KOL453 | Objections to Argumentation Ethics, Libertarian Property Rights, Scarcity, Intellectual Property: Discussion with a Student

Kinsella on Liberty Podcast: Episode 453. I was approached recently by my old friend, legal scholar and philosopher David Koepsell (a fellow opponent of IP who appeared on the John Stossel show with me a few years back), (( KOL308 | Stossel: It’s My Idea (2015). )) as one of his students at Texas A&M, Eliot Kalinov, was interested in my and Hoppe's work on argumentation ethics and related issues. I offered to have a discussion with Eliot about these issues for his research and publication plans, which we did yesterday (Feb. 18, 2025). We recorded it for his own purposes, and I post it here, with his permission, for those who might find the topics discussed of interest. He is very bright and asked very intelligent questions. We discuss mainly the topics noted in the title of this episode. Grok shownotes: [0:03–28:37] In this episode of the Kinsella on Liberty podcast (KOL453), Stephan Kinsella engages in a discussion with a Texas A&M Classics major and Philosophy Club president about Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s argumentation ethics and related libertarian concepts. The student, introduced to libertarianism through figures like Liquid Zulu and Kinsella’s work on intellectual property (IP), seeks to explore argumentation ethics for an undergraduate philosophy journal paper. Kinsella explains that argumentation ethics, which posits that certain normative presuppositions (like self-ownership and property rights) are inherent in rational discourse, is a compelling framework for grounding libertarian principles. He clarifies its transcendental nature, avoiding the is-ought gap by deriving norms from the act of argumentation itself, and addresses its persuasive power despite not always convincing non-libertarians like socialists. [28:38–1:33:11] The conversation delves into critiques of argumentation ethics, particularly from Bob Murphy and Gene Callahan, focusing on issues like the necessity of property rights due to scarcity and the applicability of norms to edge cases (e.g., children, mentally impaired individuals). Kinsella defends the theory by emphasizing the prior-later distinction and the inevitability of conflict over scarce resources, which necessitates property norms. He also tackles inalienability, distinguishing body ownership from external object ownership, and critiques Walter Block’s voluntary slavery stance, arguing that contracts do not create obligations but transfer titles. The discussion broadens to libertarian property rights, the role of aggression in justifying responsive force, and the cultural rise of libertarianism, with Kinsella offering to review the student’s paper and suggesting publication avenues like the Journal of Libertarian Studies. Transcript and detailed Grok shownotes below. https://youtu.be/2vjVNAF0JUA Update: He recently (May 2025) notified me that his updated paper has been published as Eliot Kalinov, “The Universalizability of Argumentation Ethics,” Aletheia: Texas A&M Journal of Undergraduate Philosophy (Spring 2025): 58–79 (local copy). He also told me "in our discussion, I mentioned an Encrypted Will analogy and falsely attributed it to Walter Block." The paper is Ian Hersum, "A Rational Theory of the Rights of Children," Studia Humana 9:2 (2020): 45–52. Detailed Grok Shownotes Detailed Summary for Show Notes with Time Segments Segment 1: Introduction and Background (0:03–7:26) Description: The episode begins with the student introducing their background as a Classics major at Texas A&M, their role as Philosophy Club president, and their exposure to libertarianism via David Koepsell, Liquid Zulu, and Kinsella’s anti-IP work. They express interest in argumentation ethics, inspired by Kinsella’s discussion with Bob Murphy, aiming to write a paper for an undergraduate philosophy journal. Kinsella shares his connection with David Koepsell, a utilitarian with unique legal theories, and outlines the persuasive appeal of argumentation ethics, noting its transcendental approach to grounding libertarian norms. Summary: Student discusses joining the Philosophy Club and learning about IP from Koepsell, connecting Kinsella’s anti-IP stance to their research (0:03–1:23). Mentions discovering Kinsella through Liquid Zulu and realizing his Houston connection (1:05–1:37). Kinsella recalls collaborating with Capsel and publishing a translation of Adolf Reinach’s work in Libertarian Papers (2:09–3:09). Student introduces their paper on argumentation ethics, inspired by Kinsella’s Murphy discussion, aiming to steelman the theory (3:28–4:45). Kinsella explains argumentation ethics as a transcendental argument, avoiding the is-ought gap by deriving norms from discourse (4:52–6:27). Segment 2: Contract Theory and Inalienability (7:27–28:37) Description: The student