Last time we spoke about the bitter stalemate the emerged during the battles of Shaho and Sandepu. General Kuropatkin had finally rid himself of the nuisance that was Admiral Alexeiev. However his quasi replacement would turn out to perhaps be much worse. The battle of Shaho resulted in nothing, but disaster for the Russians. The battle of Sandepu would go even worse.

The megalomaniac General Grippenberg was overly zealous in the offensive maneuvers and made numerous mistakes while refusing to comply with orders from his superior. As a result countless Russians found themselves attacking the wrong village, then becoming attacked by better coordinated Japanese forces. The fighting around Sandepu because of catastrophe seeing Stakelberg relieved of command and Grippenberg asking to be relieved likewise. Yet again the Russians were in a situation of retreat and now all that lay in front of the Japanese was the prize of Mukden.

#82 The Russo-Japanese War part 9: The fall of Mukden

Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War.

The opening land battle of the war at the Yalu river was nothing but a curtain raiser to what has been described as the first of the “modern wars”. The battle of Liaoyang and the battle of Mukden would be considered the first real modern battles of the 20th century. The battle for Mukden was characterized by deceptive planning and tactical maneuver. It has often been described as a game of chess between Kuropatkin and Oyama. Never before in the history of warfare had so many pawns been brought upon a board of war to be played. If Mukden fell, Vladivsotok would most certainly be next. Yet not all was lost for the Russians. The trusty trans siberian railway continued to bring troops and now Kuropaktin had under this thumb 275,000 riflemen, 16,000 cavalry and over 1219 guns. To their south amasing around Liaoyang Oyama had assembled 200,000 riflemen, 7300 cavalry and 992 guns. The only thing the Japanese held superiority in was machine guns, 200 vs 56.

General Nogi’s 3rd IJA arrived to Liaoyang and thus virtually all of Japan’s entire fighting strength was now together, but cracks within the Japanese military machine were beginning to become visible. Every major land battle against the Russians saw them fleeing intact, tremendous casualties had been dished out upon the Japanese. Both the Russian empire and Japanese were being financially drained by the war. Tokyo’s bankers felt they would soon see refusals from Europe and America for further funds, the war needed to come to an end swiftly. Russia came into the war with a gold reserve of 106.3 million pounds and was being funded primarily by France who handed a series of loans totaling 800 million francs. The Tsar also managed to get a loan from Germany for another 500 million marks. Japan came into the war with a gold reserve of 11.7 million paling in comparison. To compensate Japan took loans from the UK, the US and Canada. Japan’s total expenditure for the war would be a colossal 2150 million yen of which 820 million came from overseas funding. Both nations by this point of the war were literally becoming bankrupt and needed it to end quickly. Alongside the casualties and financial troubles, the Baltic fleet of Admiral Rozhdestvenski was drawing near. Tremendous pressure was placed upon Marshal Oyama, not just to seize victory, but to once and for all give a decisive blow to the Russian land forces, not to allow them through Japanese fingers another time.

The new Russian line south of Mukden was over 90 miles long, with relatively little depth and a general reserve centrally placed. Over to the right flank in the west was a wide flat plain, occupied by the 2nd Manchurian army of General Kaulbars who had recently replaced Grippenberg. His right rested on the Hun River and his left on the railway. The railway and old Mandarin road were the boundaries between him and the central position held by the 3rd Manchurian army under General Bildering. His position held the railway, the mandarin road and the Putilov Hill. The rest of the terrain further to the east as far as Shinking was occupied by the 1st Manchurian army led by General Linevich. His territory was more mountainous. 2/3rd’s of the Russian cavalry led by General Rennenkampf were placed on the extreme left of the line in some higher features. It was a purely defensive setup and did not enable the Russians much in terms of offensive action.

