3.125 Fall and Rise of China: From the Jinggangshan Mountains to the Jiangxi Soviet

Last time we spoke about the Central Plains War. Chiang Kai-Shek faced a formidable anti-Chiang coalition led by Yan Xishan, Feng Yuxiang, and Li Zongren. Zhang Xueliang, initially absent, worked tirelessly from Mukden to prevent Northern warlords from joining the coalition. The conflict, exacerbated by severe famine in Shaanxi that fueled unrest, saw major battles as Chiang's forces clashed with the anti-Chiang fronts across multiple railways. Despite initial setbacks, Chiang's strategic maneuvers and alliances, including a pivotal deal with Zhang Xueliang, gradually turned the tide. The Young Marshal’s entry into the fray and the subsequent defections from Feng Yuxiang's camp weakened the anti-Chiang forces. By October, the anti-Chiang leaders, overwhelmed and isolated, sought peace. The Central Plains War, a grueling seven-month struggle, ended with the anti-Chiang factions disbanding, leaving China’s civil war landscape dramatically altered. Within the vacuum, the CCP was thriving, but now the Generalissimo could direct his full attention on the Red Menace.

 

#125 From the Jinggangshan Mountains to the Jiangxi Soviet

Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War.

The last time we were talking about the CCP, they had performed the Nanchang uprising, Autumn Harvest Uprisings and the Guangzhou uprising. These all did not go very well and literally saw the surviving CCP forces fleeing for their lives into the mountains. Their experiences during these uprisings reinforced the idea they required a strong military force to push forward a new agrarian-based communist revolution. To develop such conditions favoring a revolution, Mao Zedong and Zhu De adapted the Red Army and CCP policies to the local conditions in order to recruit, sustain and retain loyal troops and build a relationship between the army, local populaces and party. 

After the collapse of the Harvest Autumn Uprisings, the Red Army scattered into the rural parts of China. Mao Zedong himself narrowly escaped capture by the NRA, as he made his way to Sanwan of Jiangxi province. Countless were killed, arrested or deserted. Less than 1000 Red soldiers remained from the original uprising force. Moral was law, there lacked direction, there existed conflicting loyalties and many blamed Mao Zedong for the failings. In order to counteract this, Mao Zedong held a conference on September 29th of 1927 whereupon he implemented a series of radial policies to stave off an implosion. He began streamlining the command structure, instituted political representatives within each unit to instill revolutionary spirit within the troops. A political cell was established in each squad, a branch at company levels and a party committee at the battalion and regiment level. Next he established troop soviets within the units to provide a form of democratic centralism within the units. Additional he began spinning the narrative in his own favor, shifting blame for the failed uprisings to the collective poor understanding of the revolutionary course within China, rather than upon her leadership. Now initially a large part of the Red Army wanted to return to their hometown of Anyuan, but the local military presence was too strong there. Another option was needed and quickly as they had many sick and wounded amongst their ranks. They looked to the nearby Jinggang Mountain Area as a temporary fix. Many of Mao Zdong’s former Peasant Movement Training students knew the area well.

Jinggangshan meaning “well ridge mountain”, derived its name from the 5 villages around its main city of Ciping: Big Well, Middle Well, Little Well, Upper Well, and Lower Well. The mountain is situated in the Luoxian range, straddling the border between Jiangxi and Hunan. It also happens to be a place where 4 counties converge: Lingxian, Suichuan, Ninggang and Yongxin. Surrounding it were factional and political enemies, thus preventing most provincial forces from really coordinating efforts or massing against them. The terrain provided ample defensive obstacles. It also stood in the midpoint between Changsha, Nanchang and Guangdong, offering the Red Army flexibility to try and finish the uprisings they started in those locations.

Given the weak state the Red Army was in, it would not be feasible to occupy Jinggangshan by force. Jinggangshan was controlled by two bandit leaders named Yuan Weicai and Wang Zuo. Mao Zedong was forced to negotiate with the two to come to an arrangement. The CCP was of course concerned about the trustworthiness of the two bandit leaders. At an early meeting in Gucheng, some CCP members of the front committee doubted the revolutionary character of Yuan and Wang, believing them to only be bandits at heart. Mao Zedong on the other hand argued the two leaders and their loyal followers were crucial to the communist movement. I would argue Mao Zedong was grasping at straws. 

