In 'Anarchy, State, and Utopia', Robert Nozick presents a rigorous argument in favor of a minimal state, limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, theft, fraud, and the enforcement of contracts. He critiques more extensive state activities as violations of individual rights and argues against more extreme views such as anarcho-capitalism. Nozick's work is influenced by John Locke, Immanuel Kant, and Friedrich Hayek, and it includes a theory of rights, a critique of John Rawls' 'A Theory of Justice', and a model of utopia. The book is a foundational text of libertarian thought and has been widely acclaimed for its philosophical richness and analytical argumentation[1][2][5].
In this book, Sam Harris challenges the traditional separation between scientific facts and human values. He argues that morality can be understood in terms of human and animal well-being, and that science can provide objective answers to moral questions. Harris contends that moral relativism is false and that science can tell us how we ought to live to achieve the greatest well-being. He uses his expertise in philosophy and neuroscience to make a case for a science of morality, emphasizing that moral values should be grounded in empirical facts about what causes people to flourish.
In this book, Sharon Hewitt Rawlette explores the concept of value and its intrinsic nature. She argues that value is not something external but is rooted in the qualia of phenomenal consciousness. The book delves into metaethics, examining whether there are objective truths in ethics and how we come to know them. Rawlette posits that positive feelings and sensations are intrinsically valuable, while suffering and pain are intrinsically negative. She defends a form of moral realism where the goodness or badness of experiences are qualitative properties directly observable in conscious experience[2][3][4].
Thomas Nagel's essay "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" is a seminal work in philosophy of mind. It explores the subjective nature of consciousness and the challenges of understanding other minds. Nagel argues that even with complete physical knowledge of a bat's brain, we cannot fully grasp its subjective experience. This essay highlights the limitations of reductionist approaches to consciousness. It continues to be a central text in discussions about qualia, subjective experience, and the mind-body problem.
In 'Thinking How to Live', Allan Gibbard delves into the realm of ethical theory, particularly addressing what he terms 'planning questions' rather than empirical questions about the natural world. The book examines how moral judgments are made and what moral terms and statements mean. Gibbard discusses his metaethical ideas, including the notion that moral questions are fundamentally about planning and decision-making rather than empirical facts. He also engages with various philosophical theories, including expressivism and the normative concept of meaning.
What in the world is intrinsically good — good in itself even if it has no other effects? Over the millennia, people have offered many answers: joy, justice, equality, accomplishment, loving god, wisdom, and plenty more.
The question is a classic that makes for great dorm-room philosophy discussion. But it's hardly just of academic interest. The issue of what (if anything) is intrinsically valuable bears on every action we take, whether we’re looking to improve our own lives, or to help others. The wrong answer might lead us to the wrong project and render our efforts to improve the world entirely ineffective.
Today's guest, Sharon Hewitt Rawlette — philosopher and author of The Feeling of Value: Moral Realism Grounded in Phenomenal Consciousness — wants to resuscitate an answer to this question that is as old as philosophy itself.
Links to learn more, summary, full transcript, and full version of this blog post.
That idea, in a nutshell, is that there is only one thing of true intrinsic value: positive feelings and sensations. And similarly, there is only one thing that is intrinsically of negative value: suffering, pain, and other unpleasant sensations.
Lots of other things are valuable too: friendship, fairness, loyalty, integrity, wealth, patience, houses, and so on. But they are only instrumentally valuable — that is to say, they’re valuable as means to the end of ensuring that all conscious beings experience more pleasure and other positive sensations, and less suffering.
As Sharon notes, from Athens in 400 BC to Britain in 1850, the idea that only subjective experiences can be good or bad in themselves -- a position known as 'philosophical hedonism' -- has been one of the most enduringly popular ideas in ethics.
And few will be taken aback by the notion that, all else equal, more pleasure is good and less suffering is bad. But can they really be the only intrinsically valuable things?
Over the 20th century, philosophical hedonism became increasingly controversial in the face of some seemingly very counterintuitive implications. For this reason the famous philosopher of mind Thomas Nagel called The Feeling of Value "a radical and important philosophical contribution."
In today's interview, Sharon explains the case for a theory of value grounded in subjective experiences, and why she believes the most popular counterarguments are misguided.
Host Rob Wiblin and Sharon also cover:
• The essential need to disentangle intrinsic, instrumental, and other sorts of value
• Why Sharon’s arguments lead to hedonistic utilitarianism rather than hedonistic egoism (in which we only care about our own feelings)
• How do people react to the 'experience machine' thought experiment when surveyed?
• Why hedonism recommends often thinking and acting as though it were false
• Whether it's crazy to think that relationships are only useful because of their effects on our subjective experiences
• Whether it will ever be possible to eliminate pain, and whether doing so would be desirable
• If we didn't have positive or negative experiences, whether that would cause us to simply never talk about goodness and badness
• Whether the plausibility of hedonism is affected by our theory of mind
• And plenty more
Chapters:
- Rob’s intro (00:00:00)
- The interview begins (00:02:45)
- Metaethics (00:04:16)
- Anti-realism (00:10:39)
- Sharon's theory of moral realism (00:16:17)
- The history of hedonism (00:23:11)
- Intrinsic value vs instrumental value (00:28:49)
- Egoistic hedonism (00:36:30)
- Single axis of value (00:42:19)
- Key objections to Sharon’s brand of hedonism (00:56:18)
- The experience machine (01:06:08)
- Robot spouses (01:22:29)
- Most common misunderstanding of Sharon’s view (01:27:10)
- How might a hedonist actually live (01:37:46)
- The organ transplant case (01:53:34)
- Counterintuitive implications of hedonistic utilitarianism (02:03:40)
- How could we discover moral facts? (02:18:05)
Producer: Keiran Harris
Audio mastering: Ryan Kessler
Transcriptions: Katy Moore
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