Back in his HQ at Liaoyang, Oyama and his staff determined to strike when the very worst winter conditions would lessen up, but not before the rivers thawed. It was a bit of a gamble, if the rivers prematurely thawed it could spell doom to the offensive that would rely on easy river crossings. A brand new Japanese army would join the battle and take to the right of the line set up against Rennenkampf in the high mountains. This was the 5th IJA led by General Kawamura Kageaki. Kawamura had notably served as a field commander during the battle of Yalu and thus his army was nicknamed the Yalu Army. Though called an army, it was only in name, for it was quite under strength and consisted of the 11th division, some veterans of the Port Arthur Siege and reservists. To Kawamuras left and east of the railway was the 1st and 4th IJA of Generals Kuroki and Nozu. The 2nd IJA of Oku was to the left of the line. Back in the rear, due west of Liaoyang was Nogi’s 3rd IJA, whose arrival would trigger the new offensive. The Times had this to say of Oyama’s assembly “To launch, direct and support 400,000 [sic] men engaged at such a season over a front 100 miles in length, was one of the most remarkable tasks ever undertaken on the field of battle by a modern staff. Wisely remaining at a point well in rear of the army, but linked up with every column by telegram and telephone, Oyama, Kodama and their staff were uninfluenced by the emotions of the battlefield, and were able to direct the whole course of the battle with frigid precision and all the desirable calm.”

Nogi was very fortunate not to be relieved of command, certainly there were many commanders who believed he should be. The arrival of Nogi’s 3rd IJA weighed heavily upon Kuropatkins mind. Russian intelligence indicated the movement of troops in the east, most likely Kawamura’s and this was seen as a threat towards Vladivostok. Although if you pull out a map, you might ask “well how could or why would the Japanese attack Vladivostok”, Kuropatkin nonetheless responded by reinforcing Vladivostok lest it become besieged like Port Arthur. The Japanese had also launched a small cavalry raid against Kuropatkins lines of communication. On January 9th, a Japanese cavalry unit advanced 300 circuitous miles and on February 11th reached their objective, a point along the railway 160 miles north of Mukden. There they blew up a bridge before returning back to their lines on March 13th. The Japanese units received a Kanjo citation for the brave act while Kuropatkin reacted by dispatching a brigade and two regiments to protect rear areas.

Throughout the war over land, the Japanese had figured out Kuropatkins psychology quite a bit. Something they took a strong notice of, was how he always reacted to every threat, little or large. Thus peppering these maneuvers, the Japanese knew he would dispatch forces and honestly it worked like a charm. Alongside this the Japanese enjoyed supremacy when it came to intelligence and espionage, their agents outplayed the Russians and kept up the misinformation campaign plaguing Kuropatkins HQ. Kuropatkin was convinced the Japanese sought to avoid the plains where they would be outmatched by the quality of the Russian artillery and quantity of Russian cavalry. The Japanese seemed to always have the edge in mountain warfare, thus Kuropatkin believed the Japanese would hit him in the right flank through the mountains. Kodama played upon this idea “I had resolved to attack the Russians by enveloping them apparently in the east, so that they might despatch their main strength thither while our main force was to be directed against the Shaho–Mukden–Tiehling section of the railway, enveloping them from the west.” Kuropatkin had again overestimated the strength of his adversary, particularly Kawamura’s “army”. His scouts believed the army advancing to the right was in fact Nogi’s 3rd IJA. Kuropatkin believed two full armies were facing him on his right hand side, but in face it was just Kawamura. In the meantime Nogi’s 3rd IJA arrived to the theater sitting behind Oku’s 2nd IJA, well protected from Russian scouts. A key factor in Oyama’s war plan was to convince Kuropatkin the 3rd IJA were somewhere waiting to pounce upon his right flank, while in truth they sat in the west.

Kawamura’s army began their advance on February 23rd prior to the general advance of the Japanese forces. Oyama explained the object of the battle “was to decide the issue of the war. The issue is not one, therefore, of occupying certain points or seizing tracts of territory. It is essential that the enemy be dealt a heavy blow. Since in all our battles hitherto pursuit has been very slow, it is imperative upon this occasion to pursue as promptly and as far as possible.” Kawamura’s army advanced towards the Fushun mines and this prompted Kuropatkin to detach the 1st Siberian corp from Kaulbars command and hastily place them in front of Kawamura’s advance. From the foreign observers attached to Oyama’s army it seemed like he was performing the same type of tactics done during the Zulu wars, one war correspondent wrote gn reminded a correspondent of tactics borrowed from the Zulu Wars: ‘The five Japanese armies were to form a crescent whose cusps, over ninety miles apart at first, would gradually draw together, the western cusp however being finally and suddenly thrown forward so as to form a closed curve with the eastern.’ One thing Oyama sought to avoid at all cost was battling in the ancient city of Muken. The Japanese had managed to be on good terms with the Chinese during this war, something in dramatic contrast to their war in 1894 when civilians were butchered. Oyama was keeping a keen eye to the political future of their war. Winning this war with the Russians on Manchurian soil was one thing, consolidating any gains afterwards was another.

