally introduced vulnerabilities or if it was a result of mismanagement within the organization.
Controversial Perspectives
During the episode, participants present opposing views on whether Dual EC was deliberately engineered as a backdoor by the NSA. One guest argues that the vulnerabilities inherent in Dual EC do not amount to a purposeful backdoor, while the other contends that its design aligns more closely with what one would expect from a backdoor. The speakers refer to historical incidents, including NSA's handling of secure communications following 9/11, as context for their positions. This debate outlines the inherent conflict within cryptography, security practices, and governmental transparency in the face of emerging cyber threats.
The Role of NIST
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) plays a critical role in the standardization of cryptographic algorithms, including Dual EC. The podcast discusses NIST’s collaboration with the NSA and how it potentially leads to conflicts of interest, especially concerning the parameters used inDual EC. Participants mention that NIST had to follow guidelines set by the NSA, sometimes resulting in practices that lack transparency and trust from the broader cryptographic community. The certification of Dual EC as a standard thus raises suspicions about the intentions behind its approval and subsequent implementation in various systems.
Impacts of Dual EC on Security
The implications of Dual EC's integration into commercial products, particularly firewalls, are examined in relation to the Juniper incident. The podcast recounts how Juniper included Dual EC as a random number generator in its products but failed to disclose its vulnerabilities, leading to significant security breaches. This led to a cascading effect, affecting the integrity of numerous systems that relied on those products. The discussion underscores the importance of transparency in cryptographic implementations, as trusting flawed standards can have dire consequences in cybersecurity.
Final Thoughts on Accountability
As the conversation wraps up, the speakers call for clearer accountability regarding cryptographic standards and the organizations that influence them. They highlight the difficulty in disentangling the roles and responsibilities of different entities, including the NSA, NIST, and commercial contractors. The episode illustrates the ongoing complexity of establishing trust within both the cryptographic community and governmental practices, especially when historical actions lead to widespread mistrust. The final sentiment points to the need for more rigorous oversight and involvement from diverse stakeholders to prevent repeating past mistakes.
Nothing we have ever recorded on SCW has brought so much joy to David. However, at several points during the episode, we may have witnessed Matthew Green's soul leave his body.
Our esteemed guests Justin Schuh and Matt Green joined us to debate whether `Dual_EC_DRBG` was intentionally backdoored by the NSA or 'just' a major fuckup.
- Dicky George at InfiltrateCon 2014, 'Life at Both Ends of the Barrel - An NSA Targeting Retrospective': [https://youtu.be/qq-LCyRp6bU?si=MyTBKomkIVaxSy1Q](https://youtu.be/qq-LCyRp6bU?si=MyTBKomkIVaxSy1Q) - Dicky George: [https://www.nsa.gov/Press-Room/Digital-Media-Center/Biographies/Biography-View-Page/Article/3330261/richard-dickie-george/](https://www.nsa.gov/Press-Room/Digital-Media-Center/Biographies/Biography-View-Page/Article/3330261/richard-dickie-george/) - NYTimes on Sigint Enabling Project: [https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/09/05/us/documents-reveal-nsa-campaign-against-encryption.html](https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/09/05/us/documents-reveal-nsa-campaign-against-encryption.html) - On the Practical Exploitability of Dual EC in TLS Implementations: [https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity14/sec14-paper-checkoway.pdf](https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity14/sec14-paper-checkoway.pdf) - Wired - Researchers Solve Juniper Backdoor Mystery; Signs Point to NSA [https://www.wired.com/2015/12/researchers-solve-the-juniper-mystery-and-they-say-its-partially-the-nsas-fault/](https://www.wired.com/2015/12/researchers-solve-the-juniper-mystery-and-they-say-its-partially-the-nsas-fault/) - ProPublica - Revealed: The NSA's Secret Campaign to Crack, Undermine Internet Security [https://www.propublica.org/article/the-nsas-secret-campaign-to-crack-undermine-internet-encryption](https://www.propublica.org/article/the-nsas-secret-campaign-to-crack-undermine-internet-encryption) - DDoSecrets - Sigint Enabling Project: [https://data.ddosecrets.com/Snowden%20archive/sigint-enabling-project.pdf](https://data.ddosecrets.com/Snowden%20archive/sigint-enabling-project.pdf) - IAD: [https://www.iad.gov/](https://www.iad.gov/) - Ars Technica - “Unauthorized code” in Juniper firewalls decrypts encrypted VPN traffic: [https://web.archive.org/web/20151222023311/http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/12/unauthorized-code-in-juniper-firewalls-decrypts-encrypted-vpn-traffic/](https://web.archive.org/web/20151222023311/http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/12/unauthorized-code-in-juniper-firewalls-decrypts-encrypted-vpn-traffic/) - 2015 IMPORTANT JUNIPER SECURITY ANNOUNCEMENT: [https://web.archive.org/web/20151221171526/http://forums.juniper.net/t5/Security-Incident-Response/Important-Announcement-about-ScreenOS/ba-p/285554](https://web.archive.org/web/20151221171526/http://forums.juniper.net/t5/Security-Incident-Response/Important-Announcement-about-ScreenOS/ba-p/285554) - Extended Random Values for TLS: [https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-rescorla-tls-extended-random-00](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-rescorla-tls-extended-random-00) - The Art of Software Security Assessment: [https://www.amazon.com/Art-Software-Security-Assessment-Vulnerabilities/dp/0321444426](https://www.amazon.com/Art-Software-Security-Assessment-Vulnerabilities/dp/0321444426)
