Gaza Peace Deal

This week we talk about October 7, the Gaza ceasefire plan, and Netanyahu.

We also discuss Hamas, Qatar, and the new US administration.

Recommended Book: Witch King by Martha Wells

Transcript

On October 7, 2023, the militant group Hamas launched a sneak attack from the Israeli occupied Gaza Strip against Israel itself, killing about 1,200 people and taking just over 250 hostages.

Israeli forces were caught stunningly unaware by this, but shortly thereafter, Israel launched a counterattack into Gaza, sweeping through the Strip, with both on the ground incursions of tanks and troops, and with seemingly endless air raids and missile strikes, ostensibly to clear out Hamas fighters and find their leadership, but the net impact of this, on top of Hamas’ organization being substantially degraded, was the reductiond entire cities to rubble and the displacement almost the entirety of the Gazan population—something like 2.3 million people, most of whom have been living on the streets or in ramshackle encampments, without reliable sources of food, water, or shelter, as aid shipments from elsewhere have been held back by Israeli forces, for more than a year.

Gaza’s Health Ministry estimates that more than 46,000 Palestinians and other Gazan residents have been killed as a result of the fighting over the past 15 months, with more than double that, nearly 110,000 wounded. The Israeli military says they’ve killed more than 17,000 militants over the course of their invasion, though both sources are biased and are operating from incomplete numbers, so these figures are all considered to be suspect at this point, if probably in the right general ballpark, in terms of orders of magnitude.

The hostages taken by Hamas during that initial attack into Israel have remained a tricky issue throughout this conflict, as Hamas leaders have continuously used them as bargaining chips and at times, human shields, and the Israeli government has regularly reassured the hostages’ families that they’re focused on returning those captives home safely—but they’ve done this while also, in many cases, seemingly doing the opposite; focusing on taking out Hamas and its leadership, first and foremost, to the point that Israeli forces have seemingly killed many of the hostages they’re attempting to rescue, because they went in after a Hamas leader or bombed a neighborhood into oblivion without first checking to see who was in that neighborhood.

This stance has in some cases been incredibly inconvenient for the Israeli government, as the families of the hostages have in some cases been at the center of, or even sparked, some of the large protests against the Israeli government and its actions that have become a fixture of Israeli life since this war started.

Prime Minister Netanyahu and his military leaders have been a particular focus of this internal ire, but the Israeli government in general has been targeted by seemingly endless public acts, meant to show civilian discontent with how they’re doing things.

Since that day when Hamas attacked Israel in October of 2023, this war has expanded to encompass not just Israel and Hamas, but also other militant groups, like the Houthis operating out of Yemen, and Hezbollah, operating out of Southern Lebanon, just on the other side of Israel’s northern border.

All three groups are supported, in terms of training, weapons, and money, by Iran’s government, and they’ve helped Iran sustain a collection of proxy conflicts throughout the region for years, without Iran ever having to get directly involved.

These relationships and that sponsoring of these groups has allowed Iran to exert its influence throughout the Middle East and beyond, including into the Red Sea, which typically serves as a vital international shipping channel, but because of regular attacks against shipping vessels by the Houthis from Yemen, the whole of the global supply chain has been disrupted, all sorts of things becoming more expensive and goosing already high inflation levels, because of the longer routes and thus, more expensive shipping costs that have become necessary in an era in which this channel is dangerous to traverse.

This dynamic, of Iran playing puppetmaster with its proxies throughout the Middle East, has shifted a fair bit over the course of this war, as these attacks, on Israel and other entities in the region, have attracted counterattacks by Israel and their allies, including the US, and that in turn has left Hezbollah all but destroyed—a series of brazen decapitation attacks by Israeli forces basically wiping out the whole of the group’s upper ranks and resource stockpiles within a matter of days. They’ve also destroyed much of Hamas’ local infrastructure and leadership, and the Houthis, while attracting a lot more attention and prestige for their efforts in the Red Sea, have also seen their capacity to operating more broadly degraded by the presence of a swelling, and increasingly aggressive, anti-Houthi fleet.

