KOL293 | Faith and Free Will, with Steve Mendelsohn

Kinsella on Liberty Podcast, Episode 293. This is my discussion with my old friend and colleague, patent lawyer Steve Mendelsohn, about faith and free will and related issues, some of which are discussed in his book Shallow Draughts: Faith in the Absence of Free Will (2017) (PDF of this book and his most recent one posted here [Shallow Draughts] and here [Sequitur] with his permission). (Steve and I worked as patent lawyer associates together from about 1994-96 or so in Schnader Harrison in Philly.) Yes, yes, I know I normally talk only about libertarian legal theory, or, mostly, IP, and try to avoid discoursing about topics I don't think I'm an expert on ... like faith, concept formation, knowledge theory, free will, compatibilism, and the like, but, hey, what the hell. Caveat listener! Related: KOL471 | “What Is Property? And What Is Not? — Part 1," Capitalism & Morality (Vancouver) (see in particular text at note 3: "In society, others’ free will introduces the risk of interference with possession, necessitating property rights to protect it. [Note: I do not mean to imply here there is free will in the causal sense, but it’s too complicated to get into in such a talk, and not necessary either. 3. My friend Steve Mendelsohn, the “law school asshole” mentioned above–he and I have disagreed before on free will. See KOL293 | Faith and Free Will, with Steve Mendelsohn. I have not talked in detail about free will, but have mentioned it here and there: Peikoff on Copyright, Michael Jackson; Memories of Meeting Rothbard in 1994; Remembering Tibor Machan, Libertarian Mentor and Friend: Reflections on a Giant, the section “Free Will/Downward Causation”. Re the current talk, Steve commented to me: “Apparently I listened too long because I got to the part where you imply that free will exists. So sad.” My response: “Basically as I have tried and failed to explain, I’m a dualist and think have different realms of phenomenon to understand and different concepts and terminology appropriate to each—to causal world and the teleological world. If and insofar as we find it useful or indeed unavoidable to understand and characterize our and other humans actions as purposive, that is as action, not mere behavior, aimed at achieving “chosen” or selected ends, then there is no other vocabulary to use than to describe the action as one where we choose our means and ends. But this “choice” is the way we conceive of and describe human action, th way we characterize it in a teleological sense. It does not mean that there is “free will” in the causal sense. But it’s hard to explain which is why I use shorthand. Similar when talking about natural law or natural rights I will sometimes refer to ‘God” as a placeholder concept even though there is no real “God.” It’s just language.] Peikoff on Copyright, Michael Jackson Memories of Meeting Rothbard in 1994 Remembering Tibor Machan, Libertarian Mentor and Friend: Reflections on a Giant, the section "Free Will/Downward Causation" Ayn Rand on Free Will David Kelley lecture on Free Will, Foundations of Knowledge lecture series https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m8qeaxNl7jE&list=PLnHOyZsmJrozETJ9zzryDhW0kliZkbIsu&index=5 It is obvious that "genuine free will" in a causal sense is impossible. Randians are diehard monists so try to force it into this monism by some handwaving legerdemain about how the "locus" is on the choice to focus blah blah blah. At least Kelley admits that to have "genuine"… — Stephan Kinsella (@NSKinsella) November 28, 2025 Update: Re the upcoming PFS talk by David Dürr (Switzerland): “On Freedom of the Will,” I had these comments to Hoppe: I am curious to see what he will say. I am also skeptical of free will in the causal sense, since it seems to presuppose downward causation, which seems to me to be as irrational and spooky as quantum action at a distance, which Einstein himself rejected. And yet in the teleological realm there must be choice as it's a component of action. So this is the dilemma. I know there are some libertarian arguments that try show free will is apriori true--by Rand and others, maybe Rothbard--to the effect that you cannot deny free will because it is presupposed in arguments where you are trying to persuade others that free does not exist—since you presuppose they are free to (choose to) change their minds if they agree with your arguments. There is some subtle error in this reasoning, I think. For genuine apriori—necessarily true—truths, they are of the form that the denial is contradictory since the proposition denied is assumed to be true in the attempt to deny it. E.g. we cannot conceive of a world that does not exist, or without causality. But we can conceive of a mechanistic world where intelligent humans emerge who experience an illusion of volition but are wrong that it is real, because they are conflating the teleological-praxeological realm with the