This week we talk about interdiction, the NSA, and Mossad.

We also discuss exploding pagers, targeted strikes, and paramilitary organizations.

Recommended Book: Uncertainty in Games by Greg Costikyan

Transcript

In the world of technology, and especially computers—or anything with microchips and thus, some computing capabilities—a “backdoor” is a bit of code or piece of hardware that allows someone (or a group of someones) to get inside that computer or compute-capable device after it’s been delivered and put into use.

At times the installation of backdoors is done beneficently, allowing tech support to tap into a computer after it’s been sold so they can help the end-user with problems they encounter.

But in most cases, this term is applied to the surreptitious installation of this kind of hardware or software, and generally it’s meant to allow those doing the installing to surveil the activities of whomever is using the product in question, or maybe even to lock them out and/or hijack its use at some point in the future, should they so desire.

There are potential downsides to the use of backdoors even when they’re installed with the best of intentions, as they can allow malicious actors, like hackers, working independently or for agencies or nation states, to tap into these devices or networks or whatever else with less effort than would have otherwise been required; in theory such a backdoor would give them one target to work on, rather than a bunch of them, which would mean attempting to access each and every device individually; a backdoor in an operating system would allow hackers who hacked that backdoor system access to every device that uses said OS, for instance.

Backdoor efforts undertaken by the US National Security Agency, the NSA, were famously divulged by whistleblower Edward Snowden, revealing all sorts of—to many people outside the intelligence world, at least—unsavory activities being conducted by this agency, among them efforts to install backdoors in software like Linux, but also hardware like routers and servers, at times opening these devices up and installing what’s called a Cottonmouth, which allows the NSA to gain remote access to anything plugged into that device.

This sort of interdiction, which is basically the interception of something before it reaches its intended destination—so intercepting a modem that’s been ordered by a big company, opening it up, installing a backdoor, then repackaging it and sending it on its way to the company that ordered it as if nothing has happened—is not uncommon in the intelligence world, but the scope of the NSA’s activities in this regard were alarming to pretty much everyone when they were divulged, with leaks and reporting showing, basically, that the NSA had figured out ways to put hardware and software backdoors in just about everything, in some cases resulting in the mass collection of data from American citizens, which goes beyond their legal remit, but also the surveillance of American allies, like the chancellor of Germany.

What I’d like to talk about today is another, recent high-visibility example of an intelligence agency messing with devices ordered by a surveillance target, and what consequences we might expect to see now that this manipulation has come to light.

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In the world of covert operations—spy stuff, basically—a “hand of God” operation is one that is almost immaculately targeted to the point where it might almost seem as if those who are struck did something to piss off a deity; those who the targeters want to hit are hit, and everyone else is safe or relatively safe.

In 2020, a hand of God operation was launched against an Iranian general named Qassem Solaimani while he was near the Baghdad airport, an American Reaper drone hitting Solaimani and his escorts’ cars with several missiles, killing the general and nine other people who were with him, but leaving everyone else in the area largely unscathed—not an easy thing to do.

Hamas’s leader, Ismail Haniyeh, was assassinated in July of 2024 by Israel, which blew up his bedroom in a military-run guesthouse in Iran’s capital city, Tehran, either using a well-targeted missile or a bomb that they somehow managed to hide in that room ahead of time—either way, it was a very precise attack that made use of a lot of intelligence data and assets in order to hit the target and just the target, avoiding other casualties as much as possible—which again, can make this sort of strike, though still massively destructive, seem like an act of god because of how highly specific it is.

On September 17 of 2024, at around 3:30 in the afternoon, local time, thousands of pagers, which were purchased and used by the militant group Hezbollah, which governs the southern part of Lebanon, and which is locked in a seemingly perpetual tit-for-tat with Israel, mostly using rockets and drones across their shared border, these pagers began to buzz, indicating there was a new message from Hezbollah leadership, and then seconds later they exploded—some in their owners’ pockets or on their hips, some in their hands, if they lifted them to their faces to see what the message contained.

These sorts of devices were subbed-in for smartphones by the organization’s leadership in recent years, especially following the early October attacks on Israel by Hamas in 2023, due to fears that Israel’s notorious intelligence agency, Mossad, would be able to tap their communications if they used more sophisticated tools.

The pagers in question were a bit more modern than those that were common a few decades ago, allowing users to basically text each other, and it was thought that they were simple enough that they would reduce the number of software backdoors that Mossad could use to intercept their messages, while still allowing those in the higher-levels of the organization to communicate with each other quickly and efficiently.

Instead, it looks like Hezbollah acquired these pagers from an Israeli shell company—maybe several shell companies—operating out of Hungary which licensed the device schematics and branding of a Taiwanese company in order to make it seem legit.

This company or companies were set up in mid-2022, and the tangled web of activities surrounding them is still being unspooled by journalists and intelligence agencies, but pretty much everyone, from the pager brand’s parent company to the Hungarian government deny any connection to any of this, the US and Israel’s other allies deny having any foreknowledge of the operation, and Israel’s Mossad is of course not divulging their secrets, so it could be a little while before we know all the details, if we ever do, but it seems like this larger operation, the infrastructure for it, anyway, may have been in the works for a decade or more.

