“China and America: The Error Bounds Are Larger Than We've Seen in Decades”: An Interview with Jordan Schneider

🇨🇳 After publishing my in-depth piece on advanced manufacturing in China, I was struck by the volume and intensity of feedback it generated. The numerous interactions and follow-on discussions made it clear that China, once again, emerged as a subject I needed to explore much more deeply.

As is often the case when I embark on such a learning journey, one of my go-to sources is Jordan Schneider's newsletter and podcast ChinaTalk, which I've been following for many years.

* Jordan's work stands out for two compelling reasons: its unwavering focus on China—with a more recent pivot toward technology and US-China rivalry; and its refreshingly multidisciplinary approach. ChinaTalk isn't merely a publication about technology, economics, and finance, but one where culture, history, institutions, and comparative analysis of different regimes and countries occupy substantial space, offering a uniquely valuable perspective for Westerners seeking to better understand China.

Jordan and I have known each other for years, following each other's work (I believe we started writing on Substack around the same time), and occasionally exchanging thoughts via social media and email. However, this interview marks our first extensive face-to-face conversation, and I'm delighted to have created this opportunity to deepen a relationship that I expect will be instrumental in continuing to make sense of China in the years ahead.

In our conversation, Jordan and I explore a wide range of topics: his personal journey learning Mandarin and living in China; the volatile cycles of Western perception regarding China's rise; the evolution of China's technological capabilities from hardware manufacturing to software innovation; the critical role of China's governance system as the great unknown variable; the complex dynamics of US-China competition; Europe's precarious position caught between these superpowers; and the growing challenges facing Western China analysts who can no longer conduct on-the-ground research. Throughout, Jordan brings nuance and historical context to these discussions, challenging simplistic narratives about China's trajectory.

I should note that Jordan gently scolded me when I mentioned wanting to publish this interview in written form only. He challenged me to release the audio track as well, pointing out that it gives the audience more flexibility in how they consume the content, and that the audio version provides a more intimate experience of connecting with both host and guest, as well as capturing the unique alchemy of our conversation. So feel free to read the (slightly edited) transcript below, or listen to the (also edited) audio track above.

* I should mention that I haven't yet decided whether I will resume podcasting on a more regular basis as part of Drift Signal, so I didn't include formal elements such as an intro or opening song. I hope you enjoy it anyway!

Introduction and Background

Hi, Jordan.

Thanks so much. It's such a pleasure to be here. I'm a big fan of yours.

Oh, thank you. I'm a big fan of yours as well! Thank you for making the time.

I'd like to start with maybe a few words about yourself and your relationship with China. Where does it come from?

My name is Jordan. I run a podcast and newsletter called ChinaTalk, where we cover China technology and US-China relations. I lived in China from 2017 to 2020. I started there as a graduate student and spent time at a tech company. It's defined my professional life for the past decade. I think China is a fascinating, wonderful place with incredibly dynamic people, culture, and history. It's also America's strategic competitor, and reconciling that tension is complex. I feel a connection to China at a high level, but have learned enough about the place to have some strong issues with the government and the direction it's taking the country. This is a tension that myself and everyone in the West who engages with China professionally has had to grapple with for a very long time.

You mentioned being there from 2017 to 2020. Does it mean that you had to come back because of COVID?

Yes. I was in Malaysia for Chinese New Year of 2020, which is when COVID started in China. I was scuba diving at a resort where 150 of the 200 people were from Wuhan with strong Wuhan accents. By day four, we started coughing and got very sick. I flew back to the US to see my parents because China was the only place with a pandemic at that time. Then the world shut down. Foreigners couldn't enter China regardless of their visa status, and at some point, I had to move my life back to the US.

I guess you still had to get your stuff out?

Yes, it was in boxes for a while, then on a boat. I think it showed up six months later. I didn't even bring a laptop to Malaysia because it was supposed to be a relaxing trip.

Learning Mandarin: “Electric Brain” and Beyond

You mentioned recognising the Wuhan accent, which reminds me and should remind the audience that you're fluent in Mandarin.

Can you explain how you learned Mandarin? For us Europeans who are not native English speakers, we have to learn English first. And then if you tell me after that you have to learn Mandarin, I'd say that's just too much. How did you manage it?

