David Pitt, "The Quality of Thought" (Oxford UP, 2024)
Feb 13, 2025
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David Pitt, a philosophy professor at Cal State LA and author of "The Quality of Thought," challenges conventional views on the nature of thought. He argues for a distinct phenomenology of thought, differing from sensory experiences. Pitt explores the implications of unconscious thought and introspection’s role in understanding cognition. He critiques traditional philosophical frameworks, suggesting new approaches to grasp consciousness. Throughout the conversation, intriguing concepts like the relationship between language and thought, and the consciousness of non-human animals are examined.
David Pitt argues that cognitive phenomenology highlights the unique experiential quality of thoughts, distinguishing them from visual or auditory experiences.
Pitt critiques traditional views on content determination, advocating for an internalist perspective that emphasizes introspection's role in understanding thought processes.
Deep dives
Phenomenology of Thought
Thinking is characterized by a unique phenomenology, distinct from other conscious experiences such as visual or auditory sensations. This concept, known as cognitive phenomenology, argues that one can have immediate, introspective knowledge of their thoughts, which is not purely linguistic or sub-vocal. David Pitt asserts that recognizing the experiential aspect of thought can help overcome philosophical issues regarding the nature of belief and understanding. The idea posits that different thoughts possess unique experiential qualities that inform us about their contents, setting cognitive phenomenology apart from traditional views that deny such a distinct experience.
Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program
The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program seeks to link experiential quality with intentional content, claiming that the content of thoughts is intrinsically tied to its phenomenology. This position challenges the prevailing views of content determination, which suggest external factors influence what we think. By arguing for an internalist approach, Pitt highlights that one's conscious experiences fundamentally shape their thought processes. This view redefines how philosophers might consider thought content, advocating that it arises from a proprietary experience unique to thinking itself.
Introspection and Empirical Methodology
Pitt advocates for an introspective methodology as a key tool in studying consciousness, aligning with the belief that self-reflection can provide insights into our mental states. While acknowledging limitations in introspection and its potential pitfalls, he argues that it remains foundational for understanding experience. Pitt suggests that empirical psychology can complement introspective insights, particularly in resolving disagreements about cognitive phenomena. This combination allows for a more nuanced examination of thought and experience without completely dismissing the validity of introspective conclusions.
Challenging Unconscious Thought
The discourse on unconscious thought is addressed through the lens of phenomenal intentionality, questioning whether unconscious processes can be truly experiential. Pitt suggests that while unconscious thinking is posited by some theories, it may not necessitate the existence of unconscious phenomenology. By drawing analogies with computational processes, he argues that cognitive functions can operate without conscious awareness, undermining the assumption that all mental activity requires deliberate thought. Thus, this perspective offers an alternative understanding of how thoughts could emerge and be processed while challenging traditional views on unconscious cognition.
The idea that there is a distinct phenemenology of thought – that there is thinking experience just as there is visual experience or auditory experience – is a radical position in philosophy of mind. David Pitt is one of its foremost proponents.
In The Quality of Thought (Oxford University Press, 2024), Pitt provides an extended defense of the position and its implications: if thinking is a kind of experience, then what about unconscious thought, or the idea that explaining thought must rely essentially and primarily on introspection? Pitt, who is a professor of philosophy at Cal State LA, also considers what the sui generis phenomenology of thought might be and explains how thought contents are determined purely internally, challenging today’s dominant views of content determination and the possibility of explaining thought content using naturalistic, non-introspection-based methods.