As for Yuan and Wang, their primary concerns were the impact of a new military force affecting the regional balance of power. In essence the mountain areas outside the major cities had a complex power dynamic. Bandits and local elites maintained the status quo, any change to that power dynamic could lead to problems. There was also an ethnicity issue. Jinggangshan was considered something of a Hakka ancestral land, and the Han settlers amongst them were more like guests. There always remained a Hakka-Han tension, and this prompted Hakka to vet any Hans coming in. Mao first convinced Yuan how a partnership would be mutually beneficial. In exchange for food, housing and local support the Red Army would provide weapons, training and support Yuan and Wang’s operations. Mao presented Yuan with a gift of 100 rifles to sweeten him over. Mao then made a similar gesture to Wang, sending him 70 rifles. The two bandit leaders let the Red Army right in.

Upon arriving, the Red Army began conducting guerilla operations and peasant mobilization. On October 7th, 1927 the began activity in Maoping and moved to Ciping. While marching they passed through Lingixan and Shuikou villages, attacking the local elites and their militias, freeing prisoners in jails and holding mass rallies to recruit. On the 22nd they reached Dafen, where they were ambushed by a local militia. Using their knowledge of the terrain the militia inflicted severe casualties, forcing the Red Army to retreat towards Wang Zuo for aid. Wang Zuo was wary of them, but Mao Zedong won him over by promising more weapons and training for his bandits. Mao also pledged to support him against his local rivals, one of whom was Xiao Jiabi. Wang’s bandits and the Reds joined forces in Dajing and together seized Shimen. Then the Reds arrived in Ciping on October 15th. They quickly seized the city center and within a month's time established a base of operations.

The CCP quickly expanded its influence in the surrounding area, preying upon local populations where government control was weak or in flux. By mid November the Red Army dispatched a battalion west to capture Chaling. This success allowed them to further expand into Suichang in January of 1928. In February the Red Army occupied its first major city, Xincheng in Ningang country. Within two months of action the Reds had nearly doubled their territory now occupying portions of 3 counties. For the most part Mao Zedong was left alone because of the political shakeup after the failed uprisings in the larger metropolitan areas. Contact with the provincial and regional CCP community still existed though. Zhou Lu, a member of the southern Hunan special committee heard about the CCP expansion in the mountain areas and came to inspect them. While at Jinggangshan he gave Mao Zedong orders to dispatch his unit to support Zhu De’s forces in a uprising about to hit southern Hunan.

After the failed Nanchang Uprising, Zhu De took the remnants of his forces and fled into southern Jiangxi and then Fujian where he linked up with a fellow Yunnanese NRA leader, Fan Shisheng. They stayed with Fan Sisheng’s unit awhile, but once rumors spread he was harboring Reds they had to go. By January of 1928 they fled for southern Hunan to try and support urban uprisings. Upon arriving, Zhu De’s force began augmenting the local peasantry forces and Zhou Lu said he would get Mao Zedong to lend his support. However the uprising never really got its legs. It began in late January, but the urban workers and local populace couldn't rise as expected. Instead local support turned against the communists. Likewise Mao Zedong’s men never made it to southern Hunan, he had intentionally dragged his feet on the issue. Instead Mao Zedong focused his attention in central Hunan holding rallies and mobilizing local peasant groups. Thus Zhu De was pounced upon by local warlord groups in Guangdong and Hunan. Zhu De’s Red Army engaged the warlord armies as they slowly retreated into Jinggangshan. Zhu De and Mao Zedong would meet in Maoping for a conference. On May 20th, 1928 they agreed to establish the Jinggangshan Special Committee, with Mao Zedong as its general secretary. Additionally the 4th Red Army was created and nicknamed the Ironsides Army. The 4th Red Army was roughly 12,000 men strong consisting of Zhu De’s Nanchang uprising force, now designated the 28th regiment, Mao Zedongs Autumn Uprising force now designated the 31st regiment, Yuan Wencai and Wang Zuo’s bandits, later designated the 32nd regiment and the Hunan uprising force now designed the 29th regiment. Zhu De’s arrival also brought in a traditional military mindset, adding some more professionalism to the Red Army. Here Zhu De also made a famous quote “When the enemy advances, we retreat; when the enemy halts and encamps, we harass them; when the enemy seeks to avoid battle, we attack; and when the enemy retreats, we pursue”. This statement would guide much of the Red Army’s actions going forward.