All of which has significantly diminished Iran’s reach, and its capacity to move pieces on the board. Attacks directly against Iran by Israel, too—which were met with remarkably ineffective counterattacks—have likewise destroyed infrastructure, but perhaps more importantly substantially reduced Iran’s credibility as a true force in the region; they’re still a huge military power, in other words, but unless something changes, like their military managing to develop a nuclear weapon, they’re no longer considered force they were at the beginning of all this; their weakness at range, in particular, makes them look downright ineffectual compared to pretty much all the other military powers in the region, right now.

This has also, arguably, made them a less appealing ally for Russia. And though the two nations recently announced a new defense pact, this pact was seemingly signed because both nations recently lost a valuable supplicant state in Syria, which saw its Assad government toppled not long ago—the new government not clearly aligned with either of them, and perhaps even oppositional to them.

This pact was made from a place of relative weakness, then, not strength, and its dictates are pretty limited: no mutual defense clause, no formal alliance. It’s basically meant to indicate that the two nations won’t actively help anyone else attack the other from their territory, which is about as noncommittal as these sorts of agreements get.

To Russia, still, then, Iran is more or less a provider of drones and rockets, not a peer or even true regional power. And that’s partly the result of the weakness Iran has shown in the face of repeated Israeli aggression toward them, during this conflict.

This conflict has also shaped global politics, as people on the political left, in particular, have tended to rally for innocent Gazan civilians, while those on the right have tended to support Israel’s (also conservative) government, and it’s decision to conduct the war as it has.

This may have nudged the recent US presidential election in Trump’s favor, and other campaigns have likewise been at least minutely affected by this issue, and its polarizing, at times fracturing impact on left-leaning parties in particular.

What I’d like to talk about today, though, is what looks to be the beginning of the end of this conflict, and what a newly negotiated ceasefire between the involved parties entails.

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The events I breezed through in the intro paint a far from complete picture of what’s happened during this war; it’s been big, expansive, expensive, and brutal, and has fundamentally changed the geopolitical setup of the region, and in some ways the world, as well.

Just as potentially wide-reaching is the ceasefire that’s been negotiated and, as of the day I’m recording this at least, one day after it officially came into effect, is so far still active, and which seems primed to nudge things away from active conflict and toward some new state of affairs in the region.

So let’s jump in and talk about the details of this ceasefire.

Governments have been shipping diplomats to the region since this thing broke out, all wanting to polish their reputation as peacemakers and reliable intermediaries, and all trying to formalize something like this, some kind of lasting peace, pretty much from the day Hamas launched that sneak attack, but even more so after Israel began pummeling Gaza to dust.

And Qatar has been a focal point for these peace efforts from the get-go, enjoyinf some initial success in helping the two groups establish a four-day ceasefire in late-November 2023, that period later extended by several days, so that in total 100 Israeli hostages were freed in exchange for the freedom of 240 Palestinian women and children who were being held in Israeli jails.

Qatar has been building its reputation for these sorts of negotiations, and Egypt joined in, partly for the same reputational reasons, but also because Israel’s invasion has come dangerously close to their shared border, and there have been concerns that displaced Palestinians might be forced across that border by Israel’s attack, creating a humanitarian crisis within Egypt that would have been expensive and disruptive in many ways.

The worst case version of that concern didn’t materialize, but Egypt maintained its involvement in the peacemaking process, working with representatives from the US and Qatar, the former a staunch ally of Israel, the latter on good terms with Hamas, even housing some of their leaders, to keep negotiators from Hamas and Israel talking.

Throughout the war, these and other involved parties have generally supported a three-phase ceasefire proposal, which would begin with a ceasing of hostilities, followed by the release of all Israeli hostages being held in Gaza and a bunch of Palestinians being held in Israeli prison, and following that, if everything goes according to plan, the establishment of a permanent ceasefire, which would see Israel pulling its forces from Gaza and the beginning of a reconstruction process in the Strip—which again, has had many of its most populous cities leveled, completely unlivable, at this point, while almost all of its population has been living on the streets and in camps, without things like power, water, or electricity.

