And I think with a sura, you have the same thing. We're saying, okay, moral, moral requirements, they, there's a kind of phenomenology to them and we're trying to work out what that thing is in the real world. And one of the features moral requirements have is they have a certain kind of content, right? So we think that moral requirements have a certain kind of content where they enjoy in actions which are loving, which are just, which seek human flourishing and so on. And so any plausible property identity candidate is going to have to have those kinds of properties. Now when we think of the commands of a sura, well, the commands of a sura clearly don't have those properties, right? The kinds of sura have their own kind of content. So we can just say, well, that's clearly not those kinds of commands or demands clearly identical with the demands morality max on us. But when you're talking about God, now you're talking about a being with different attributes, talking about a being who's fully informed, who's rational, who seeks the flourishing of his creatures. And so now you're seeing a set of demands that are rational, that are formed, that seek the flourishing of people. And you might think, well, you know, that's much, much, much more like moral demands, right? Moral demands seem to be, seem to have those features too. So we've got a reason for preferring the commands of a sura as a property identity candidate. And the reason for rejecting a sura as a property identity candidate, which we don't have, for God. And in fact, I think your argument in your paper trades on this because the argument in your paper is that once you see, once you reflect on the idea of a sura commanding something, you just say, well, that can't possibly be a moral obligation. And the reason of course is because you realize that it has the wrong content and so it's dismissed as a plausible identification. So I think when you look at it that way, I think, I mean, there you'd have to go into the deeper arguments about, you know, what's the case of divine command theory? Why do you make this property identity in the first place and so on? But I think there are differences between God and the sura, which make God's commands a much more plausible candidate as the property that you identify with moral obligations. And there are with a sura, I think the sura has certain kinds of properties which disqualify this commands from being a denical to moral

demand. Let's see if we can spend about another five, ten minutes on this. And then I want to try to get to that third problem. So just a little more back and forth here and then we'll move on to the third problem. Okay, that sounds good. So my response to what Matthew said now is that it seems like when you're talking about the content of moral obligations, giving us reason to think that it's more likely that there it is God's commands that are the ground of moral obligations than the suras. It seems like there's a sense in which that's right, but if it is right, then it's because there are independent of God, independent of his commands, features of morality and moral obligations. It's only because of that, because they're independent, completely independent of God, independent of the sura, completely independent facts about morality that make it completely impossible that they could be that a sura's commands could have anything to do with it. But then that shows that there are independent facts about morality, right, that are independent of God and independent of a sura. If we don't think that there are any such independent facts about morality and about what's morally required, then I don't see how we can appeal to anything like that to suggest that it is God's commands rather than a sura's. And if we're just sticking to things that are internal to them, and this is what I sort of want to come back to, if we're going to say that God's commands have this feature, and that is that they constitute moral obligations, whereas a sura's commands don't have that feature, then it's got to be something internal to God and internal to a sura, in virtue of which the commands of God can constitute moral obligations, but the commands of a sura cannot. And therefore, I don't see that we can appeal to things external to these entities, these deities, including facts about the content of morality. We have to talk about them and what it is that makes them different. Why? And so, again, let me try to restate the question. What makes, say the question is slightly a different way. What makes a sura's commands impotent in those worlds in which he exists, he issues commands, what is it about him and his commands that make them fail to constitute obligations? Okay. Okay.