The increase in communist numbers brought unwanted attention immediately from Jiangxi and Hunan forces. The first major military campaign against the Reds began in May of 1928 and was led by Zhu Peide wielding Jiangxi provincial military units. The campaign was based out of Yongxin with the Jiangxi government unleashing the 27th division. One regiment garrisoned at Yongxin was held as reserve while the division sent another regiment to attack the Red Army stronghold in Nanchang and another regiment flanked to the east. The Reds countered by stationing a regiment in the mountains to protect the base, another regiment to defend the mountain passes and 2 regiments to conduct spoiling attacks on the Jiangxi regiments flank. The Red Army was able to destroy the flanking unit, forcing them to retreat back to Yongxin. They pursued them to Yongxin, destroying its garrison regiment in the process. The Red Army then maneuvered to the rear of the Jiangxi division pushing them to pull back to Ji’an. Thus the Reds occupied Yongxin where they went to work establishing a worker-peasant government, expanding the Soviet across the county. 

A second encirclement campaign was unleashed in late MAy, with the same Jiangxi 27th division leading the action. This time they were reinforced as they quickly recaptured Yongxin and began cautiously pursuing the Reds into the mountains. The Reds tried to exploit the terrain for guerilla warfare but was met with little success. The Red 28th regiment was soon forced to help distressed red forces at Chaling county. However the Jiangxi Division did not account for the Red Army’s mobility. The Red 31st regiment quickly assumed the 28th regiments former defensive positions offering a stiff fight against the Jiangxi forces. When the 28th regiment returned to reinforce the 31st they hit the enemy's rear and advanced upon Yongxin again while the Jiangxi forces pulled back to Ji’an again. 

Another encirclement campaign was unleashed the following June this time seeing Jiangxi and Hunanese forces work together against the Reds. The Jiangxi 9th division was deployed in combination with the remaining 2 regiment of the 27th Jiangxi division. The Jiangxi forces performed a frontal attack through the mountain passes using 3 regiments. Meanwhile the Red Army had to perform a feint attack in the east to occupy a Hunanese division. The Red Army deployed a battalion augmented by local guerilla groups along the western flank of the mountain passes. Guerilla attacks on the eastern flank of the Jiangxi forces caused the commander to maintain 2 regiments at Yongxin. Exploiting the mountain terrain the Red Army managed to destroy one regiment as they funneled up the passes. This small victory brought much needed arms and new soldiers who quickly recaptured Yongxin for a third time. 

By the end of June, the Jinggangshan base had basically hit its apex in terms of size. They now controlled Ninggang, Yongxin, Lianhua counties and parts of Ji’an and Anfu. At this point Chiang Kai-Shek took notice of the Red gains and directed a new campaign against them. Another series of campaigns were unleashed seeing Hunanese and Jiangxi armies attack the 4th Red Army beginning in July 1928. The Hunan 8th Army began their attack from the west through Ninggang while the Jianxi army unleashed 11 regiments from the 3rd and 6th armies through Yongxin against the eastern border of Jinggangshan. To meet this threat the Reds kept 2 regiments to defend the bases while the 28th and 29th regiments advanced west to slip behind the Hunanese forces to conduct raids against their rear. Meanwhile local Red Army militia forces began a scorched earth strategy removing all food, poisoning water sources and evacuating villagers to deny their enemy. The Hunan 8th army was forced to retreat in the face of this, allowing the Reds to focus on the Jiangxi forces around Yongxin.

The 28th and 29th regiments advanced west to support the attack against the Jiangxi forces, but then suddenly turned south towards southern Hunan, citing orders to assist the Southern Hunan Special Committee. Then these 2 regiments attacked the city of Chenzhou, roughly 200 kms away from the Jinggangshan mountains. There they defeated local forces. Afterwards the Red troops began strolling through the streets of Chenzhou as civilians, many of them had families in the area. Some began looting the area. They had made the egregious error of now pursuing their enemy further and gave them too much respite to reorganize themselves. The local forces counterattacked driving the 28th regiment to withdraw with little casualties. The 29th regiment fared much worse, being ambushed trying to retreat over the only bridge leading in Chengzhou. They suffered heavy casualties and many of their surviving forces simply joined the 28th regiment as a result. Meanwhile with the 2 regiments gone from the mountain, the NRA forces were emboldened.

