Game Changer - the game theory podcast Political Polarisation – A Game-Theoretic Perspective | with Adam Meirowitz
Feb 3, 2026
Adam Meirowitz, Damon Wells Professor of Political Science at Yale who studies game-theoretic electoral competition. He discusses why classic candidate convergence can fail. He explains echo chambers and selective exposure. He shows surprising reasons these can lead to moderation, how bounded rationality can amplify polarization, and why strategic uncertainty can produce occasional extreme platforms.
AI Snips
Chapters
Transcript
Episode notes
Median Voter Drives Convergence — Until Uncertainty
- Median-voter logic predicts candidate convergence to the political center in simple models.
- Uncertainty about the median and policy preferences creates a trade-off that can sustain moderate divergence.
Echo Chambers Bias Vertical Information
- Echo chambers curate information so like-minded voters receive reinforcing, biased news.
- This selective exposure alters what voters learn about candidates, especially on competence and electability.
Less Vertical Learning Can Produce Moderation
- When echo chambers reduce learning about candidates' competence, voters rely more on policy proximity.
- That increased policy-responsiveness pushes candidates to moderate, reducing polarization in equilibrium.