Journalist Ronen Bergman discusses the intelligence failures of the IDF during the Gaza war, exploring Hamas tactics, tunnel systems, and lessons from past conflicts like the Yom Kippur War. The podcast delves into the challenges faced by Israeli intelligence services and the implications for future security decisions.
Israeli intelligence underestimated Hamas's capabilities and intentions, leading to a lack of preparation for the October 7 attack.
Lessons from past intelligence failures like the Yom Kippur War were not adequately learned, hindering a comprehensive understanding of threats.
The Israeli Defense Forces' defense strategies crumbled on October 7 due to breakdowns in communication and a lack of coherent response plans.
Deep dives
Israel's Intelligence Disaster and Operation Jericho
Israel faced an intelligence disaster due to Operation Jericho, where a top-secret Israeli operation named Jericho won by obtaining Hamas's detailed war plan. Despite breaching 58 instead of the planned 60 places in the defense, the invasion mirrored the May 22 plan. Israeli intelligence saw Jericho as an aspirational force-building blueprint rather than an imminent threat.
Misreading Hamas Intentions and Capabilities
Israeli intelligence misinterpreted Hamas's intentions and capabilities leading to a lack of preparation for the October 7 attack. Israel believed Hamas could not execute a massive operation due to defensive measures like the subterranean fence. Surprisingly, Hamas had a substantial tunnel network, underestimated by Israel, allowing for a strategic surprise attack.
Echoes of Past Failures and Lessons Not Learned
Lessons from past intelligence failures, especially the Yom Kippur War, were not adequately learned, leading to a similar surprise attack on October 7. The failure to investigate intelligence blunders in history and a sense of vanity within Israeli defense establishments hindered a comprehensive understanding of Hamas's capabilities and intentions, culminating in the October 7 attack.
Hamas's Preparation and Israeli Intelligence Failures
Hamas meticulously orchestrated a massive tactical operation on October 7, involving thousands of their members in Gaza. Despite some signs being noticed by Israeli intelligence, they were all misinterpreted as routine exercises due to a lack of a strategic model to assess Hamas's intentions. The failure to grasp the gravity of the situation left Israel unprepared for the well-coordinated assault, highlighting the limitations of traditional intelligence approaches and the consequences of underestimating threats.
IDF's Collapse and Military Response Chaos
The Israeli Defense Forces' defense strategies crumbled on the day of the attack, as multiple military bases were simultaneously targeted, overwhelming the IDF. The breakdown in communication, misinterpretation of signals, and paralysis of defenses left IDF units stranded without adequate support. The lack of a coherent response plan, including a failure to mobilize forces effectively, contributed to the catastrophic breach of Israeli defenses, emphasizing the urgent need for comprehensive evaluations and adjustments in military preparedness.
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One of the questions we repeatedly get from you, our listeners, is - "Where was the IDF on October 7th?" It's a topic that we have strenuously avoided. After the war, there will be a formal commission of inquiry that attempts to understand all that went wrong and why. There will be a time and a place for that.
And yet, as the war in Gaza winds down, and as Israel prepares for another possible war, this question re-emerges. What lessons can be learned? More and more journalists in Israel are exploring the topic. So, we are going to dedicate an episode from time to time in the weeks ahead to try to understand what these journalists are learning.
Our only caveat is that this is a difficult topic to explore - for all the obvious reasons. The information is uneven... there is still an element of fog of war.
When I was in Israel last week, I visited Ronen Bergman in his home in Ramat HaSharon, to have a long conversation about what he has pieced together.
Ronen is a staff writer for The New York Times Magazine and Senior Correspondent for Military and Intelligence Affairs for Yedioth Ahronoth, an Israeli daily. Ronen recently won a Pulitzer Prize for his reporting on this war and the pre-war intelligence failures.
He has published numerous books, including:
“Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel’s Targeted Assassinations” - https://tinyurl.com/mwbmchaj
And also, “The Secret War with Iran" - https://tinyurl.com/2p8sh9u
Ronen is also a member of the Israeli bar (he clerked in the Attorney General’s Office), and has a master’s degree in international relations, as well as a Ph.D. in history from Cambridge University.
Read Ronen's piece in The New York Times here: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/30/world/middleeast/israel-hamas-attack-intelligence.html
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