My fellow pro-growth/progress/abundance Up Wingers,

With the rise of American populist nationalism has come the rise of nativism: a belief in the concept of “heritage Americans” and a deep distrust of immigration. Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I talk with Alex Nowrasteh about the ideology beneath this severe skepticism, as well as what Americans lose economically if we shut our doors to both low- and high-skilled immigrants.

Nowrasteh is the vice president for economic and social policy studies at the Cato Institute. He is the author of his own Substack with David Bier, as well as the co-author of Wretched Refuse? The Political Economy of Immigration and Institutions.

Read more of Nowrasteh’s work on immigration, nationalism, and other research.

In This Episode

* Illegal immigration (1:16)

* Rise of xenophobia (3:48)

* Psychology of immigration skeptics (9:20)

* The future American workforce (14:04)

* Population decline and assimilation (17:35)

Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation.

Illegal immigration (1:16)

The system that I would favor is one that allows a substantially larger number of people at every skill level to come into this country legally, to work, to live, and to become Americans . . . because this country demands their labor and there's no way for them to come legally.

Pethokoukis: Will you, in a very short period of time, give me a sense of the situation at the southern border of the United States of America in terms of immigration, how that has evolved from Trump 1, to Biden, to now? Is it possible to give me a concise summary of that?

Nowrasteh: From Obama through Trump 1, the border apprehension numbers were pretty reasonable, you were talking about somewhere between 400,000 and 800,000 per year. Then came Covid, crashed those numbers down to basically nothing by April of 2020.

After that, the numbers progressively rose. They were at the highest point in December of 2020 than they had been for any other December going back over 25 years. Then Biden takes office, the numbers shoot through the roof. We're talking about 170,000 to 250,000, sometimes 300,000 a month until January or so of 2024; those numbers start coming down precipitously. December of 2024, they're at 40,000 or so, 45,000. January 2025, Trump comes in, they go down again. First full month of Trump's administration in February, they're about 8,000, the lowest numbers without a pandemic in a very long time.

What's the right number?

That's a hard question to answer? In an ideal world where costs and benefits didn't matter, I think the ideal number is zero. But the question is how do you get to that ideal number, right? Is it by having an insane amount of enforcement, of existing laws where you basically end up brutalizing people to an incredible extent? Or is it practically zero because we let people come in lawfully to work in this country. The system that I would favor is one that allows a substantially larger number of people at every skill level to come into this country legally, to work, to live, and to become Americans, and that would bring that number down to about what it is now or even lower than what it is now every month, because the reason people come illegally is because this country demands their labor and there's no way for them to come legally.

Rise of xenophobia (3:48)

. . . I just don't think the economic argument is what moves people on this topic.

As I’ve understood it, and maybe understand it wrong, is this issue has developed that — at first it seemed like the concern, and it still is the concern, was with illegal undocumented immigrants. And then it seems to me the argument became, “Well, we don't want those, and then we also really don't want low-skill immigrants either.” And now it seems, and maybe you have a different perspective, that it's, “Well, we don't really want those high-skill immigrants either.”

You gave me the current state of illegal immigration at the southern border. What is the current state of the argument among people who want less, perhaps even no immigration in this country?

State of the argument is actually what you described. When I started working on this topic about 15 years ago, I never thought I would've heard people come out against the H-1B visa, or against high-skilled immigrants, or against foreign entrepreneurs. But you saw this over Christmas actually, December of 2024. You saw this basically online “H-1 B-gate” where Vivek Ramaswamy and Elon Musk were saying H-1Bs are great. I think Musk had tweeted, “over my dead body we're going to cut the H-1B,” right? And you see this groundswell of conservatives and Republicans — not all of them, by any means — come out and say, “We don't even want these guys. We don't want these skilled immigrants,” using a whole range of arguments. None of them economic, by the way. Almost none of them economics; all culture, all voting habits, all stereotypes, a lot of them pretty nasty in my opinion.

So there is this sense where some people just don't want immigrants. The first time I think I encountered this in writing from a person who was prominent was Anne Coulter, Jeff Sessions when he was senator, and these types of people around 2015, in a big way, and it seems to have become much more prominent than I ever thought it would be.

Is it that they don't understand the economic argument or they just don't care about that argument?

They don't care about it. I have come to the realization — this makes me sad because I'm an economist by training — but I just don't think the economic argument is what moves people on this topic. I don't think it's what they care about. I don't think it animates . . . It animates me as a pro-immigration person, I think it animate you, right?

