Mao takes a critical position on the military line pursued by the Comintern and the Politburo. Also, the issue of scapegoating individuals as a way of dealing with repudiated party policies.

Further reading:
Marcia Ristaino, China’s Art of Revolution: The Mobilization of Discontent, 1927 and 1928
C. Martin Wilbur, The Nationalist Revolution in China, 1923-1928
Tony Saich, The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party
Stuart Schram, ed., Mao’s Road to Power, vol. 3: From the Jinggangshan to the Establishment of the Jiangxi Soviets, July 1927-December 1930
Zhou Enlai, Selected Works of Zhou Enlai, vol. 1

Some names from this episode:
Qu Qiubai, Named head of new provisional politburo at August 7, 1927 Emergency Conference
Besso Lominadze, New Comintern head in China starting in July 1927
Tang Shengzhi, Leader of Guomindang Left military forces
Mikhail Borodin, Comintern agent and head of Soviet mission to aid the Guomindang
Tan Pingshan, Communist representative in Wuhan government
Chen Duxiu, Former General Secretary of the Communist Party
Zhou Enlai, Member of temporary standing committee of Communist Politburo appointed in July 1927

Army or Militia? Mao and the Politburo Diverge on Military Policy for the Autumn Harvest Uprising