
Theories of Everything with Curt Jaimungal Curt Jaimungal: What is Existence, Exactly?
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Jul 1, 2026 They explore the Batman paradox and why saying something does not exist forces us to refer to it. They trace Russell’s theory of descriptions and Kripke’s critique about rigid names. They examine Meinong’s claim that non-existent objects populate our discourse and the modern fixes to avoid contradictions. They connect the debate to null pointer errors, AI struggles with fictional facts, and competing ontological trade-offs.
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Russell Recasts Existence As A Property Of Properties
- Russell solves empty-name sentences by treating existence as a second-order property of properties, not individuals.
- He analyzes names as disguised definite descriptions, so "Batman doesn't exist" denies instantiation of the description "the caped crusader".
Kripke Shows Names Aren't Just Descriptions
- Kripke's Naming and Necessity shows names are rigid designators that pick out the same individual across possible worlds, undermining descriptivism.
- Modal contrasts like "Peter Parker may not have been bitten" vs "the guy bitten may not have been bitten" expose the difference.
Meinong's Bold Proposal To Quantify Over Nonexistent Objects
- Alexius Meinong proposes including non-existent objects in the domain of quantification so names can refer to objects that lack existence.
- Curt notes this makes existence an ordinary property some objects have while others, like Batman, lack it.