3 Hunanese regiment joined 11 Jiangxi regiments to attack the Jinggangshan mountains. The remaining Reds employed every tactic they knew to survive. They began giving up terrain as the enemy penetrated closer to the mountain base. The 31st and 32nd regiments found themselves retreating to the protection of higher ground, where the established defensive positions along key routes to maximize casualties upon the invaders. Mao Zedong took a battalion from the 3st regiment south to escort the incoming 28th regiment, further weakening the lines. Meanwhile guerillas raided the flanks and rear of the advancing NRA forces heading up the mountain. After repeated failed attempts to get to the peaks of the mountains,the Jiangxi and Hunanese forces ultimately had to withdraw come September allowing the 28th regiment to safely get back to Jinggangshan. From there the Red Army contuined to fight and recapture lost territory. By October they retook Ninggang county and portions of Suichuang, Lixing and Yongxin, but were unable to reclaim everything they once had. 

Another campaign coincided with an economic blockade and the arrival of General Peng Dehaui’s 5th Army. The Jiangxi and Hunanese forces adopted blockade tactics, normally employed against bandits, to try and deprive the Reds from using markets in the lowlands. Starting in the fall of 1928, NRA and local militias established checkpoints along all routes and trails leading into the Jinggangshan mountains. Local private armies with troops familiar with the area conducted interdiction patrols to capture anyone trying to get past blockades. The blockade halted most local trade, meaning little medicine, clothing, food or salt was getting into Janggangshan. The Reds began subsisting on sweet potatoes and pumpkins, then Peng Dehuais 5th army arrived in December worsening the burden on the area. Simulteanously NRA forces from Fujian were added to the Jiangxi and Hunanese to fully surround the mountains in preparation for a offensive. 

In the face of all of this the 4th Red Army’s leadership convened a conference at Bailu. The attendees all were trying to figure out how to overcome the situation but their options were very limited. Many called for the same tactics that had been winning them the battles as before. Some called for withdrawing to a safer area momentarily and launch a counterattack when the enemy lightened up. The economic blockade exacerbated the civilian military relations in the mountains and it seemed the local populace was no longer willing to help the Reds. The last option many advocated for was to mount a defense of the mountain range, but this would not allow for any withdrawal route for the 6000 or so troops. Ultimately the adoptd a hybrid solution. The 4th army would break through the blockade to try and draw forces away from the mountains while also obtaining supplies. The 5th army who were pretty battered from their march would defend mountains and base. On January 14th of 1929 the 4th army led by Zhu De and Mao Zedong broke through the blockade and headed south into Jiangxi. 

The 4th army at first was only meeting light resistance as they captured Suichuan and Shangyu. After this they headed for Dayu, but there found 3 Jiangxi regiments who ambushed them. The Reds were forced north into the Xingguo-Ji’an area. They marched 30 days, often 30 miles per day to avoid their pursuers, while taking casualties and losing equipment. They found themselves at Dabaidi village on February 10th where 2 regiments of the 15th NRA division fought them. The Reds routed the NRA forces and even captured the two regimental commanders alongside 800 soldiers and their equipment. This victory earned the 4th army a safe place to rest up for quite some time.

As we saw in the former episodes, the Chiang-Gui and Central Plains War engulfed Chiang Kai-Sheks attention, giving the Reds some breathing space. During this period, Mao Zedong and Zhu De expanded that is referred to as the Jiangxi Soviet. They did so through a series of campaigns into western Fujian. In February 1929 the 4th army incorporated 2 independent guerilla regiments and used them to occupy Ji’an, Ningdu and Ruijin. In March they entered western Fujian and captured Tingzhou. At Tingzhou the Reds got 3000 NRA soldiers to defect. From Tingzhou they expanded the Jiangxi Soviet to encompass over 20 counties in Jiangxi and Fujian. In light of their major accomplishments, Mao Zedong dispatched word to the Central Committee proclaiming all they had done in Jiangxi and Fujian. In May the Red Army unleashed a second campaign into western Fujian, this time capturing Longyan and Yongding. With every successful campaign the Red Army recruits more soldiers, obtained more equipment, more territory and acquired further fundings sources. 

