Calvinists are more "Semi-Pelagian" than Arminians?

Dan Chapa wrote:

Is Calvinism Semi-Pelagian?   Given Mr. Christensen’s definition of Semi-Pelagianism, does Calvinism avoid the charge of Semi-Pelagianism? I will argue that it does not and that Calvinism has serious problems with affirming total depravity. Mr. Christensen states: "The freedom to choose to love God and exercise saving faith is not a problem. Calvinists agree with this in substance as long as freedom of choice is defined as acting willingly or voluntarily in accordance with one's regenerated nature." But this admits that on Calvinism, faith is our act – God does not believe for us. And on Calvinism we are responsible for our actions. So on Calvinism, we are responsible for our faith. So if Arminianism has a problem because man is responsible for faith, so does Calvinism, but in other ways we can see that Calvinism is worse.   On Calvinism, an unregenerate man would believe if they wanted to.3 This sort of freedom (sometimes call compatibilist freedom; other times called natural freedom does not require the man to be regenerated, nor is it dependent on supernatural grace. Rather, man by nature has the ability to act on his desires. So long as the man is not handicapped or compelled, he is free in this sense and therefore responsible per the Calvinist's own description of responsibility. So Calvinists end up with the unwanted but unavoidable conclusion that unregenerate man is able to repent and believe (in what they hold to be the morally relevant and common man’s sense of ability) 4.   This conclusion is unwanted, because Calvinists insist that one of the foundations of their theology is the idea that unregenerate men cannot repent and believe. But what we have is a conflict between Calvinists’ theology (total depravity) and their philosophy (compatibilism).Compatibilism constrains what Calvinists mean when they say man is unable to believe and whatever they mean by it, they do not mean man cannot believe in what they consider to be the common man’s notion of ability, nor in the sense of ability relevant to moral responsibility.5 To insist that God’s giving man good desires makes Him responsible for our faith, undermines the compatibilist idea that we are responsible so long as we act on our desires. Sure unconditional election and irresistible grace settle the big picture, but this settling operates above the level of moral responsibility, per compatibilism. We still act on our desires whether those desires come from our depraved nature or the new nature God gives us in regeneration; so since we are acting on our desires we are responsible in either case.  So to claim God is alone responsible undermines compatibilism.   Arminianism avoids the problems that attaches to Calvinism, by embracing Total Depravity in a deeper and more persistent way. When our Lord says "no man can come to me unless the Father who sense me draw him" (John 6:44), we take that to mean that without grace, we do not have libertarian freedom to believe. We understand Christ’s statement using the common man’s notion of ability, a sense relevant for moral responsibility. But on compatibilism, Christ is not denying compatibilist freedom, or man’s ability to believe where ability is understood in the common man and morally relevant sense. If Christ were denying compatibilist freedom, that would amount to saying we are compelled to unbelief or mentally handicapped.   So on Calvinism, without God's drawing man can believe (using the definition of ability they deem to be the main one in discussing freedom, ability and moral responsibility. And on Arminianism, without God's drawing man cannot believe (using our definition of ability, which we deem the main one for ability, responsibility and freedom). So which is Semi-Pelagian? Nevertheless, this result exposes errors in Mr. Christensen’s way of defining Semi-Pelagian, rather than identifying Calvinists as real Semi-Pelagians.    -------------------------------- 1If synergism means both God and man’s libertarian free will is involved in conversion, then yes Arminians are synergists. But synergism is often uses in other contexts such as justification by works or does man regenerate himself and Arminianism is not synergistic in these senses. 2 Faith is a gift of God in some sense and like most gifts it can be rejected, but for a discussion onEphesians 2:8-9, see http://www.middletownbiblechurch.org/reformed/godgift.htm 3For example, Turretin affirms that man has "the essential freedom from coaction and physical necessity" and "natural power or faculty of the will" and even grudgingly concedes that in this sense an unregenerate man can be said to "be able to believe if he wishes". (See sections 2 and 4 on page 669 and section 40 on page 682 of Volume I, Tenth Topic, Question 4 of Institutes of Elenctic Theology).;   4 Per Calvinism, moral responsibility attaches to just compatibilist freedom (what Edwards calls moral freedom). For example, John Frame says: “An alternative concept of freedom, one consistent with Reformed theology and held by a number of philosophers (the Stoics, Spinoza, Locke, Hume, Hobart, Richard Double et al) is often called “compatibilism,” for on that basis, free will and determinism (the view that all events in creation are caused) are compatible. … Reformed theology recognizes that all people have freedom in the compatibilist sense… I believe that compatibilist freedom is the main kind of freedom necessary to moral responsibility”. (link)   5According to Edwards, “But it must be observed concerning moral Inability, in each kind of it, that the word Inability is used in a sense very diverse from its original import. The word signifies only a natural Inability, in the proper use of it; and is applied to such cases only wherein a present will or inclination to the thing, with respect to which a person is said to be unable, is supposable. It cannot be truly said, according to the ordinary use of language, that a malicious man, let him be ever so malicious, cannot hold his hand from striking, or that he is not able to show his neighbor kindness; or that a drunkard, let his appetite be never so strong, cannot keep the cup from his mouth. In the strictest propriety of speech, a man has a thing in his power, if he has it in his choice, or at his election: and a man cannot be truly said to be unable to do a thing, when he can do it if he will. It is improperly said, that a person cannot perform those external actions, which are dependent on the act of the Will, and which would be easily performed, if the act of the Will were present”. (Edwards. Freedom of the Will. I.4)    

 

 

http://www.traditionalbaptistchronicles.com/2013/03/prevenient-grace-and-semi-pelagianism.html