The Japanese general advance was taken up in a long line. The 1st IJA advanced towards Kawamura’s left flank and both armies would find the Russian defenders putting up a strong resistance. Facing massive delay, Kuroki yet again tenaciously took the initiative and pushed his men forward regardless of loss. As a war correspondent with his forces would write ‘Kuroki was ready to go on with the attack, but Oyama did not yet consider the sacrifices that this would entail would be warranted.’ On February 27th, Nogi’s 3rd IJA began their advance going northwest towards the Liao River. Meanwhile the Japanese heavy artillery, including the colossal 11 inch guns began to pound the Russian positions at Putilov and Novgorod Hills. The aim of the artillery was to hold down the central Russian forces. Cossack cavalry sighted Nogi’s cavalry screen along the right flank, sounding alerts. Kaulbar reacted by assembling an ad hoc reconnaissance force to travel back to the Russian supply depot located at Hsinmintun, some 33 miles west of Mukden, to get an idea of the size of the Japanese force. A secondary force of 2 squadrons and 4 guns was also tasked with trying to drive the Japanese back over the Hun River.

On the 1st of March the fighting in the east and center was a static stalemate. Over in the west, Oku’s 2nd IJA were slowly advancing and Nogi’s 3rd IJA had just reached Hsinmintun. Kuroki’s 1st IJA found themselves in a dilemma. Nogi had taken his force in a dangerous and exposed circuitous path, Kuroki did not have reserves to respond effectively to match Nogi’s movement. All Kurkoki could muster was to detach a brigade to act in a counter penetration role. The Japanese staff had believed the Russians would hold one of their flanks and attack on the other. It was now clear the Russians intentions were to defend both however. This was an enormous tactical advantage for the Japanese, one who was on the offensive could ask for no better situation. Upon realizing the situation Baron Kodama would say ‘It also made the result of the battle far greater than had been anticipated. It was never thought possible by us that we could surround the Russians and bring about a second Sedan.”

The next day saw the battle gradually transition into a new phase that would last until the night of March 7th. In the east the Japanese continued to whittle away at the Russians as their commanders watched for signs of Kuropatkin responding to Nogi’s threat. They were hoping to see a sign he would thin out or withdraw some troops into the mountains. On March 7th, the anticipated signs began to appear. Kuroki received a report that the Russian trenches to his front had just been hastily evacuated. Kuroki seized the moment and ordered the men to pursue the enemy. Word was sent over to Nozu on his left flank, asking if he saw the trench lines thin out in front of him. Nozu sent scouts forward and they came back stating the Russian were abandoning many positions. Nozu joined in the chase. The Russians were thrown into a fit of chaos. Forces in the rear areas began to riot in crazy drunkenness and looted where it could be done. Kaulbar’s 2nd Army, who had been poised to be the hammer to hit the Japanese were now dispersing across the battlefield and could no longer operate in effective formation.

Kaulbar grabbed command of the residue of forces, trying to form a counter attack aimed at Oku and Nogi’s armies who were now advancing upon Likwanpau. The counter attack was no better coordinated than the rest. Kuropatkin looked on at his hopelessly disorganized force who were no intermingling in penny packets. The Times correspondent wrote this of the scene “There were no less than sixteen detachments fighting isolated actions in this part of the field, many of them having received special instructions direct from army headquarters. Several army corps commanders found themselves without troops and unable to exercise any control upon the course of the battle. This situation had been caused by the precipitate manner in which attempts had been made to stem an attack against which no antecedent precautions had been taken”

