Episode 2522: Edmund Fawcett on Trump as a Third Way between Liberalism and Conservatism

I’ve been in London this week talking to America watchers about the current situation in the United States. First up is Edmund Fawcett, the longtime Economist correspondent in DC and historian of both liberalism and conservatism. Fawcett argues that Trump’s MAGA movement represents a kind of third way between liberalism and conservatism - a version of American populism resurrected for our anti-globalist early 21st century. He talks about how economic inequality fuels Trumpism, with middle-class income shares dropping while the wealthy prosper. He critiques both what he calls right-wing intellectual "kitsch" and the left's lack of strategic vision beyond its dogma of identity politics. Lacking an effective counter-narrative to combat Trumpism, Fawcett argues, liberals require not only sharper messaging but also a reinvention of what it means to be modern in our globalized age of resurrected nationalism.

5 Key Takeaways

* European reactions to Trump mix shock with recognition that his politics have deep American roots.

* Economic inequality (declining middle-class wealth) provides the foundation for Trump's political appeal.

* The American left lacks an effective counter-narrative and strategic vision to combat Trumpism.

* Both right-wing intellectualism and left-wing identity politics suffer from forms of "kitsch" and American neurosis.

* The perception of America losing its position as the embodiment of modernity creates underlying anxiety.

Full Transcript

Andrew Keen: Hello everybody, we are in London this week, looking westward, looking at the United States, spending some time with some distinguished Englishmen, or half-Englishmen, who have spent a lot of their lives in the United States, and Edmund Fawcett, former Economist correspondent in America, the author of a number of important books, particularly, Histories of Liberalism and Conservatism, is remembering America, Edmund. What's your first memory of America?

Edmund Fawcett: My first memory of America is a traffic accident on Park Avenue, looking down as a four-year-old from our apartment. I was there from the age of two to four, then again as a school child in Washington for a few years when my father was working. He was an international lawyer. But then, after that, back in San Francisco, where I was a... I kind of hacked as an editor for Straight Arrow Press, which was the publishing arm of Rolling Stone. This was in the early 70s. These were the, it was the end of the glory days of Haight-Ashbury, San Francisco, the anti-war movement in Vietnam. It was exciting. A lot was going on, a lot was changing. And then not long after that, I came back to the U.S. for The Economist as their correspondent in Washington. That was in 1976, and I stayed there until 1983. We've always visited. Our son and grandson are American. My wife is or was American. She gave up her citizenship last year, chiefly for practical reasons. She said I would always feel American. But our regular visits have ended, of course. Being with my background, my mother was American, my grandfather was American. It is deeply part of my outlook, it's part of my world and so I am always very interested. I read quite a bit of the American press, not just the elite liberal press, every day. I keep an eye on through Real Clear Politics, which has got a very good sort of gazetteer. It's part of my weather.

Andrew Keen: Edmund, I know you can't speak on behalf of Europe, but I'm going to ask a dumb question. Maybe you'll give me a smarter answer than the question. What's the European, the British take on what's happening in America? What's happened in this first quarter of 2025?

Edmund Fawcett: I think a large degree of shock and horror, that's just the first reaction. If you'll allow me a little space, I think then there's a second reaction. The first reaction is shock and terror, with good reason, and nobody likes being talked to in the way that Vance talked to them, ignorantly and provocatively about free speech, which he feels he hasn't really thought hard enough about, and besides, it was I mean... Purely commercial, in largely commercial interest. The Europeans are shocked by the American slide from five, six, seven decades of internationalism. Okay, American-led, but still internationalist, cooperative, they're deeply shocked by that. And anybody who cares, as many Europeans do, about the texture, the caliber of American democracy and liberalism, are truly shocked by Trump's attacks on the courts, his attacks on the universities, his attack on the press.

Andrew Keen: You remember, of course, Edmund, that famous moment in Casablanca where the policeman said he was shocked, truly shocked when of course he wasn't. Is your shock for real? Your... A good enough scholar of the United States to understand that a lot of the stuff that Trump is bringing to the table isn't new. We've had an ongoing debate in the show about how authentically American Trump is, whether he is the F word fascist or whether he represents some other indigenous strain in US political culture. What's your take?

