He challenges what I believe is a dominant view in philosophy and psychology about how we experience our lives. His target is two targets, the psychological narrative thesis and the normative narrative thesis. He goes into a lot of detail to try to argue against them. That's the diachronic view. When you have this memory, you think of it as you and an episodic person. You have these memories but you don't identify with the person in those memories.
Do you think of your life as a story? Does your life have a narrative structure or form? Do you identify with your past selves and your future selves? If not, can you live a good life, a moral life, an authentic life? Can you feel guilt, regret, and resentment? Plus, speaking of stories, we talk about a new study suggesting that books with anthropomorphic animals can't teach moral lessons to kids.
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Links:
- Larsen, N. E., Lee, K., & Ganea, P. A. (2017). Do storybooks with anthropomorphized animal characters promote prosocial behaviors in young children?. Developmental Science.
- Children's books with humans have greater moral impact than animals, study finds | Books | The Guardian
- Strawson, G. (2004). Against narrativity. Ratio, 17(4), 428-452.
- Strawson, G. (2007). Episodic ethics. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements, 60, 85-115.
- Parfit, D. (1995). The unimportance of identity.
- I am Not a Story