3.128 Fall and Rise of China: The Fourth encirclement campaign

Last time we spoke about the fourth encirclement campaign against the CCP. In 1931, the CCP survived brutal encirclement campaigns while the threat of Japanese invasion in Manchuria shifted focus in China. The new leadership, known as the 28 Bolsheviks, seized control after the downfall of Li Lisan, leading to infighting within the CCP. Despite initial successes, Mao Zedong opposed the aggressive military strategies favored by the Bolsheviks. As the Red Army expanded, Mao's calls for caution clashed with the Central Committee's ambitions, highlighting the struggle for power and differing strategies within the party during a time of upheaval. As the 28th Bolsheviks gained power, they stripped Mao Zedong of key positions, deeming his strategies outdated. The Red Army, while suffering losses, adapted tactics and launched further offensives. Political tensions rose, leading to purges and reorganization under more orthodox leadership. Ultimately, despite setbacks, the CCP’s resilience and guerrilla tactics allowed them to persist against KMT forces.

 

#128 the fifth encirclement campaign

Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War.

So the CCP had just survived 4 encirclement campaigns. Now each time an encirclement campaign was unleashed, it was done so during a very tumultuous time to say the least. The first three were done between 1930-1931 where the Central Plains War and multiple large scale rebellions were kicking off. It was also on the cusp of the re-unification of China, thus Chiang Kai-Shek arguably had bigger fish to fry. During the fourth encirclement campaign Chiang Kai-Shek was very much taking notice of the red menace in his interior, however a rather earth shattering moment occurred, the Japanese had invaded Manchuria. And yes, we will get to the 15 year war in good time no worries folks your boy has a lot of goodies coming. So one can understand Chiang Kai-Shek could not very well fully go after the Reds when the Japanese had invaded northeast China and there was absolutely no telling where or when they would stop. Well the fourth encirclement campaign did not provide the results the KMT needed, so obviously there was to be a fifth…and guess what, the Japanese began an invasion of North China that same year of 1933. Now if you really are itching to hear more about these events we will tackle in a few episodes, over at the Pacific War Channel on Youtube or on all major podcast platforms might I suggest the following: my Kanji Ishiwara series covering his entire involvement in these events and during WW2, my full documentary/podcast on the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and lastly my full podcast on the Japanese invasion of North China. I am a very busy boy over there as you can see. 

In the late winter and early spring of 1933, the Kwantung Army had begun an invasion of North China. They specifically began by invading the province of Rehe, modern day Jehol. After this they attacked the Great Wall of China, a pretty insane story to be honest, and descended further into north china. Understandably Chiang Kai-Shek shifted his focus from the Red menace to the Japanese at his front door. Beginning in July, the KMT established a review team to examine why the encirclement campaigns were failing to provide real results and what improvements could be made. They also established division level training units to retrain the forces with the lessons learned against the Reds. There was also a lot of integration of foreign military advisers, particularly Germans who helped develop better tactics and strategies. The Germans immediately proposed a more deliberate strategy against the Soviets. The first step they argued was to establish an economic blockade. Raw materials and durable goods could not be allowed to enter or leave the Soviet areas. Foods like rice and salt were especially targeted, there was to be an absolute ban on them going in or out. The second step was to establish a series of fortifications, basically blockhouses made out of concrete to provide fire support to offensive operations in nearby cities. As NRA forces advanced into areas to clear them, the previous blockhouses would be abandoned as new ones were built. There also needed to be lines of operation, requiring road development in rear areas to expedite logistical needs to the front. Now none of this sounds new compared to what we spoke about in the previous campaigns, but what was the issue was that it was not being done by all units prior. The KMT was also going to introduce political reforms that complemented the new standardized military strategies. New slogans arose such as “Thirty Percent Military, Seventy Percent Political,”. They were going to revive the baojia system. 