This plan sounds pretty straightforward, on its face, but the specifics are fuzzy, and the negotiation has thus been fraught, and any implementation is inherently riddled with diplomatic landmines and other perils. And this is part of why previous versions of this ceasefire agreement have been hamstrung. Back in mid-2024, Netanyahu halted progress on what seemed to be an acceptable to everyone version of the plan, saying he wouldn’t support any resolution that ended the war, only one that implemented a partial ceasefire, and that seemed to be a political move on his part. But throughout the negotiation process, there have been a lot of good faith concerns and disagreements, as well, so this has been a slow, frustrating grind for those involved.

Pressure from those aforementioned involved parties, though, and almost certainly Israel’s successes on the ground against all those Iranian proxies, and Iran, itself, seems to have led to the right combination of circumstances that even Netanyahu has indicated it’s probably a good time for a ceasefire.

There have been murmurs, unconfirmed at this point, that freshly reelected US President Trump pressured Netanyahu to move in this direction, and that this new pressure from the incoming administration, which has long been on friendly terms with Netanyahu’s people, combined with those other, existing pressures, might have been what sealed the deal; and is probably why all this has coincided with Trump’s recent inauguration.

Whatever the specifics of the genesis of this agreement, though, there was finally enough appetite for a three-stage ceasefire to come together, and the resulting plan was approved by Israel’s security cabinet, and then the government’s full cabinet, on January 17, 2025. The other parties were already on board, so this was enough to move the thing forward.

This plan, which was officially implemented a few days before this episode goes live, on January 19, 2025, will start with a 42-day pause in fighting that will see Israeli forces leave Gaza, pulling back to a buffer zone along the periphery of the Strip. This will allow civilians to return to what’s left of their homes, while also enabling the import and distribution of a whole lot more aid deliveries, which have been hampered by those Israeli forces up till this point.

There will be a complete ceasefire from this point forward, if everything goes according to plan, and a bunch of hostages will be released—33 Israeli civilians and female soldiers freed by Hamas, and some larger number of Palestinian prisoners held by Israel released, in exchange, a portion of that total number released each week at regular intervals.

Shortly after the first stage’s implementation, the Rafah crossing that divides Gaza and Egypt will also be reopened to allow sick and wounded people to leave the Strip, though it’s not clear at the moment if control of that crossing, which is currently held by Israeli forces, will be returned to the Palestinians soon, at a later stage, or at all.

After that six week period, the second stage will focus on the exchange of the remaining Israeli hostages, alive and dead, and the release of a proportionate number of Palestinians prisoners; though prisoners who have been convicted of murder will be released to prisoners in other countries, rather than back into Gaza or the West Bank.

Israel would also completely withdraw from Gaza, at this point, though Israel’s cabinet hasn’t yet voted on this specific condition, and far-right members of that cabinet have said they’re not in favor of this, so it could end up being a sticking point.

This second stage currently has an unknown duration, which is another complexity that could ultimately trip things up, as an inability to agree upon the end of a stage could keep the next one from ever happening, without technically derailing the agreement as a whole.

The third stage, if and when we get there, could last a long time, even years, and it would include an exchange of the dead bodies of hostages and Hamas members that haven’t yet been returned, while also kicking off a three- to five-year reconstruction period that would see the Strip being rebuilt under international supervision.

This is also when some kind of Palestinian governance will need to be reestablished in the Strip. Though while many international players want the Palestinian Authority, which governs the Israeli-occupied West Bank, to retake control of Gaza—they governed the area previously, but were booted by Hamas back in 2007—Israel isn’t in favor of PA leadership being reintroduced to the region, so that’s another point of contention that could derail things before the whole of the peace process can play out.

The thing to watch, right now, is whether these first six weeks go as planned, with the first several dozen hostages successfully returned to their families by Hamas, and a far larger number of Palestinian prisoners released by Israel, in exchange.