Edmund Fawcett: No, and that's the response to the shock. It's when you look back and see this Trump is actually deeply American. There's very little new here. There's one thing that is new, which I'll come to in a moment, and that returns the shock, but the shock is, is to some extent absorbed when Europeans who know about this do reflect that Trump is deeply American. I mean, there is a, he likes to cite McKinley, good, okay, the Republicans were the tariff party. He likes to say a lot of stuff that, for example, the populist Tom Watson from the South, deeply racist, but very much speaking for the working man, so long as he was a white working man. Trump goes back to that as well. He goes back in the presidential roster. Look at Robert Taft, competitor for the presidency against Eisenhower. He lost, but he was a very big voice in the Republican Party in the 1940s and 50s. Robert Taft, Jr. didn't want to join NATO. He pushed through over Truman's veto, the Taft-Hartley bill that as good as locked the unions out, the trade unions out of much of the part of America that became the burgeoning economic America, the South and the West. Trump is, sorry, forgive me, Taft, was in many ways as a hard-right Republican. Nixon told Kissinger, professors are the enemy. Reagan gave the what was it called? I forget the name of the speech that he gave in endorsing Barry Goldwater at the 1964 Republican Convention. This in a way launched the new Republican assault on liberal republicanism. Rockefeller was the loser. Reagan, as it were, handed the palm to Rocket Goldwater. He lost to Johnson, but the sermon they were using, the anti-liberal went into vernacular and Trump is merely in a way echoing that. If you were to do a movie called Trump, he would star, of course, but somebody who was Nixon and Reagan's scriptwright, forgive me, somebody who is Nixon and Reagan's Pressman, Pat Buchanan, he would write the script of the Trump movie. Go back and read, look at some of Pat Buchanan's books, some of his articles. He was... He said virtually everything that Trump says. America used to be great, it is no longer great. America has enemies outside that don't like it, that we have nothing to do with, we don't need allies, what we want is friends, and we have very few friends in the world. We're largely on our, by our own. We're basically a huge success, but we're being betrayed. We're being ignored by our allies, we're being betrayed by friends inside, and they are the liberal elite. It's all there in Pat Buchanan. So Trump in that way is indeed very American. He's very part of the history. Now, two things. One is... That Trump, like many people on the hard right in Europe, is to some extent, a neurotic response to very real complaints. If you would offer a one chart explanation of Trumpism, I don't know whether I can hold it up for the camera. It's here. It is actually two charts, but it is the one at the top where you see two lines cross over. You see at the bottom a more or less straight line. What this does is compare the share of income in 1970 with the share of the income more or less now. And what has happened, as we are not at all surprised to learn, is that the poor, who are not quite a majority but close to the actual people in the United States, things haven't changed for them much at all. Their life is static. However, what has changed is the life for what, at least in British terms, is called the middle classes, the middle group. Their share of income and wealth has dropped hugely, whereas the share of the income and wealth of the top has hugely risen. And in economic terms, that is what Trumpism is feeding off. He's feeding off a bewildered sense of rage, disappointment, possibly envy of people who looked forward, whose parents looked forward to a great better life, who they themselves got a better life. They were looking forward to one for their children and grandchildren. And now they're very worried that they're not those children and grandchildren aren't going to get it. So socially speaking, there is genuine concern, indeed anger that Trump is speaking to. Alas, Trump's answers are, I would say, and I think many Europeans would agree, fantasies.

Andrew Keen: Your background is also on the left, your first job was at the New Left Reviews, you're all too familiar with Marxist language, Marxist literature, ways of thinking about what we used to call late-stage capitalism, maybe we should rename it post-late-stage-capitalism. Is it any surprise, given your presentation of the current situation in America, which is essentially class envy or class warfare, but the right. The Bannonites and many of the others on the right fringes of the MAGA movement have picked up on Lenin and Gramsci and the old icons of class warfare.

Edmund Fawcett: No, I don't think it is. I think that they are these are I mean, we live in a world in which the people in politics and in the press in business, they've been to universities, they've read an awful lot of books, they spend an awful lot of time studying dusty old books like the ones you mentioned, Gramsci and so. So they're, to some extent, forgive me, they are, they're intellectuals or at least they become, they be intellectualized. Lenin called one of his books, What is to be Done. Patrick Deneen, a Catholic right-wing Catholic philosopher. He's one of the leading right-wing Catholic intellectuals of the day, hard right. He named it What is To Be Done. But this is almost kitsch, as it were, for a conservative Catholic intellectual to name a book after Vladimir Lenin, the first Bolshevik leader of the Russian Revolution. Forgive me, I lost the turn.