The Baojia system was an administrative structure that emerged during the Song Dynasty 960–1279 AD and was prevalent in various forms throughout subsequent dynasties. Its primary purpose was to enhance local governance, community responsibility, and social stability. The system was based on the grouping of households into units known as "bao" and "jia". Each bao typically consisted of ten households, while a jia consisted of ten baos, totaling about one hundred households. This hierarchical structure allowed for more manageable governance and oversight, facilitating communication and administration at the local level.

Under the Baojia system, each household was assigned to a bao, and the head of the bao was responsible for maintaining order, collecting taxes, and ensuring the compliance of families with local laws and regulations. The heads of the baojia units worked in conjunction with local officials to enforce state policies and maintain social harmony. This system not only provided a means for effective local governance but also fostered a sense of community among families. Neighbors were encouraged to cooperate and support one another, creating a network of mutual responsibility. In addition to its administrative functions, the Baojia system played a significant role in maintaining social order. By organizing families into these small units, it facilitated surveillance and mutual accountability among community members. Residents were motivated to monitor each other's behavior, discouraging misconduct and promoting adherence to social norms. As a result, the system contributed to the overall stability and cohesion of society, particularly in rural areas where government presence was often limited.

Now to get all of this done, the KMT increased the NRA forces deployed to Jiangxi to nearly 700,000 who were broken down into 4 area armies and 5 air corps. They deployed the Northern Route NRA Army consisting of 33 divisions in Jinzhi, Jishui, Nangeng and the Le’an front; and the Southern Route NRA Army, consisting of eleven Guangdong divisions and one independent regiment, established a blocking position along a line connecting the cities of Wuping, Anyuan, Shangyou and Ganxian. The Southern Route NRA army would move to the blocking positions north in coordination with the other NRA forces to try and squeeze the Reds. The Western Route NRA army consisting of 9 Hunanese divisions and 3 independent regiments were responsible for blocking the Reds from advancing west of the Gan River. The Fujian-Zhejiang-Jiangxi area army HQ was assigned 11 divisions and 4 security regiments to block any Reds from escaping through northeast Jiangxi. All of this encompassed the fifth encirclement campaign. 

When the NRA was ready to commence the campaign, it was too late for the Reds to properly mount a counter encirclement campaign. The only thing the Reds had going for them was their recruitment efforts that saw them grow perhaps 100,000 strong. The Red Army even began touting a slogan “Million Man Army” to further recruit. By late October 1933, the Reds were certainly numerous, but this also meant they needed more supplies and equipment. With their Eastern Front Army now in Fujian, the Central Front Army and local populace should have been raising revenues and stockpiling supplies, especially rice and salt, but that is of course if they knew a fifth encirclement campaign was coming. 

On September 25th, the NRA deployed 3 divisions south from Nanchang to attack Lichuan. Within 3 days of battle, the city fell, which greatly shocked the CCP. The Central Front Red Army fell back, waiting for the Eastern Front Red Army to rush back over from Fujian to meet the threat. By October 6th both front Red armies consolidated to perform a counterattack. They first attacked Xunkou, where they annihilated 3 NRA brigades. However the success was to be short lived. For the proceeding two months, the Red Army attacked multiple NRA blockhouses in Zixi, Huwan Bajiaoting, Xiaoshi, Daxiongguan and Yuangai Mountain. Yet they were unsuccessful at breaching the defensive line. The concrete block houses were acting as pillboxes allowing the NRA to concentrate fire using brand new German made machine guns. They also were utilizing new Krupp artillery pieces and German made aerial bombs against the Red army formations whenever they assaulted the blockhouse line. By November the KMT’s attention was slightly diverted as Fujian had just seen a full blown rebellion, more about that in the next episode, but to summarize a bit.

