Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Megan Fritts, discusses non-causal theories of action explanation. Topics include the critique of utilitarianism, the superiority of structural explanations, interpretations of the practical syllogism, and addressing Davidson's Challenge.
Megan Fritts argues for a non-causal approach to action explanation, emphasizing the use of structural explanations.
Megan's view distinguishes between the candidate reasons for acting and the actual reasons for which an agent acts, providing a more precise understanding of action explanations.
Deep dives
Causal and Non-Causal Theories of Action and Explanation
In this podcast episode, Megan Fritz, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Arkansas, Little Rock, discusses causal and non-causal theories of action and explanation. She explains that the standard view of action explanation is causal, where actions are explained by citing the causes and reasons behind them. Non-causal views, on the other hand, reject the idea that action explanations primarily rely on citing causes. Megan argues for a non-causal approach to action explanation, emphasizing the use of structural explanations. She proposes that action explanations can be seen as citing activities that partially constitute the action in question, such as the practical syllogism. Megan's view aims to provide truth-apt and genuinely explanatory non-causal action explanations.
Donald Davidson's Challenge to Non-Causalists
Donald Davidson's challenge to non-causalists is addressed in the podcast. Davidson argues that action explanations must be causal explanations, as there may be various reasons that rationalize an action but are not the actual causes of the action. Megan responds to this challenge by asserting that her non-causal view can provide a satisfactory answer. By focusing on the constitutive relationship between activities and actions, she argues that her view distinguishes between the candidate reasons for acting and the actual reasons for which an agent acts. This distinction allows for a more precise understanding of action explanations and addresses Davidson's challenge.
Structural Explanations in Action Theory
Megan discusses the concept of structural explanations in action theory. Structural explanations involve explaining the properties or behavior of a complex entity by alluding to its structure. She highlights that structural explanations can be concrete or abstract and cites examples such as mathematical explanations and explanations based on the distribution of potential customers. Megan's own account suggests that action explanations are structural explanations, with the practical syllogism serving as the relevant structure. By citing the practical syllogism, which involves the premises and conclusion of practical reasoning, action explanations can be seen as partially constituting the action in question. Megan argues that structural explanations provide a robust alternative to purely causal explanations.
