From Contingency to God with Steven Nemes | (MoR No. 8)

Steven Nemes joins me for a cordial discussion on a potential path from contingent being to the God of classical theism.  

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I wish to add some clarifications on my response near the end of the video, as I could have been clearer concerning the thrust of my response.

Steven's argument against the (live epistemic) possibility of a composite necessary being roughly proceeded as follows:  

Composite beings are always a mixture of two distinct principles: a principle of intelligibility (which is, of itself, universal and not tied down to any concrete particular) and a principle of individuation (which is, of itself, particular and indeterminate). Because neither of the two principles demand that they be combined with one another, there must be some extrinsic cause or principle which accounts for their unity.

I have three primary responses to this that I did not sufficiently disentangle in the video:  

(1) In the case of a metaphysically necessary being (e.g. the neo-classical theistic God of Bill Craig, Ryan Mullins, and co.), it's precisely because it is a metaphysically necessary being that its principle of intelligibility and principle of individuation are necessarily conjoined or united with one another. That need not be explained in virtue of some extrinsic cause -- it's explained in virtue of the being's metaphysical necessity. We would presumably only need a causal explanation if the composite being were such that its two principles are merely contingently united. But that wouldn't be the case for a necessary composite being. And we cannot derive contingency from mere composition, since from the fact that x and y are distinct, it doesn't follow that they could come apart, or that one is accidental to the other, or that they are separable, or that they are possibly absent from reality. For instance, the properties having a radius and having a circumference are distinct but nevertheless inseparable, non-accidentally related, necessarily co-instantiated, and so on.

(2) It seems question-begging to claim that ‘neither of the two principles demand that they be united with one another’. This is the very question at issue -- namely, whether there could be a being with distinct parts/principles but which is nevertheless such that its distinct principles demand that they be conjoined and necessarily instantiated in reality.

(3) Not in and of itself a response to the argument, but something worth bearing in mind: the argument relies on heavy metaphysical background assumptions that many philosophers deny.

Note that these considerations are NOT the end of the discussion, and that Steven himself will have responses, I'll have responses to his responses, Steven... and so on. Hopefully this gives a taste, however, of the complexities involved!

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For Steven Nemes' work, check out his Academia page! https://fuller.academia.edu/StevenNemes

For my work, check out my book and blog!

Book: https://www.amazon.com/Majesty-Reason...

Blog: https://majestyofreason.wordpress.com/