Andrew Keen: You talk about kitsch, Edmund, is this kitsch leftism or is it real leftism? I mean if Trump was Bernie Sanders and a lot of what Trump says is not that different from Sanders with the intellectuals or the few intellectuals left in. New York and San Francisco and Los Angeles, would they be embracing what's happening? Thanks, I've got the third again.

Edmund Fawcett: No, you said Kitsch. The publicists and intellectuals who support Trump, there is a Kitsch element to it. They use a lot of long words, they appeal to a lot of authorities. Augustine of Hippo comes into it. This is really kind of intellectual grandstanding. No, what matters? And this comes to the second thing about shock at Trump. The second thing is that there is real social and economic dysfunction here that the United States isn't really coping with. I don't think the Trumpites, I don't think the rather kitschy intellectuals who are his mature leaders. I don't think they so much matter. What I think matters here is, put it this way, is the silence of the left. And this is one of the deep problems. I mean, always with my friends, progressive friends, liberal friends, it's terribly easy to throw rocks at Trump and scorn his cheerleaders but we always have to ask ourselves why are they there and we're here and the left at the moment doesn't really have an answer to that. The Democrats in the United States they're strangely silent. And it's not just, as many people say, because they haven't dared to speak up. It's not that, it's a question of courage. It's an intellectual question of lacking some strategic sense of where the country is and what kinds of policy would help get it to a better place. This is very bleak, and that's part of, underlies the sense of shock, which we come back to with Trump after we tell ourselves, oh, well, it isn't new, and so on. The sense of shock is, well what is the practical available alternative for the moment? Electorally, Trump is quite weak, he wasn't a landslide, he got fewer percentage than Jimmy Carter did. The balance in the in the congress is quite is quite slight but again you could take false comfort there. The problem with liberals and progressives is they don't really have a counter narrative and one of the reasons they don't have a counter-narrative is I don't sense they have any longer a kind of vision of their own. This is a very bleak state of affairs.

Andrew Keen: It's a bleak state of affairs in a very kind of surreal way. They're lacking the language. They don't have the words. Do they need to reread the old New Left classics?

Edmund Fawcett: I think you've said a good thing. I mean, words matter tremendously. And this is one of Trump's gifts, is that he's able to spin old tropes of the right, the old theme music of the hard right that goes back to late 19th century America, late 19th century Europe. He's brilliant at it. It's often garbled. It's also incoherent. But the intellectuals, particularly liberals and progressives can mishear this. They can miss the point. They say, ah, it doesn't, it's not grammatical. It's incoherent. It is word salad. That's not the point. A paragraph of Trump doesn't make sense. If you were an editor, you'd want to rewrite it, but editors aren't listening. It's people in the crowd who get his main point, and his main point is always expressed verbally. It's very clever. It's hard to reproduce because he's actually a very good actor. However, the left at the moment has nothing. It has neither a vocabulary nor a set of speech makers. And the reason it doesn't have that, it doesn't have the vocabularies, because it doesn't have the strategic vision.

Andrew Keen: Yeah, and coming back to the K-word you brought up, kitsch. If anything, the kitsch is on the left with Kamala Harris and her presentation of herself in this kitschification of American immigration. So the left in America, if that's the right word to describe them, are as vulnerable to kitsch as the right.

Edmund Fawcett: Yes, and whether it's kitsch or not, I think this is very difficult to talk to on the progressive left. Identity politics does have a lot to answer for. Okay, I'll go for it. I mean, it's an old saying in politics that things begin as a movement, become a campaign, become a lobby, and then end up as a racket. That's putting it much too strongly, but there is an element in identity politics of which that is true. And I think identity politics is a deep problem for liberals, it's a deep problem for progressives because in the end, what identity politics offers is a fragmentation, which is indeed happened on the left, which then the right can just pick off as it chooses. This is, I think, to get back some kind of strategic vision, the left needs to come out of identity politics, it needs to go back to the vision of commonality, the vision of non-discrimination, the mission of true civic equality, which underlay civil rights, great movement, and try to avoid. The way that identity politics is encouraged, a kind of segmentation. There's an interesting parallel between identity politics and Trumpism. I'm thinking of the national element in Trumpism, Make America Great Again. It's rather a shock to see the Secretary of State sitting beside Trump in the room in the White House with a make America it's not a make America great cap but it says Gulf of America this kind of This nationalism is itself neurotic in a way that identity politics has become neurotic.

