The Tianjin Axis: China Operationalizes its Alternative World Order

The 25th Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit wasn't just a meeting; it was the unveiling of a strategy. Hosted by Xi Jinping, the summit served as a calculated demonstration of Sino-Russian convening power. More importantly, it marked a concrete effort to operationalize an alternative, multipolar system designed explicitly to bypass Western economic and technological architectures.

We just witnessed a significant inflection point in the global strategic competition. The rhetoric in Tianjin was overtly adversarial, with Xi Jinping denouncing "bullying behavior" and a "Cold War mentality." But beyond the rhetoric, the summit launched China's Global Governance Initiative (GGI), formalized commitments to building parallel financial infrastructure, and featured a strategically significant—and complex—détente between China and India.

To break down the implications of this pivotal gathering, SCSP’s President and CEO Ylli Bajraktari sat down with colleagues David Lin (China/East Asia/Tech), Joe Wang (Russia/Europe), and Sameer Lalwani (U.S.-India Defense) for an immediate assessment.

The Propaganda Coup and Autocratic Convening Power

The immediate takeaway from the summit was the sheer spectacle. Xi positioned himself at the center of the largest gathering in the organization’s history, flanked by Vladimir Putin and, significantly, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

The timing was deliberate. As David Lin noted, it was a "big week for Xi." The SCO meeting was strategically sandwiched between the first-ever public meeting of Putin, Kim Jong Un, and Xi, and a massive World War II anniversary parade in Beijing featuring thousands of troops and military hardware.

"It's a huge propaganda win for Beijing," Lin observed. "It gives Xi an opportunity to promote itself as being this global convener," while simultaneously pushing a tech-focused agenda.

For Vladimir Putin, the summit was essential for mitigating diplomatic isolation and promoting the SCO as an alternative to NATO.

"Look at the past couple of weeks of Putin... he's going to be riding high right now," said Joe Wang. While few concrete deals may have materialized immediately that changed the dynamics in Ukraine, the optics were invaluable. "Being seen with President Xi, being seen with Modi... it's like Russia's back. For him, it's a great PR coup."

The Architecture of a New Techno-Economic Order

The summit demonstrated that the SCO is evolving from a regional security forum into the primary vehicle for the PRC to consolidate a bloc resistant to U.S. influence. We are witnessing the acceleration of a bifurcated world, characterized not just by differing political ideologies, but by competing technological ecosystems and financial systems.

1. The Export of Digital Authoritarianism

Xi formally introduced the Global Governance Initiative (GGI). While promoting "sovereign equality," the GGI is, in practice, a strategic blueprint to legitimize digital sovereignty—the right of states to control domestic information ecosystems, data flows, and technological infrastructure without adherence to democratic norms.

The SCO's endorsement provides an institutional foundation for the PRC to export its model of techno-authoritarian control. This isn't just theoretical.

"At the SCO in particular, China was trying to push a lot of its techno-political agenda," David Lin emphasized. This included announcements that Beijing wants to set up S&T cooperation centers, an “AI application cooperation center,” launch joint solar and wind projects, and push Beidou, its alternative to GPS, across the SCO member states. Taken together, this could directly challenge the open, interoperable architecture championed by the U.S. and its allies, moving toward a fractured, PRC-controlled digital ecosystem across Eurasia.

2. Accelerating Financial De-Coupling

The most concrete outcome was the political decision to fast-track the establishment of an SCO Development Bank, seeded with significant Chinese capital. This mechanism, coupled with agreements to expand the use of local currencies for intra-SCO trade, is explicitly designed to circumvent the SWIFT system and erode the efficacy of U.S. financial sanctions.

This coordinated effort directly challenges the foundation of U.S. economic statecraft by building a resilient, alternative financial architecture among major energy producers (Russia, Iran) and the world’s largest manufacturer (China).

The India Factor: A Strategic Recalibration

The most significant geopolitical development, and the one that caused the most consternation in Washington, was the visible rapprochement between Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi—Modi’s first visit to China in seven years.

"For a lot of US-India relationship watchers, Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Beijing and attending this meeting came as a big surprise. It was a shock," Ylli Bajraktari noted.

