People of the Pod On the Ground at the Republican National Convention: What's at Stake for Israel and the Middle East?
Israel’s right to self-defense and security, governance in Gaza, the Iranian regime and its network of terror, the Jewish state’s relationship with Arab countries in the Gulf, and much more were among the topics of discussion at an AJC-convened panel discussion at the 2024 Republican National Convention in Milwaukee. Listen to an excerpt of the panel, moderated by AJC’s Chief Policy Officer and the head of AJC’s Center for a New Middle East, Jason Isaacson, along with policy experts Dr. Ken Weinstein, Kirsten Fontenrose, and Rich Goldberg.
*The views and opinions expressed by guests do not necessarily reflect the views or position of AJC. AJC is a nonpartisan, 501(c)3 nonprofit organization. AJC does not endorse or oppose political parties or candidates.
Episode Lineup:
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(0:40) Jason Isaacson, Ken Weinstein, Kirsten Fontenrose, Rich Goldberg
Show Notes:
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Transcript of Panel with Jason Isaacson, Ken Weinstein, Kirsten Fontenrose, and Rich Goldberg:
Manya Brachear Pashman:
America’s political parties are kicking off the 2024 convention season, starting this week with the Republican National Convention in Milwaukee. AJC was on the sidelines of the RNC, with a live program titled Israel and the Path to Peace, moderated by AJC's chief policy officer, Jason Isaacson. Jason is also the head of AJC's recently launched Center for A New Middle East.
Joining Jason was Dr. Ken Weinstein, former longtime CEO of the Hudson Institute and the Walter P. Stern Distinguished Fellow at Hudson; Kirsten Fontenrose, the President of Red Six Solutions and Senior Director of Gulf Affairs in the National Security Council under President Trump; and Rich Goldberg, Senior Adviser at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and Director of Countering Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction for the National Security Council, under President Trump.
Just a reminder: AJC is a 501(c)3 nonpartisan organization and neither supports nor opposes candidates for elective office. A similar program will be offered at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago later this summer. Now onto today’s episode: an excerpt from AJC’s convention program.
Jason Isaacson:
Let me begin by reading to you a couple of passages from the Republican platform, which was adopted yesterday at the Republican National Convention. This is what it said about Israel. Quote, We will stand with Israel and seek peace in the Middle East, we will rebuild our alliance network in the region to ensure a future of peace, stability and prosperity. And then there was, as you may recall, for the Republican platform, his list of 20 promises. And it's described as 20 promises that we will accomplish very quickly when we win the White House and Republican majorities in the House and Senate.
And number eight, on that list of 20 promises is the following, quote: restore peace in Europe and in the Middle East. So let's drill down with our panelists on those two statements in January 2025. That's more than six months away. It may be that the Israel Hamas war will be won over by them, and perhaps whatever conflict is so close to boiling over between Israel and Hezbollah, that that might not any longer be the case, might have boiled over, might be a thing of the past.
But let's say for the sake of argument, that hostilities are in fact, continuing, and let's assume that the Republican Party is victorious this fall. What are you expecting the Trump administration to do to, quote restore peace in the Middle East and to accomplish that, quote, very quickly. And let me begin Kirsten, with you.
Kirsten Fontenrose:
Great, thanks so much for having us. All of us like to nerd out about these kinds of topics all the time when we're just grateful that there are other people who are as interested. What I expect to see in America is a revived peace plan. So you all remember the deal of the century, the vision for peace, we will see that come back. If there's a second Trump administration. Not in isolation, it will be part of a larger context.
That will also include assurances about Israel security and governance for Gaza and the like. Why have we not seen this yet? Because no one's asked the Trump team. But that will come back and you will see that. There's an expectation, whether it's naive or not, which we'll see, that there will be a greater receptiveness among the Palestinian population for an economic plan that offers improvements in livelihood after this conflict.
If there is a marginalized Hamas, there'll be more movement in this space for reviving these kinds of ideas. So we will definitely see a revived peace plan, you won't see less attention on this issue, you'll see very top level attention on the issue. You're also going to see, I think gloves off with the Houthis in the Red Sea.
