Associate Professor of Economics at Rice University, Mallesh M Pai, discusses mechanism design in an economic context, focusing on censorship in MEV systems. They explore the impact of proposer builder separation on efficiency and censorship resistance. The conversation also touches on the connection between censorship and MEV, MEV blocking techniques, the role of finance in cryptocurrency, and using mechanism design to address censorship in blockchain systems.
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Quick takeaways
MEV introduces efficiency and censorship resistance challenges in blockchain systems.
MEV blocking techniques expand possibilities but require careful consideration of incentives.
Mechanism design principles can be applied to blockchain systems, but MEV introduces unique challenges.
Deep dives
MEV and Censorship Resistance
The podcast episode features a discussion with Malesh Pai, Associate Professor of Economics at Rice University, who specializes in mechanism design. The focus of the conversation is on maximal extractable value (MEV) and censorship resistance in blockchain systems. MEV refers to the ability of a proposer to determine the order in which transactions are included in a block, allowing them to extract value from the system. The conversation highlights the potential efficiency and censorship resistance challenges associated with MEV, and explores the concept of Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) as a way to address these issues. The discussion also touches on the need for diverse solutions and competition within the MEV space to promote decentralization and protect users from censorship.
MEV Blocking Techniques
The podcast delves into the topic of MEV blocking techniques, which aim to mitigate the negative implications of MEV on the blockchain. These techniques involve using encryption and privacy mechanisms to prevent the manipulation of transaction order by individuals or groups. While these solutions expand the possibilities and provide alternatives, they do not eliminate the inherent incentive problems present in the system. The discussion emphasizes the need for careful consideration of incentives and a holistic approach to address the complexities surrounding MEV and censorship resistance.
MEV and Mechanism Design
The conversation highlights the field of mechanism design, its relationship with game theory, and its relevance to understanding and addressing MEV challenges. Mechanism design focuses on designing strategic interactions to achieve desired outcomes. Examples include auctions, matching mechanisms, and voting systems. The podcast emphasizes that while the principles of mechanism design can be applied to blockchain systems, MEV introduces unique challenges due to the decentralized nature and continuous time dynamics. The discussion recognizes the interdisciplinary nature of MEV research, involving economics, computer science, and operations research, and emphasizes the importance of ongoing exploration and competition for developing effective solutions.
MEV and its similarity to user-generated finance
MEV (Miner Extractable Value) in the crypto space is seen as conceptually similar to user-generated finance, where users have the ability to create, destroy, add, or remove orders and structures. This distinguishes it from traditional finance where users have limited control. The crypto space allows for greater flexibility and user influence on the network. MEV and user-generated finance offer a wide design space and the ability to quickly implement and test new ideas.
Decentralization and censorship in the crypto space
The podcast episode explores the challenges of censorship in the crypto space, specifically in terms of decentralization and its implications. With a focus on block proposals and roll-up sequencers, the episode discusses how blockchain's monopoly-like temporary or perpetual control over block inclusion can lead to potential censorship. While decentralized sequencers could provide potential censorship resistance, there are still practical and economic concerns to address, including latency, bandwidth, and alignment of incentives among various network participants.
On this week’s episode, Anna Rose and Tarun Chitra chat with Mallesh Pai, Associate Professor of Economics at Rice University. They explore mechanism design in an economic context and Mallesh’s work around MEV topics - specifically on censorship in an MEV context and within his Special Mechanism Group.
The discussion takes the team back into the topic of MEV, revisiting the proposer builder separation concept and the impact that this may have on the efficiency and censorship resistance of these systems.
Bonsai, RISC Zero’s most anticipated product, allows developers to prove huge programs off-chain, roll them into one succinct proof, and verify anywhere with low amounts of gas.