The way it played out, though, is that those thousands of pagers seem to have been filled with a few ounces of explosives and rigged with software that would detonate said explosives when a specific message was received by them. These pagers, then, were delivered to Hezbollah, distributed to their higher-ups, their inner-circle, basically, and then on September 17 thousands of them received the detonate message, blew up, and killed at least 12 people and injured nearly 3,000.

Lebanon’s hospitals were filled with the dead and grievously injured, shutting down a significant chunk of their overall medical capacity, and the following day a wave of radios—the kind used to communicate, not the kind used to listen to music, so basically walkie-talkies—alongside a few mobile phones, laptops, and some solar power cells, all owned and used by Hezbollah officials and operatives, blew up, killing at least 25 people and injuring about 450.

Then, a few days later, Israel launched an airstrike on a suburb in Beirut—the capital city of Lebanon—killing two senior Hezbollah officials and something like 36 other people with the 140 or so rockets it launched during the operation.

Anonymous officials from the US and Israel have told reporters that the explosives hidden in those pagers and other devices, were originally meant to be used as an opening salvo of an all-out attack against Hezbollah, which by definition would probably mean an invasion of Lebanon, since Hezbollah controls a fair portion of the country, but they were growing concerned that Hezbollah might have been on to them and their explosives-hiding efforts, so they decided to move sooner than planned and detonate these devices without having that immediate full-bore followup ready to go.

This might be part of why the attack is generally being seen, in analytical and intelligence circles, at least, as a tactical success but a strategic question mark, as the end-goal isn’t really clear, especially since Israel is still partly tied-up in Gaza and increasingly the West Bank, as well, and thus not super well-prepared for a potential real-deal war with Lebanon, to its north. This operation’s culmination would have made a lot more sense several months in the future, when they would theoretically have been in a better spot to detonate these devices, launch a bunch of missiles, and then move in with soldiers on the ground to capture or kill the rest of Hezbollah’s leadership.

It has been posited that this effort still serves a few important purposes for Israel’s military and intelligence agencies, though. For the latter, it serves as a reinvigoration of the “don’t mess with us” reputation they held up until the successful sneak-attack by Hamas last October; Mossad has been heavily criticized for ignoring the signals they were receiving about that attack, and this could have been partly meant to show their government and the world that they still have plenty of gas in the tank; it was a highly sophisticated operation, and it’s fairly terrifying to think that the devices we all carry in our pockets might be weaponized in this way; Iran’s military is reportedly disallowing the use of such devices for the time being, and local airlines are not allowing folks to bring these sorts of things aboard, either, so the scare-factor has definitely worked, and it will likely make it a lot more difficult for Hezbollah and similar organizations in the area to function, since they won’t know for certain which of their communication channels have been compromised and potentially weaponized against them.

The Israeli military, too, would seem to benefit from what amounts to a decapitation attack on an organization that has declared its intention to wipe Israel off the face of the map.

Hezbollah and similar organizations are more fluid than typical government organizations by necessity, but Hezbollah is a lot more established and entrenched than other Iran-backed entities, like Hamas in Gaza and the Houthis in Yemen, which means they have more infrastructure, a larger military force, and a more concrete leadership structure—the latter of which was hit hard by these strikes and hand of God operations, and the former of which has been hit hard over the past year or so, airstrikes targeting Hezbollah’s rocket, drone, and missile capabilities in particular having become more common since Hamas attacked Israel.

There are several interesting, and in a few cases alarming, possible implications of this operation and its accompanying airstrikes.

First is that it could represent a time-delayed unofficial declaration of war by Israel against the Hezbollah-controlled portion of Lebanon.

There have been very clear red-lines honored by both militaries for the past several years, both of them generally sticking to hitting targets within a few miles of their shared border, and both sides generally avoiding hitting major cities or higher-ups from the opposing side with their strikes; a lot of rockets and missiles and drones flying, but few of them hitting anything meaningful, other than the sites from which those projectiles were launched.

Israel seems to be indicating that the rules have changed, though, and while Hezbollah has made similar gestures in recent days, aiming at and hitting a few Israeli targets beyond the typical projectile launch-sites and military installations close to the border, including towns dozens of miles from that border, they’re still proving to be less brazen than Israel in this regard, so far at least.

So it could be that Israel is leaving Hezbollah some space to back off, giving them a taste of what’s to come if they don’t accept that ultimatum, and it could be that Hezbollah is gesturing at hitting back, but avoiding doing anything they can’t step back from in order to give themselves time to either tone things down on what feels like their own terms, or to prepare for a more formal conflict; this could change at any moment, of course, but that seems like the most likely resting stance for Hezbollah at the moment—though in recent days both sides have indicated they’re not just prepared, but actually keen for a more formal conflict, including an Israeli invasion of Lebanon, which would allow the Israelis to do more capturing and disassembling of Hezbollah’s infrastructure, but could also bog them down in street combat, which would make them less effective in Gaza, while also probably requiring the summoning of thousands of new soldiers, or already active, but exhausted soldiers—which wouldn’t be a popular move on the Israeli homefront.

