In this episode, we discuss:
*Col Peznola’s education and training as a young officer
*Col Peznola’s take on what “blocking and tackling” and “the basics” means in a tactical sense
*His experience attending the Army’s Cavalry Leaders Course and what he learned from being around soldiers
*When Col Peznola first heard about what would later be termed maneuver warfare
*His time as an instructor at The Basic School (TBS)
*Who the “maneuver warfare instigators” in the TBS bullpen were
*How the curriculum at TBS had changed since Col Peznola had been a student there
*How Peznola approached teaching lieutenants in the field
*The central role that Lieutenant Colonel Ray Cole played in the shift to maneuver warfare at TBS
*Captain Paul Kennedy’s use of BB guns in force on force training and how this inspired Peznola to create the “Zen Patrol”
*What it was like facilitating the Zen Patrol
*How patrolling seemed to “stick” more with students when taught this way
*The role of the debrief and the instructor in the Zen Patrol
*How Peznola’s experiences at TBS fostered within him an inquisitive mindset
*Why Peznola thinks the Marine Corps needs to change its manpower system and truly reward Marines who innovate
*What it was like having 2ndLt Brendan McBreen as a student
*Peznola’s thoughts on command and control
*What it was like sitting through John Boyd’s briefings and interacting with Boyd
*What it was like having now-Major General Roger Turner as a student in Peznola’s platoon at TBS
*Peznola’s interactions with John Kelly and John Allen at TBS and the impact Kelly and Allen had on the effort to infuse maneuver warfare into the curricula at TBS and IOC
*The dearth of communication that occurs today between TBS and IOC instructors and how that wasn’t the case in Peznola’s time
*What TBS and IOC would look like if Peznola were king
*Peznola’s experiences at 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion
*Peznola’s deployment with the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit and his time in Somalia
*His time serving in manpower at Headquarters Marine Corps
*His time as the general officer monitor officer
*Why some Marines leaders resisted maneuver warfare
*Peznola’s reaction to the publication of Warfighting
*His thoughts on and experiences with Bill Lind
*On whether the Marine Corps practiced maneuver warfare in its invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan
*What maneuver warfare looks like in garrison
*Whether the Marine Corps’ current model of recruit training helps or hinders new Marines from executing maneuver warfare
*Peznola’s thoughts on SOI-West’s inclusion of Chess in its Infantry Marine Course
*His time as the commanding officer of the Marine Special Operations Advisor Group
*His criticism of special operations in Afghanistan
*How the US created the Afghan forces in its own image
*Peznola’s time as the chief of staff of a special operations task force in Afghanistan
*His thoughts on America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan
*His thoughts on Force 2030
*His take on general officer and joint professional military education
*Who Ike Skelton was and why the US military needs another person like him
*If Col Peznola could change one thing about the Marine Corps
*What excites him most about the future direction of the Marine Corps
Links