Andrew Keen: Yeah, it's a Linguistic.

Edmund Fawcett: Neurosis. Both are neurotic responses to genuine problems.

Andrew Keen: Edmund, long-time viewers and listeners to the show know that I often quote you in your wonderful two histories of conservatism and liberalism when you, I'm not sure which of the books, I think it may have been in conservatism. I can't remember myself. You noted that this struggle between the left and the right, between liberalism and conservatives have always be smarter they've always made the first move and it's always been up to the liberals and of course liberalism and the left aren't always the same thing but the left or progressives have always been catching up with conservatives so just to ask this question in terms of this metaphorical chess match has anything changed. It's always been the right that makes the first move, that sets the game up. It has recently.

Edmund Fawcett: Let's not fuss too much with the metaphor. I think it was, as it were, the Liberals made the first move for decades, and then, more or less in our lifetimes, it has been the right that has made the weather, and the left has been catching up. Let's look at what happened in the 1970s. In effect. 30-40 years of welfare capitalism in which the state played ever more of a role in providing safety nets for people who were cut short by a capitalistic economy. Politics turned its didn't entirely reject that far from it but it is it was said enough already we've reached an end point we're now going to turn away from that and try to limit the welfare state and that has been happening since the 1970s and the left has never really come up with an alternative if you look at Mitterrand in France you look at Tony Blair new Labor in you look at Clinton in the United States, all of them in effect found an acceptably liberal progressive way of repackaging. What the right was doing and the left has got as yet no alternative. They can throw rocks at Trump, they can resist the hard right in Germany, they can go into coalition with the Christian Democrats in order to resist the hard right much as in France but they don't really have a governing strategy of their own. And until they do, it seems to me, and this is the bleak vision, the hard right will make the running. Either they will be in government as they are in the United States, or they'll be kept just out of government by unstable coalitions of liberal conservatives and the liberal left.

Andrew Keen: So to quote Patrick Deneen, what is to be done is the alternative, a technocracy, the best-selling book now on the New York Times bestseller list is Ezra Klein, Derek Thompson's Abundance, which is a progressive. Technocratic manifesto for changing America. It's not very ideological. Is that really the only alternative for the left unless it falls into a Bernie Sanders-style anti-capitalism which often is rather vague and problematic?

Edmund Fawcett: Well, technocracy is great, but technocrats never really get to do what they say ought to be done, particularly not in large, messy democracies like Europe and the United States. Look, it's a big question. If I had a Leninist answer to Patrick Deneen's question, what is to be done, I'd be very happy to give it. I feel as somebody on the liberal left that the first thing the liberal left needs to do is to is two things. One is to focus in exposing the intellectual kitschiness, the intellectual incoherence on the one hand of the hard right, and two, hitting back in a popular way, in a vulgar way, if you will, at the lies, misrepresentations, and false appeals that the hard-right coasts on. So that's really a kind of public relations. It's not deep strategy or technocracy. It is not a policy list. It's sharpening up the game. Of basically of democratic politics and they need to liberals on the left need to be much tougher much sharper much more vulgar much more ready to use the kinds of weapons the kinds of mockery and imaginative invention that the Trumpites use that's the first thing the second thing is to take a breath and go back and look at the great achievements of democratic liberalism of the 1950s, 60s, 70s if you will. I mean these were these produced in Europe and the United States societies that by any historical standard are not bad. They have terrible problems, terrible inequities, but by any historical standard and indeed by any comparative standard, they're not bad if you ask yourself why immigration has become such a problem in Western Europe and the United States, it's because these are hugely desirable places to live in, not just because they're rich and make a comfortable living, which is the sort of the rights attitude, because basically they're fairly safe places to live. They're fairly good places for your kids to grow up in. All of these are huge achievements, and it seems to me that the progressives, the liberals, should look back and see how much work was needed to create... The kinds of politics that underpinned that society, and see what was good, boast of what was and focus on how much work was needed.