raises a contract example to explore the is-ought gap, prompting Kinsella to discuss his Rothbardian title-transfer theory of contract, which views contracts as title transfers, not obligations. He critiques conventional contract theory, arguing that ownership, not promises, drives legal norms. The discussion shifts to inalienability, with Kinsella distinguishing body ownership (inalienable due to direct connection) from external object ownership (alienable via intent and possession). He contrasts this with Walter Block’s voluntary slavery argument, asserting that body ownership cannot be contractually alienated due to the primacy of current consent. Summary: Student references Capsel’s a priori contract theory, linking it to the is-ought gap (6:44–7:14). Kinsella outlines his title-transfer theory, arguing contracts transfer ownership, not obligations, per Rothbard (7:21–8:46). Discusses economic vs. legal exchanges, clarifying that economic exchanges describe actions, while legal exchanges involve ownership (9:18–14:53). Explains inalienability, arguing body ownership is distinct from object ownership, as bodies are not acquired like external goods (15:48–21:13). Critiques Block’s slavery stance, emphasizing that current consent overrides past promises, using a rape analogy (21:58–24:14). Segment 3: Argumentation Ethics and Scarcity (28:38–44:03) Description: The student asks why scarcity necessitates property rights norms, addressing critiques from rational and ethical skeptics. Kinsella clarifies that scarcity, or rivalrousness, implies conflict over resources, requiring norms to minimize disputes. He explains that argumentation presupposes peace, self-ownership, and the right to homestead unowned resources, aligning with Hoppe’s prior-later distinction. These norms are unavoidable in rational discourse, making libertarian principles the only justifiable framework. The discussion touches on handling socialist objections, emphasizing that argumentation’s context inherently supports libertarian norms. Summary: Student questions why scarcity requires property norms, targeting skeptical audiences (28:58–29:36). Kinsella defines scarcity as rivalrousness, necessitating norms to resolve conflicts over resources (29:49–31:28). Explains argumentation’s presuppositions: peace, self-ownership, and homesteading rights, per Hoppe (31:52–34:02). Argues that socialists cannot deny conflict’s role in norm-setting, as discourse assumes peaceful resolution (34:08–35:42). Introduces the prior-later distinction, grounding property rights in first use and consensual transfer (35:54–39:54). Segment 4: Aggression, Children, and Edge Cases (44:04–1:03:25) Description: The student probes distinctions justifying differential treatment (e.g., imprisoning criminals), asking if only prior aggression validates such actions. Kinsella confirms that aggression (e.g., crime) creates a relevant distinction, allowing responsive force, unlike arbitrary traits like race. He addresses children’s rights, using Walter Block’s “decrypted will” analogy to argue that parents have guardianship due to their special connection and children’s limited rationality. For mentally impaired individuals, Kinsella suggests society may extend rights via “piggybacking” out of benevolence, acknowledging these as edge cases requiring moral, not strict legal, reasoning. Summary: Student asks if only prior aggression justifies differential treatment, citing Murphy’s critique (42:11–43:07). Kinsella argues aggression creates a relevant distinction, unlike race or height, allowing responsive force (43:44–50:30). Discusses children’s rights, endorsing Block’s “decrypted will” analogy for gradual consent development (53:08–56:57). Addresses mentally impaired individuals, suggesting “piggybacking” rights out of respect for human affinity (57:23–1:01:26). Notes that libertarianism doesn’t solve all edge cases (e.g., lifeboat scenarios), but neither do other systems (1:03:32–1:04:47). Segment 5: Post-Scarcity and Critiques of Argumentation Ethics (1:03:26–1:33:11) Description: The student explores a post-scarcity world’s impact on property rights, with Kinsella arguing that even superabundance wouldn’t eliminate conflict over bodies or specific goods, necessitating norms. They address critiques claiming argumentation ethics presupposes norms like wakefulness, which Kinsella dismisses as misdirected, as all normative systems face similar challenges. He critiques Objectivist hostility to Hoppe’s Kantian-inspired approach, linking it to misinterpretations of Kant and Mises. The episode concludes with Kinsella identifying critics’ main misunderstanding: failing to grasp the normative presuppositions of discourse, like the right to disagree, and offering to review the student’s paper. Summary: Discusses post-scarcity, arguing that conflict over bodies persists, requiring property norms (1:05:00–1:07:24).