Former chair of the Containment Laboratory Community Advisory Committee, Beth Willis, and senior fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, Dr Lynn Klotz, discuss the dangers of gain of function research and the potential catastrophic consequences of releasing genetically altered superbugs. They also highlight the need for stronger safeguards in biotech research to prevent accidental releases and the threat of a deadly pathogen causing a global pandemic.
Accidental releases of highly contagious and lethal pathogens pose a significant risk due to human error and inadequate safety practices in biotech labs.
The potential for a pandemic caused by genetically altered viruses is concerning, as accidental releases of pathogens with short incubation periods and high transmission rates can quickly spread globally.
Oversight and regulation of gain of function research, which aims to understand virus evolution and pandemic potential, is necessary to prevent potential catastrophes.
Deep dives
The dangers of biotech research
The biotech field poses existential risks due to the dangers of working with deadly pathogens and the potential for accidental releases. Gain of function research, which involves altering viruses to be deadlier and more contagious, is particularly risky. Labs have a history of accidents and a lack of oversight, with various incidents involving viruses like SARS and anthrax. Accidental releases and incorrectly inactivated pathogens are a common occurrence, even in high-level containment labs. There is a lack of transparency and reporting, putting the public at risk.
The risk of pandemics
The potential for a pandemic caused by a genetically altered virus is a major concern. Accidental releases of pathogens that have short incubation periods and high transmission rates can quickly spread globally. The fear is that a highly virulent and easily transmissible virus could cause an existential threat. Biotech labs have a responsibility to prevent accidental releases, but accidents are common due to human error and inadequate safety practices.
Issues with gain of function research
Gain of function research, which aims to study how viruses evolve and become more dangerous, is highly controversial. It involves forcing mutations in viruses to understand their potential for pandemic outbreaks. Some argue that studying non-infectious proteins can achieve similar results without the risks. Others propose creating genetic modifications that render altered viruses unable to survive in nature. Oversight and regulation of gain of function research is necessary to prevent potential catastrophes.
Accidental releases and lab accidents
Accidental releases of dangerous pathogens have occurred due to errors in inactivating viruses and lapses in safety protocol. This includes incidents like the mishandling and mailing of live anthrax and the loss of smallpox stocks. The increasing number of biotech labs conducting research on potential pandemic pathogens has raised concerns about the probability of accidents and the lack of reliable reporting. Accidents, both domestic and international, compound the risk of a catastrophic outbreak.
Lack of global oversight and safeguards
There are no comprehensive regulations or global oversight for labs working with deadly pathogens. The lack of consistency and transparency in safety practices and reporting creates a significant risk. Private labs and those outside the jurisdiction of public funding often go unregulated and unreported. Suggestions for improvement include implementing international regulatory bodies, stricter safety protocols, and mandatory reporting of potentially risky experiments.
Natural viruses and bacteria can be deadly enough; the 1918 Spanish Flu killed 50 million people in four months. But risky new research, carried out in an unknown number of labs around the world, are creating even more dangerous humanmade pathogens. (Original score by Point Lobo.)
Interviewees: Beth Willis, former chair, Containment Laboratory Community Advisory Committee; Dr Lynn Klotz, senior fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.