Alfred Mele discusses the problem of luck for libertarianism and various perspectives on free will. He explores different types of libertarian views, such as event causal and agent causation, and discusses the distinction between them. Mele proposes a solution to the problem of luck that incorporates its existence without negating free decisions, addressing antecedent probabilities and the first free choice.
The Problem of Luck challenges libertarian views of Free Will by questioning the role of luck in decision-making and its impact on free will and moral responsibility.
Alfred Meely proposes a solution to the Problem of Luck that allows for the acknowledgement of luck while maintaining free will and moral responsibility by shaping antecedent probabilities through past choices and learning.
Deep dives
The Problem of Luck and Libertarian Free Will
The episode explores the Problem of Luck, which challenges libertarian views of Free Will. Cross-world differences and rollback scenarios are presented as examples of luck in decision-making. The main concern is whether luck undermines free will and moral responsibility. The guest, Alfred Meely, proposes a solution that acknowledges the presence of luck but explains how it doesn't preclude free decisions. He suggests that antecedent probabilities of choices are shaped by learning from past actions, allowing individuals to have control despite the cross-world differences in luck. This solution can be applied to both event causal and agent causal libertarian views.
Differentiating Event Causal and Agent Causal Libertarian Views
The episode discusses the distinction between event causal and agent causal libertarian views. Event causal libertarians ascribe causes of actions to reasons, apprehensions of reasons, and other events or states, similar to compatibilists. On the other hand, agent causal libertarians believe that the causal relation occurs between the agent and the outcome, highlighting the agent's control over their actions. The episode explores how agent causal libertarians can respond to the problem of luck by emphasizing the agent's role in shaping antecedent probabilities through past choices and reflective learning.
The Solution to the Problem of Luck
Alfred Meely presents his solution to the Problem of Luck, which involves acknowledging the presence of luck in decision-making while maintaining the compatibility of free will and moral responsibility. Meely argues that the bar for moral responsibility can be set relatively low for children, allowing them to have control over their actions and shape the antecedent probabilities of future choices. As individuals mature, their responsibility increases as their past choices shape the probabilities of their decisions. This approach explains how individuals can be responsible despite cross-world differences in luck and can be adopted by both libertarians and compatibilists.
Compatibility of Indeterminism with Free Will
The episode also touches on the compatibility of indeterminism with free will. It notes that many physicists interpret quantum mechanics as indeterministic, leaving room for indeterminism in the world. This aligns with the views of some compatibilists who believe that free will does not require determinism. Meely suggests that his solution to the Problem of Luck can be adopted by compatibilists who argue for free will in an indeterministic world. He emphasizes that his solution does not reject the presence of luck but provides an explanation for how it can coexist with free will.
In this episode, Alfred Mele explains the problem of luck for libertarianism (the view that we have free will and that free will is incompatible with determinism). Along the way, we discuss different types of libertarian views of free will, as well as Al’s own proposed solution to the problem of luck on behalf of libertarians.
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