I wouldn't say fluent. I would say on the journey. I started in 2017. It's been eight years now. Chinese is a very vocabulary-dependent language as opposed to romance languages, which are much more grammar-forward. With romance languages, if you know one, you get 50% of the vocabulary for free when learning another, or even 75% if you're going from Spanish to Italian.

Since I'm not living in China anymore, my vocabulary and comprehension are weirdly spiky. I can read a Xi Jinping speech very well or understand discussions about semiconductors or AI, but casual conversations or following multiple friends talking at once becomes much more difficult.

There are aspects of Chinese which are much easier than people expect. Once you get over the initial challenge of the writing system, the characters build into each other. Words, especially modern ones, are very logical. The word “computer”, for instance, translates into “electric brain,” which is fun. You're making new words with ancient characters.

The grammar isn't difficult, which means you can ramp up quickly. There's not the pain of people correcting you on subjunctives like I experienced with four years of high school Spanish. With Chinese, once you know the words, you can pretty much say what you want to say.

How do you practice in the US? Do you have a tutor or friends with whom conversation in Mandarin is mandatory?

I have a friend group in New York City. There's a cool diaspora community worldwide now. People used to leave China only for economic reasons, especially after '89, but over the past decade, there's been a new wave. If you're gay or lesbian, or uncomfortable with the politics and have enough money to study overseas, often the choice is to stay abroad, not just for the salary but for the lifestyle.

In New York, there's a fun left-wing, feminist monthly comedy event all in Chinese. You see people doing stand-up making fun of Xi and masculinity in China. This is speech that's not allowed in the PRC. I get to participate a bit in this diaspora community. I also do online tutoring through Italki.com, which is incredible—you can book tutors for $5-15 an hour.

I watch a lot of Chinese TV too. The best show last year featured four celebrity couples who'd been married for at least 10 years and were all on the verge of divorce. Initially, you think there's no way this is real—who would sign up for this? But after one episode, you realise it's incredibly authentic. No one would fake having the arguments they've been having with their spouse for 10 years in front of the whole country. I try to have at least 2-3 hours of Chinese from podcasts, TV, and conversations every day to keep progressing.

The Sine Wave of US-China Relations

The reason I reached out to suggest we record this interview is because I listened to what I think was your latest episode of ChinaTalk [as of 28 April 2025], where you interview Rush Doshi. I'll let you tell more about Rush and his work. But yesterday, I believe you wrote that it was probably the most important episode of the year.

In this episode, part of your conversation is about how there are too many ups and downs in how we perceive China. We go from bearish to bullish and back again.

This echoes my own experience with China. I grew up traumatised by the Tiananmen protests and how they were crushed by Deng Xiaoping. Then years later, I read books about Deng and how he contributed to developing China, which was impressive. I became bullish about China because they excelled in tech. Then I became bearish because of how they handled COVID. And suddenly this year, since Liberation Day, everyone seems bullish again.

We can't keep track, and I appreciate your take on why it's so volatile.

I think it might just be human nature. We were talking about Europeans, and everyone was pessimistic for the past 5-15 years. Then suddenly Germany starts spending money, Europe's back, and the stock market's up.

We saw this in the Cold War too. JFK went to his grave convinced the Soviet Union would overtake America. Throughout the Cold War, America was frequently convinced its adversary was gaining ground.

I wonder if the media environment is compressing these sine waves. In American history from the 1830s-40s onward, there was quiet confidence that America would eventually overtake Britain. Maybe not tomorrow, but at some point—whether in 1880, 1910, or as it turned out, 1945.

I agree it's been wild. I've been following politics professionally for about 15 years, and to have experienced so many flips between “America's back/China's back” and “America's cooked/China's cooked” suggests it's less about fundamental changes and more about how people use these narratives rhetorically or simply want something new to discuss.

Can you tell us a bit about Rush and how his work is relevant to what we just discussed?

Rush Doshi is a scholar with a PhD in China studies. He wrote an excellent book about China's long-term ambitions called The Long Game that everyone should check out. In 2020, he joined the Biden administration on the National Security Council, which coordinates national security decision-making for any presidency. He's since left government and works at a think tank.

He and his colleague Kurt Campbell, who was his boss and later became Deputy Secretary of State under Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, tried to step back from that compressed sine wave of “China is winning/China is losing” and “America is winning/America is losing.” They performed what's called a “net assessment” of the long-term factor endowments, strengths, and weaknesses that we can plausibly project over a decade or two.