How should the U.S. interpret this move by a critical Quad partner?

"Honestly, I think this was inevitable in some ways. India has been rebalancing," explained Sameer Lalwani. India has always professed itself to be a multi-aligned country, but recent U.S. actions also played a significant role. "The elephant in the room is, the United States has been pushing India around a little bit more... in terms of tariffs, additional tariffs because of Russian oil."

Lalwani argued that India was "demonstrating they had some options." However, this does not signal a fundamental shift. "It shouldn't be lost on us that before India went to this, they stopped in Japan first." Furthermore, Modi notably absented himself from the military parade, signaling nuance in his engagement—he would participate in the SCO, but not the military spectacle.

The underlying strategic realities also remain unchanged.

"India has a border with China that's still disputed, and China continues to coerce India... [and] China armed, trained and wired the weapons that Pakistan used to fight India" in a recent conflict. — Sameer Lalwani

"I don't think that's forgotten for India," Lalwani added. The U.S.-India defense relationship remains a strong ballast, pointing to ongoing joint exercises (like Yudh Abhyas currently underway in Alaska) and India's reliance on U.S. platforms for maritime reconnaissance.

The Limits of the Axis (And Why We Can't Ignore It)

While the summit projected unity, the SCSP analysts urged a nuanced view of the underlying relationships.

"It is important to remember that a lot of this is perhaps only skin deep," David Lin cautioned, pointing to the recent history of violent border clashes between China and India, and the tight spot Beijing was put in by Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

Yet, dismissing the SCO would be a strategic error. The organization has evolved significantly.

"I remember I was in grad school when [the SCO] first came up... we all kind of jokingly just laughed it off," Joe Wang recalled. "Fast forward 15, 20 years and see where it is now... Things don't just happen overnight."

While the "bromance between Putin and Xi" is undeniable, the integration is not comparable to U.S. alliances like NATO or the U.S.-Japan relationship. "There's still a level of distrust that I think we need to be mindful about," Wang noted.

The trap is assuming this alignment is already solidified, while simultaneously failing to plan for the contingency that it might be. "If you're in the US government, you don't have the luxury of not taking a lot of these statements at face value," Wang said. "We need to plan ahead."

The U.S. Response: Competing in the Gray Zone

The 2025 SCO Summit confirms that the organization is the leading edge of China's campaign to fracture the global order. How should the United States respond?

1. Offer a Compelling Alternative Tech Stack. "One of the lowest hanging fruit things the U.S. should do is show that there is an alternative to this," David Lin argued. As the SCO bloc develops internal capacities and indigenous technology standards, the U.S. must demonstrate there is a viable, democratic alternative to the "China tech stack" that Beijing is actively exporting.

2. Master the Game of Global Diplomacy. The U.S. must regain its strategic agility and relearn how to operate in a complex world. "After the Cold War, one of the things that America stopped doing well was play the game of global diplomacy," Joe Wang argued. The U.S. has often viewed the world in black-and-white terms, assuming its preeminence was undisputed.

"We've lost that strategic foresight and ability to be nimble and operate in this sort of gray zone... We need to see the world for being the gray zone that it is." — Joe Wang

This means avoiding the trap of reacting to events like Modi's visit by assuming allegiances have permanently shifted—"Oh my God, Modi is in China. Therefore it must mean that he's now on their side"—while still applying pressure and offering incentives to keep partners aligned.

3. Double Down on Real Alliances. The U.S. must emphasize the depth of its own partnerships, which Lin noted "runs so much deeper" than the transactional relationships within the SCO.

For India specifically, Sameer Lalwani urged action over reaction. "I don't think there's any need to overreact to cheap talk." Instead, the U.S. bureaucracy needs to move faster on concrete deliverables, and Congress should confirm key diplomatic nominees. "When India says it wants to buy Javelin missiles and it's ready to do so, I don't want that to get stalled in a process when we need the political wins now."

The competition is no longer just between the U.S. and China; it is between the U.S.-led democratic order and a sophisticated, resource-rich, PRC-led coalition. The Tianjin Summit is a clear signal that this coalition is moving from rhetoric to action. The U.S. must do the same.

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