It does, yeah, it sure does.

It does not animate the people who are opposed to it. I think it is a cultural argument, it is a crime element, it is a threat element, it is a, “This makes us less American somehow” weird, fuzzy-feeling argument.

Would it matter if the immigrants were all coming from Germany, France, and Norway?

Maybe for a handful of them, but generally no, I don't think so. I think the idea that America is special, is different, is some kind of unique nation that ethnically, or in other ways cannot be pierced or contaminated by foreigners — I think it's just like an “Ew, foreigners,” type of sentiment that people have. A base xenophobia that a lot of people have combined with a very reasonable fear and dislike of chaos. When people see chaos on the border, they hate it.

I hate chaos on the border. My answer is to get rid of the chaos by letting people come in legally, because you legalize a market, you can actually regulate it. You can't regulate an illegal market. But I think other people see chaos, they have this sort of purity conception of America that's just fanciful, in my opinion, and they just don't want foreigners, and the chaos prompts them, makes it even more powerful.

To what extent is it fear that all these immigrants will eventually vote for things you don't want? Or in this case, they're all going to become Democrats, so Republicans don't want them.

That’s definitely part of it. I think that's more of an elite Republican fear, or an elite sort of nativist or conservative fear than it is amongst the people online who are yelling at me all the time or yelling at Elon Musk. I think that resonates a lot more in this city and in online conservative publications, I think that resonates much more. I don't think it's borne out by the facts, and people who say this will also loudly trumpet how Hispanics now basically split their vote in the 2024 election. David Shore, who is the progressive analyst of electoral politics, said he thinks that Trump actually won the naturalized immigrant vote, which is probably the first time a Republican has won the naturalized immigrant vote since the 19th century.

The immediate question is, does that kind of thing, will that resonate into a changing opinion among folks on the right if they feel like they feel like they can win these voters?

I don't think so because I think it's about deeper issues than that. I think it's a real feelings-, values-based issue.

Psychology of immigration skeptics (9:20)

When people feel like they don't have control of something in their country or their government doesn't have control of something, they become anti- whatever is the source of that chaos, even the legal versions of it.

Has this been there for a long time? Was it exacerbated for some reason? Was it exacerbated by the financial crisis and the slow economy afterward? The only time I remember hearing about people using the idea of “heritage Americans” were elite people whose great great grandparents came over on the Mayflower and they thought they were better than everybody else, they were elites, they were these kind of Boston Brahmans. So I was aware of the concept from that, but I've never heard people — and I hear it now — about people who were not part of the original Mayflower wave, or Pilgrims, think of themselves as “heritage Americans” because their parents came over in the 1850s or the 1880s, but now their “heritage.” That idea to me seems new.

I hadn't heard of it until just a few years ago, frankly, at all. I racked my brain about this because I used to have a lot of affinity for the Republican Party, just to be frank. And I'm from California, and I'm in my ’40s, so I remember Prop 187 in 1994 when the state had a big campaign about illegal immigrants’ enforcement and welfare, and it really changed the state's voting patterns to be much more democratic, eventually.

Then I saw the Republican Party under George W. Bush, and John McCain, and all these other guys who were pro-Republican, but always in California the Republicans were very skeptical of immigration across the board, but I didn't really see that spread. Then I saw it go to Arizona in 2010, 2009, 2008, around there. I saw it go to South Carolina, Mississippi, some of these places, and then all of a sudden with Trump, it went everywhere.

So I racked my brain thinking, did I miss something? Was there always something there and I was just too myopic to view it, or I wasn't in those circles, or I wanted to convince myself that it wasn't there? And I really think that it was always there to some small extent, but Trump is the most brilliant political entrepreneur of our lifetime and probably of our country's history, and that he took over this party from the outside and he convinced people to be nativists. Because what he was saying, the words — not that different from Scott Walker saying about immigration. It was not that different from what Mike Huckabee was saying about immigration. It wasn't that different from Santorum. But he said it or sold it in a way that just worked, I guess. That maybe absolves me of some responsibility or maybe allows me to say that I didn't miss anything, but I do think that that largely explains it.

And how does it explain that, and you may not have an answer. I can sort of understand the visceral concern about chaos at the border or people coming here illegally. But then to take it to the point that we don't even want AI engineers to come to this country from India, or, “I'm really angry that someone from a foreign country is taking my kid's spot at Harvard.” That, to me, seems almost inexplicable.