Net assessment has been part of American strategic thinking for at least 50 years. Andy Marshall, a legendary figure in American strategic history, started at RAND and then founded the Office of Net Assessment in the Pentagon in the early '70s. It works as the Secretary of Defense's personal think tank to help think beyond the next budget cycle or current war to the long-term challenges America faces.

When you're a defense secretary, your decisions matter 10-20 years down the line in terms of research and development investments, platform purchases, and force evolution. Rush and Kurt did an abbreviated version of this assessment in a Foreign Affairs article, stepping back to look at what the US and China will likely bring to the table in coming decades.

China's Technology Rise: Hardware First, Software Second

Can we revisit a few episodes of this recent history? I'd like your views on specific events that contributed to my perception of the US-China balance.

Before 2014, I was completely dismissive of China regarding tech. I wrote a book about tech in 2012 with a friend who suggested including content about China. And I said that in my opinion there was nothing interesting there—they'd never export anything relevant to Westerners in the technology field. Then two years later, the Alibaba IPO opened everyone's eyes to the big things happening in China that might be on par with US tech giants. What was your perception at that time?

In 2014, I was 24 and just starting my career, so I didn't have well-formed thoughts then. But looking at when Chinese software and hardware really started making a global impact, there's a wonderful book coming out called Apple in China that covers how China scaled production of iPods and then iPhones at an exponential rate throughout the 2000s and 2010s.

To understand Chinese technology, you need to look at both hardware and software, with hardware being the more impressive story that starts earlier. In 1976, China was one of the world's poorest countries—poorer than India. The party recognized that the Mao era was a disaster and decided to take a different path, changing the incentive structure for government officials from ideological purity to economic growth.

This created incredible competition across provinces to attract business, provide free land, and make deals. It got things moving. They imported the East Asian development playbook from Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. China's size and education system allowed them to scale from assembly to management to developing and selling their own products globally.

This remarkable interaction of international capital, engineering know-how, and management expertise was absorbed, domesticated, and then re-exported under Chinese brands. They saturated their enormous domestic market, which was protected to help firms get a head start. Now we have Huawei, Xiaomi, Oppo, BYD, DJI, and other hardware-forward global firms that are as competitive, if not more so on some dimensions, than the best the rest of the world offers.

The next step for me was 2016. Uber, trying to compete in China, had to retreat and sell its operations to local rival Didi. This signaled that US tech companies wouldn't be global after all and would concede significant market share to Chinese competitors.

The Uber/Didi story illustrates how software and operations developed in China. Several Chinese software companies benefited dramatically from protectionism—Facebook was banned, Google was banned, and there's a list of about 250 banned platforms.

Smart, hungry Chinese software engineers built remarkable companies like Tencent and Alibaba. There were also localisation challenges. It's harder to compete if you're trying to do Finnish e-commerce against Amazon, but if you can leverage all of China, there's a higher total addressable market where you can use local knowledge, understanding, and hustle against foreign companies that might be arrogant.

The large market made it easier for companies like Didi or Alibaba to take on Uber, eBay, or Groupon. Scale is the big moat for both hardware and software companies, and China is really the only place where you could achieve enough scale, with some government assistance.

But I think government intervention is sometimes overstated. Didi still paid significant money to buy Uber's China operations. If the game was entirely tilted in their favor by the government, they could have just appropriated it or revoked Uber's license. There's a sliding scale the government considers with all companies—Tesla is a great example. How much foreign competition do we want to help upgrade our own players? What consumer surplus and jobs can foreign players bring? But ultimately, they prefer Chinese firms to win domestically, then be disciplined by export competition.

China's “Wolf Warrior” Miscalculation

Then Trump was elected, and there was an inspiring article in the New Yorker by Evan Osnos titled “Making China Great Again.” It suggested Trump was so rude, clumsy, and incompetent that China had an open road to conquest, influence, and making new friends.

But then, as you discussed with Rush, they blew it with wolf warrior diplomacy—being clumsy and threatening to many countries. Why did they squander the chance to gain advantage using Trump as leverage?

