The Nonlinear Library EA - The US-China Relationship and Catastrophic Risk (EAG Boston transcript) by EA Global
Jul 12, 2024
31:08
Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: The US-China Relationship and Catastrophic Risk (EAG Boston transcript), published by EA Global on July 12, 2024 on The Effective Altruism Forum.
Introduction
This post is a write-up of a panel discussion held at EA Global: Boston 2023 (27-29 October). The panel was moderated by Matthew Gentzel. Matthew currently co-leads
Longview Philanthropy's program on nuclear weapons policy and co-manages the organization's Nuclear Weapons Policy Fund.
He was joined by two other experts on US-China relations and related catastrophic risks:
Tong Zhao, Senior Fellow for the
Nuclear Policy Program and
Carnegie China,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Bill Drexel, Fellow for the Technology and National Security Program,
Center for a New American Security
Below is a transcript of the discussion, which we've lightly edited for clarity. The panelists covered the following main topics:
Opening remarks summarizing the panelists' general views on the US-China relationship and related risks, with an initial focus on nuclear security before exploring other risks and dangerous technologies
How to address different norms around sharing information
Problems resulting from risk compensation
Quick takes on which risks are overhyped and which are underhyped
AI governance structures, the Chinese defense minister's dismissal, and the US's semiconductor export policies
Ideas for calibrating how the US cooperates and/or competes with China
Opening remarks
Matthew: We'll start with opening remarks, then get into questions.
Tong: Thank you so much. I think the catastrophic risk between the US and China is increasing, not least because the chance of serious military conflict between the two sides - most likely arising from a Taiwan Strait scenario - is growing. And in a major military conflict, the risk of nuclear escalation is certainly there. In a mostly strained scenario, this could lead to a nuclear winter if there's a massive nuclear exchange.
Even a limited nuclear exchange or very serious conventional conflict between the two powers could destabilize the international geopolitical landscape and very negatively affect the normal development and progression of humanity.
In the long run, I worry that both sides are preparing for a worst-case scenario of major conflict with each other, leading to de facto war mobilization efforts. In the case of China, strategists in Beijing are still worried that there is going to be an eventual showdown between the two sides. And therefore, China is working on developing the necessary military capabilities for that eventuality.
It is developing its economic capacity to withstand international economic sanctions and its capability to influence the international narrative to avoid political isolation in a major crisis. And those efforts are leading to incremental decoupling in the economic and technological domains, as well as to general decoupling of policy expert communities on the two sides.
As a result of this long-term competition and rivalry, I think long-term risks to humanity are generally downplayed. Part of China's recent policy change is a very rapid increase of its nuclear weapons capability. This does not necessarily mean that China aims to use nuclear weapons first in a future conflict. However, as China focuses on enhancing its nuclear and strategic military capabilities, it is paying less attention to the risks associated with such development.
One example is China's increasing interest in having launch-under-attack or launch-on-warning nuclear capability. That means China will depart from its decades-long practice of maintaining a low-level status for its nuclear forces and shift towards a rapid-response posture, in which China's early warning system will provide Chinese leadership with a warning of any incoming missile attack.
Before the in...
Introduction
This post is a write-up of a panel discussion held at EA Global: Boston 2023 (27-29 October). The panel was moderated by Matthew Gentzel. Matthew currently co-leads
Longview Philanthropy's program on nuclear weapons policy and co-manages the organization's Nuclear Weapons Policy Fund.
He was joined by two other experts on US-China relations and related catastrophic risks:
Tong Zhao, Senior Fellow for the
Nuclear Policy Program and
Carnegie China,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Bill Drexel, Fellow for the Technology and National Security Program,
Center for a New American Security
Below is a transcript of the discussion, which we've lightly edited for clarity. The panelists covered the following main topics:
Opening remarks summarizing the panelists' general views on the US-China relationship and related risks, with an initial focus on nuclear security before exploring other risks and dangerous technologies
How to address different norms around sharing information
Problems resulting from risk compensation
Quick takes on which risks are overhyped and which are underhyped
AI governance structures, the Chinese defense minister's dismissal, and the US's semiconductor export policies
Ideas for calibrating how the US cooperates and/or competes with China
Opening remarks
Matthew: We'll start with opening remarks, then get into questions.
Tong: Thank you so much. I think the catastrophic risk between the US and China is increasing, not least because the chance of serious military conflict between the two sides - most likely arising from a Taiwan Strait scenario - is growing. And in a major military conflict, the risk of nuclear escalation is certainly there. In a mostly strained scenario, this could lead to a nuclear winter if there's a massive nuclear exchange.
Even a limited nuclear exchange or very serious conventional conflict between the two powers could destabilize the international geopolitical landscape and very negatively affect the normal development and progression of humanity.
In the long run, I worry that both sides are preparing for a worst-case scenario of major conflict with each other, leading to de facto war mobilization efforts. In the case of China, strategists in Beijing are still worried that there is going to be an eventual showdown between the two sides. And therefore, China is working on developing the necessary military capabilities for that eventuality.
It is developing its economic capacity to withstand international economic sanctions and its capability to influence the international narrative to avoid political isolation in a major crisis. And those efforts are leading to incremental decoupling in the economic and technological domains, as well as to general decoupling of policy expert communities on the two sides.
As a result of this long-term competition and rivalry, I think long-term risks to humanity are generally downplayed. Part of China's recent policy change is a very rapid increase of its nuclear weapons capability. This does not necessarily mean that China aims to use nuclear weapons first in a future conflict. However, as China focuses on enhancing its nuclear and strategic military capabilities, it is paying less attention to the risks associated with such development.
One example is China's increasing interest in having launch-under-attack or launch-on-warning nuclear capability. That means China will depart from its decades-long practice of maintaining a low-level status for its nuclear forces and shift towards a rapid-response posture, in which China's early warning system will provide Chinese leadership with a warning of any incoming missile attack.
Before the in...