The early days of the Jiangxi Soviet were quite chaotic. Despite the Red Army’s expansion, in reality they were not a unified force. Numerous factions with their own ideologies existed. The Red Army was an amalgamation of different groups coming together less so of a common goal, more so out of survival. Many of the soldiers were former peasants, but there were also former NRA troops, warlord troops and bandits. The traditions of these different groups, coupled with a lack of education in the rural areas creating a boiling pot of bad behaviors and this hurt morale. To accommodate this the Red Army made itself extremely flexible in the early days.

In the early days it was only about survival. Mao Zedong and Zhu De recognized the fact, in a conventional battle the Red Army stood no chance against even a Warlord Army, let alone the NRA. Thus the 4th army created a new political-military strategy within the rural areas to protect and grow the revolution. The first part of the strategy adopted by Mao Zedong was making alliances. It was a no brainer, increase numbers, gain more legitimacy, learn more about local areas, keep expanding. Yet the Central Committee frowned upon being too open to alliance, like with lets say, bandits? In 1928 a resolution from the CCP 6th Party Congress called for expelling bandits from the Red Army, but this obviously ran counter to everything going on in Jinggangshan. To remedy this, Mao Zedong simply did not comply and vetoed any plans made against the bandit leaders such as Yuan and Wang.

The second strategy was adapting communist policies to local conditions. Contrary to the CCP guidance of attacking landlords and rich peasants, the Red Army tended to just attack those disliked by the local community. They often would avoid attacking popular landlords or rich peasants because it could endanger local support. Instead they would use propaganda and negotiations to win over such popular figures. Yet over time the strategies changed from survival to expansion. Mao Zedong described the CCP expansion to come in a series of waves. He believed a systematic development of rural Soviets was an effective way to encircle cities and create the conditions necessary for revolution. 

To survive and expand the Red Army had to create a new way to fight their superior enemies. A famous slogan “the enemy advances, we retreat”, became doctrine quickly. The Red Army combined mobile warfare, guerilla warfare and propaganda against their rival the KMT. During the Jingangshan and Jiangxi Soviet period, guerilla warfare was the mainstay. It’s purpose was not to gain victory, but to gain time, so the CCP could continue growing. The Red Army in Jinggangshan and Jiangxi focused on small-unit tactics, emphasizing scouting, patrolling, ambushing, mobility and so on. Most guerilla units were local militia units trained by Red Army officers, many of whom were also political leaders. They always sought to meet the enemy via ambush, during a raid, a feint attack or attacks to the rear and flank. Yet the Red Army did often find itself facing those like the NRA in conventional warfare. For these engagements it tended to be done only by the professional Red Army units.

A major issue facing the Reds was logistics. They were guests in most of the areas they occupied and had to abide by the local customs. They also could not consume all the local resources in an area, it would hinder growth and foster resentment. Thus the Red Army had to make sure they gained as much as possible from battle. The capture of Tingzhou in 1929 was essentially an economic choice. There the Red Army captured 2 arsenals and a clothing factory. The Red Army also focused strongly on propaganda. Early on propaganda teams were created, each assigned 5 soldiers. These teams had one oratory section and one product section. The oratory section was responsible for spreading propaganda in village markets, centers and halls. The products section was responsible for creating propaganda products. They would go around towns placing up signs and banners to increase awareness. Typically in a month the propaganda teams would hold a large mass rally in the center part of town to vie for local support. They would try to tailor their messaging to meet the local needs. These efforts would help recruitment, elicit support and differentiate them from the run of the mill bandits. If the conditions became ripe and a local populace was sufficiently agitated by social inequalities, the Red Army leaders would make a call for action to topple the local government and push the people to create their own. The Red Army was very careful on who to replace in such situations as the local leadership typically proved useful at transitioning. The Red Army had a selective way of executing key leaders who would be the most troublesome towards their communist needs. 

When a new local government sprung up, the CCP would entice everyone to join the Red Army. This saw people join different parts of the Red Army. For teenagers there was the communist youth organization which was basically a feeder unit into the Red Army. The Red Guard was a local militia group that protected the community and supplemented the Red Army when needed. Those who proved themselves capable could join the Red Army proper. The Red Army instituted a series of organizational changes to establish loyalty to the CCP and allow for a dispersion of forces. Initially the Red Army applied the Russian Soviet and NRA models, but changes were necessary to meet local conditions. When the 4th Red Army captured Sanwan, Mao Zedong established party rule over the army by using party representatives and soldier soviets. The party representatives and army leaders held equal footing, allowing for both to have greater oversight into the issues and concerns of the other. It was commonplace in Warlord armies and the NRA for soldiers to be abused. This quasi democratization allowed soldiers to have a greater voice.