It's not the fact of the chaos, but it's the perception of the chaos, because when Trump came in in 2015, the border crossing numbers were really low. They were in the 300,000s, low 400,000s, but he talked about it like it was millions, and he created this perception of just insane, outrageous chaos.

There's a research and political psychology field about the locus of control. When people feel like they don't have control of something in their country or their government doesn't have control of something, they become anti- whatever is the source of that chaos, even the legal versions of it. In some way, it's an understandable human reaction, but in some ways it is so destructive. But, like you said, it spreads to AI engineers from China because it's like all immigration, and it's so bad, and it's so destructive, and that is the best explanation that I've seen out there about that.

The future American workforce (14:04)

What we notice in the economics of immigration, when we do these types of studies and we take a look at the wage impacts, we've got basically no wage effect on those of native-born Americans.

I write a lot about, hopefully, this technological wave that we're going to be experiencing, and then I also write a little about immigration. The question I get is, if we're going to be worried about the jobs of the future being taken over by software or by robots, if we really think that's going to happen, shouldn’t we really be thinking very hard about the kinds of people we let enter into this country, even legally, and their ability to function in that kind of economy?

I think we need to think about what is the best mechanism to select people to come here that the economy needs. What you described . . . assumes an amount of knowledge, and foresight, and, frankly, the incentive to make a wise decision in the hands of bureaucrats and politicians that they just do not have and that they will never have. and what matters most and who can pick the best in the market,

You can say STEM degrees only. I only want people who have STEM degrees from colleges that, on some global ranking, are in the top 500 universities. You could say that. That would be one way of selecting.

They could try to centrally plan it like that. . .

You're saying “centrally planned” because you know that's going to get a reaction out of me, but go ahead.

I do. The thing is, there's all different types of ways to have an immigration system and there's going to be a little bit of planning any immigration system. But I think the one that will work best is the one that allows the market to have the widest possible choice. We don't know how automation is going to turn out.

There's this thing called Moravec’s paradox in a lot of AI writing, which is the idea that you'll probably be able to automate a lot of high-skill jobs more easily than you will be able to automate, say, somebody who's a maid, or a nanny, or a nurse, or a plumber, just because the real world is harder than . . . You and I type, and talk, and do math. That's probably easier to do. So maybe the optimal thing to do would be to increase immigration for low-skilled people because all the jobs in the future are going to be low-skilled anyway, because we're going to be able to automate all the high-skilled jobs.

Though you could say then that that would take away the jobs from the natives.

You could say that, of course. What we notice in the economics of immigration, when we do these types of studies and we take a look at the wage impacts, we've got basically no wage effect on those of native-born Americans. If we were to have a situation where let's say massive amounts of jobs disappear in entire sectors of the economy, vanished, automated . . . well, that just means that we're going to have more opportunities and specialization, division of labor, where there's going to be a lot more lower-skilled and mid-skill jobs, just because there's such a much larger and more productive side of the economy.

There's going to be so much more profits in these other ones that we're going to have a bigger economy in the same way that when agriculture basically shrank as a massive section of the workforce, those people got other jobs that were more productive, and it was great. I think we could maybe see that again, and I hope we do. I don't want to have to work anymore.

Population decline and assimilation (17:35)

. . . if the whole world is going to have population decline in 20, 30, 50 years, we're going to have to deal with that at some point, but I'd rather deal with that problem with a population of 600 million Americans than a population of 350 million Americans.

The scenario — and this was highlighted to me by one of our scholars who looks a lot about demographics and population growth — his theory is that all the population-decline estimates, shrinkage, and slowing down estimates from the United Nations are way too optimistic, that population would begin to level off much faster. Whatever the UN's low or worst-case scenario is, if you want to put a qualifier on it like that, it's probably like that. And a lot of policymakers are underestimating the decline in fertility rates, and eventually everyone's going to figure that out. And there'll be a mad global scandal for population — for people.

There's going to be tons of labor shortages and you're going to want people, and there's going to be this scramble, and not every country is going to be as good at it. If people want to immigrate, they're probably more likely, everything else equal, they're going to want to go to the United States as opposed to — not to smear another country — I don't know, Argentina or something. We have this great ability to accept people to come here and for them to succeed and build companies. Maybe that company is a bodega, maybe that company is a technology company. So we're at this moment where we have this great natural advantage, but it seems like we're utterly rejecting it.

