In this engaging discussion, John D. Norton, a Distinguished Professor of philosophy of science at the University of Pittsburgh, dives into the intricacies of inductive inference. He presents his material theory of induction, emphasizing the importance of contextual background facts over universal rules. Norton critiques traditional views, shedding light on the complexities of scientific maturity and the intersection of faith and scientific evidence. He also tackles Hume's famous problem of induction, offering a fresh perspective that seeks to dissolve long-standing philosophical challenges.
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Material Theory of Induction
Mainstream inductive inference research is flawed because it mimics deductive inference by searching for universal rules.
Good inductive inferences are authorized by true background facts within a specific domain, not universal rules.
question_answer ANECDOTE
Marie Curie's Radium Chloride
Marie Curie inferred the crystallographic form of all radium chloride from a single sample.
This inference was based on the established fact that crystalline substances fall into specific families.
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Large-Scale Inductive Inference
Warranting facts, which justify inductive inferences, need to be true to avoid mistakes.
Knowledge of these facts often relies on further inductive inferences, creating a large network.
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John Norton's "The Large-Scale Structure of Inductive Inference" delves into the nature of inductive reasoning in science. He challenges traditional views by proposing a 'material theory of induction,' arguing that the validity of an induction depends on specific background facts rather than universal rules. The book explores the intricate network of inductive support within scientific theories, addressing concerns about circularity and coherentism. Norton's work offers a novel perspective on the problem of induction, demonstrating how scientific knowledge is built upon a complex web of interconnected inferences grounded in empirical evidence. The book is a significant contribution to the philosophy of science, providing a detailed analysis of how scientific knowledge is constructed and justified.
Science depends essentially on inductive inferences – inferences that go beyond the evidence on which they are based. But inductive inferences have historically been modeled on deductive inferences, which are valid if and only if they satisfy a valid argument form.
In The Large-Scale Structure of Inductive Inference (BSPS Open/University of Calgary Press), John Norton expands his defense of what he calls the material theory of induction: what makes an induction good is not its conforming to a universal rule, like deduction, but instead by its being warranted by true background facts in a particular domain. Norton – Distinguished Professor of philosophy of science at the University of Pittsburgh -- argues that while these facts are themselves in turn supported by inductive inferences, the resulting network of inductive support does not suffer from vicious circularity, is not a form of coherentist epistemology, and dissolves the infamous problem of induction articulated most clearly by Hume.