Regarding Trump and wolf warrior diplomacy, 2016-2020 was a tumultuous time in US-China relations. Trump went on a remarkable arc. Initially, he seemed aggressive toward allies, but in retrospect, he wasn't threatening to invade Canada. Xi was riding high and seemed to think that being able to say “F-you” to many people was the mark of a great power—or perhaps the domestic upside of being praised for confrontational statements was more important than winning over Indonesia, Vietnam, or India.

China's engagement with the world became even more noxious and concerning than what Trump brought, to the point that by the end of his administration, most countries had decided to ban Huawei—an outcome that wouldn't have been predicted in 2016 when Trump seemed intent on dismantling alliances.

So Western cohesion was basically saved by China's twisted incentive system that rewarded confrontational statements on social media rather than building long-term alliances?

Yes. Also, recording this in 2025, Trump feels much more consequential. During his first term, it didn't feel like he was really about to reshape the international order and abandon America's alliances. Countries doing 20-year assessments were still pricing in a high probability that America would get over this phase and return to being a strong, reliable ally. The discount factor of America being there when it counts is much lower in capitals now than it was during Trump's first term.

The COVID-19 Response: Strengths and Fatal Flaws

Which leads us to 2020, with both the pandemic and Trump leaving office after losing the election, replaced by the Biden administration. That's when everyone around me became bearish on China because they seemed to close everything down. There was the crackdown on tech companies. Jack Ma disappeared in November that year.

A significant influence for me then was Peter Zeihan, who emerged as a go-to expert explaining why China is doomed to fail due to weak demographics, poor geography, and other problems. What's your take? Did we become too bearish? Is Zeihan right that China will break apart demographically?

I haven't read much of Zeihan, so I'll pass on that assessment. But the arc from 2020 to 2022 is interesting. People were angry at China because they “created the virus,” whatever that means. But from 2020 to 2022, we saw both strengths and weaknesses of contemporary Chinese governance.

People forget that the entire world was locked down in crisis, yet for a while, there was no virus in China. Their playbook—intrusive lockdowns and mass testing with targeted containment—worked until the virus mutated to become so virulent that the approach no longer applied. The Western approach of partial shutdowns meant our deaths came earlier—a million people died in America over 2020-2021 from essentially unchecked spread.

The Chinese government made catastrophic errors affecting millions when they took too long to accept the new reality with Omicron. You couldn't lock down your way back to normalcy, yet they shut Shanghai for 10 weeks with people unable to leave their apartment buildings, only to reopen and have the virus return.

They made the incredible decision not to buy Western vaccines, perhaps due to nationalism or misinformation reaching leadership. By the time they opened up, more people died than necessary because they were using inferior vaccines instead of mRNA technology.

You can analyse factor endowments like demographics and debt levels as Rush did, but there's an enormous unpredictable variable about China's performance over decades: the party and its governance system. On one hand, they've strategically enabled industrial upgrading that created incredible EV companies and advances in semiconductors, batteries, and manufacturing. On the other hand, you have a leader who appears to be another leader for life, making succession scary. Information flows during COVID showed the dangers of lacking mechanisms to speak truth to power or media that can raise issues. The risk from politics going wrong is much higher with this system than with the more collective decision-making of the mid-90s to 2013.

“Hardware Eating Software”: A New Pendulum Swing

Now we're in a different period. Since Liberation Day, everyone seems bullish again. Nick Denton, the Gawker founder, has left the US and bet everything on China. He's working with my friend David Galbraith, a European VC, on a thesis that China is winning the industrial war because software is now embedded in hardware, and China dominates hardware manufacturing.

The thesis follows that while “software is eating the world” (Marc Andreessen's thesis), now “hardware is eating software” because software is so cheap it can be given away free with hardware like EVs, drones, or whatever Chinese manufacturers export.

The overarching view is that China owns the world now because it's about manufacturing hardware at scale. This, along with various other things, seems to be prompting Noah Smith to write about the “Chinese Century” with everyone seemingly giving up on the West's ability to compete. Are we going too far to the other extreme?

Tom Friedman has been writing something similar about China's hardware capabilities, and he admitted, “Whenever I'm writing about China, I'm really just writing about America.” For casual observers (Friedman visits one week a year), these broad narratives are often focused on making statements about domestic politics through arguments about adversaries.

Noah Smith deserves more credit—he's spent time in Japan, he's an economist, and he's been thinking about industrial policy.