On November 30th, the KMT 19th route army in conjunction with the Fujian provincial government rebelled against the KMT and set up an independent government. As you might be guessing, they were also working with the CCP. Back in October they had formed a military alliance, better said cease fire. This little arrangement did not last long and there even emerged hostilities. During this chaos the revolutionary military council held an emergency meeting to figure out a course of action. Otto Braun advocated for a strong offensive to decisively defeat the KMT. He argued the golden age of guerrilla warfare in China was over and now the Red Army must conduct convention warfare against NRA positions. Thus Mao Zedong’s “lure the enemy in deep” strategy was replaced by “defending against the enemy outside the Soviet”. In January of 1934 the second soviet congress was held where a series of resolutions were passed to focus the Red Army against the fifth encirclement campaign. The resolutions reiterated Otto Braun’s offensive strategy and repeatedly attacked Mao Zedong's strategies. Building upon the strategy of defending against the enemy outside the Soviets, Otto Braun also proposed using “short, swift thrusts”. This would see the employment of repeated infantry assaults to overwhelm the NRA blockhouse lines. Otto Braun also advocated for continuing the mass recruitment efforts and brought up perhaps beginning a system of conscription to fill the ranks.

After the Fujian rebellion situation simmered down, the NRA refocused their attention against the Reds. The NRA established a line of blockhouses going from Lichuan to Le’an and began clearing out the area south of Ruijin using 35 divisions. The NRA forces first targeted Guangchang, lying about halfway between Nanchang and Ruijin. The NRA’s Eastern Front also began advancing west, totaling some 14 divisions. By March of 1934 the NRA Northern and Eastern Fronts linked up at Deshengguan where they began coordinated efforts towards Guangchang. In response to the NRA advances towards Guangchang, the Red Army built a series of fortifications and trenchworks to defend the area. On April 9th, the NRA began its attack on Guangchang, deploying the 3rd Route army’s 10 divisions from Nanfeng with heavy artillery and aircraft support. The NRA forces advanced south along both sides of the Xu River leading towards Guangchang. The Northern Route NRA Army established new blockhouses on one side of the river before clearing the other side. It took the NRA forces roughly 2 weeks to advance down the riverway to Guangchang. By April 23rd, they breached the Red Army’s defensive lines and seized control over some high ground surrounding the area. The Reds were forced to pull back into the city where they continued to build fortifications and trench lines. On the 27th the NRA began to artillery and aerially bomb the city, easily destroying the wooden fortifications and trench lines constructed by the Reds. On the 28th, the NRA stormed the city forcing the Reds to retreat south. The Reds had suffered 5093 casualties, roughly 20% of their defending force at Guangcheng whereas the NRA suffered 2000 casualties. It was very evident, the NRA were wielding superior equipment, notably the heavy artillery and aircrafts that the Red’s had no real answer for. 

After Guangchang the NRA advanced in all four directions. By May 1, NRA forces from the Western Front had taken control of both Shaxi and Longgang. Meanwhile, the Eastern Route NRA forces advanced and captured Jianning by May 16. By June, the CCP began feeling the strain from these assaults. A combination of the blockade and the baojia system was gradually eroded local support for the CCP. The attrition warfare strategy also took a toll on the quality of leadership and experience in the Red Army, as more inexperienced soldiers filled the ranks. Under pressure, many of these recruits deserted, further weakening the Red Army's effectiveness. Additionally, the shortage of supplies and food lowered morale and diminished public support for the Red Army's offensive. Even military and party publications gradually withdrew their support for the offensive, shifting focus to the promotion of guerrilla warfare to conserve resources. Recruitment efforts to replenish losses had little impact as the NRA’s superior strategy continued to stifle the Soviet, reducing its control from seventeen counties to ten.

In the summer of 1934, the Red Army began exploring new strategies, establishing a defensive perimeter stretching from Ninghua to Ningdu and Xingguo. By May, the Central Committee convened and concluded that the current offensive strategy was ineffective, likely necessitating the Red Army’s evacuation from the Soviet area. They sought approval from the COMINTERN to change their approach, which was granted a few days later, stressing that the CCP's priority should be preserving the Red Army's combat strength. However, Braun and Bo Gu proposed a different method. Instead of immediately preparing to withdraw from the Soviet, they advocated for a final stand, urging everyone to give their all to defend the territory and secure victory. Alongside this shift in rhetoric, the Red Army maintained its defensive posture, constructing wooden blockhouses and trenches. Additionally, the CCP approved an expansion of guerrilla warfare across multiple fronts to defeat the NRA.