We are not just rejecting it, we are turning it from a positive into a big negative. You have these students who are being apprehended and having their visas canceled because of a fishing license violation six years ago. People who are skilled science students studying the United States who could go on to be founders of big companies or just high-skilled workers, and we're saying, “Nope, can't do it, sorry.” We're kicking people out for reasons of speech — speech that I often don't like, by the way, but it doesn't matter, because I believe it on principle. It's important.

We already see it showing up in tourism numbers plummeting to the United States, and I think we're going to see it in student visa numbers shortly. And student visas are the first step on that long chain of being able to be a high-skilled immigrant one day. So we are really doing long-term damage.

On the population stuff, I completely agree, and if the whole world is going to have population decline in 20, 30, 50 years, we're going to have to deal with that at some point, but I'd rather deal with that problem with a population of 600 million Americans than a population of 350 million Americans.

What is your general take on the notion of assimilation? Is that a problem? Should we doing more to make sure people are successful here? How do you think about that?

I do think assimilation is important. I don't think it's a problem. When I talk about assimilation, I use it in the way that Jacob Vigdor — Jake is a professor, University of Washington economist, and he says, assimilation is when an immigrant or their kids are indistinguishable from long-settled Americans on the measurements of family size, civic participation, income, education, language. Basically it takes three generations. That is, the first generation are the immigrants, second are their kids, third are their grandkids, on average.

Some, much faster. Like my Indian neighbors are more than assimilated in the first generation. They do better than native born Americans on most of those measures. Some lower-skilled Hispanic or some East African immigrants, takes three, three and a half, four sometimes, to do that well, but it's going very well.

We do not have the cultural issues that some countries in Europe have. To some extent, it's overblown in Europe, those problems, but they do exist and they exist to a greater extent than they do here. Part of that is because we have birthright citizenship. People who are born in this country are citizens, they don't feel like they're an illegal underclass because they’re not. They feel totally accepted because they are legally, and we have an ethos in this country, because we don't have an ethnic identification of being American like they do in places like Germany or in Norway. I have family members in Norway who are half Iranian and they're not really considered to be Norwegian, culturally. Here it's the opposite. If I were to go say I'm not an American, people would be offended. There, if you say, “Oh, I'm Norwegian,” they'll correct you and be like, “No, you're not Norwegian, you're something else.”

We have this great secret sauce born of our culture, born of our lack of an ethnic Americanness. It doesn't matter what ethnicity or race you are, or religion, anybody can be American. And we have done it so well and we just don't have these issues, and I don't think, as a result, we should do more because I'm worried about the government breaking it.

Based on what you just said, at a gut level, how do you feel when someone uses the phrase “heritage Americans,” and they hate the idea of America as an idea, and to be an American you need to have been here for a long time. That whole way of looking at it — do you get it, or do you at some level [think], I am not a psychologist, I do not understand it?

A way to make sense of it [is] by swapping out the word “American” in their sentence and we place it with the word “Frenchman,” or “German,” or “Russian,” or “Japanese,” or some other country that's a nation state where the identity is bound up with ethnicity. That's the way that I make sense of it, and I think this is a concept that just does not work in the United States; it cannot work. Maybe it's the most nationalistic I am, but I think that that's just a fundamentally foreign idea that could never work in the United States. It sounds more at home in Europe and other places. That's what strikes me

As I finish up, I know you have all kinds of ideas to improve the American immigration system, which we will try to link to, but instead of me asking you to give me your five-point plan for perfection, I'm going to ask you: How does this turn around? What is the scenario in which we become more accepting again of immigrants, perhaps the way we were 30 years ago?

That really is a $64,000 question. The idea that I have floated — which probably won't work, but at least gets people to pause — is the entitlement programs are going insolvent, and I have pitched to my grandmother-in-law, who is a very nice woman, who is a Republican who is skeptical of immigration, but who is worried about Social Security going bankrupt, I say, “Well, there is one way to increase the solvency of this program for 30 or 40 years.” And she said, “What's that?” and I say, “Let in 100 million immigrants between the age of the 20 and 30.” And it gives her pause. I think if that idea can give her pause, then maybe it has a shot. When this country seriously starts to grapple with the insolvency of entitlement programs, that's looming.

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