The US military has been very careful to make sure that all of our strikes so far had been from a defensive perspective. But you will see, I believe, because the world has not criticized any of these strikes, I think you're gonna see more latitude there. More room for movement for preemptive striking, for instance, because the perception is that for the whole world, this shipping interception problem is just out of hand. So I think we'll see more latitude there. And we'll see gloves come off a bit there.
And then I think you're gonna see some tough talk, frankly, with Prime Minister Netanyahu. President Trump has watched the US be yanked around a bit by the current Israeli government.
And I think you're going to see less tolerance for that recognition that Israel is a sovereign country, but more of an attempt to say the US is the superpower here, and we will be leading the ideas from hence. If we're expected to play a role, we will be leading in that role. What you will see, however, will be interesting to watch as there is division among Trump advisors about a two state solution. So you'll see that be debated out.
Jason Isaacson:
Thank you for that. Ken, let me ask you, restoring peace in the Middle East and Europe and doing it very quickly, you've had a very broad focus on a whole range of foreign policy issues at the Hudson Institute and before and since. Tell me how you see that playing out under a second Trump administration?
Ken Weinstein:
I'd say first of all, I think President Trump came to the conclusion early on, in his first term, he came in remember, talking about the deal of the century with you know, this peace agreement, he was booed at the Republican Jewish Committees event when he was a candidate.
And he quickly came into office and understood he could not trust Mahmoud Abbas, because of the incitement to terror by the Palestinian Authority and the tensions that were given out, and the pay for slay efforts that the Palestinian Authority has. Whereby people who kill Jews, kill Americans, were getting Palestinian Authority pensions in prisons, for their families and the like.
And so, Trump quickly came to understand that the challenge in the peace process wasn't bringing Israel and the Palestinians together, it was that the peace process itself was misconstrued. The peace process was being used by Middle Eastern governments, in particular, the Iranians, but also the Palestinians as a means to put leverage on Israel, exercise leverage on Israel, by a bunch of people who wanted to see the end of Israel's existence. And Trump quickly reversed that equation.
He understood that the best way to move forward was to remove items from the table such as moving the embassy to Jerusalem, which didn't have any of the backlash that John Kerry and others predicted would happen. And he quickly understood the best way to move things forward was to put pressure on the Palestinians.
Trump's a real estate guy. And so he understands leverage, he understands how to put pressure forth, and how to deter. I think we're going to see much more of that moving forward. We're not going to have a vice president of the United States who's going to get up and say, the Israelis can't evacuate Rafah, it's going to lead to 10s of 1000s of deaths.
And here I actually disagree slightly, I think Trump will actually give the Israelis the latitude they need to finish the mission, which is to destroy Hamas, and eventually bring about a transformation in Gaza, with the assistance of the Saudis. Who were absolutely critical in de-radicalizing Gaza, they have done it successfully themselves, as has the UAE.
And so I think we're going to look much more at a regional approach on these issues. Obviously, Iran is going to be, to borrow a term from Joe Biden, President Biden, in the crosshairs of the Trump administration, as they were before. You're gonna see massive sanctions again, we're gonna get them, we're gonna enforce those sanctions. And Rich can talk to this stuff far more deeply than I ever could.
And you're gonna have the Iranians on the run so that they don't feel that they can work with Hamas or work with Hezbollah, to do more damage to Israel. And already we're seeing a deterrent effect on the Northern Front. And also with regard to Hamas.
Because with regard to Hamas, we see that the fear of a Trump administration is leading to a greater willingness to negotiate with Israel. And on the northern front, I think it's less likely that the Israelis will take dramatic action before the US election, knowing that they will not be reined in by an administration that is somehow searching for a delusion of peace with Hezbollah and with Lebanon.
Jason Isaacson:
What about peace in Europe? Is is that something that you see, that you can envision under a Trump administration?
Ken Weinstein:
First, let me say something with regard to Europe and the Middle East. I think that the Trump administration, the Trump team has been infuriated by this notion of enforcing this ridiculous ICC policy with regard to Israel and those who threatened to arrest Netanyahu. I think you're going to see in places particularly, I can just think of the kinds of actions they'll take in Germany.