In July, the NRA launched another offensive, focusing this time on the city of Shicheng, positioned between Ninghua and Ningdu as their entry point. The two forces clashed fiercely along this final line of defense for nearly a month. In early August, the Red Army mounted a strong counteroffensive during the battle of Gaohunao, inflicting over 4,000 casualties on the NRA. However, the Red Army also suffered heavy losses and was forced to retreat to the last defensive line just north of Shicheng. At Shicheng, the Red Army managed to hold the NRA in a stalemate. Ultimately, the NRA deployed twelve large howitzers, breaking through the defensive line in August. Shicheng eventually fell in October. The defense cost the Red Army 5,000 casualties, leaving it severely weakened and forcing its leaders to consider drastic actions. By this point, the Jiangxi Soviet had been reduced to a small area around Ruijin and Xingguo. With mounting casualties and the imminent threat of an NRA assault on Ruijin, the Red Army made a bold decision to retreat from Jiangxi on October 10, 1934, ending the Fifth Extermination Campaign.

There has been a lot of thorough investigative work into why the CCP failed during the fifth encirclement campaign. This episode will be a bit different then previous ones as I thought it might be interesting to tell the overall story and then explain the finer details as to why it went down this way. Going back to when I discussed the NRA analyzing why their fourth encirclement campaign had failed. The analytics from that were incorporated into plans formed by the German advisers such as Hans von Seeckt and Alexander von Faulkenhausen. The Germans dramatically improved the NRA’s performance across the board. This was seen in terms of training, the employment of more modern military tactics and of course the Germans sold the NRA some really good toys. Now again this was done in the vacuum of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and Northern China. The real aim of the Germans' assistance was directed against the Japanese, but the advisers acknowledged how China must combat the external aggressor while not succumbing to internal threats. Ironically it was that exact situation that had toppled multiple Chinese dynasties in the past, take the Ming for example. 

The NRA also employed effective counterinsurgent strategies that complimented their conventional warfare strategies. Beginning back in 1928 the KMT gradually re-instituted the baojia system. The NRA first cleared out Red areas and then established local administrators who were loyal to the KMT, protected by local militias. Through this the NRA was able to hold cleared areas and block any Red infiltration. Many residents in these areas actively began providing intel to the NRA. The Baojia system also supported the economic blockade, providing a system of sentries at the entrance of villages placing a lot of pressure on the Red Army and local populations. Chiang Kai-Shek’s political reform “70% political, 30% military” also helped incorporate many disenfranchised Chinese, taking their support away from the Reds. The NRA also adopted a methodical, patient approach to tackle the Reds. The NRA quickly found out the Reds did not have the necessary weaponry to take out their concrete blockhouses, thus a war of attrition was on the table. Electing for a long campaign rather than a short one severely hurt the Reds who were incapable of conducting prolonged operations. The NRA also had learnt from the Red’s usage of diversionary and feint attacks, not falling for them this time around. There was also obviously their NRA enormous advantage in numbers, they did toss nearly a million men at the Soviets.

On the other side the Red Army suffered from numerous internal problems. The Red Army had undergone numerous measures to reform and professionalize the army, under the leadership of the 28 bolsheviks whom dominated the Central Committee. The mass recruitment efforts were directly primarily on uneducated peasants who required intensive training. Meanwhile the offensive strategy was decimating Red Army forces, many new recruits were tossed straight into the front lines without any training. The lack of training and political guidance, accompanied with low morale led to mass desertions. By the end of the fifth encirclement campaign the Red Army could not generate the proper forces to fill its demand and simply kept tossing more and more untrained peasants into the lines, degrading the combat effectiveness.