Andrew Keen: Maybe rather than talking about making America great again, it should be making America not bad. I think that's too English for the United States. I don't think that should be for a winner outside Massachusetts and Maine. That's back to front hypocritical Englishism. Let's end where we began on a personal note. Do you think one of the reasons why Trump makes so much news, there's so much bemusement about him around the world, is because most people associate America with modernity, they just take it for granted that America is the most advanced, the most modern, is the quintessential modern project. So when you have a character like Trump, who's anti-modernist, who is a reactionary, It's bewildering.

Edmund Fawcett: I think it is bewildering, and I think there's a kind of bewilderment underneath, which we haven't really spoken to as it is an entirely other subject, but is lurking there. Yes, you put your absolutely right, you put your finger on it, a lot of us look to America as modernity, maybe not the society of the future, but certainly the the culture of the future, the innovations of the future. And I think one of the worrying things, which maybe feeds the neurosis of Make America Great Again, feeds the neurosis, of current American unilateralism, is a fear But modernity, talk like Hegel, has now shifted and is now to be seen in China, India and other countries of the world. And I think underlying everything, even below the stuff that we showed in the chart about changing shares of wealth. I think under that... That is much more worrisome in the United States than almost anything else. It's the sense that the United States isn't any longer the great modern world historical country. It's very troubling, but let's face it, you get have to get used to it.

Andrew Keen: The other thing that's bewildering and chilling is this seeming coexistence of technological innovation, the Mark Andreessen's, the the Musk's, Elon Musk's of the world, the AI revolution, Silicon Valley, who seem mostly in alliance with Trump and Musk of course are headed out. The Doge campaign to destroy government or undermine government. Is it conceivable that modernity is by definition, you mentioned Hegel and of course lots of people imagine that history had ended in 1989 but the reverse was true. Is it possible that modernity is by-definition reactionary politically?

Edmund Fawcett: A tough one. I mean on the technocracy, the technocrats of Silicon Valley, I think one of their problems is that they're brilliant, quite brilliant at making machines. I'm the machinery we're using right here. They're fantastic. They're not terribly good at. Messy human beings and messy politics. So I'm not terribly troubled by that, nor your other question about it is whether looming challenges of technology. I mean, maybe I could just end with the violinist, Fritz Kreisler, who said, I was against the telegraph, I was against the telephone, I was against television. I'm a progressive when it comes to technology. I'm always against the latest thing. I mean, I don't, there've always been new machines. I'm not terribly troubled by that. It seems to me, you know, I want you to worry about more immediate problems. If indeed AI is going to take over the world, my sense is, tell us when we get there.

Andrew Keen: And finally, you were half-born in the United States or certainly from an American and British parent. You spent a lot of your life there and you still go, you follow it carefully. Is it like losing a lover or a loved one? Is it a kind of divorce in your mind with what's happening in America in terms of your own relations with America? You noted that your wife gave up her citizenship this year.

Edmund Fawcett: Well, it is. And if I could talk about Natalia, my wife, she was much more American than me. Her mother was American from Philadelphia. She lived and worked in America more than I did. She did give up her American citizenship last year, partly for a feeling of, we use a long word, alienation, partly for practical reasons, not because we're anything like rich enough to pay American tax, but simply the business of keeping up with the changing tax code is very wary and troublesome. But she said, as she did it, she will always feel deeply American, and I think it's possible to say that. I mean, it's part of both of us, and I don't think...

Andrew Keen: It's loseable. Well, I have to ask this question finally, finally. Maybe I always use that word and it's never final. What does it mean to feel American?

Edmund Fawcett: Well, everybody's gonna have their own answer to that. I was just... What does it mean for you? I'm just reading. What it is to feel American. Can I dodge the question by saying, what is it to feel Californian? Or even what is to be Los Angelino? Where my sister-in-law and brother-in-law live. A great friend said, what it is feel Los Angeles you go over those mountains and you put down your rucksack. And I think what that means is for Europeans, America has always meant leaving the past behind.

Edmund Fawcett was the Economist‘s Washington, Paris and Berlin correspondent and is a regular reviewer. His Liberalism: The Life of an Idea was published by Princeton in 2014. The second in his planned political trilogy – Conservatism: The Fight for a Tradition – was published in 2020, also by Princeton University Press. The Economist called it ‘an epic history of conservatism and the Financial Times praised Fawcett for creating a ‘rich and wide-ranging account’ that demonstrates how conservatism has repeated managed to renew itself.

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