I think you can expect individual sanctions on the people who were behind Nord Stream as a sign to not dare mess with Netanyahu, period. And you'll see other actions like that. I know the Spanish ambassadors here with regard to Spain with that we will be taking numbers, as Nikki Haley did so effectively at the UN, and as the Biden team does not.
So with regard to Europe. Look, I think the situation with regard to Ukraine, as President Trump understands it, I think, Trump, you have to understand he comes to this. He's not a policy person. He thinks that policy people like the three of us, four us up here, we lack creativity, we have a sense the policy options run from the letter L or P to the letter Q or R. And in fact, for Trump, they run from A to Z. And so that meant fire and fury in Pyongyang, but it meant eventually potentially beachfront condominiums in North Korea and an economic vitality to North Korea, if it gave up its nuclear program.
With regard to Iran, it was maximum pressure, but it was the new Iran deal that got rid of the nuclear program that got rid of the missile program that got rid of regional activities, and that internally reshaped Iran, and led to a new relationship with Iran, with not only the region but the rest of the world. And with China, it was massive tariffs on China, but a new trade deal in the phase one that was gonna get rid of intellectual property stuff, which was at the core of what President Trump saw correctly as the engine of the Chinese economy, and the engine of the China 2025 program. So I'd say with regard to Ukraine, the President is looking at options that will, as he himself has said, he would tell the, you know, the Ukrainians on day one, you've got to, you know, we've got to end the fighting, you would tell Putin, if you don't end the fighting, we're gonna arm the shit out of Ukraine, pardon my French, as he said something along those lines. And I think what we'll see at the end of the day, is a massive program to guarantee Ukrainian security, that is going to take massive security guarantees.
But the Europeans are going to have to step up and step up in a very serious way. And we've seen since the announcement of the JD Vance nomination are ready to reaction in Europe, the Europeans, you know, have to understand they're not gonna be able to backchannel they’re not going to be able to figure out some way out of this.
They're gonna have to be big providers of security guarantees, we will do the same for the Ukrainians as well, but Europe has to take up a big portion of it. And Trump does not, he is not Joe Biden, he's not going to cut and run, as in Afghanistan, he doesn't want to be humiliated on the stage, he understands deterrence, he's going to send a very clear signal to the Russians, as he did to the Taliban.
When they were talking about when they were negotiating with the Taliban, Trump was on a video call once with the Taliban leader, and said, I want to make this very clear, you're not to strike at any of our people. And if you do, and hit the button on Play, and he showed a video of I think, the Taliban leader's kid leaving their house to say we're watching you every moment, and we will take care of you. And there'll be some kind of a version of that with regard to Putin, that's going to be very clear.
He was very blunt with Putin behind closed doors, from the White House in particular. And I think there was a good reason why Putin didn't go into Ukraine during Trump's term. And so I think that there's going to be some kind of a square in the circle solution that's going to have to come together. And I've been telling European foreign and defense ministers for the last few months, think about this now, how to do it, how to implement it.
Jason Isaacson:
Ken, thank you so much. Rich, let me turn to you. We've been talking about Iran, and you are an expert on Iran. It happened for years. I didn't see a reference to Iran and the Republican platform. But of course, we know, former President Trump's record on Iran. And Ken has been talking about that. Should he return to the White House next January, what do you foresee on this front to return to maximum pressure, or something more kinetic? And what is your sense of our regional strategic partners priorities? Are our friends in the Gulf hoping for a decisive showdown with Iran? Or are they sufficiently risk averse that they prefer a less confrontational approach? What do you think?
Rich Goldberg:
I think if you look at the top lines, right, and you compare the policy, the recipe, if you will, under the Trump administration: maximum pressure on Iran, maximum support for Israel gets you peace, gets you deterrence. And when you flip the narrative and you go to maximum deference to Iran and pressure on Israel, you get conflict in the Middle East. It's not disconnected from what Ken's just talking about in other regions of the world as well, whether in Europe, whether you're in the Indo-Pacific.
