Dive into Max Scheler's intriguing exploration of sympathy and fellow feeling, unraveling their ethical implications. The discussion sets apart genuine sympathy from mere identification, emphasizing the necessity for individuality in ethical understanding. From critiquing emotional engagement to examining the pitfalls of total unity, the speakers navigate the intricate relationships between empathy and personal identity. They also tackle the biological roots of moral emotions, challenging us to rethink our connections while honoring our distinct selves.
Sympathy, as defined by Scheler, emphasizes that it involves understanding others' emotions without losing one's individuality and identity.
Scheler critiques ethical theories that equate human connection with shared experiences, advocating for recognition of individuals as distinct beings in moral discourse.
Deep dives
Understanding Sympathy and Fellow Feeling
Sympathy and fellow feeling are explored as intentional acts, where one takes another's emotional state as an object rather than experiencing it as their own. This distinction is crucial because it clarifies that empathizing does not require replicating another's pain internally; instead, it involves acknowledging and understanding it from an external perspective. Schaler argues that founding ethics solely on the basis of sympathy proves inadequate, especially when considering situations where one might sympathize with wrongdoing. Instead, he presents an exploration of how people connect on different psychological levels, emphasizing the importance of genuinely understanding others while maintaining individuality.
The Nature of Fellow Feeling
Fellow feeling can be classified into types, including commiseration and shared joy, with Schaler emphasizing that these interactions mark a reactive rather than an active connection to others. Feeling sympathy does not imply an action-driven response; it is a natural human reaction to the emotional states of others. He differentiates between simplified emotional contagions and true emotional identification, suggesting that authentic fellow feeling goes beyond merely reacting to others' emotions. This understanding underscores the need for a deeper appreciation of interpersonal connections in ethical discourse, rather than treating them as mere interactions.
Ethics and Individuality
Schaler critiques various ethical theories that reduce human connection to monistic concepts of unity, claiming that genuine ethical engagement requires recognizing individuals as fundamentally distinct beings. He asserts that if sympathy were based solely on shared experience, it would ultimately lead to egoism, negating true altruistic sentiment. Instead, he argues for the necessity of differentiating ourselves as individuals capable of understanding moral equality among others, independent of shared experiences or backgrounds. This approach enforces that ethics must stem from appreciating others as unique entities, strengthening the foundational premise of human connectivity.
The Role of Capacity in Empathy
The podcast emphasizes the innate capacity of individuals to understand and empathize with the emotions of others, suggesting that this ability is part of our biological inheritance. Contrary to theories that require shared experiences for empathy, Schaler argues that we can connect with others emotionally through an inherent understanding of suffering, even without direct experience. This notion supports the idea that one can empathize across cultural and experiential divides, evidencing a profound underlying capacity to relate to the emotional lives of others. This capacity does not eliminate ethical responsibility but rather amplifies it, fundamentally shaping our interactions and sense of morality.
On The Nature of Sympathy (1913, expanded 1922), Part I: "Fellow Feeling," Ch. 1-4.
What is it to feel sympathy (aka "fellow feeling") for another person? It is NOT to "identify" with that person; ethics requires that the person be irreducibly Other, not part of my (extended) ego.