Questions central to the philosophical discussion of lying and other deception parentheses may be divided into two kinds. Questions of the first kind are definitional parentheses, or conceptual. They include questions of how lying is to be defined,. Whether lying is always a form of deeiving., whether it's morally worse than deceiving. If lying and deception are defeasibly morally wrong, they are morally optional on certain occasions, or sometimes more morally obligatory.
David and Tamler return after an end of summer hiatus to finally talk about the ethics of deception….eventually. But first they break down a recent article in the journal Science documenting an attempt to replicate 100 recent psychology experiments. What does it mean that just over 1/3 of the studies were successfully replicated? Is social psychology in crisis or is this just how science works? Will David somehow try to pin the blame on philosophers?
Plus--a brief and almost certainly regrettable foray into the Ashley Madison hack, the neuroscience of lying to your kids about Santa, and we announce a new way to contact us to help celebrate our 75th anniversary.
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