causal realm, just as logical positivists and monists do. There have been some so-called "compatibilists" who attempt to square the circle, e.g. Daniel Denniet, but they all fail as far as I can tell since they are too monist. This is similar to the way most atheists' arguments against God are weak because they come from an empiricist and logical positivist stance. They are all too scientistic and unaware of dualism and praxeology. So I have thought the apparent dilemma, an antinomy, really, can be solved best by a type of dualism inspired by Mises's—in which we recognize that choice is an ineluctable component of action in praxeological-teleological analysis--an unavoidable assumption. It is part of the conceptual language we must employ in characterizing other humans as actors (teleological realm) instead of mere behavers (causal realm). I think you (Hoppe) hint at something similar in ESAM--where you writes: But if one can learn from experience in as yet unknown ways, then one admittedly cannot know at any given time what one will know at a later time and, accordingly, how one will act on the basis of this knowledge. One can only reconstruct the causes of one’s actions after the event, as one can explain one’s knowledge only after one already possesses it. Indeed, no scientific advance could ever alter the fact that one must regard one’s knowledge and actions as unpredictable on the basis of constantly operating causes. One might hold this conception of freedom to be an illusion. And one might well be correct from the point of view of a scientist with cognitive powers substantially superior to any human intelligence, or from the point of view of God. But we are not God, and even if our freedom is illusory from His standpoint and our actions follow a predictable path, for us this is a necessary and unavoidable illusion. [The Economics and Ethics of Private Property] I think this basically is the solution to the dilemma: a Hoppean-Misesian type of dualistic approach like this. Hoppe's reply: "The central error of the determinists is that on their own terms they cannot claim their theory to be true or false. True or false, right or wrong do not exist. But talking about this very question shows demonstrates that it DOES." My reply: I agree with you we have to assume choice because we must understand others as choosing actors. As long as we understand that this applies to the understanding of humans as actors, in the praxeological-teleological realm, and doesn't have any implications for "spooky" causal notions of downward causation etc., ... in other words, adopting a type of dualist approach is inescapable if one wants to regard others as actors and to understand their actions, motives, purposes, and so on. This is what modern logical positivists and empiricists are unable to do; they are stuck with monism. Update: See discussion of free will as an assumption behind some arguments in quantum physics (which I have always been skeptical of). https://youtu.be/2kxoq5UzAEQ?si=sfZHqS28SVEsQlND&t=360 Here she discusses Gerard 't Hooft, The Cellular Automaton Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (2016) and his idea about an ontological wave function. Hunh. *** Grok Summary: Kinsella on Liberty Podcast: Faith and Free Will with Steve Mendelsohn - Show Notes Introduction and Guest Background 0:02 - 2:10 In this episode of the Kinsella on Liberty podcast, host Stephan Kinsella interviews Steve Mendelsohn, an old friend and patent lawyer colleague from Philadelphia. Kinsella introduces the episode as a rare direct interview, one of only a few among his 300+ episodes, which typically feature rebroadcasts of his appearances on other shows. Mendelsohn, a mentor to Kinsella during their time at the Schnader law firm in 1994, joins from his home in the peaceful suburbs of Philadelphia, specifically near Narberth. The conversation begins with a light discussion about Mendelsohn’s current situation, including his limited visits to his office due to remote work trends post-March 2020. Remote Work and Office Space Changes 1:14 - 2:10 Mendelsohn discusses how his law firm is adapting to remote work, with their office lease expiring and plans for a smaller downtown footprint. He explains that the central Philadelphia location remains necessary due to the geographical distribution of staff and lawyers across the region. The conversation touches on the phrase “it is what it is,” with Kinsella noting its recent use by Michelle Obama, setting a casual tone before diving into the main topic. Introduction to the Main Topic: Faith and Free Will 2:10 - 3:44 Kinsella outlines the episode’s focus on faith and free will, a departure from his usual topics of intellectual property, libertarianism, and Austrian economics. He admits to not being an expert in this area but finds it suitable for an interesting discussion. Mendelsohn, who has self-published a book titled Shallow Drafts: Faith in the Absence of Free Will,