Nogi’s encircling maneuver was progressing at a slow pace, making Oyama quite anxious. Kuropatkin decided to personally lead a counter-stroke against Nogi, lest his 3rd IJA cut off the Russian line of communications. To do this Kuropatkin had to repeat the same tactic used during the battle of Liaoyang, to withdraw forces and create a reserve to use for the counter stroke. Kuropatkin sent orders to Bildering and Linivich to withdraw during the night of March 7th to the shock of both commanders. Neither commander was aware of Nogi’s movement. Both men were aware for the past 10 days of the appalling conditions they faced fighting both the Japanese and winter itself. Many of their men in trenches were literally freezing to death, hunkering down under artillery fire. Once Bildering and Linivich began their withdrawal, as I said earlier the Japanese began pouncing upon them. Oyama saw the enormous opportunity laid bare and would write in his general orders ‘I intend to pursue in earnest and to turn the enemy’s retreat into a rout.’ Guarding the left flank in front of the Hun River was Major General Mikhail Alexeiev who tried to put up a resistance to give the men more time, but his force was completely overwhelmed. The Russians initially tossed as much artillery as they could at the charging Japanese and indeed it caused tremendous casualties, but the Japanese simply did not stop. The Russian defense cover the riverbank completely collapsed seeing all of them flee.

Now back at the battle of Liaoyang, the Russians withdrew over the Taitzu, an unfordable river, but here the Hun river was frozen and quite fordable. The dice of fate also played a roll, for right as the Japanese crossed the Hun river, the ice began to break. Some Japanese would have to use bridging pontoons for their heavy guns, but it was a lot easier than fording a raging river. So Bildering and Linivich’s men were running for their lives, but had zero respite as the Japanese were right on their heels. You can imagine trying to reorganize units while this was going on was very chaotic. Meanwhile back over in the west, Oku’s 2nd IJA and Nozu 4th IJA overwhelmed the Russian defenses and breached a gap. And further north, Nogi’s 3rd IJA managed to wreck a large portion of the railway tracks above Mukden while also establishing a large blocking line to cut off Kuropatkin’s retreat. All of this made Kuropatkins efforts to create a counter-stroke completely useless, it was the same type of catastrophe that had occurred at Liaoyang, just on a larger scale.

On March 9th a violent blizzard occurred that blew right into the face of the defenders as they fled. At the very least it also hindered the Japanese ability to chase after them and this storm would rage on until the next day. Regardless the Japanese kept closing up their ring as the blizzard, a smoke of burning supplies filled the air. At the Mukden station, the Russians were hastily evacuating their sick and wounded, even the personal trains of commanding generals were used. With the increasing noise of battle drawing closer and closer to the city, Kuropatkin knew they had lost the battle. At 6:45pm on March 9th he gave the full retreat orders. His plan of retreat had the 2nd Manchurian army acting as a rearguard while the 1st and 3rd armies would withdraw to Tiehling. Nozu’s 4th IJA breakthrough over the Hun river, however, forced the fleeing Russians into a sort of funnel. The 2nd and 3rd Manchurian armies had been assigned an axis of retreat along the line of communication, while the 1st Manchurian army kept trying to flee east avoiding the entire debacle unfolding.

The Russian withdrawal northward along the line of communication was at first conducted in good order. The Japanese were pursuing them on a parallel course, but enjoyed superior artillery and rifle fire positions as they held the railway embankment. The Times correspondent with the 2nd Manchurian army had this to write “All tactical control had been lost before the retreat began and the army followed the stream of fugitives in mobs and groups as best it might. The Russian Armies were scattered in the hills as sheep having no shepherd. Companies, battalions, regiments and even brigades disappeared from the ken of their commanders and from each other”.

Kaulber was exhausted and completely demoralized, he also was wounded having fallen from his horse at one point and now his shoulder was in a sling. He was pausing for a rest when he overheard a liaison officer asking about the location of the 7th regiment. Kaulbar could not help himself but scream out “‘The Seventh Regiment? I do not know what has become of my whole army and he asks me where my Seventh Regiment is!” Some of the generals managed to form a proper rearguard when the Japanese suddenly came upon them. Seeing the Japanese reinvigorated the panic and soon the Russians began to rout. The wounded and war materials were all abandoned as men fled for their lives. The terror fueled their retreat so intensely, many Russians ran wildly up any nearby mountains they could see.