This pattern repeats throughout history—in the Cold War regarding the Soviet Union, with Japan in the 1980s, and with Americans talking about the British Empire in the 19th century. People mainly think about themselves and want to win domestic political fights. They craft the adversary to support their domestic policy priorities.

Regarding Nick Denton's “hardware taking over the world” thesis—if you look at global GDP or manufacturing, China isn't at 100%; it's around 30-35%. There are many other countries. The point Rush and Kurt emphasize, which resonates with me, is that the world is uncomfortable with the Chinese government as currently constituted. There will continue to be lingering discomfort with a world where the commanding economic heights of the 21st century are completely controlled by China.

Given this discomfort, leaders and policymakers with liberal democratic leanings should recognise that the G7 collectively equals or exceeds China. China represents only about 25% of global land mass, resources, and population, meaning 75% of the world could counterbalance them if it cooperated more effectively. Whether hardware, software, or something else determines who shapes the 21st century, it's important for countries to work together to reach the scale needed to counter China.

The most frustrating thing about the Trump administration was its failure to recognise this. I worry about what happens if America truly steps back—will the rest of the world fold? Or will they create their own arrangements, like what happened with TPP?

I had a fascinating conversation with a Japanese nuclear analyst about the US nuclear umbrella becoming less reliable. He said 95% of Japanese hate the Chinese government and fear a world they dominate. Despite being victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, he believed Japan would acquire nuclear weapons before allowing China to dictate terms. There's significant latent energy even without America.

Europe's Position: Caught Between America and Chin

I'm curious about Europe's position, Nicolas—both in accepting America's disengagement and taking military and economic steps to address that reality.

Good question. I think Europe will take a long time to realise America is drifting away. They heard JD Vance's speech in Munich but will need three or four similar messages before they truly accept it and act. Europe still sees itself as too fragmented, with power distributed among national capitals, to leverage its size.

As Rush argues, we have size but lack the ability to convert it into scale and ultimately power. What I'm hearing lately is “if we can't count on America anymore, maybe we should get closer to China.” It's always either/or—either America or China. Europe struggles to imagine its future without relying on a larger protective trade and security partner. America used to be both. China can't be a security partner, but it can be a trade partner.

Look at Germany—they need the Chinese market for cars and machine tools. A world without that is hard for them to imagine, creating pressure on their government not to cut ties with China. We're stuck in between, and it's difficult to predict our direction until we've invested in our own capabilities and sovereign infrastructure.

That's fascinating—you'll need three more JD Vance speeches. Maybe a war starts and America doesn't show up. That would be the ultimate message. It's hard to imagine how much more obnoxious he could be.

What I meant is that the JD Vance speech would have been enough, but followed by the incompetence displayed with Liberation Day and its aftermath, everyone thinks “they're not that serious after all, they're still incompetent.” Maybe they didn't really mean what they said in Munich.

From a European perspective, the Trump administration looks like “clowns” (to quote Tom Friedman)—dangerous clowns because they're in charge—but it's difficult to imagine they have a thousand-year plan to cut ties with Europe and end security guarantees.

Just wait. Trump's pretty old. You might get a JD Vance president before you know it. That might be what Europe needs to take this seriously.

That brings me to another aspect. We all prefer to rely on economics, trade, and hard data, but as you say, a key part of your message is that it all depends on the party and what it becomes regarding China. For America, maybe it depends on how the culture wars evolve.

I was impressed by Noah Smith's piece suggesting America is drifting away from Europe because Europe no longer presents the image of a white Christian continent. America liked that about Europe, but Europe has changed, so Americans are disappointed and less interested in our problems.

I don't know how to answer that directly. It has been interesting to see how race and religion influence foreign policy, with America often showing more sympathy when white Christian people are under threat. I don't know if Europe not benefiting from that historical bias in American foreign relations is a factor, but what I will say is that the US has elections every two years. As extreme as governance gets, the pendulum tends to swing back, particularly after swinging hard in one direction.

China sometimes has that feedback loop too—you can see it in how the tech lash has evolved to Xi Jinping meeting with Jack Ma five years later saying “We really need you guys.” But they have an aging leader who's been in power for over 10 years with no term limit. History shows strange things happen when people hold power too long.