This comes down to the ability to restore American deterrence. And then you have options. There are a lot of genies that are out of the bottle due to the last three and a half years. Iran today and its nuclear program is at the one yard line of nuclear weapons thresholds. They were not there four years ago. In fact, after the killing of Soleimani, in early 2020, the rest of the year the Iranians never escalated the nuclear program again.
They waited until January of 2021. And that's when they started jumping to 20% high enriched uranium. And then they saw nothing's happening to us. So they went to 60% high enriched uranium. They started installing all the advanced centrifuges, they've advanced, so far accelerated to this incredible capacity to produce a dozen nuclear weapons in just a couple of months if they so chose. Plus Intel now coming in that the administration is trying to downplay work on weaponization. There's a lot of genies out of the bottle here that Donald Trump's going to have to try to put back into the bottle.
And that will not be easy. But the formula remains correct. Restore deterrence, have maximum pressure and isolation on the Iranian regime and provide support to your allies. Now, the Gulf Arabs, by the way, the Saudis, the Emiratis, they've made some strategic decisions due to the policies that they saw, sustained by Joe Biden. They've cut deals with the Iranians and sort of cut their own JCPOA. with Iran with the Houthis. I'm not sure they're going to be on board for what's coming next. And they need to make some preparations for the return of a Trump administration and hawkishness towards Tehran and understand that we also won't tolerate them hedging with the Chinese. Now, that comes from the fact that America is hedging on them.
And so there's going to be a lot of parts that have to come together like a puzzle, to try to put Humpty Dumpty back together again, actual restored turns and regain that peace through strength in the region. This is true in the Middle East. It's true in Europe, and it's true in the Indo Pacific. So what is deterrence? I think that's a major question. What is deterrence?
Made up of two big things, capacity and will. Joe Biden and Donald Trump both have capacity. They were the commander in chief at some point of the most powerful military on Earth. Nobody doubts that you have capacity when you are the president of the United States. But our enemies do doubt the will. And they test the will early on.
Every single administration gets tested, whether it's China, whether it's Putin, whether it's Iran, they get tested. At some point, Donald Trump got tested by the Iranians and Soleimani is dead. And that changed a lot of things in the world. And over the course of time, the unpredictability, the some of the craziness of the media went hysterical over the red button with Kim Jong Un did get the attention of people like Vladimir Putin. The Taliban tested Joe Biden, and he failed the test. And Kabul fell. And then Ukraine was invaded. And then now in China, they're expanding and starting to harass and actually attack in some ways, the Philippines and Taiwan.
And what are we seeing? Nothing. So, the minute Donald Trump becomes president, when I hear Trump say, just my election is going to start bringing about a change on the Ukraine front, a change in the world. You might have laughed at that.
I think after Saturday, you're not laughing anymore. A picture that if you're Xi Jinping, the Ayatollah, Putin, Kim Jong Un, looking at that on your desk every day of Donald Trump with his fist in the air blood dripping, right after being shot, saying fight. You're not questioning will. And that will be, I think, the big game changer.
Now, they might still test it. And there's a Chinese proverb, which is, you have to kill the chicken to scare the monkey. And I think President Trump might have to kill a chicken. He'd have to pick the chicken wisely. I think it might be the Houthis. That makes no sense to me. There is a national interest, there's a strategic importance to it. And it will game change how you're trying to get the Gulf Arabs back on side, see that we are committed to the security in the Gulf in the broader Middle East, it will send a major signal to Tehran, and it'll be part of that pivot back to maximum pressure on Iran and maximum support for Israel.
Jason Isaacson:
Rich, thank you. But before I turn back to the Abraham Accords, let me ask you, what's your sense of the Saudi and UAE and Bahraini overtures to Iran? Are they just seeking some kind of stability, some kind of channel, but it doesn't have a whole lot of meaning, or what's your sense and how should the US respond? Rich?
Rich Goldberg:
I think there is meaning to it. I think that Mohammed bin Salman, the Crown Prince in Saudi Arabia has changed his strategic calculus over the last three years. I think that there was a game changing moment for him when the Houthis were raining down missiles, next to a Formula One race he was hosting out in Jeddah. And you’re talking about major investors, world leaders, important people all driving into a race course already there. And you're seeing a ballistic missile explode within your line of sight. And the United States does nothing.