The arrival of the Twenty-eight Bolsheviks in the CCP led to significant changes in the overall military strategy of the Red Army. Much of the new leadership's perspectives were shaped by Stalinist Soviet ideology, which markedly contrasted with the views of both Li Lisan and Mao Zedong, particularly in relation to Mao Zedong’s approach, which was influenced by political considerations. These ideological differences also resulted in a substantial gap in military tactics. Nevertheless, both the Bolsheviks and Mao shared a similar stance on the expansion and training of the Red Army, emphasizing the vital importance of political training in building a robust party army. Ultimately, the CCP believed that the success of the Red Army hinged on the professionalization of the force, ensuring unity of command, a shared understanding of the mission, and an enhanced capacity to execute that mission.

The primary advocate for the professionalization strategy of the Red Army was the Soviet Union. Stalin's interest in the Red Army was driven by both external and internal factors. The Soviet Union viewed an imminent threat from both Japan and Germany. Japan, a longstanding adversary of Russia, had expanded its presence in China, particularly following the 1932 occupation of Manchuria, which posed a direct risk to Russia’s southern flank and national security. The Soviets believed that a large, professional Red Army, loyal to the Soviet Union, would serve as a formidable defense against Japanese aggression, and later, German threats. Additionally, the Soviets resumed discussions with the Nationalist government after years of silence to help ensure the security of their Chinese flank. For Stalin, the struggle for control over the CCP was intertwined with a broader power struggle within the Soviet Union against Trotsky. His internal conflicts with Trotsky solidified his communist ideology, resulting in a stringent approach within the COMINTERN and the new CCP. Through the COMINTERN and Bolsheviks, Stalin aimed to consolidate his power by eliminating Trotskyists in China. These internal Soviet political dynamics ultimately influenced the choice of Chinese political and military strategies, which had detrimental effects on the Red Army.

At first glance, the policies of the Twenty-eight Bolsheviks closely resembled those of Li Lisan. Both groups viewed the urban proletariat as the central force in the communist revolution. They shared the conviction that merging the revolutionary spirit of the proletariat with modern strategies would empower the Red Army to achieve victory. Additionally, they felt that the conditions were ripe for revolution to spread into urban areas, emphasizing the necessity for the Red Army to engage in the cities to support students and workers involved in the movement. Wang Ming even remarked that although the 1930 assault on Changsha was a mistake, he did not see this failure as evidence against the soundness of the strategy of targeting urban centers. Upon closer inspection, the distinctions between the two factions were quite pronounced. Disputes between them arose early on; in June 1930, Li Lisan criticized Wang Ming, Bo Gu, and two other group members for opposing his plans. However, their differences ran deeper than mere political conflict. Ideologically, the Bolsheviks challenged Li Lisan's characterization of the bourgeoisie. In Wang Ming's The Two Lines, he asserted that all "capitalist bourgeois reformers were counterrevolutionary." This broadened the definition to encompass wealthy and middle-class peasants, who became targets during land reform efforts. Additionally, their strategies for confronting urban centers differed significantly. The factions also had contrasting views on the role of the Red Army: Li Lisan believed it should support urban proletariat uprisings to capture the cities, while the Bolsheviks regarded it as the primary force for seizing the metropolis.

The distinctions between Mao Zedong and the 28 Bolsheviks were significant. Unlike Mao Zedong, the Bolshevik-led CCP rejected any form of alliance, insisting on the defeat of both the Nationalists and the Japanese. In their view, both groups were imperialists and posed equal threats to the Soviet Union and the communist movement. During the Mukden Incident, many nationalists and communists sought to forge a united front against Japanese aggression. However, the CCP opposed this, advocating for the overthrow of what they considered the agent of imperialism—the KMT. 

The Bolsheviks also held a strong opposition to Maoist military strategies. They believed that an incorrect guerrilla warfare approach had infiltrated the Red Army, epitomized by the "lure the enemy in deep" tactic. Wang Ming likened this strategy to a form of "retreat" or "escape." The Bolsheviks advocated for the significant expansion and professionalization of the Red Army, aiming to move away from a peasant mentality. With a larger force, the Red Army could adopt an offensive stance, employing Soviet tactics to capture urban centers and extend Soviet influence. While guerrilla warfare was not entirely dismissed, it was relegated to local militias in rear and flank areas. In contrast, Mao had a more practical perspective on the capabilities of Red Army soldiers. He recognized that the Red Army lacked the technology necessary for conventional warfare. Moreover, Mao believed that achieving victory was not the sole priority; sustainability after victory and ensuring that the gains outweighed the losses were also crucial considerations.