There should be a full-on ceasefire for the duration of this process, and that ceasefire should become permanent along the way, with Gazan civilians able to move freely and return to their homes, throughout. About 600 truckloads of aid scheduled is to arrive each day, too, which is up from around 18 truckloads, pre-agreement. That should help stabilize the humanitarian catastrophe that’s been simmering on the ground for more than a year—though to be clear, this is a stabilization to still dire circumstances, not a return to anything close to normal for those afflicted.

From there, it’s a question as to whether Israel sticks to its agreement to limit its forces to the buffer zone, and whether the specifics of that pull-back, the negotiations for which have been scheduled for February 4, end up working for everyone, including those aforementioned hawks in Netanyahu’s cabinet.

We may also see Hamas unable to provide as many living hostages as claimed, which already happened once during that previous exchange back in November of 2023, which could disrupt this new exchange process, and possibly serve as justification for one side or the other to backtrack on promises made and conditions to which they’ve committed.

So it’s possible that things will go smoothly, that no one will be perfectly happy, but everyone will be generally satisfied—which is what tends to happen with a well negotiated ceasefire of this kind.

Israel seems to be in a good spot to lock in their winnings, basically, having hobbled their primary enemies in the region and apparently gotten away with committing some seemingly serious atrocities that have been condemned by all sorts of international bodies—those atrocities maybe swept under the rug as one more incentive to basically get them to stop, which is a benefit other victors in similar conflicts have historically enjoyed.

Hamas also seems to still exist, if in a far diminished form, and as soon as the ceasefire was implemented, they started fanning their people across Gaza, establishing a sort of police force—the message apparently being “we’re still here and in charge,” and they might be hoping this de facto governance will sway things in their favor, put control and the ability to strike Israel in the future back in their hands, no matter who the international community eventually decides should take official control of the region.

At the same time, it’s also possible that one side or the other might use this ceasefire as cover, doing what they need to do to keep it afloat and technically still in motion, while basically preparing for their next antagonistic effort against their enemies.

Other facets of this process, like what’s happening in the north, where the Lebanese government has insisted Israeli forces leave the southern portion of their country by January 26, could complicate things; Hezbollah has agreed, as part of this ceasefire plan, to pull its forces back to a point about 20 miles from the country’s border with Israel, but there are still weapons caches belonging to either Hezbollah or some other militant organization in that part of Lebanon, according to UN peacekeepers.

It’s possible that some small violation on some component of this larger plan, purposeful or not, could give one of the involved justification for perpetuating some aspect of this conflict; and that’s true now, at the very beginning, but it’s also true later on, even after a permanent ceasefire has technically been signed, and full-on war has officially stopped.

Show Notes

https://www.timesofisrael.com/these-are-the-33-hostages-set-to-be-returned-in-phase-one-of-the-gaza-ceasefire/

https://apnews.com/article/gaza-ceasefire-negotiations-mediators-3a646fe5606d87db767e8a434f7a5f74

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/16/world/middleeast/israel-gaza-strikes-ceasefire.html

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/15/what-do-we-know-about-the-israel-gaza-ceasefire-deal

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jan/19/how-will-the-gaza-ceasefire-and-hostage-deal-work

https://responsiblestatecraft.org/gaza-ceasefire-2670859688/

https://www.propublica.org/article/biden-blinken-state-department-israel-gaza-human-rights-horrors

https://jacobin.com/2025/01/ceasefire-deal-gaza-israel-hamas/

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/18/world/middleeast/israel-gaza-ceasefire.html

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/shattered-homes-uncertain-fates-israels-hostage-families-anxiously-await-reunion-865cc923

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/17/world/middleeast/gaza-returning-home-after-war.html

https://www.nytimes.com/live/2025/01/19/world/israel-hamas-gaza-ceasefire#heres-what-to-know-about-the-cease-fire

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/18/israel-must-withdraw-from-lebanon-by-january-26-deadline-president-aoun?traffic_source=rss

https://apnews.com/article/israel-cia-fbi-telegram-eb0215277fc5f521f9ee2efa4da70adc

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cy5klgv5zv0o

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israel%E2%80%93Hamas_war

https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-hamas-war-news-01-09-2025-ffae654d619e8e848e2ceda8576e8fe5

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/18/iran-russia-analysis-syria-setback