And then Abu Dhabi comes under attack by the Houthis, and the United States does nothing. And they're saying, Wow, they're just at the table trying to give the Iranians whatever they can, they've taken the Houthis off the terror list. They're not defending us anymore. They've pulled the missile defense augmentation that Trump put in, in 2019-2020. And they're still trying to get this nuclear deal done.
What are we doing here? Why are we just waiting around for Godot? Why are we exposed? We should cut a deal here. And why if the United States can hedge on us, can't we hedge on them, and they start cozying up to the Chinese and doing things that we probably don't like very much I need to put an end to. So I think it's very real. These channels are real. They're in a hedge.
I think it's taken a while for others that are far more suspicious of Iran, like Bahrain to get on board this strategy. But everybody sort of signed up to this. There's a normalization process with Assad that I think is partially connected to it as well. All of that's going to have to change. You have Donald Trump is back in office. And I don't know that they appreciate that very much.
Jason Isaacson:
There's also a recollection of the Trump administration in this reaction or non reaction to this Iranian attack on Saudi Aramco facilities. So it's been a mixed bag. But But first, let me let me let me turn back to you. And we were talking about the Abraham accords before. That was a great foreign policy access success of the last months of the Trump administration, first of the UAE, then Bahrain and then with different terminology, but Morocco and Sudan.
As you know, the Biden administration has been vigorously pursuing an effort to normalize Saudi relations with Israel, and objective that was also very much a part of the Trump administration's vision. What are your perspectives on the likelihood of that kind of a deal being closed in the last months of the current Biden administration, if they do move forward on such a deal with the Republicans getting the Senate joined with Democrats in the Senate to support such a deal before the election? Or perhaps in a lame duck session after the election?
Kirsten Fontenrose:
Well that's the big question. So I think if you have a deal that includes normalization with Israel, Saudi us still includes normalization with Israel, it has a shot of getting through, but the closer we get to the election, the smaller that shot gets, because the more Republicans Congress will want to hold out to grant that foreign policy when to potential Republican administration.
But if you have a deal that is being discussed now, as a Plan B, that is just a US-Saudi deal, without normalization. And this is because of the Israeli government's decision, perhaps not to grant that the Saudis are fully on board, you won't get it through, there's just not enough in it. For the US. There are lots of questions about why we'd be granting Saudi assistance with civilian nuclear technology. And a security guarantee, when we're not really getting much out of it. There's nothing in this deal in terms of concrete asks on the relationship with China.
And we can really go quite far in blocking Chinese influence in the Gulf by just improving our own foreign military sales process. We don't need to grant security guarantees, the Israeli Saudi relationship is so close right now. It's normalization and everything but public statement and name and that public statement name is important for the follow on effects you have around the world globally and with other Muslim populations.
But in terms of their coordination, they're in a pretty good place. So we're not in some sort of crisis rush to make sure this happens in the next few months, unless you're the Biden team. And you're desperate for a foreign policy win, because your promises on other foreign policy fronts have not borne out.
So I think you will still see this continue, though we have doubled down on the Saudi discussion, if there is a second Trump administration. But you will not see this granting of a deal to Saudi Arabia, even though they are a phenomenal partner. And we are quite close, without more concrete asks that benefit U.S. goals as well. It's not the opinion that just having Saudi on side with nothing we've actually signed them up to, would they grant overflight rights, if things came down with Iran.
We need to make those more specific before we would do something that would require commitment of troops, large resources, equipment, perhaps to the detriment of other partners, we would be able to send those same troops and equipment. So I don't think we're going to see it in the last months of this administration.
Manya Brachear Pashman:
To hear the rest of the panel, head to the link in our show notes. Another reminder that AJC is a nonpartisan organization and will be at the DNC next month in Chicago. We hope to see some of you there.
Next week on People of the Pod, tune in for our sit down with two Jewish Olympians before they head to Paris for the Summer Olympic Games.