In hindsight, the positional warfare and offensive tactics advocated by Otto Braun and the students proved to be ineffective against the NRA. However, at the time, it is understandable why this approach was favored over Mao Zedongs strategy of "luring the enemy deep." This new offensive military strategy was predicated on the belief that the Red Army was strong and capable of launching attacks against the NRA. Although this assessment may have been overstated, the victories achieved during the Extermination Campaigns did boost the morale of the Red Army. Furthermore, their later success in resisting the Fourth Extermination Campaign reinforced the capabilities of the Communist military forces.

This offensive strategy also marked a departure from the tactic of conceding territory, which had always posed challenges for the local population. The CCP garnered more support for its strategy by asserting that the Red Army was now strong enough to defend their territory and confront the enemy directly, allowing locals to remain in their homes. This simple shift fostered greater support for their cause. Conversely, Mao Zedong had a keen understanding of local conditions and recognized the detrimental effects of Bolshevik policies on land redistribution. The Bolshevik approach increased the burden on a larger portion of the local populace and threatened the fragile support necessary for waging a "people's war." Mao Zedong and his followers also aimed to delay and hinder large recruitment efforts, arguing that expansion would be an unnecessary distraction for locals who were already busy with agricultural work.

Moreover, the Bolshevik offensive strategy was more conventional compared to Mao Zedongs concept of mobile warfare. At that time, Mao Zedongs approach of "luring the enemy deep" and other mobile warfare tactics were revolutionary in China and faced considerable criticism and skepticism. Even after the significant defeat of the Li Lisan line, the ability of the Bolsheviks and Otto Braun to revive a similar strategy two years later demonstrated the ongoing support for a more conventional military approach.

In its new strategy, the Red Army blended traditional and modern tactics to engage the enemy. On the one hand, it maintained its reliance on established strengths in intelligence gathering and deception to outmaneuver the NRA. However, with the introduction of the Twenty-eight Bolsheviks and Otto Braun, the Red Army transitioned from a mobile defense approach to employing “short, swift thrusts” as offensive tactics against the NRA blockhouses during the Fifth Extermination Campaign. The Red Army also capitalized on advantages gained from previous campaigns. Improvements in signal intelligence, particularly through increased collection of wireless communications and the creation of training schools, enabled the Red Army to closely monitor NRA movements during the Fourth Extermination Campaign. Additionally, the Red Army integrated tactical intelligence into its operations, using plain-clothed soldiers and deploying double agents within KMT units to gather intelligence and disrupt them.

The thoroughness of the Red Army's intelligence collection was a notable strength. For instance, an intelligence report on the KMT’s Seventy-ninth NRA Division analyzed the background and motivations of its soldiers, revealing that many hailed from the same area as their commander, which fostered strong loyalties. This insight made the unit a less appealing target for subversion, given the traditional Confucian emphasis on hierarchical loyalty. The Red Army continued to execute feints and deceptive operations throughout its campaigns. The Eleventh Red Army effectively served as the main effort on two occasions. Moreover, the Red Army sent misleading communications to confuse NRA forces. For instance, while near Huangpi, NRA scouts “intercepted” a message claiming that the Red Army's main forces were positioned in Nanchang, prompting the division units to lower their guard in the city, only to be ambushed.