On June 22nd of 1929 the 4th Red Army held their 7th representative congress in Longyan. Mao Zedong spoke much of party control over the military, ruffling a lot of feathers and would contribute to his failure at becoming the Front Committee secretary General that year. In the wake of that loss, Mao Zedong departed for Fujian to assist the mass mobilization going on over there whence he became quite ill. During that period, Chen Yi representing the 4th Red Army in Shanghai reported to the Central Committee. Based on his reports they authorized political communist control over the Red Army units. At least vindicated that his ideas were accepted, Mao Zedong attended the 9th Representative Congress in Gutian county of Fujian. Here he would issue a famous statement “On the Rectification of Incorrect Ideas in the Party” . It outlined his views on the Red Army and what needed to be improved. That same conference gave a platform to Mao Zedong and Zhu De to push for further centralization of power within the Red Army. The Red Army had suffered numerous casualties, desertions and received numerous new recruits. Because of this Mao Zedong believed the military structure needed change. There was also the issue of factionalism within the Red Army. Mao Zedong believed more educated and centralized control would help maintain the unity of the armed forces. 

In December of 1929 a conference was held in Gutian seeing more initiatives adopted to help consolidate military power under party control. The Red Army adopted the political commissariat system from the Soviet Red Army, placing greater control of the army into the hands of the political commissar. The political commissar had political training, but did not have the same power over political operations. The introduction of former KMT and NRA members into the Red Army increased a need for more political indoctrination. Alongside this the Gutian Conference reiterated the equality amongst soldiers and civilians.

Mao Zedong and Zhu De understood the important role of military training for the Red Army. Two major groups of soldiers already had formal training, former NRA and graduates of the Peasant movement training institute. Many of these men were lost in the initial battles however leading the Red Army to be filled with peasants with little to any combat experience. Another issue was the Red Guards lacking any experience, requiring Red Officers to be pulled from front lines to help them out. By developing a competent and trained local force, this further allowed the Red Army to advance outside its borders and expand. 

With a lack of discipline a lot of property damage became common. To combat this, Mao Zedong initially instituted three disciplines in 1927 (1) obey orders in all your actions; (2) don’t take anything from the workers and peasants; and (3) when attacking the local bullies, turn over whatever you take from them. This was expanded further into 8 by 1930 (1) Put back the doors [you have taken down for bed boards]; (2) put back the straw [you have used for bedding]; (3) pay fairly for what you buy; (4) return everything you borrow; and (5) pay for anything you damage. Mao and Zhu later added two more points of attention: (7) defecate only in latrines, and (8) do not steal from captives. The purpose of such rules was two-fold, to curb reckless soldierly behavior and to not piss off local communities. 

Yet discipline alone does not guarantee success in war. The 4th Army held many senior leaders who had trained at Baoding, Whampoa and the Yunnan military schools. But at the lower levels the military experience was quite uneven. The Red Army needed to create a universal standard. Mao Zedong established the first training unit, the 31st regiment training units in December of 1927 at the Longjiang academy in the Jingangshan mountains. Zhu De and Chen Yi would create similar units. Once in Jiangxi the Red Army established mobile schools that accompanied the forces to the front lines. The pressure from the KMT led encirclement campaigns made it impossible to implement a normal education system. While schools were important, for many soldiers the only way to learn was from doing. Sometimes conditions did not allow for the training, and the students were thrust into combat immediately. Mao stated “to learn warfare through warfare—this is our chief method.” However many of the new recruits and junior leaders never received formal education and found classes and training boring. To retain interest, practical exercises were used. By the beginning of 1930, the 4th Red Army had expanded from Jinggangshan to Jiangxi, Hunan and Fujian. Additionally 7 other Soviets were established in the interior of China, demonstrating the viability of the CCP model. For a large part it was the efforts of Mao Zedong and Zhu De that allowed the CCP to thrive. However major issues loomed externally and internally.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

Mao Zedong had forged a seed in the Jinggangshan mountains the would grow into the base of a new 4th Red Army. Forming alliances with local groups and adopting new innovative strategies to survive allowed the 4th Red Army to expand and with it Mao Zedong’s career. Yet externally and internally enemies lay everywhere.