The potential for errors is orders of magnitude larger than what an American president could do, constrained as they are by courts, public opinion, and elections. This is the big unknown that's difficult to project. On one hand, it's impossible to know what Chinese governance will look like in 20 years. On the other, Trump has expanded our understanding of how damaging an American president can be—willing to dismantle global free trade and alliance networks that have served America well since 1941.

This makes analysis harder but also more interesting. The error bounds around both a personality-driven Chinese state and a norm-breaking American presidency create more uncertainty than we've seen in decades.

The Uncertain Future of China Analysis

One last quick question: you're an American analyst focused on China and technology. Can you confirm that people like you haven't been able to return to China for research in recent years? The tensions seem too high for people interested in sensitive topics to be allowed in. How do you conduct research, and what happens to China analysis in 10 years if no Americans have been able to immerse themselves?

During COVID, no one could enter for two years. After Meng Wanzhou, the CFO and daughter of Huawei's founder, was arrested [in Canada], China detained two Canadians who were doing normal analyst work and dramatically expelled others. Some Americans have been stuck there for uncomfortable reasons, making Western analysts nervous about conducting research in China.

The situation has improved slightly with more delegations and track-two dialogues. Tom Friedman visited recently. But right now, we're in a trade war with significant uncertainty. I wouldn't go today because arresting people and using them as bargaining chips is one of China's escalation options. In such an uncertain environment [we're recording on April 28, 2025], I wouldn't want to be caught in the middle.

I would like to return eventually. There are safer approaches, like being invited by universities or organizations, rather than what people used to do—arrive on tourist visas and conduct interviews. That's clearly no longer viable. If you're discussing politics and technology, you can't do it secretly or on a tourist visa, as they might label you a spy and detain you.

More broadly, the number of American students in China has dropped from 10-15,000 to perhaps 500 now. That's a significant disruption. Young people who listen to my podcast and ask for career advice face challenges. The language is difficult and takes time. It's much less enjoyable studying at your computer versus living there and absorbing the culture.

China is an enormous, gorgeous country with incredible food. Chinese people are similar to Americans—personally forward, outgoing, and interested in random conversations, with little pretense. Everyone dresses casually without rigid social hierarchies like in Japan, making it a fun and exciting place for foreigners to explore.

It saddens me that fewer people pursue this path due to political challenges. It's also problematic for policymaking that fewer people have experiences like mine and Rush’s, spending substantial time in the country and learning the language.

Essential Reading on China's Past, Present and Future

Finally, apart from ChinaTalk, what would you recommend for listeners or readers interested in learning more about China today and tomorrow?

I have two book recommendations to start. First, a biography of Xi Zhongxun (Xi Jinping's father) by Joseph Torigian coming out this summer. Joseph is a unique scholar who speaks both Chinese and Russian, which helps understand Cold War history through Soviet archives.

Biographies of Xi Jinping tend to be boring due to limited source material, but his father had an incredible life—he was a prominent general who was purged, then returned as a forward-leaning provincial leader. His son witnessed this during the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, seeing his father nationally shamed for being a “bad Communist.” Joseph's book is monumental, both in research and narrative.

For deeper Chinese history, I recommend Jonathan Spence, considered the best English-language writer on the subject. His The Search for Modern China, starting around 1600 and continuing to the present, is getting a new edition this summer updated to 2025. It's beautifully written and shows how current challenges faced by the party and Chinese people have been addressed differently over centuries. Many people read this book and fall in love with learning about China.

Lastly, Julian Gewirtz's Never Turn Back covers China in the 1980s, the most exciting period in Chinese cultural thinking. There was tremendous openness and possibility before the government's response to Tiananmen in 1989. Given how static Chinese governance feels today, it's refreshing to remember that not long ago, there was enormous internal debate about what China should look like and how society should be organized. Julian, also a poet, provides a human, literary, and grounded sense of the possibilities people imagined in the 1980s. That future was blocked, but similar changes will likely occur again in our lifetimes. His book expands your imagination of China and prepares you for the changes it will almost certainly undergo during the 21st century.

Great. Thank you, Jordan. You've been very generous with your time, insights, and book recommendations. I'm very happy we had this conversation.

This was a ton of fun.

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From Paris, France 🇫🇷 (and New York City, US 🇺🇸)

Nicolas

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