There Are Chinese Spies at Stanford w/Elsa Johnson and Garret Molloy

When Stanford students Elsa Johnson and Garret Molloy began investigating Chinese intelligence operations on their campus for the Stanford Review, they uncovered something far more extensive than expected: a systematic intelligence network that has transformed thousands of Chinese students into assets for Beijing's technology collection efforts. Their investigation revealed that between 20,000 and 50,000 Chinese students studying in America receive funding from Beijing's China Scholarship Council, with many maintaining contact with "handlers" who expect regular intelligence reports.

This discovery exposes a fundamental asymmetry in how China and America approach academic exchange. Beijing leverages our relatively open research environment through "nontraditional collection"—crowdsourced intelligence gathering through students and researchers—while maintaining strict control over their own institutions. China wants access to our openness while preserving their own secrecy.

But America's response threatens to undermine the very qualities that make our universities innovative. The trade-off seems impossible: remain vulnerable to systematic exploitation or adopt surveillance methods that mirror authoritarian systems. Can universities maintain their innovative edge while protecting sensitive research? Johnson and Molloy's investigation reveals how these questions will shape the future of American higher education in an age of great power competition.

Note: The Stanford Review was erroneously referred to as the "Stanford Economic Review" once in this episode.