Dive into the intriguing world of perception as differences in sensory modalities are explored, particularly the stark contrast between sight and touch. The discussion scrutinizes the philosophical concept of resemblance in visual knowledge and its implications for understanding reality. Pain and non-signifying feelings are examined, revealing their significance in our sensory experiences. The intertwining of perception and language highlights how our grasp of reality is shaped by trust and skepticism. Engage with these deep philosophical inquiries for a richer understanding of how we perceive the world!
Reid argues for the resemblance between visual and tactile experiences, asserting that both senses are crucial for understanding spatial relationships.
He challenges skepticism about sensory data by promoting the idea that credible sensory experiences facilitate a deeper connection with reality.
Deep dives
Critique of Berkeley's Dual Perception
Thomas Reed challenges Berkeley's notion that the qualities of objects perceived through sight and touch are fundamentally different. He argues that there is a resemblance between the seen and touched attributes of an object, particularly when focused on a singular item, such as a square, which can be identified similarly through both senses. Reed uses the example of a blind individual regaining sight, asserting that this person could discern the relationship between the tactile and visual experiences of objects. He believes that recognizing these systematic resemblances can enhance our understanding of perception and the relationship between sensory modalities.
The Role of Spatial Information in Sensory Experience
Reed posits that both vision and touch are essential for acquiring spatial information, suggesting that our ability to perceive space depends on the interplay of these two senses. He emphasizes that a person lacking the sense of touch would not fully develop a sense of spatial awareness through vision alone. This perspective infers that the physical movement of an individual is crucial for visual perception to flourish, reinforced by the idea that our sensory organs, being three-dimensional, significantly shape our understanding of the physical world. The implications of this model suggest that our mobility and interaction with the environment are integral to developing a coherent spatial perception.
Understanding Resemblance and Signification
Reed delineates the differences between various sensory modalities, particularly highlighting how some experiences lack resemblance while others do. He affirms that while spatial perceptions, like sight and touch, can signify similarities, other modalities such as smell do not support the same kind of resemblance, as they operate through distinct interactions with material substances. The analogy of pain further illustrates how sensations do not always directly represent an external reality, thereby questioning the relationship between sensation and perception. This nuanced view of resemblance versus signification underscores Reed's broader argument against the theory that sensations must resemble their sources for perception to be valid.
Skepticism and the Nature of Reality
Reed addresses the skepticism around human perception and the reliability of sensory data, challenges the premise that skepticism is a valid stance based on the inherent nature of sensation and perception. He argues that if we accept the credibility of our sensory experiences as naturally grounded and evolutionary advantageous, there would be little room for skepticism about the external world. Moreover, he suggests that developing a belief in the consistency and reliability of our sensations fosters a deeper connection with the reality around us, thus discrediting skepticism as fundamentally flawed. The interplay of perception and belief reveals how intertwined our understanding of reality is with our embodied experiences and the inherent trust in our sensory inputs.
Concluding our treatment of "Of Seeing" in Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense.
We continue to hammer at this idea of "resemblance" between mental contents and physical objects, consider more carefully Reid's level of support for the primary/secondary quality distinction, how he treats non-signifying feelings like pain and warmth, and his comparison of sense experience to testimony.