The biggest change to Red Army tactics was the introduction of what Otto Braun described as “short, swift thrusts,” while Lin Biao defined this tactic as “sudden, rapid raids launched against the enemy who emerges from their blockhouses to advance the fortification line by a short distance, specifically between 2½ to 5 kilometers or even less. These thrusts aim to eliminate the main enemy forces before they can solidify their position. Although the tactics appeared straightforward, significant differences emerged in their application, particularly between Braun's theoretical approach and Lin Biao's practical execution. Firstly, the ultimate objectives of the tactics differed greatly. Braun's approach was part of a broader strategy aimed at safeguarding Soviet territory. Rather than seeking a decisive victory over the numerically superior NRA forces, the Red Army focused on defending territory and achieving small tactical victories that could translate into operational and strategic advantages. In contrast, Lin Biao viewed this tactic as a means to “annihilate the enemy or secure victory in the entire battle.”His emphasis was on defeating the enemy and achieving a decisive victory.

Secondly, Braun promoted a more methodical strategy, where the Red Army would establish strong points with small clusters of fortifications. These areas provided defensive protection against artillery and air assaults, creating conditions conducive for the Red Army to launch rapid attacks on the NRA when they were away from their blockhouses. During an attack, Braun suggested that the Red Army should first fix the NRA in its rear, flank, or even front, followed by a strike aimed at weakening the enemy to disrupt its forces. Conversely, Lin Biao had a different perspective on the assault, prioritizing mobility and movement for the Red Army during these thrusts. The Red Army's primary defense relied on secrecy, moving quietly to occupy high ground while only establishing makeshift defensive structures for air and artillery protection. When the enemy entered their territory, the Red Army would encircle their forces, cutting off their retreat and swiftly attacking their flanks before they could construct fortifications. He advocated for the pursuit, believing it was the most effective way to convert a tactical victory into operational or strategic success. In contrast, Lin Biao rejected the idea of pursuit, reasoning that if his tactics were executed effectively, the enemy would have no escape route, making a pursuit unnecessary.

These differing views on tactics underscored the challenges of translating theoretical military concepts into practical application. Otto Braun’s offensive strategy stemmed from his experiences and understanding of Western military traditions. When applied to the Chinese battlefield, Lin Biao adapted his own experiences to formulate his interpretation of “short, swift thrusts,” which incorporated several of Mao’s tactical principles. Given the circumstances of the Red Army, Lin Biao aimed for a quick, decisive victory, steering clear of prolonged battles with the NRA. He utilized intelligence and terrain—particularly through reconnaissance—to gain an advantage over the enemy. His strategy prioritized focusing on the enemy rather than merely securing territory, enabling his unit to engage in battle on favorable ground. While the localization of “short, swift thrusts” did not provide the Red Army with the decisive edge needed to overcome the NRA, it illustrated how the Red Army continued to adapt concepts to local conditions to achieve success in combat.

Between 1932 and 1934, the Red Army reached its maximum size and level of professionalism, only to be outmatched by a stronger NRA force. With the rise of the Twenty-eight Bolsheviks, the Red Army adopted a more aggressive, offensive strategy. Although this approach would later be deemed a mistake, it initiated a series of reforms that enhanced the Red Army's professionalism. During this period, the Red Army nearly doubled its strength to six army corps. To promote uniformity and centralize command, all Red Army units, including local militia groups, were standardized. Additionally, the Red Army founded the Red Academy and the Red Army War College, alongside specialized schools to train and develop its officers. These reforms contributed to the Red Army's success in the Fourth Extermination Campaign against the NRA and facilitated the expansion of Soviet influence into four provinces. However, following their defeat, the NRA adapted and developed a more effective strategy against the Red Army. Lacking the necessary heavy weapons and supplies, the Red Army could not prevent the systematic encirclement of the Jiangxi Soviet during the Fifth Extermination Campaign. In order to survive the Red Army would have to embark on arguably one of the most important historic moments of the CCP’s history, it was a notably very long march.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

The 28 Bolsheviks wrestled control over the CCP and this had rather dramatic consequences. For one, Mao Zedong’s strategies were thrown to the wind as full on offensive strategies took the center stage. In the face of the most intense NRA encirclement campaign as of yet, the CCP crumbled and would now have to march to away trying to survive.