How Exactly Does Common Ownership Harm Competition? A Conversation with Florian Ederer, Jerry S. Cohen Award Winner for Antitrust Scholarship
Aug 14, 2024
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In this conversation, Florian Ederer, an award-winning professor at Boston University, shares his groundbreaking insights on common ownership's impact on competition. He discusses how common ownership can weaken managerial incentives and lead to less competitive behavior in industries like airlines. The episode delves into the correlations between CEO compensation and ownership levels, revealing surprising findings about passive investors' influence on market dynamics. Ederer also addresses implications for antitrust policy, emphasizing the need for fresh approaches in this evolving landscape.
Common ownership can significantly diminish competition by allowing firms to coordinate indirectly, resulting in higher prices for consumers.
The incentive structures influenced by common ownership lead to less efficient management behavior, reducing the profitability motivation for CEOs.
Deep dives
The Impact of Common Ownership on Competition
Common ownership refers to the phenomenon where large investors own shares in competing firms, potentially leading to reduced incentives for those firms to compete vigorously against each other. The podcast highlights research that demonstrates how common ownership can soften competition by enabling firms to coordinate indirectly through their structures rather than explicit collusion. This idea, which dates back several decades, has gained renewed attention as empirical evidence has emerged, linking common ownership to anticompetitive effects across various industries. Notably, a study indicated that higher levels of common ownership in the airline industry resulted in higher ticket prices due to diminished competitive pressure among airlines sharing the same investors.
Mechanisms Linking Ownership to Management Behavior
The research presented explores how common ownership influences management behavior through incentive structures rather than direct management control. Specifically, it posits that reduced performance-sensitive incentives for CEOs lead to less efficient firm operations, as they are less motivated to maximize profitability. This results in regional managers who set prices higher, benefiting the industry's overall profit margins while the individual firms may suffer lower profitability. The mechanism suggests that passive ownership may create an environment where top managers opt for a 'quiet life,' compromising competition without any direct intervention by the owners.
Implications for Antitrust Policy and Further Research
The podcast emphasizes the need for ongoing research and potential policy adjustments to address the anti-competitive effects of common ownership. It discusses current regulatory discussions regarding the limits on common ownership, particularly in concentrated industries, as indicated by new merger guidelines from the DOJ and FTC. These guidelines bring attention to the interplay between ownership structures and competitive dynamics, positioning common ownership as a critical factor in antitrust considerations. Researchers and policymakers are urged to further investigate the nuanced effects of common ownership beyond pricing impacts, including potential influences on innovation and labor markets.
Professor Ederer is the Allen and Kelli Questrom Professor in Markets, Public Policy & Law at Boston University’s Questrom School of Business. His article, co-authored with Professors Miguel Antón and Mireia Giné of the IESE Business School and Martin Schmalz of the University of Oxford Saïd Business School, won the 22nd Annual Jerry S. Cohen Memorial Fund Writing Award, presented on May 22 at AAI’s 2024 Annual Policy Conference, New Thinking on the Antitrust Treatment of Collective Action: Organized Labor, Countervailing Power, and Algorithmic Price Setting. The article helps explain the existing empirical evidence on the anticompetitive effects of common ownership and meaningfully advances our understanding of the underlying theory behind the effects.
Among other things, Professor Marx and Professor Ederer discuss the theoretical and empirical background behind the theory of anticompetitive effects from common ownership (5:06), the mechanism by which common ownership actually leads to anticompetitive effects, notwithstanding that top managers and their delegees (rather than investors) control firms (12:13), and the implications of these findings for enforcers, policymakers, and future research (26:09).
Antitrust scholarship that is considered and selected for the Jerry S. Cohen Award reflects a concern for principles of economic justice, the dispersal of economic power, the maintenance of effective limitations upon economic power or the federal statutes designed to protect society from various forms of anticompetitive activity. Scholarship reflects an awareness of the human and social impacts of economic institutions upon individuals, small businesses and other institutions necessary to the maintenance of a just and humane society–values and concerns Jerry S. Cohen dedicated his life and work to fostering.
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