This also raises all sorts of questions about the safety, or lack thereof, of international supply chains.

Some of these supply chains have already suffered as a consequence of their tangling and breaking during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, but others are beginning to shrink or even wither as a result of concerns about, for instance, China integrating itself in global communications systems via its 5G technology and mobile devices, which has led to all sorts of sanctions and import bans by countries like the US and their allies.

Could iPhones built in China be messed with before they’re shipped to their end-users in other countries? It’s not impossible, and the same is true of just about anything that’s made in one place and exported to another. That doesn’t mean it will happen, but the knowledge that it could—and the line that’s been crossed by Israel in blowing up seemingly safe personal devices in this way—could lead to more such bans, or at least concerns and posturing by political figures about these fears. That, in turn, could expedite the truncating and culling of some of these supply chains, further curtailing the expansiveness, range, and openness of global trade.

And finally, this raises more concerns about the possibility of Israel’s invasion and occupation of Gaza sparking a larger, regional conflict, as Hezbollah is backed by Iran, which also backs an array of other non-government interests in the region, including several paramilitary groups. And the Israeli government seems keen to take down as many of the threats it’s surrounded by as possible before any peace treaties are signed; which perhaps understandable when you’re running a country that’s been invaded by all of its neighbors simultaneously as many times as Israel has in its relatively short history as a sovereign nation, but it’s also pretty alarming as Israel is a hugely potent military force in the region, and it’s backed by many of the world’s most globally potent military forces, which means it could wreak a whole lot of havoc if it wants to, and if such an effort increases in scope, that could pull other regional powers, like Iran, more formally and overtly into the conflict.

There are other forces at play, here, too, like the political machinations of Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, who’s walking a fine line attempting to stay in office in the midst of large and seemingly endless protests by Israelis who oppose his seeming kowtowing to the country’s far-right political establishment, and who’s scrambling to stay in office, in part to avoid facing ongoing corruption charges against him.

There are also external factors that could influence the region’s next steps, like Russia, which would love to see this conflict expand because that would take resources and attention away from its invasion of Ukraine, while other nations, like Saudi Arabia, would likely prefer to continue along a previous course of regional stabilization and normalization—of more trade enabled by more peace, basically—though it now seems inclined to put those efforts on pause because of the unpopularity of dealing directly with Israel until and unless it recognizes a Palestinian state, which doesn’t seem likely in the immediate future, given everything that’s happened in the past year.

Lots going on, then, and this most recent wave of attacks would seem to stir the pot more than it settles much of anything for everyone involved; which means, most immediately, and this is true whether or not Israel and Lebanon more formally go to war with each other, the ongoing peace talks that many of Israel’s neighbors and allies have been hoping for have been essentially back-burnered for the time being.

Show Notes

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assassination_of_Qasem_Soleimani

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assassination_of_Ismail_Haniyeh

https://archive.ph/OqfPt

https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/israel-strikes-lebanon-hezbollah-revenge-device-blasts-nasrallah-rcna171946

https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/hezbollah-commanders-killed-israel-strike-beirut-device-blasts-rcna172085

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/09/21/israel-lebanon-hezbollah-exploding-pagers/

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cz04m913m49o

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/21/business/dealbook/exploding-pagers-deliver-supply-chain-warning.html

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/hezbollah-exploding-pagers-israel-supply-chain-a4937b48

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israels-ultimatum-to-hezbollah-back-off-or-go-to-war-f1b99924

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/09/21/israel-lebanon-pager-explosions-hezbollah-warfare/

https://www.axios.com/2024/09/21/hezbollah-launches-medium-range-rockets-israel

https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/09/22/world/gaza-israel-hamas-hezbollah

https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-gaza-755733f50ad52c5af05a2ea7ef082e26

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/21/world/middleeast/israel-hezbollah-lebanon.html

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/20/world/middleeast/gaza-cease-fire-talks-hezbollah-lebanon.html

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/israel-s-hand-of-god-operation/ar-AA1qMval

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/17/world/middleeast/israel-hezbollah-pagers-explosives.html

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/17/world/middleeast/hezbollah-pager-explosions-lebanon.html

https://www.axios.com/2024/09/18/hezbollah-pager-explosions-supply-chain-terror

https://apnews.com/article/lebanon-israel-hezbollah-pager-explosion-e9493409a0648b846fdcadffdb02d71e

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/22/world/middleeast/mideast-diplomacy-hezbollah-israel.html

https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/09/22/world/gaza-israel-hamas-hezbollah

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/23/world/middleeast/israel-hezbollah-escalating.html

https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-guards-ban-communications-devices-after-strike-hezbollah-security-2024-09-23/

https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/05/photos-of-an-nsa-upgrade-factory-show-cisco-router-getting-implant/

https://www.reuters.com/article/world/spy-agency-ducks-questions-about-back-doors-in-tech-products-idUSKBN27D1DO/

https://www.extremetech.com/defense/173721-the-nsa-regularly-intercepts-laptop-shipments-to-implant-malware-report-says

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Security_Agency

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardware_backdoor

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