At 10am Oyama sent a message back to Tokyo “Today, at 10 a.m., we occupied Mukden. Our enveloping movement, which has been proceeding since several days, has completely attained its object.” However, yet again Oyama failed to capture or annihilate the bulk of the Russian army. It seemed Oyama was fated to win battles but not a war. The battle of Mukden saw a quarter of the Japanese involved become casualties, 15,892 officers and 59,612 men. For the Russians, when Kuropatkin reached Tiehling over a third of his force did not report for duty. 20,000 were killed or missing, another 20,000 were captured by the Japanese in the grand enveloping maneuver and 49,000 were wounded. Kuropatkins war supplies had been effectively lost, wagons and horses were hard to find. Fearing the Japanese would simply storm Tiehling, the city was quickly put to the torch and the Russians continued marching for 10 days northward to a new line of defense at Hispingkai, modern day Siping in Jiling province. There General Mikhail Batyanov relieved General Bildering of his command over the 3rd Manchurian army. He organized a new line of defense against the Japanese who were expected to continue their march north. However the expectations would come to naught, as Kuropatkin quickly organized a complete withdrawal of Russian forces from the region. There would not be any more significant fighting within Manchuria.

The Russians had been driven out of southern Manchuria, but luckily for them Oyama had stretched his logistical capabilities when he attacked Mukden. You have to imagine such a vast amount of men requires so much provisions, and getting said provisions further inland was a colossal task. Despite being defeated yet again, even more demoralized and losing vast quantities of war supplies, the Russian army was still intact. The Japanese had seized a vast amount of the trans siberian railway and delivered a crippling blow, but not a fatal one to the Russian land forces.

The victory at Mukden shocked the great world powers, they simply could not believe a non white army had so thoroughly defeated an empire like Russia on the field of battle. All the great powers knew Russia held the advantage in numbers of men and materials, but the Japanese simply outperformed them it was astonishing. The battle of Mukden also showcased, the Imperial Japanese Army was now officially the 6th largest army in the world. For Tsar Nicholas II the news was incredibly shocking. A nation with just 2% the landmass of his empire had so brutally defeated his army. The Russian commanders were lambasted for incompetency and they in turn would turn upon another. General Samsonov and Rennekampf began to hate another and publicly attacked another. All of the shame and guilt that was delivered upon such men would have a long lasting effect when world war one broke out. You would think such commanders who benefited from commanding in what has colloquially been called world war zero would take lesson learned and apply them against the Germans and Austro-Hungarians…but instead they would be completely annihilated.

It was to be Kuropatkin’s last battle as a commander, Tsar Nicholas II ordered him to be relieved by Linivich and to return to Irkutsk. Kuropatkins pleaded with the Tsar to allow him to retain his command, and the Tsar agreed to exchange back the commands between the two men. Many would write about how the battle for Mukden was lost. Cassels history of the Russo-Japanese War states “Yet by the employment of artifice, coupled by the most perfect co-ordination of his various armies, he [Oyama] was able, if not to envelop completely a force not appreciably smaller than his own [sic] , at any rate to squeeze it out of a strong position and to damage it very seriously in the process. Without artifice, deceit, delusion, dust-throwing, or some such dissimulatory methods, the result of the Battle of Mukden might have been altogether different.” The Times correspondent attached to the 2nd Manchurian army had this to write “The crowning victory of Mukden was won, first and foremost because the statesmen of Japan had the spirit and the backbone to declare war at their own hour; it was won because Japan was united in the attainment of national aims and shrank from no sacrifice to secure it; because the moral forces within the nation doubled and trebled material strength; because all was prepared, weighed, studied, known; because the shortcomings of the enemy, which were many, were recognised and profited by; because a general staff, framed on the best existing model, was able to direct all forces to a common end; because each soldier and seaman knew and understood the part he had to play, and played it wholeheartedly for his country regardless of his own unimportant fate; and last, but not least, because the offensive in naval war was the beginning and middle and end of national strategy.” Tsar Nicholas II had this to write in his diary after hearing the news of the loss at Mukden . ‘It is painful and distressing,’ However, the Tsar could not possibly know, the embarrassment faced upon the war over the land was about to become twofold upon the sea.

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Kuropatkin and the Russian land forces had been served defeat after defeat after defeat, here at Mukden would be their last. Though they were defeated, their army remained intact and there lingered still hope for Russia to come out on top, as their Baltic fleet approached the Pacific hoping to win a decisive battle.

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